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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this thesis is to test the hypothesis, through the comparative method, 
that malpractices in three major ports, New York and two in Britain, were the result of 
divergent collective bargaining and economic processes. Few inter-country studies 
have been conducted of working practices and malpractices on docks, none to any 
depth and here utilising original source materials where possible. Strengths of 
alternative frameworks as a step towards explaining the existence and continuation of 
industrial malpractices are highlighted before their limitations are exposed, leading to 
the conclusion that `subjective' factors and local and governmental levels were as 
important in conditioning perceptions of docks malpractices as were any `material' 
variables identified and analysed previously. Docks phenomena were imbued with 
political significance and meanings altering their representation, reflected in 
legislation, mandates and policies. Subjective labels attached by governments to 
similar docks malpractices, by no means consistently with one another, accounted for 
most of the supposed `differences' ascribed to docks misbehaviour as expressed in 
published sources. A perspective is developed in which local constituents within port 
systems were of the utmost importance. `Autonomous' dockworker actions were as 
critical in moving debates forward as well-placed state interventions and industrial 
structures, the basis of most other accounts. The legitimacy or otherwise of 
malpractices became a key issue around which consensus or conflict was caused at 
national policy-framing level, and was a powerful determinant of dockworker 
behaviour. Simultaneously, `material' opportunities for malpractices to emerge in the 
cargo handling process were as important in generating an environment in which 
malpractices came to assume those enduring forms that this work is concerned with. 
While recognising the contributions made by other authors in this field, a 
comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon of docks malpractices and how they 
were perceived recognises the often-singular interaction of politics, legitimacy and 
ideology at the national and local scales, as well as common characteristics of port 
systems within the realm of economics. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
COMPARATIVE PORT PRACTICES - ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
The origins of this thesis lay in obvious inconsistencies between perceptions of 
waterfront practices in three ports, reflected in published materials. When one 
examines the open record on New York harbour malpractices, they seem to bear little 
relationship to those in British ports over the same time frame, despite the empirical 
groundings of run-of-the-mill cargo handling being similar in their outlines. 
At a personal level, the subject of organized crime has been an interest to the author 
for many years, resulting in a published bibliography. ' This involvement informs the 
questions asked of dock practices and explains the emphasis herein placed on 
malpractices. 
The central conclusion reached was that many, but not all, of the supposed differences 
in dock practices and malpractices in Liverpool, London and New York were the 
results of predisposed reporting. The question then becomes one of examining why 
radically different interpretations and policy responses emerged out of comparable 
industrial practices. 
A popular image of gangster-ridden New York harbour, as opposed to the supposed 
standards following and `legal' situation in British ports, never seemed very realistic 
and less so as research progressed. Writers on dock practices have rarely mounted 
inter-country comparisons of malpractices, but when doing so they emerge with 
formulaic designs that rarely advance the debate, in part since they assume the portrait 
of New York reflects the historical reality. Images of waterfront racketeering in New 
1 Critchley, D., International Perspectives on Organized Crime: A Bibliography (Vance 
Publications, 1984). 
2A classic case was the grotesque description given by author John Davis of New York dock 
union leader Anthony Anastasio -'Picture the Anastasia brothers on a Brooklyn dock ... the 
ferocious Albert is followed, a few paces behind, by his brother Tough Tony, wearing his 
trademark custom-made, wide-lapelled, double-breasted suit with white tie and white 
carnation' (Davis, J. H., Mafia Dynasty, (HarperCollins, 1993) p. 54). 
1 
York have exerted a disproportionate influence even on scholarly studies, the most 
recent example being in 20013 This work therefore deals with cargo handling 
practices in three major ports, while being heavily animated by the question of 
waterfront malpractices. 
Although the physical characteristics and logistics of dock work were comparable in 
New York and in Britain, political environments differed radically. As each dock 
system functioned within a unique interaction of state and industry, outcomes in terms 
of the inspection and the interpretation of dock practices varied. Was `the problem' of 
docks malpractices purely one of law breaking, for example, or of defective union 
controls, or of both? One group of solutions to the question of docks malpractices 
were based on the criminal law, whilst others were drawn from a tradition of industrial 
consensus. 
THE COMPARATIVE APPROACH 
A key element in the approach adopted in this thesis is the decision to move beyond 
existing single-port or single-country studies. The comparative method compels 
researchers to explore complexities beyond the single unit in order to historicize and 
to test the robustness of previous analyses. 4 
Prior comparative studies of docks malpractices have concentrated on differences 
within the same country5 and have not adequately identified the full range of variables 
involved. The nearest to this present work was Vernon H. Jensen, who in 1964 
compared hiring regimes in several leading ports including those at the centre of this 
thesis. Jensen, however, did not connect his observations to theoretical models, nor 
3 Woodiwiss, M., Organized Crime and American Power: A History (University of Toronto 
Press, 2001). 
4 May, T., Social Research (Open University Press, 1997) p. 186. 
s E. g. Kimeldorf, H., Reds or Rackets? The Making of Radical and Conservative Unions on 
the Waterfront (University of California Press, 1988); Larrowe, C. P., Shape-Up and Hiring 
Hall: A Comparison of Hiring Methods on the New York and Seattle Waterfront (University 
of California Press 1955). 
6 The many works by Peter Turnbull and others, into strike activity and the post-1970 docks 
have partly redressed this imbalance insofar as stoppages are concerned. 
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did he take a serious look at the issue of malpractices. Methodologically too his range 
of sources was limited. 
Through an historical and comparative prism, evidence was gathered that definitions 
utilised as to what constituted `acceptable' practices changed over the passage of time 
and by place .8 Breuilly, in his discussion Labour and Liberalism in Nineteenth 
Century Europe: Essays in Comparative History, warned prospective researcher 
against viewing without critical reflection historical `norms' since they were always 
maleable in relation to other factors .9 
As Burton and Turnbull contended, comparative studies should `be grounded and 
incorporate a multilevel analysis. ' Further, `contextual comparisons' are at least as 
important as `matched' comparisons, the `direct' measurement of one practice against 
another disregarding the context. In this view, `convergent' outcomes in, for example, 
the decasualisation of dock work could originate from very different `inputs. "0 The 
use of appropriate case studies, contextual variables and the comparative method are 
required to understand and to explain more fully regulatory systems as they influenced 
work practices and malpractices. 
Problems remain. Employment relations were conditioned not only by tangible 
influences that could be identified and isolated, but also by value-laden implications 
and constraints. `Historical development and national circumstance', notes Evans, 
`have led to divergent systems, which should be judged in their native context and not 
in terms of how they would work on alien soil. ' 11 
7 Jensen, V. H., Hiring of Dock Workers and Employment Practices in the Ports of New York, 
Liverpool, London, Rotterdam, and Marseilles (Harvard University Press 1964) 
8 Mackie, T. and Marsh, D., The Comparative Method' in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds. ) 
Theory and Method in Political Science (Macmillan Press, 1995) p. 174 
9 Breuilly, J., Labour and Liberalism in Nineteenth Century Europe: Essays in Comparative 
History (Manchester University Press, 1992) pp. 1-19. 
10 Barton, H. and Turnbull, P., `Labour Regulation and Competitive Performance in the Port 
Transport Industry' European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 8 no. 2 (July 2002) p. 136; 
Turnbull, P. and Sapsford, P., `Hitting the Bricks: An International Comparative Study of 
Conflict on the Waterfront' Industrial Relations, vol. 40 no. 2 (April 2001) pp. 231-257 
11 Evans, H., Governmental Regulation of Industrial Relations (Cornell University, 1961) p. 
116. 
3 
Validity of comparisons 
It was concluded that sufficient similarity existed between dock practices in three 
geographical settings to make defensible comparisons achievable. The mechanics of 
dock work, as Frankel and Marcus remarked, was much the same everywhere. 12 
Barzman further argued that dock labour regulation was increasingly `standardised' 
from 1940 through the effects of wars, economic convergence, and developments in 
organized labour and state controls, in particular over the question of `decasualised' 
port labour. 13 
This characteristic simplified the process by limiting the number of variables to be 
taken into consideration. For purposes of international comparison, therefore, 
waterfronts are unusually good environments in which to adjudge practices and 
malpractices. 
SELECTION OF PORTS AND OF TIME FRAME 
The ports of Liverpool, London and New York were chosen for several reasons. First 
and foremost, New York was selected as the foremost public example of waterfront 
racketeering in an attenuated form. 14 A second reason for using these ports lay in 
their `general cargo' traffic features that were expected to result in comparable 
practices and malpractices. Liverpool, London and New York ports were the largest 
water-borne general cargo terminals in their countries. Definitions commonly used 
are denoted in Appendix A. 
12 Frankel, E. G. and Marcus, H. S., Ocean Transportation (MIT Press, 1973). See also 
Broeze, F., `Militancy and Pragmatism: An International Perspective on Maritime Labour, 
1870-1914' International Review of Social History, XXXVI (1991) p. 194 
13 Barzman, J., `State and Dockers' in Davies, S. et al, Dock Workers: International 
Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970 (Ashgate Publishing 2000) p. 651 
14 For example, Freeman, I. H., 'New York's Port: Rule by Rackets', NYT, 9 December, 1951; 
Frees, W. A., Labor Racketeering in the International Longshoremen's Association and Its 
Impact on the Port of New York (John Jay College, 1970). 
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They were the largest employers of dock labour and handled the most tonnage, 
serving huge internal markets. 15 Appendix B gives the employment statistics from 
1953, when datasets became available, but as Jensen warned they `are useful only for 
the most general comparison. 16 The labour factor is of extreme importance for this 
purpose, since existing theories of industrial malpractices examined place great stress 
on labour market and collective bargaining imperfections. 
All three ports are well sourced with documentary evidence. Governments of all 
persuasions took an interest in docklands, mirrored in the large body of extant 
literature. '7 Independent groups also occasionally brought out reports, particularly in 
New York. Sources varied in quality and relevance to this work, and reflected 
national characteristics. Typically, the question of docks criminality occupied a 
disproportionate amount of space in American materials while being ignored or 
couched in different terms in typical British texts. 
The time frame covered in this thesis is loosely set at between 1890 and 1972, but 
since the problem of `malpractices' did not assume a higher profile political or public 
dimension until after 1945, the majority of the material herein covers the years 1945 
to 1972. In New York, docks corruption became a major theme from 1945 and the 
quantity of material becoming available hugely expanded. There is also evidence that 
`malpractices' may have become more significant a factor to be addressed after 1945 
in Liverpool and London. 
As Bean stated, by 1890 `The more leisurely methods of cargo handling on sailing 
ships had given way to the need for speedy turn-round and quick dispatch of 
's Cunningham, B., Port Studies (Chapman and Hall, 1928) p. 38; Morewedge, H., The 
Economics of Casual Labour: A Study of the Longshore Industry (H. Lang., 1970); Nelson, 
B., 'Longshoremen in the Port of New York: 1850-1940', Report of the International 
Conference on Comparative International History of Dock Labour, c. 1790-1970 
(Organization of American Historians, April, 1992); MID LPEA Box 137: `Committee of 
Inquiry into Dock Strikes in London' (1950) 
16 Jensen, V. H., Hiring of Dock Workers and Employment Practices in the Ports of New York, 
Liverpool, London, Rotterdam, and Marseille (Harvard University Press, 1964) p. 1. 
17 A good bibliography for Britain is found in Wilson, D., The Dockers (Fontana/Collins, 
1972). For New York, Jensen was the outstanding authority and his books are excellently 
sourced. 
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steamships as a result of the high costs of keeping them in port. '18 The adoption of 
steam propulsion gave rise to less regular work for dock labourers but did give them, 
once hired, new economic levers through which to extract improper payments based 
upon the supreme importance to most steamship owners of getting their ships in and 
out of dock as quickly as possible. 
The process was far from even however. Union organisation remained the same after 
1972 as before, for example, while technological developments raced ahead. For this 
reason, where considered appropriate, examples are occasionally taken from the later 
1970s and the 1980s. For example, British union misbehaviour in the 1980s had 
likely carried over from the 1940s, as chapter two will argue. 
METHODOLOGY 
In efforts to get to `the truth' about docks practices and malpractices, yet remaining 
sensitive to the many perspectives to be engaged with, a multiple strategy 
methodology was deployed. Such a methodology - often referred to as a 
`triangulation' methodology - uncovered the `mutual interdependence' of data sources 
whilst allowing for the systematic testing of factual statements. 19 
Published reports were read alongside unpublished materials, and interviews were 
held with individuals having knowledge of how ports operated. Apart from indicating 
the limits of single-source perspectives, it was expected that a continuous 'cross- 
checking' exercise covering both documentary and oral resources would yield a more 
reliable, comprehensive and factually accurate portrait of working practices. 
Such was the case when dealing with activities that documents were ambiguous about. 
A category of working practices initially thought of as `malpractices' for example, 
after further probing with interviewees turned out to be within the orbit of jointly 
agreed practices. In New York, as an example, work gangs were guaranteed, under 
18 Bean, R., Employers' Associations in the Port of Liverpool 1890-1914, ' International 
Review of Social History, vol. XXI (1976), p. 363 
19 Jupp, V., Methods of Criminological Research (Unwin Hyman, 1989) pp. 72-4; Jupp, V., 
Davies, P., Francis, P. (eds. ) Doing Criminological Research (Sage, 2000). 
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the general cargo agreement, four hours' pay whether they worked past midnight or 
not 20 British dock settlements contained similar clauses 21 As Bryman persuasively 
argued, `by combining (qualitative and quantative research), the researcher's claims 
for the validity of his or her conclusions are enhanced if they can be shown to provide 
mutual confirmation. 22 
The triangulation methodology likewise highlighted some of the more obvious 
subjective `biases' inherent in accounts. In such a hotly contested industrial arena as 
docks, this was to be expected. Dealing as much with differential perspectives and 
multiple voices as with the `hard facts, ' the methodology paralleled `real world' 
conflicts over labour regulation. Ideological preconceptions were evident in many 
accounts of dock work, whether published, unpublished or oral. Dock reformers 
exaggerated the extent of the evils to be found, and their perceptions did not always 
match those of portworkers themselves 23 while most employers preferred the 
freedoms associated with `free market' means of hiring and distributing waterfront 
labour. 24 
Interviews 
Since many improper practices were either sidestepped or downplayed in the 
published literature, particularly in Britain, a redress for imbalances this caused was 
sought through interviewing over sixty participants in varying capacities, ranging 
from rank and file activists to waterfront managers. Real names are not used for 
reasons of privacy and confidentiality. 
Labels for those interviewed were organized by prefixes, first by port - 'LIV' refers to 
a portworker from Liverpool, while 'NY' denotes a dockworker from New York and 
20 Interview with NYB, 29.3.00. 
21 Interview with LOND, 22.10.99 
22 Bryman, A., Quantity and Quality in Social Research (Routledge, 1996) p. 131 
23 Turnbull, P. Woolfson, C. and Kelly, J., Dock Strike: Conflict and Restructuring in Britain's 
Ports (Avebury 1992) p. 20 
24 An article on `The London Irish' for instance, commented `The docks have ... often (been) 
represented by Socialist grievance-mongerers as illustrative of supreme capitalist tyranny ... '. (The London Irish', Blackwell's Edinburgh Magazine, vol. CLXX, no. MXXIX, July 1901, p. 
130) 
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'LON' focuses on London's portworkers. Then a simple lettering system is used, for 
example `NYA' refers to a portworker from New York, lettered `A' for convenience, 
as the source for information. Brief biographies of those interviewed are given at the 
end of this work. 
A printed schedule was prepared, asking approximately the same questions to each 
individual interviewed based on prior reading. Interviews themselves were semi- 
structured, permitting subjects to add comments where thought necessary for clarity or 
elaboration . 
2'5 Appendix C reproduces the main question areas. Most interviews were 
tape-recorded, aiding memory and enabling the interviewer to concentrate on the 
answers. Another advantage was that the subsequent tapes were available to others in 
order to ascertain the reliability of facts and events claimed throughout this thesis. 
The use of a tape recorder could have inhibited respondents, especially given the 
sensitivity of the information being discussed. 26 But in the vast majority of cases, it 
did not appear to be an obstacle to discussions. All interviewees signed the consent 
form supplied by the university ethics committee. 
Experience showed that with notable exceptions portworkers were not prolific writers, 
as evinced by a lack of written feedback to enquiries made. 7 This left the face-to-face 
interview as the major route by which to acquire information. Interviews were of 
particular value regarding those malpractices that were of a `taken for granted' type 
and therefore rarely mentioned in the documentary evidence. 
Since few `old-time' dockers could be located by visiting the present docks premises, 
because so few dockworkers had survived latter-day technological and organisational 
changes, alternative means were deployed to contact a sample to be interviewed. 
`Hiring halls' for example, in New York, had closed years previously, denying that 
avenue through which to contact labour. In Liverpool and London, meanwhile, a 
u May, Social Research, pp. 111-2. 
26 May, Social Research, p. 125. 
27 If I wrote to ten dockworkers, perhaps two would write back. Published recollections by 
dockworkers are available, among them being Ayers, P., The Liverpool Dockland (University 
of Liverpool, c. 1930s); Kisseloff, J., You Must Remember This: An Oral History of 
Manhattan from the 1890s to World War 11 (Schocken Books 1989) pp. 483-529; Bloomberg, 
J., Looking Back: A Docker's Life (Stepnrey Books, 1979) 
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parallel process of industrial rationalisation and mass closures left similar problems in 
their wake. Random sampling was therefore impractical. 
In the case of Liverpool, a press advertisement and connections provided by other 
interviewees, the local port authority and university lecturers were the mechanisms 
through which men were contacted. With London, an earlier researcher supplied 
many `names' that in turn provided details of others who could be of value to the 
project. Intensive research efforts prior to the field trip to New York in the spring of 
2000 yielded names of a sample of people there, obtained via a local waterfront 
museum, the Internet and a Jesuit priest. 
They added new insights but were less familiar, generally, with the `nitty gritty' of 
pier practices as a whole. Since the port of New York encompassed vast tracts of 
land, and covered several boroughs and municipalities, none of those interviewed 
could state with certainty that their observations were necessarily those of 
dockworkers in other boroughs or working with other union branches. In part 
counterbalancing this was the fact that a group of former dockworkers interviewed in 
New York worked in several different sites. 
The use of a `snowball sampling' technique partly employed tended to bring forth the 
more articulate and militant elements in the former docks community, possibly with 
an agenda of their own. 8 There were also problems of comparability, in that the 
sample interviewed in London were more knowledgeable of port-wide operations, 
being in a few cases high-ranking union officials of a stature not interviewed in 
Liverpool or New York. The New York sample was more heterogeneous in its 
composition. 
Nobody with a wider view could be found in New York from the union side; this was 
less of a problem on the management side. Waterfront Commission staff were unable 
to give advice on anything other than present day hiring processes and no 
representatives from the New York Shipping Association (NYSA) were available. 
28 May, Social Research, p. 119 
9 
The dockworker and employer sample interviewed for this work probably emerged as 
`untypical' in certain respects 29 A majority of the dockworkers interviewed for 
instance agreed with the principle of dock labour decasualisation. This conflicted 
with the argument often reported that a majority of older dockers, with first hand 
knowledge of the `casual' system of dock engagements, preferred the freedoms 
associated with it. Interviewees who represented employers tended to be more 
characteristic of the industry insofar as their complaints and concerns frequently 
echoed the documentary evidence. 
The majority of interviewees discussed work practices with apparent candour. With a 
few exceptions, none appeared to deliberately try to deceive the writer. Of help was 
the fact that most dock systems where they once worked had long since passed into 
history; therefore any disclosures they made had little or no impact on current events 
and personalities. 
It was explained why the research was being done and where. This may have helped 
to `loosen tongues' insofar as it was for an academic study and looking into past 
relations with little current resonance. It was also explained that the names of those 
involved in illegal activities were not important for the purposes of research. 
Interviewees often mixed up eras, notably those between modern-day cargo-handling 
processes and the `break bulk' era preceding it. The operationalisation of concepts 
was also sometimes problematical. When asked whether there were `many' 
malpractices in a port, for instance, the reply given depended on what constituted 
`many'? Former port authority interviewees tended to discount the existence of 
widespread illegalities, probably since it reflected badly on their own management 
skills at the time. Former private sector managers in Liverpool and London had a 
contrasting propensity to exaggerate the extent of malpractices, perhaps in order to 
reinforce the favoured view that the docks had become ripe for the radical reforms of 
the 1980s giving them greater powers. 
29 Mankelow gives the similar view that such individuals were most likely to be articulate, 
with a sophisticated view of relations, `and of course most of them are accustomed to debating 
and arguing a case. ' (Mankelow, The Effects of Modernisation and Change, p. 249) 
10 
Within New York port, the issue of malpractices was still a `live' one for many 
persons interviewed 30 New York interviewees, with a few exceptions (usually those 
who were by then retired) tended to paint a rosy, `textbook' portrait of waterfront 
relations from the 1950s, in which dock malpractices were seen as being a feature of 
the distant past. Evidence of a difference between this view and the reality was 
starkly underlined by indictments and a trial in 2003 related to activities on a Staten 
Island port terminal visited by this author just three years previously. 31 
Aside from the influence of heavy policing in inhibiting most subjects in New York 
from talking freely of port malpractices, it may be hypothesised that a difference from 
British interviewees could be laid at the door of differential historical development. In 
1989, British dock relations were radically restructured, marking a decisive `break' 
from the past. Working practices that were discarded in the process were easier to 
discuss, as now part of `history. ' By distinction, relations in New York today were 
more similar to those in the 1960s and even before. New York employers were 
consequently far more wary, in this view, of harming contemporary relationships with 
unionism by making incautious (if truthful) remarks as to their own experiences. 
Documentary sources 
Where possible, original sources are used over secondary materials. Primary 
documentary sources in Liverpool and London were considerably more plentiful than 
those in New York. Detailed minute books were available for the London employers' 
and trade union groupings from the 1950s and 1960s (much less so for the pre-war 
era). But documentary sources, like oral resources, were found to be partial in their 
understanding of dock practices. Public Library holdings were marginal to the subject 
of the thesis but were helpful in furnishing critical background influences and 
deliberations. 
30 According to one source in New York, the Waterfront Commission, the chief crime-fighting 
agency on the docks, once pulled the license of a stevedoring firm after it discovered that the 
company had given the rank and file working with it a turkey at Christmas or at Thanksgiving 
interview with NYA, 31.3.00). 
1 The trial opened in January 2003 of high placed individuals associated with Howland Hook 
Marine Terminal on Staten Island, including leaders of the Gambino crime family, in which it 
was claimed that all manner of abuses had taken place, directed by the Gambinos (Staten 
Island Advance, 5.1.03,15.1.03) 
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The documentary evidence was apt to address different questions according to the port 
under inquiry. Official reports were only released on `matters of contemporary 
concern, '32 and rarely dealt with the view from the 'bottom'33 where most problems 
were found. Surviving primary records were also incomplete, occasionally grossly 
SO. 4 As Taplin explained, sources such as newspapers and official reports 
commented largely on immediate questions while `the day-to-day activities of the 
workers and their union remain obscure. '35 American materials were also unhelpful in 
those very areas where British reports were most profuse. Works by private groups 
and New York waterfront historians such as Barnes and Jensen made up much of this 
shortfall however. 
The major sources for New York items proved to be press clippings, whereas those in 
Liverpool and London were of greater depth and included detailed minute books and 
background papers. Wagner Labor Archives, the major New York depository for 
New York items, had several boxes of materials that, upon inspection, consisted 
mainly of newspaper articles mixed in with press releases and copies of agreements. 
Longshore union headquarters in Manhattan was unable to help with records. By 
contrast, the library of the Transport and General Workers' Union in London, 
representing most port workers in Britain, supplied a set of Biennial Delegate 
Conference minute books. 
The Port of New York Authority and the New York Waterfront Commission denied 
access to most of their original records. Commission staff may have feared possible 
legal repercussions, while the Port Authority required a hefty fee before even starting 
a search. Waterfront Commission staff were also busy with routine duties and thus 
had limited time in which to answer queries. 
Fortunately, a set of the printed hearings from the New York State Crime Commission 
was obtained from a university library before the field trip, and this helped to re-assess 
32 Taplin, `The History of Dock Labour: Liverpool, c. 1850-1914, ' p. 443 
33 Thompson, P., The Voice of the Past, (2nd ed. ) (Oxford University Press 1988) p. 3. 
34According to Sanderson, B., Ships and Sailing Wax (Heinemann. 1967), wartime bombing 
destroyed many British records of this sort (p. 144). 
35Taplin, `The History of Dock Labour: Liverpool, c. 1850-1914' p. 443. 
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many of the assumptions dominating thinking on New York's difficulties with 
racketeering. In addition, the good quality of New York Times articles on waterfront 
questions closed some gaps in information. 
An unusually large collection of British items was found in the Museum in Dockland, 
housing the Port of London Authority (PLA) archives and those of several smaller 
organisations. Finding aids or indexes were found to encompass only a part of the 
collections; therefore, a painstaking exercise of going through all the pertinent 
unindexed boxes was mounted. A set of audio recordings concerning London 
docklands' stakeholders of the past was heard at the Museum of London, but for this 
work they were of restricted value. 
The Liverpool maritime archives were well organized, with good indexing, but the 
majority of surviving materials dated from 1947. Since a group of Liverpool 
employers also operated in London, and in the case of the Cunard Line in New York 
as well, this archive nonetheless proved useful for comparative purposes. 
ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS 
The thesis is organized along themes and, from chapter five, by port. Theoretical 
considerations inform the arguments presented. 
Chapter Two 
Chapter two describes the limits of this thesis and its theoretical justification. A 
number of authors and other sources are introduced, as marking the shape of previous 
debates on waterfront malpractices. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, they 
became associated with a particular view of `how' British and New York practices 
and malpractices should be defined and analysed, dating in the main from the post 
1945 period. Finally, a conceptual synthesis is suggested by the use of a third 
perspective, based upon a modification of Smith's `spectrum' theory. 
A conclusion is reached that although previous academic texts were useful as 
baselines for discussion, they were incomplete. Sufficient numbers of political and 
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economic constituents were common to New York and to the two British ports as to 
make comparisons feasible, despite sources (for instance) failing to make clear the 
effective transferability of their concepts to other ports outside of the `base' ones. 
The subject matter was politicised. As Smith asserted, subjective or moralistic notions 
can easily dominate discussions of `economic' characteristics when they become 
`dysfunctional. ' Interpretations of docks practices varied by political structure, and 
therefore by authors who became identified with particular ways of viewing 
malpractices, reflecting a `consensus' built up along nationally specific lines on how 
this subject should be addressed. 
Several changes are made in this work to the Smith model in order to retain its 
relevance. Rather than, therefore, the object of discussion being the simple `legality' 
of a waterfront practice, what counted far more was the `legitimacy' of a particular 
docks practice or malpractice. Legitimate malpractices can be sub-divided according 
to their origin and context. In many cases, port employers were as `guilty' of 
colluding in malpractices as dockworkers were of initiating them 36 
On the national political scale, how docks practices were perceived and treated from 
the legislative perspective had profound effects on theoretical projects. The crucial 
distinction was made between New York's `organized crime' waterfront problem and 
the hugely `less serious' problem in Liverpool and London, with their less dangerous 
public order problem. Yet the economic impact of (particularly) shipboard 
malpractices in Britain was considerable, and overshadowed those in New York. 
Laws were passed and agencies established based on subjective national 
representations made of docks networks that skewed the analyses. 
In spite of such weaknesses for comparative research, the majority of sources remain 
valuable in indicating the structural and institutional barriers to effective cargo 
handling and therefore towards explaining why larger scale malpractices emerged and 
apparently thrived. Docks irregularities, in this view, are an inevitable outcome of 
port-scale mismatches that always derail attempts to impose `legal' constraints on 
36 U. S. investigative commissions found often a thin dividing line between bribery and 
extortion, shakedown and pay-off. 
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working practices. A developed theory must include this dimension along with 
subjective (`legitimising') elements; they together accounted for the predictability and 
profitability of institutionalised docks abuses. 
Local factors were usually under-estimated by American as well as by British sources, 
as was the power of the rank and file to autonomously affect changes for the better to 
their working lives. Although all major `structural' reforms of docks came in the 
wake of a series of unofficial actions, most accounts fail to represent this adequately. 
As the U. S. Labor Department noted in 1932, `No two ports, no two companies, no 
two piers, and no two ships are exactly alike so far as the nature of the cargo or the 
method of cargo handling is concerned. '37 Identical employers could cooperate with 
malpractices in one port but not in another (many shipping lines functioned across all 
three ports). Generally, for instance, quay work offered fewer openings to indulge in 
illegal practices than ship work. 38 
These influences made under-reporting of waterfront misbehaviour a constant 
problem. A further caveat relates to the size of port concerned. According to one 
well-informed source, within the smaller British ports there was greater social 
pressure on dockworkers not to indulge in `disreputable' working practices to the 
same degree or so publicly as in the larger ports. 9 Conclusions made for Liverpool, 
London and New York ports, therefore, are not extendable without further work. 
Chapter Three 
Always at the forefront of initiatives were hiring practices, as analysed in chapter 
three, colouring waterfront relations, and arguably the primary cause of unrest. 
Government drives in Liverpool, London and in New York to eliminate casual 
employment are given attention, articulated in the form of class mediation bodies. 
Since government intervened to similar effect (and for similar reasons) in both 
37 U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, no. 550, Cargo Handling and 
Longshore Labor Conditions (1932) p. 4 
38 Interviews with LOND, 22.10.99, LONU, 26.7.99 
39 Interview with LOND, 22.10.99 
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Liverpool and London, this involvement is addressed in chapter three as though for 
one in the two British ports. 
Local factors were of importance but the origins of claims of grafting waterfront 
practices came, in the main, from the combination of militant grassroots activism and 
the undoubted fact of large-scale casual docks employment, for good or bad. A 
cautious union stance before employers on `progressive' docks issues such as earnings 
equalisation schemes gave rise to repeated claims of a leadership focused `sell out, ' 
articulated in charges of hiring misbehaviour in which union leaders were quiescent at 
best and at worst colluded with. 
The question of whether the majority of unionised dockworkers actually wanted the 
supposed `benefits' of regularisation is also posed. The argument made is that the 
New York dock union was more attuned to the desires of its members than was the 
TGWU in Britain, which pushed through its own version of decasualisation against 
the wishes of many docker unionists. 
While anti-casualism crusaders had long sought to restructure the traditional 
employment system, state mechanisms to `restore order' were only imposed following 
a rising number of stoppages from 1945 to 1951 that threatened to harm wider 
economic and political objectives in both Britain and America. What differed by each 
country was the nature of this intervention, these ultimately mirroring currents of 
national opinion and historical precedents. 
Chapter Four 
More neglected in the literature are those malpractices, described in chapter four, 
involving rank and file hatch workers on board ships. In this, opportunities afforded 
by material structures mixed with a notion of moral `entitlement' in producing a 
formidable problem of malpractices including, but by no means limited to, pilferage. 
The `hard' evidence for shipboard abuses is more compelling for Britain, less so for 
New York. Underpinning them was a strong tradition of collective action by work 
gangs in defence of `customs' sometimes shading across into misbehaviour. 
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As such American authors as Bell, Larrowe, and Kimeldorf predicted, port congestion 
and similar `background' factors affecting the flow of commodities in large ports gave 
leverage to those wishing to indulge in shipboard malpractices. The mere threat of a 
downing of tools was often sufficient to bring most employers to heel. 
The British state adopted a laissez faire policy to such malpractices in particular, 
preferring to refer any complaints by employers back to the relevant joint committees. 
The response of the New York state was equivocal after 1953, though the `criminality' 
of some of these malpractices was not left in doubt and government institutions acted 
accordingly. 
A revolution in cargo handling methods from the 1960s offered somewhat fewer 
opportunities for improper ship level practice to thrive. Working practices were re- 
negotiated, often to the advantage of employers. But the collective power of 
portworkers nevertheless remained a force employers had to reckon with and provided 
a brake on the full exercise of managerial authority. 
Chapter Five 
Chapters five to seven apply the perspectives to Liverpool, London and New York 
ports conditions. The objective is to explore through case studies how well they 
conformed to statements and arguments made by the writers identified in chapter two 
and to other, less prominent, sources. 
A common characteristic that Liverpool shared with London and New York, were 
cross cutting divisions within the employing class. Nevertheless, trade unionism 
became a force to reckon with on the docks in Liverpool relatively early. But 
fractures inside waterfront unionism allowed employers to undercut cherished union 
goals and simultaneously permitted a sizeable number of non-unionists to work 
untrammelled in the port. 
By this means, some of the assumptions enshrined in the alternative accounts of docks 
malpractices, around for instance the necessity for a monopoly control over the labour 
supply for union related malpractices to succeed, are undermined. Above all, the 
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Liverpool case demonstrates how the implications of casual docks labour markets in 
an emerging problem of malpractices may not be as important as often suggested. 
Chapter Six 
London illustrates the significance of localism and wage structures in shaping 
waterfront malpractices. Such features of dock work as disjointed employer 
associations and localised systems were also as prominent as in Liverpool. 
Problems of dock congestion were more in evidence in London than in Liverpool, an 
effect of its massive size, growth and outdated facilities. Concomitant hold ups of 
inland traffic may have given employers pause for thought before contemplating a 
refusing of recognition to unionism, and certainly functioned to motivate employers 
into colluding with improprieties. Malpractices took on more diverse forms in 
London, with a rough distinction being made between riverside and enclosed dock 
practices. 
Official interest in London dock practices is also emphasised. From the nineteenth 
century, dock employers actively sought out government backing for their ventures. 
After 1889, the Dockers' Union increasingly became the focus of efforts to enact new 
laws and to alter old ones at municipal and national political levels. 
Chapter Seven 
A central purpose informing this thesis is the exploration of how the abuses and 
improper activities typical of Liverpool and London ports compared with those in 
New York port, covered in detail within chapter seven. Conventional accounts of port 
malpractices refer to this port as the `classic' example of the malign influence of 
industrial racketeering on waterfronts. 0 
40 To take one example, according to Bell, in The End of Ideology (The Free Press, 1965), 
`Here one finds kickbacks, loansharking, petty extortion, theft and pilferage - and murder -a 
commonplace of longshore life' (p. 175) 
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With this in mind, the chapter unpacks the available evidence for New York. It 
concludes that although malpractices did exist, within the hiring function particularly, 
they were not as widespread as has been construed. Meanwhile, New York shipboard 
malpractices were in all probability not as institutionalised or frequent in their 
operation as those occurring in Liverpool or London. 
Chapter seven also identifies a number of `objective' differences that distinguished the 
ports of Liverpool and London from that in New York. Ethnic rifts and other 
elements invited disunity in the ranks of New York docks labour. Syndicated 
criminals also `invaded' sections of the New York union structure in a fashion not 
known in Britain. Evidence that professional criminals were active in the port, 
although exaggerated, was the ostensible reason for state intrusions into the process of 
free collective bargaining. 
Counterbalancing a lack of across the port decasualisation measures in New York 
were localised arrangements of an informal nature regulating which work gangs 
should be chosen for work. Like London, customary practices and standards assumed 
an unusually influential role, stymieing the efforts of reformers acting without state 
backing. 
A shifting and complex relationship between dock organisers and political elites in 
New York City acted in concert with concerns specific to the American post-war 
polity. Waterfront practices became embroiled in these and in Cold War politics 41 
Compelling reasons exist supporting the argument that local and state political 
structures in New York were more prone to criminal subversion than their 
counterparts in Britain. By the same token, there was no direct evidence that New 
York waterfront criminals were able to use `the edge' this theoretically gave them and 
which was always assumed rather than proven. 
ai `The beliefs that both communist and organized crime activities in the United States, ' as 
Woodiwiss explained, `were directed by alien forces ran parallel after the war' (Woodiwiss, 
M., Crime Crusades and Corruption (Pinter Publishers, 1988) p. 107). 
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Chapter Eight 
Chapter eight draws central themes together and engages them with theoretical 
concerns made explicit in chapter two. The perception of docks working practices and 
malpractices reflected dominant conditions and coalitions found within each age and 
inside each country. In the process, deeply politicised histories of port relations were 
written, yet referring to economic activities that were broadly similar by their 
characteristics. 
Non-market considerations were far more significant in shaping the presentation of 
dock working practices in Liverpool, London or New York than admitted by the 
theorists discussed in chapter two. Economic and industrial factors of the docks 
industry in both countries were not insignificant in providing an overarching 
`material' configuration through which to understand docks malpractices. But they 
were by no means the whole story Chapter two extends this argument. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the theoretical underpinning to the thesis. Brief summaries are 
given of major works in Britain and American to show the outlines of the argument. 
Following on, a synthesis is attempted in which both `subjective' and `objective' 
elements identified in these researches are more fully integrated into the analysis and a 
comprehensive understanding is thereby achieved. The general movement in the 
literature has been away from individualised accounts of malpractices involving 
malevolent offenders towards `structural' and economic understandings. Bell thus 
explained that: `Industrial racketeering can exist only in a specific type of economic 
market. '1 
Although American authors have not explicitly dealt with British port malpractices in 
their works, the form of their analyses strongly suggests their applicability to `foreign' 
conditions. Transferable `background' properties of dock work such as the logistics of 
cargo handling make their observations and comments of direct relevance to the two 
British ports. Furthermore, several of these authors did compare New York's practices 
with those on the U. S. West Coast, which resembled the British cases in terms of key 
economic variables that analysts like Kimeldorf have indeed recognised. 
Tables 2: 1 and 2: 2 trace the development of thought, in Britain and for New York, on 
docks malpractices. Only `major' works are included, those with malpractices as 
fundamental to their analyses and cited time and again in other materials. In the case 
of New York, the intention is also to demonstrate the way in which perspectives on 
docks malpractices showed a major disconnection after 1945, coinciding with dramatic 
events on the New York docks and in local politics. Criticisms made of these works, 
collectively and taken individually, inform much of the subsequent text. 
1 Bell, D., The End of Ideology (The Free Press. 1965) p. 176. 
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TABLE 2: 1 
MAJOR WORKS ON BRITISH DOCKS MALPRACTICES 
SHAW REPORT (1920) LEGGETT REPORT (1951) 
Causes of lost productivity: Causes of London strikes: 
Lack of trust in the industry Ease with which the disputes 
The casual system of employment system manipulated and 
castigated, along with lack of income agreements violated 
Congestion Casual attitudes and fears prevent 
Lack of a proper means to cooperation over changes 
adjust disputes Obligations under NDLS and the 
union role on disciplinary panels 
UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL (1956 
Causes of dissatisfaction in Manchester: 
Lack of good communication between 
TGWU and rank and file 
Lack of participation in TGWU and its 
shared disciplinary role on NDLS 
Lack of consultation 
Disciplinary difficulties 
Dissatisfaction with working conditions 
Casual system of employment 
DEVLIN REPORT (1965) 
Strife on the London waterfront: 
Casual attitudes among men and 
employers - no sense of loyalty 
Tradition in rank and file of 
support for workmates whatever 
the situation 
Congestion -a role in poor time- 
keeping 
TGWU lacked ambition 
ORAM (1970) PHILLIPS AND WHITESIDE 
Problems in London around pieceworking (1985) 
And interpretation of agreements British decasualisation efforts 
Distrust in the industry and obstacles 
TGWU indifference to these problems Political participants of unreliable 
quality 
The industry resistant to change 
Local practices defended 
NDLS disciplinary role fell into 
disuse after facing stiff opposition 
HOVEY (1990) TURNBULL AND SAPSFORD 
Why employer dissatisfaction grew in the late (1992) 
1960s in London `Voluntary absenteeism' on 
London piecework system a breeding British docks. Set in the context 
ground' for mischief-making, manipulation of changing disciplinary codes 
both before and after 1967. and labour-management 
Examples of improper payments relations, their significance 
After 1967 the men were unsackable altered. 
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TABLE 2: 2 
MAJOR WORKS ON NEW YORK DOCKS MALPRACTICES 
PRE-1945 
BARNES (1915) MAYOR'S COMMITTEE 
Dock work in New York profiled (1916) 
Casual system morally and New York docks casual system 
economically harmful Casual system - moral and 
economic arguments 
against. 
NEW YORK STATE (1932) SWANSTROM (1938) 
U. S. DEPT. of LABOR (1933) New York casual employment 
American docks decasualisation schemes Plans to decasualise dock labour 
described 
POST-1945 
CITIZENS' COMMITTEE (1946) JOHNSON (1948) 
New York shape-up and abuses, violence New York waterfront crime and 
Docks union corruption corruption 
Infiltration of gangsters Shape-up and violence, 
corruption 
Malpractices in ILA 
Violence on the docks eg linked 
to `public loaders' 
ILA political links 
BELL (1951) NEW YORK CRIME 
New York waterfront - structural causes COMMISSION (1953) 
of crime and corruption Organised crime and racketeering 
`Rationalising' role of organised crime on New York docks 
Hiring malpractices Hiring kickbacks 
Union leaders apathetic or share in spoils Union improprieties 
Lack of democracy in ILA Public Loading `racket' 
Corrupt politics and the union Pilferage 
Employers want quick ship turnabouts 
A unique set of corrupting circumstances 
WATERFRONT COMMISSION LARROWE (1955) 
REPORTS (1953+) Comparison New York and 
Waterfront crime west coast docks, esp. in hiring 
Programme for regularisation of New York loading `racket' 
dock earnings Penetration of organised crime 
into New York docks 
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KIMELDORF (1988) 
Comparison of practices in New 
York and west coast 
Various factors identified, incl. 
differential occupational and racial 
groups from which dockworkers 
recruited, shipping patterns differed, 
as did the surplus labour `margin'; ILA 
collaboration with employers, 
role of casual employment regimes in 
`cowing' the men; organised crime active 
on the piers and used to discipline the 
men, antiquated port facilities a contributory 
element 
Of primary importance: employer groups and 
their need for quick ship turnarounds and the 
type of docks union leadership 
NEW YORK STATE (1989) 
New York construction industry: 
A structural, organisational 
analysis. Role of the industry in 
creating an internal crime 
problem. Industrial structure 
creates `opportunities and 
incentives' for racketeers to enter 
Role of the Mafia in 
`rationalising' the industry. 
BRITISH WORKS 
British studies from 1920 displayed a far higher consistency in the way they treated 
and described docks malpractices in the major docks such as Liverpool and London. 
As Table 2: 1 illustrates, from the Shaw Enquiry onwards malpractices were 
considered as part and parcel of wider industrial relationships in the industry. In this 
respect, they were similar to American `waterfront' accounts before 1945, in 
concentrating almost entirely upon the hiring function as the chief problem. Solutions 
were sought inside an `industrial relations' framework and joint committees. Docks 
offences against the criminal law were hardly mentioned and were never a cause for 
policy change. 
Shaw enquiry (1920) 
Lord Shaw's report was the first to delve into post-hiring improper practices in 
Britain, taking evidence on the deliberate slowing down in the pace of work 
(informally termed `ca'canny') and poor time keeping on a substantial scale. 
Malpractices giving rise to `lost output' were ultimately blamed on casualism, to a 
lack of trust this generated inside the industry and, to a lesser extent, on time-wage 
working in those ports using it (encouraging the deliberate dragging out of work). 
Other constituents worthy of note and reported included (in London) chronic 
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congestion. The solution lay in more regular work or (if unemployed for short bursts 
of work) income for registered dockworkers, who would be expected to appreciate the 
strides taken and be more ready to cooperate in winding down malpractices that were 
associated with temporary employment spells? 
Leggett report (1951) 
The 1951 Leggett Report also found post-hiring malpractices. In London, it noted that 
all types of dockwork furnished `opportunities for disputes to occur to an extent not 
found in other industries. ' But attempts to impose tight discipline on local 
dockworkers were futile, only leading to industrial strife. Disciplinary rules were 
identified as a cause of concern for dockworkers because of the `invidious' role of 
union officials sitting in judgement on fellow unionists on disciplinary committees. 
London dockworkers had a reputation for militancy and challenges to their authority 
were met `with the strongest opposition'. Employers were sometimes as guilty as the 
rank and file in encouraging larger scale malpractices by agreeing to above-agreement 
`rates' without regard to the overall effect. Criticisms of the TGWU were aired, 
insofar as unofficial groups thrived upon `rumours and distortions' surrounding union 
officials. 
Goldstein (1952) 
In the field of British union improprieties, Joseph Goldstein, who was given access to 
the inner workings of the TGWU, struck a discordant note at a time when `internal' 
union affairs were considered best dealt with internally. His 1952 book catalogued a 
long list of entrenched malpractices in the union, ranging from balloting fraud to a 
lack of democracy. Some of his criticisms are contextualised and addressed in more 
detail below. The severity of Goldstein's criticisms of the union owed much to his 
2 House of Commons, Report by a Court of Inquiry Concerning Transport Workers - Wages 
and Conditions of Employment of Dock Labour, cmd. 55 (1920) 
3 Ministry of Labour and National Service, Unofficial Stoppages in the London Docks, and. 
8236 (1951) 
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application of `American' standards to the question, where union malpractices had 
long been a subject of popular and official discourse. 
University of Liverpool (1956) 
A report by the University of Liverpool in 1956 duplicated part of the Goldstein work 
in the TGWU. In the Manchester docks, for example, researchers discerned a gulf 
`between the members and their full-time officials, so that the former have grown 
discontented and dissatisfied with the services of the union. ' Major blame was placed 
on a lack of effective `communication' between the docks membership and union 
officials, but reports of hiring corruption were discounted. Other criticisms of the 
report included the `slow, elaborate and unwieldy' state of the disciplinary system, a 
lack of consultation across all levels, dissatisfaction among dockworkers over 
conditions, such as those pertaining to amenities, the casual system of engagement 
which discouraged any sense of obligation by employers, and variables peculiar to the 
5 relationship between the Ship Canal Company and the local Dock Labour Board. 
Devlin report (1965) 
Structural labour market elements stimulating unofficial disputes reinforced the case, 
supported by Lord Devlin, that all British registered dockworkers be given full-time 
jobs. Leftovers of the casual system in Britain were blamed for generating 
malpractices designed to `create' and to `protect' employment levels, particularly 
when trade was slacker. Since the casual system extended to smaller, under-resourced 
employers who were (with casual dockworkers) adjudged the major `culprits' in the 
bad industrial relations situation, Devlin recommended the elimination of any dock 
employer unable to offer sustainable employment. Permanency of employment would 
inculcate `a deeper sense of responsibility' by the industry towards its obligations. It 
was hoped that work guarantees would make the majority of malpractices a feature of 
the past. `Contributory factors' towards explaining malpractices included piecework 
4 Goldstein, J., The Government of British Trade Unions (George Allen and Unwin 1952) 
s University of Liverpool, Social Research Series, The Dock Worker: An Analysis of 
Conditions of Employment in the Port of Manchester (Liverpool University Press 1956) 
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schemes in London and physical and geographical conditions which made strict 
observance of port rules difficult to adhere to. 
Oram and Hovey (1970,1990) 
Oram and Hovey articulated the frustrations of many London port employers of the 
1950s and 1960s, in criticising the piece-payment system as a `fertile field for 
disputes, ' and as `an excuse for delay and a seedbed for argument. ' Tempering this 
denunciation, they noted that `trust' was lacking throughout the sector whatever 
payment regimes were in force. Hovey also complained about permanency of 
employment being given to Registered Dock Workers in 1967 who, in his view, 
exploited this singular advantage. Mellish, also in London, highlighted another basic 
cause of side-payments to dockworkers, in employer anxiety to get their ships away 
before berthing charges built up further. 8 
Phillips and Whiteside (1985) 
Until 1985, `political' interventions on British docks were not thought of as worthy of 
extended discussion in accounting for hiring malpractices. Phillips and Whiteside 
altered this, by demonstrating how the decasualisation of dock labour became reliant 
on state policies `within which unemployment and poverty (were) considered. '9 The 
objective was to explain how `The persistence of casualism may be ascribed, 
alternatively, to the weaknesses and inhibitions of government policy. ' In the absence 
of industry cooperation, they explained why state controls failed to materialise 
sufficiently for the issue to be imposed on the parties. 1° Phillips and Whiteside 
stressed that `the acceptability of state intervention has reflected prevailing opinion 
6 Ministry of Labour. Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain 
Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, cmd. 2734 (1965) 
7 Oram, R. B., 1970, The Dockers' Tragedy (Hutchinson and Co. 1970); Hovey, J., A Tale of 
Two Ports: London and Southampton (The Industrial Society 1990). According to Oram, 
`Hardly a day passes where conditions do not provide grounds for demands for extra payment' 
ýp. 179). 
Mellish, M., The Docks After Devlin (Heinemann 1972) 
9 Whiteside, N., Welfare Insurance and Casual Labour: A Study of Administrative 
Intervention in Industrial Employment, 1906-26, The Economic History Review, vol. 32, 
1979, p. 508 
10 Phillips, G. and Whiteside, N., Casual Labour: The Unemployment Question in the Port 
Transport Industry 1880-1970 (Clarendon Press 1985) 
27 
about the ability of government to stimulate industrial growth and economic 
prosperity. "' Hopes for further progress on decasualisation were dashed by the 
timidity of post-1920 British governments in tandem with continued opposition within 
the industry. 12 
Turnbull and Sapsford (1992) 
Turnbull and Sapsford explored patterns of `unauthorised absences' on British docks 
after 1947. Starting from the premise that many absences from work were an implicit 
or explicit challenge to authority `collectively sanctioned and socially supported', they 
examined Dock Labour Board statistics. These indicated the `legitimate' quality of 
absenteeism from the mid 1950s, when discipline was looser, to 1967, when dock 
labour was made permanent. As numerous British studies confirmed, dockworkers 
were alienated from the bureaucratised agenda of Dock Labour Boards, these 
institutions becoming the focus for a number of strikes. Following this, the Scheme 
`gradually lost its momentum' and work discipline slackened. 13 
With full-time employment for registered men, from 1967, British employers were 
given the direct responsibility for discipline, a job they had previously abrogated to 
Dock Labour Boards and now without the alternative previously open of choosing less 
`troublesome' men from the casual labour pool. Campaigns to suppress absenteeism 
by direct employers of registered dock workers led to an upturn in strife. New 
technology, moreover, had increased the need for reliable workers. In summation, 
`The pattern and meanings attached to absence changed considerably over time, as did 
the relationship between absence from work and strike action. '14 
11 Whiteside, N., Public Policy and Port Labour Reform: The Dock Decasualisation Issue, 
1910-50', in Tolliday, S. and Zeitlin, J. (eds. ), Shop Floor Bargaining and the State 
((Cambridge University Press 1985) p. 102. 
2 See thus MRC: MSS. 126/EB/PU22/1-4: Report Labour Inquiry: Draft Report (1930) - 
`Our examination of the existing registration schemes has necessarily brought out very clearly 
the effects of the complete local autonomy under which they have operated. In broad outlines 
all the schemes are similar, while certain local peculiarities are plainly the result of organic 
differences in the ports themselves and the work they are required to undertake. ' 
13 Phillips, G. and Whiteside, N., Casual Labour: The Unemployment Question in the Port 
Transport Industry 1880-1970 (Clarendon Press 1985) p 252 la Turnbull, P. and Sapsford, P., `A Sea of Discontent: The Tides of Organized and 
`Unorganized' Conflict on the Docks' Sociology, vol. 26 no. 2,1992, pp. 291-309 
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Conclusion 
Most texts stressed docks disciplinary questions and the entrenchment of unofficial 
practices, caused in large part by a lack of trust within the industry. In turn, the casual 
structure was considered as the chief culprit in fostering this unfortunate state of 
affairs, which the fact of unionism had done little to alleviate. 
Shaw and Leggett saw the primary answer in more regular work, where possible, and 
in greater labour-management collaboration. The argument was settled by the 1965 
Devlin Report, which ushered in permanent docks employment. Like the University 
of Liverpool report of 1956, Shaw and Leggett, Devlin saw TGWU weaknesses as a 
factor among severaf n creating `acceptable' levels of malpractice. TGWU problems 
over the control of its constituents were at the heart of the 1952 Goldstein work as 
well. Devlin joined Oram and Hovey in seeing a special problem in London-style 
pieceworking, although they disagreed on the solution. 
An inclusion of ideological and political variables impacting on British malpractices 
by Phillips and Whiteside advanced the debate. But they sat uneasily with evidence of 
malpractices that owed little to casual employment, depending instead on `opportunity 
structures' that the docks industry itself created and indicated by the works on 
shipboard malpractices. 
Phillips and Whiteside highlighted the essentially consensual quality of British state 
intervention. Where `the industry' was opposed to a particular solution, it was 
dropped. In this, they performed a valuable antidote to the view, especially common 
in New York accounts as much as within the TGWU leadership, that the 
decasualisation of dock labour was usually a `popular' cause. The ebbs and flows of 
macro-economic and political influences were at the heart of the Phillips and 
Whiteside work but for comparative purposes, their work does not address the 
differential interpretation and representation of docks malpractices between countries 
leading to diverging approaches. 
Turnbull and Sapsford supplied a more satisfactory `model' among the British authors 
despite their analysis being Britain-focused. Conjoined with this was an analysis of 
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the `wider picture. ' This position is returned to in the last half of this chapter, dealing 
with `spectrum' theory. 
AMERICAN WRITERS 
Until 1945, American authors tended to mirror their British counterparts; the focus 
was generally upon the supposed moral and economic effects of casual docks 
employment in the New York docks and upon steps that the industry might take to 
solve problems around the hiring function. After 1945, reflecting a radically changed 
political and industrial landscape, questions surrounding the `criminality' of New 
York docks practices came to the forefront as catalysts for change. The changing 
emphasis is illustrated in Table 2: 2. 
Pre-1945 
Text after text dating from 1911 underlined the casual hiring system in larger 
American ports and made recommendations for its removal, often based on schemes 
in other ports such as Liverpool and Hamburg. The question of malpractices - hiring 
and otherwise - was given little attention. A 1916 report from the New York Mayor's 
Committee, for example, described the `degrading' and dangerous aspects of casual 
employment, and how inefficiency in the allocation of labour led to higher costs. 
Hiring corruption was given a mention but only briefly and as another symptom of the 
fierce `competition for work. ' Barnes' classic work on longshoremen, in 1915, never 
even mentioned hiring corruption while devoting much space to employment 
irregularity as fostering `irresponsible' attitudes. 15 
15 New York State Senate, Report to the Legislature of the State of New York by the 
Commission... to Inquire into the Question of Employers' Liability and Other Matters: Third 
Report - Unemployment and Lack of Farm Labor, Senate document no. 49. (1911); Mayor's 
Committee on Unemployment, Report on Dock Employment in New York City and 
Recommendations for its Regularization (New York, October 1916); New York State 
Legislature, Preliminary Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on Unemployment, 
Legislative Document (1932) no. 69. Albany, NY, 1932; 'Longshore Labor Conditions and 
Port Decasualization in the United States', Monthly Labor Review, vol. 37 no. 6 (December 
1933) pp. 1299-1306. Swanstrom, in his major survey, devoted less than two pages to hiring 
malpractices (Swanstrom, E. E., The Waterfront Labor Problem: A Study in Decasualization 
and Unemployment Insurance (Fordham University Press 1938) 
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Post-1945 
A sea change in perceptions of the waterfront in New York occurred by the early 
1940s. Trials resulting from the infamous `Murder Incorporated' cases involving 
violent criminal entrepreneurs working on the docks were given huge media exposure, 
though their importance in the overall canvass was never examined. Five years later, 
during the New York mayoralty election in late 1945, the findings of a Brooklyn 
grand jury on the murder cases were made public and cast serious doubt upon the 
competency and honesty of William O'Dwyer, the District Attorney for Brooklyn 
once in overall charge of them and now a strong candidate for mayor. 16 O'Dwyer 
won the mayoral contest but in the process the waterfront crime and violence issues 
had emerged and become embedded in a way not before seen. 
Combined with this, in October 1945, was an unofficial port-wide stoppage over sling 
loads, the number of daily shape-ups, meal-break pay and paid vacations. Unusual by 
New York standards, the strike ended with the men winning most of their demands. '7 
Although specific industrial grievances generated the strike, the events were 
presented, by reformers, as showing strong `anti-Ryan' feeling, as a revolt against 
`boss rule' and cronyism in the docks union, and a casual employment scheme that 
buttressed loansharking and other rackets. `Background materials' directing readers 
towards this new perspective came in the form of recycled accounts of docks 
gangsterism from the late 1930s. 18 
Citizens' Waterfront Committee (1946) 
The first report in this vein came from the Citizens' Waterfront Committee. In 1946, 
the Committee warned of `crime and racketeering' at the hiring point, since `Every ill 
and every social waste on the docks sustains itself through the shape-up. ' The 1945 
strike was interpreted as a struggle for democracy in the ILA and for the ousting of 
16 Peterson, V. W., The Mob: 200 Years of Organized Crime in New York (Green Hill 
Publishing 1983) p. 243 
17 Jensen, V. H., Strife on the Waterfront: The Port of New York Since 1945 (Cornell 
University Press 1974) pp. 36-7. Consult: NYMA: LaGuardia Papers, Subject Files, Film 116 
on the October 1945 strike; Larrowe, Shape-Up and Hiring Ha11 pp. 27-9; WA: ILA 
Collection, Box 1: clippings on the 1945 strike 
18 Nation, 17.11.45,24.11.45 
31 
docks racketeers. Employers, although dissatisfied with aspects of the shape, feared 
the alternative of a militant Pacific coast version of a longshore union leadership. 
Hiring `graft' was stressed and gangsters either took over union Locals or influenced 
them, leading to murder. 19 
Johnson (1948) 
Journalist Malcolm Johnson in 1948 gave readers a no-holds barred `picture' of the 
New York docks. Drawing on materials collected by union rebels and critics such as 
Fr. John Corridan, the New York waterfront was identified as `a classic example of 
labor gangsterism. ' In a series of widely reported newspaper articles given national 
prominence, Johnson wrote of the shape-up system of engaging longshore workers. It 
was roundly condemned as causing `graft, favouritism, and the gangster rule. ' 
Gangsters had invaded both the shape-up and docks union Locals, making an old 
problem of undemocratic practices at Local level even worse, helped by the 
indifference at best of the union elite. Corrupt urban machine politicians were in 
league with largely unaccountable union bosses in causing the mess. ° 
Bell (1951) 
Daniel Bell initiated the first systematic exploration of New York malpractices, 
borrowing in part (but uncritically) on detailed evidence presented by the New York 
State Crime Commission, although taking issue with its police-oriented conclusions. 
Bell asserted that this was `at best, a surface approach to the waterfront situation ... ' 
as it `does not touch the root factors of the waterfront situation. i21 `In our fascination 
these days with power and manipulation, ' he wrote, `we often ignore the economic 
fulcrum underneath. i22 This lay, in his view, in the antiquated structure of port 
facilities damaging delivery services and `a set of political accommodations ... to 
19 Citizens' Waterfront Committee, The New York Waterfront (New York 1946) 
20 Johnson, M., Crime on the Labor Front (McGraw Hill 1950) 
21 WA: Daniel Bell papers, box 11: Daniel Bell `Comments on the Waterfront Problem' 
21955). 
Bell, D., The End of Ideology (The Free Press 1965) p. 176 
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perpetuate the baronial privileges which an inner group has staked out as a result of 
the economic morass. 23 
Physical inadequacies revolving around docking operations created the means through 
which dock racketeers gained sufficient industrial leverage by which to demand 
payoffs as the price for uninterrupted production. A problem of malpractices in New 
York involved not just corrupt individuals or `gangsters, ' nor did it involve just the 
shape-up, as Johnson had argued, but instead whole systems of mismatch between a 
demand for better port delivery and its effective denial at the infrastructure level 
playing into the hands of racketeers, who were able to promise they could nullify 
many of these barriers on the labour supply side. 
Casual employment, linked to the use of convicts, was the chief means for keeping the 
men in line. ILA officials colluded in this. Abuses inside union Locals were 
examined briefly, as were ethnic rivalries in the port and the ILA's links with 
Tammany Hall in New York County (Manhattan). Startling examples of improper 
political influence over the docks were supplied in Jersey City, where `the relationship 
of the ILA to the political setup produced a clear mirror of the meaning of political 
accommodation. ' Resembling comments made later, in 1980s reports on the New 
York building industry, Bell remarked that the professional criminal served a `vital 
function' in stabilising a chaotic industrial market `where no single force other than 
the industrial racketeer was strong enough to stabilise the industry. '24 
Bell's account did pioneer subsequent `holistic' analyses of the problem. But the 
precise interaction of political to economic constituents in creating the New York 
`problem' was not addressed. Nor was the precise source of New York's 
`vulnerability' to corruption explained in terms of primary and secondary influences 
that could be used for testing and validating purposes. 
23 Bell, `Comments on the Waterfront Problem. ' 
24 Bell, The End of Ideology 
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New York State Crime Commission (1953) 
The Fourth Report of the New York State Crime Commission is dealt with in 
considerable depth in chapter seven, but its tone can be readily discerned from chapter 
headings, ranging from `The ILA and Its Component Locals Have Flagrantly 
Disregarded the Welfare of Their Members and the Public' to `The Shape-Up and the 
Forcing of Undesirable Hiring Foremen on the Employers are Basic Evils. ' Annual 
New York Waterfront Commission reports followed this perspective in locating the 
centre of New York's problem in the shape-up engagement system, the dominant 
union organisation and in organized criminality. 
Larrowe (1955) 
Larrowe attempted to compare practices in New York with those on the Pacific coast. 
Malpractices he described for New York were taken straight from Crime Commission 
evidence. In comparing New York with the Pacific industry, Larrowe supplied a 
synthesis of previous investigations. The general picture of New York port was dräwn 
from Johnson and the State Crime Commission, in particular in their evidence of 
political interference, hiring kickbacks and gangster control over union units, although 
it was recognised that docks employment was more complex a topic than other studies 
suggested. The role of congestion in generating delays to cargo handling and thence 
racketeering was identified, reflecting Bell's analysis . 
25 
Kimeldorf (1988) 
Kimeldorf's analysis was more multi-layered. A large number of material influences, 
according to Kimeldorf, were active in generating an organized crime problem on the 
New York docks, many of them already identified by Bell and others. Problems could 
have been overcome given as radical a union leadership as that on the west coast, but 
this was absent in New York. Also given primacy by Kimeldorf was employer 
disorganisation, this creating sufficient `space' for unionists (and racketeers in the 
New York docks union) to operate and expand their organisational base. 
u Larrowe, C. P., Shape-Up and Hiring Hall: A Comparison of Hiring Methods on the New 
York and Seattle Waterfronts (University of California Press 1955) 
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The over-supply of labour was much greater in New York, on this score making 
common action less likely against predatory practices by gangsters and employers. 
The ILA leadership in New York, by contrast with the west coast union, was 
perceived as lacking direction, riddled in corrupt practices and absorbed in its own 
difficulties. 
Shipping patterns were different from those on the Pacific coast, being dominated by 
oceanic vessels that had less predictable sailing times. New York port capital was 
disunited and leaderless, allowing both legitimate unionism and corrupt unionists to 
make hay with their disorganisation. Getting ships out of port quickly was hindered 
by the inadequacy of facilities. A factor of note was the ethnically differentiated New 
York longshoremen situation, pitting racial groups against each other and reinforcing 
`Old World patterns of obligation and deference. ' Gangsters were useful as a means 
of disciplining the rank and file, and were engaged in every abuse 26 
Kimeldorf did include non-material factors in accounting for a far better situation on 
the west coast, above all in his extended discussions of `ideological' influences 
conditioning the willingness of rank and file longshoreman to accept inferior working 
conditions and hiring graft. He argued that the `solid foundation' for honest unionism 
on the west coast was laid by the `vastly different ideological communities from 
which they had been recruited' from those in New York. 27 West coast men were 
traditionally hired from jobs in which collective action was the norm. Conversely, 
newly arrived and needy immigrants in New York dependent on patronage for work 
were not promising materials from which to forge a radical workforce. 
New York construction industry reports (1989) 
Drawing on historical evidence, Taft developed this framework in his understanding 
of institutional properties encouraging American union corruption. These included a 
26 Kimeldorf, H., Reds or Rackets? The Making of Radical and Conservative Unions on the 
Waterfront (University of California Press 1988) pp. 14,39 
27 Kimeldorf, H., Working Class Culture, Occupational Recruitment, and Union Politics', 
Social Forces, vol. 64 no. 2,1985, p. 361 
28 Kimeldorf, Reds or Rackets? pp. 14,39 
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`casual' labour force and a highly competitive but fragmented industry that left the 
sole union covering the situation in a situation of relative strength. 9 Variables like 
this made law enforcement prosecutions a temporary solution at best. 
An exhaustive scrutiny of the available empirical data convinced the New York 
Organized Crime Task Force in the late 1980s that `structural' and `organisational' 
factors could better account for its persistent problem over racketeering. They argued 
that in industries where certain industrial characteristics were dominant, racketeering 
might be expected as a foreseeable outcome. Structural and organisational fault-lines 
that went unrecognised accounted for the longevity and the distribution of 
racketeering activities in these industries despite orthodox policing. Many of the 
characteristics of the construction industry in New York were replicated in dock 
markets and can be treated for comparative purposes as such. 
Construction unions dominated in negotiations with small, under-resourced firms 
rarely able to withstand sustained and determined union pressure and the advances of 
criminals illegally exploiting their positions from inside the union structure. The 
fragility of the production process made no allowance for lengthy stand-offs with 
organized labour. In common with the waterfront, time was of the essence and drawn- 
out delays unacceptable from a commercial viewpoint. 
Thus was created a `voluntary market' for the services of racketeers. In the course of 
time, a `system' of payoffs became entrenched in the construction and docks 
industries in New York, with new entrants to the marketplace made aware of what 
was expected. By these means, industrial conditions created a steady market for 
corrupt practices. Prosecutions alone proved inadequate since the problem lay at a 
deeper, institutional level. 
Concepts deployed in the analysis included those of `susceptibility' to racketeering 
incursions, and that of systematically created `opportunity structures' that encouraged 
racketeers to invade industries. The vulnerability of industries varied in line with the 
institutional opportunities made available to racketeers to control `critical 
29 Taft, P., Corruption and Racketeering in the Labor Movement, (2nd ed. ) (New York State 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations 1970) p. 34 
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components' in the process. Key among these was command over labour union 
branches. 
Special to the New York City industry was the existence of large numbers of Italian 
racketeers in the city. Like Bell's waterfront predators, these were identified by the 
report as performing a `rationalising' function in an unstable industrial structure, 
permitting profitability to be maintained via a series of illegal arrangements among 
contractors connected to the underlying threat of violence against transgressors 30 
Given this, however, the issue was deeper since corruption and racketeering had pre- 
dated `Mafia' influence in the industry, and the scale of the contemporary problem 
involved many layers of (non-Italian) bureaucrats among others 31 
Summary 
Describing the older models of industrial criminality, Woodiwiss remarked `The 
problem of organized crime ... simply boiled down to groups of bad people who 
corrupted government and business. '32 Once their removal had been affected, the 
issue would disappear. But this perspective failed to explain why racketeers had 
succeeded in infiltrating some groups of industries but not others and why industries 
affected by racketeers remained infected. 
In the New York case, the major determinants identified from 1945 were markets that 
made `criminality' much more likely to occur. These conceptually correspond with 
30 New York State, Organized Crime Task Force, Corruption and Racketeering in the New 
York City Construction Industry: Final Report (New York: December 1989) p. 56 
31 Aside from the official reports cited, consult: Fijnaut, C. and Jacobs, J. (eds. ), Organized 
Crime and Its Containment: A Transatlantic Initiative (Klewer Law and Taxation Publishers 
1991); U. S. Congress, House. Committee on Governmental Operations, Waste, Fraud, and 
Abuse at Federally Funded Wastewater Treatment Construction Projects: The Potential 
Effects of Organized Crime Infiltration and Labor Racketeering in the New York Construction 
Industry, hearing 100th Congress 2nd Session 1988, pp. 41-44; Jacobs, J. B. and Tacher, T. 
D., 'Attacking Corruption in Union-Management Relations: A Symposium', Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, vol. 42 no. 4, pp. 502-5 
32 Woodiwiss, M., Organized Crime and American Power: A History (University of Toronto 
Press 2001) p. 11 
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`background conditions' Turnbull, Morris and Sapsford refer to, though more refined 
and detailed in form. 33 
In Britain the guiding theme remained the way in which casual docks labour stymied 
attempts to impose `normal' industrial discipline on the industry. Official British 
reports reflected the 'non-judgemental' approach commonly found and used in British 
texts. These differences mirrored national characteristics and the divergent manner in 
which government inquiries addressed docks questions in these countries. 
Insights at this level involve `loopholes, hidden dynamics, or unintended side effects 
inherent in institutions. ' 34 Short lead times, a dependence on union influence to 
deliver manpower, and small production runs were often all that racketeers needed, 
sheltering behind protections that unions were afforded under the law. 35 As an 
`institutional' failure beyond the control of corrupt individuals, racketeering in 
industries `would still be a problem even if the Mafia utterly vanished. '36 
The most glaring shortcoming of the approach is its emphasis on `objective' standards 
as marking the parameters of the debate. Where `political' elements were introduced, 
from Johnson onwards, they tended to be stereotypical in design and reflected a 
jaundiced view of the effects whenever politicians meddled in industrial matters 
beyond their expertise or remit 37 A highlighting of economic and collective 
bargaining markets as moulding `opportunity structures' through which racketeers 
might penetrate the industry equally left little space for subjective perspectives or sub- 
group initiatives. 
33 Turnbull, P. Morris, J. and Sapsford, D., Persistent Militants and Quiescent Comrades: 
Intra-Industry Strike Activity on the Docks, 1947-89', The Sociological Review, vol. 44 no. 4, 
1996, p. 720 
34 Johnson, M., Political Corruption and Public Policy in America (Brooks/Cole 1982) p. 14 
35This seems to have been a general characteristic of New York's industrial structure (see 
Cook, A. H. and Gray, L. S., Labor Relations in New York City', Industrial Relations, vol. 5 
no. 3,1966, p. 102). 
m Kelly, R. J., The Upperworld and the Underworld: Case Studies of Racketeering and 
Business Infiltrations in the United States (Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 1999), p. 3. 
37 Alan Block, in a short treatise on the subject, also followed this reasoning ('On the 
Waterfront Revisited, ' Contemporary Crises, vol. 6,1982, pp. 373-96) 
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Increasingly, the movement from Bell onwards was towards the exploration of 
`broader' structures in the legitimate business or union fields that `supported' a 
racketeering problem. In this respect, it resembled `spectrum' theory, to be detailed. 
The end result was a sophisticated model for the New York construction industry that 
removed human agency from the equation and therefore implied that `change' would 
be externally imposed, emerging through a state-sponsored restructuring and 
remodelling of the variables that had attracted racketeers and other corrupt elements, 
in waterfront relations for example via the Waterfront Commission and the National 
Dock Labour Scheme. 
In spite of this, informal forms of job action illustrated the powerful hold of `man 
made' processes in altering docks relations. With respect to the New York and 
London waterfronts, for example, Mello (1997,1999) and Davis (2000) partly 
addressed this with in their respective discussions of rank and file activities in the 
cause of greater union democracy and in promoting the removal of casualism. 
Their arguments, on the other hand, did not address the reasons for `racketeer' 
penetration of the industry, nor its limitations. Nor did they arrive at the same 
conclusions. Mello saw the unofficial movements in post-1945 New York docks as 
eventually reshaping `the relations between dockworkers and their union. '38 Davis 
argued the converse. Utilising a comparative approach including New York and 
London, Davis' thesis was that unofficial movements in British docks were better 
protected against victimisation by employment systems and rights built up than their 
New York counterparts and for this reason, the New York movement was short- 
lived 39 
According to waterfront writers, a small number of economic or industrial variables 
locked malpractices into the structure and explained their presence. With the 
38 Mello, W., Pete Panto: Rank and File Radical on the Brooklyn Waterfront (New York, 
October 1997); Mello, W., The Origins of the Rank and File Reform Movement on the New 
York Waterfront 1945-1948 (New York, Spring 1999) 
39 Davis, C. J., New York City and London Dockworkers: A Comparative Perspective of 
Rank-and-File Movements in the Post-Second World War Era', Labour History Review, vol. 
65, no. 3,2000, pp. 295-316. 
39 
exception of Kirneldorf, questions of subjectivity and choice were excluded from the 
question at hand. 
SPECTRUM THEORY 
General characteristics 
The forgoing leads us to the most useful theory in resolving these dilemmas from the 
comparative perspective, in which perceptions of malpractices utilised by sources, are 
viewed as disengaged from their economic reality. `Spectrum' theory fully recognises 
and explicitly integrates into its analysis the political and ideological complexities and 
subtleties involved in discussions of industrial `deviance' while not ignoring economic 
aspects and dimensions. 
Dwight C. Smith's paradigm supplies a powerful tool by which to identify moral 
aspects applied to purely economic criteria. Like the orthodoxy, identified above, it 
sees `malpractices' in economic terms. But unlike traditional texts, it takes seriously 
the proposition that subjective ingredients distort analyses unless sufficient attention is 
afforded them. Stripped of obfuscating ideological elements, for example, the `truth' 
of malpractices as economic phenomena can be clearly adjudged and the analysis can 
proceed more fruitfully. In this, it overturns the orthodoxy but directly applies to the 
current project, since it allows valid comparisons to be made between industrial or 
economic matters that were subject to disparate political representations. 
Smith was most identified with the spectrum or `crime-enterprise' viewpoint, 40 
holding that the dividing line separating so-called `illicit' and `licit' economic 
practices were conceptually and in many cases operationally indistinguishable. `The 
advantage of crime-enterprise theory, ' as Van Duyne asserted, `is that it makes fewer 
40 Smith, D. C., 'Organized Crime and Entrepreneurship', International Journal of 
Criminology and Penology, vol. 6,1978, pp. 161-77; Smith, D. C., Paragons, Pariahs, and 
Pirates: A Spectrum-Based Theory of Enterprise', Crime and Delinquency, vol. 26,1980, pp. 
358-86; Smith, D. C., 'Ideology and the Ethics of Economic Crime Control', in Elliston, F. and 
Bowie, N. (eds. ), Ethics, Public Policy, and Criminal Justice (Delgeschlager, Gunn and Hain 
1982) pp. pp. 133-155; Smith, D. C., 'White-Collar Crime, Organized Crime, and the 
Business Establishment: Resolving a Crisis in Criminological Theory', in Wickman, P. and 
Dailey, T. (eds. ), White-Collar and Economic Crime (Lexington Books 1982) pp. 23-38 
40 
assumptions about the structure of so called `organised crime, ' while it takes better 
account of the interactions of the crime-enterprises with the surrounding markets on 
which they operate and of the mobility and adaptability which is the consequence (and 
the prerequisite) of operating on a market which is characterised by an inherent 
uncertainty. '41 Second, industrial markets and practices may remain `constant' as 
objective phenomena yet their legal significance can be transformed. However, the 
fact of their illegality may alter the contours of economic activity in unforeseen ways 
(for example, in creating new markets for underworld entrepreneurs. 
The framework, in a nutshell, mandates within its design for clearer explorations of 
economic phenomena such as docks malpractices by removing value-laden criteria 
from the equation. Similar economic variables influence both `organized' criminal 
enterprises and those of, for example, `white-collar' criminals, regardless of the labels 
assigned them by observers. Waterfront `racketeering' for instance is similar in effect 
and a comparable public order threat to those `occupational' crimes perpetrated by 
shipowners, such as tax evasion, but which are generally given a lower importance 
and priority. Conceptually and empirically, the activities of both groups are analogous 
if viewed as reacting to the same factors of markets, competition and to forms of 
regulation 42 
Subjective dimensions 
This thesis modifies the spectrum framework as espoused by Smith in two respects. 
First, the simple legality of docks practices, a centrepiece of the Smith model, is 
viewed as unduly constricting the exploration. In place of this, and thus of the 
`seriousness' of malpractices before the criminal law, as Smith poses, 43 the thesis 
employs the overarching concept of their `legitimacy' among practitioners, befitting 
the informal quality of all docks malpractices, in extending the range of questions 
asked and in accommodating to differing legal systems and laws. As such, 
41 Van Duyne, P. C., Organized Crime in Europe (Nova Science Publishers 1996) p. 54 
42 Smith, D. C., Paragons, Pariahs, and Pirates: A Spectrum-Based Theory of Enterprise', 
Crime and Delinquency, vol. 26,1980, pp. 358-86; Smith, D. C., 'Ideology and the Ethics of 
Economic Crime Control', in Elliston, F. and Bowie, N. (eds. ), Ethics, Public Policy, and 
Criminal Justice (Delgeschlager, Gunn and Hain 1982), pp. 133-155. 
43 Smith, D. C. The Mafia Mystique (Hutchinson 1975) p. 336 
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malpractices were supported and defended with vigour by the particular dock 
communities from where they originated. 
`Legality' complexities 
In terms of their `legality, ' three interlacing types of dock malpractice were identified 
on a port basis, depending on the relevant committee or statute. First were dock 
malpractices that were explicitly outlawed by criminal statute as `corrupt. ' In 
industrial relations terms, this type of misbehaviour generated few complainants, 
either from fear of economic injury against an employer or because employers gained 
in some fashion. Pilferage by dockworkers was the clearest violation of the criminal 
law and liable to attract a prison sentence and removal from a dockworker register if 
proven. 
Breaches of joint agreements were probably the most widespread malpractice. Such 
malpractices as the Liverpool `welt' or certain practices centred on the `continuity 
rule' were proscribed in agreements. They were, in turn, violations of the Dock 
Labour Scheme in British ports. The most common reported breaches of agreements 
involved unofficial strikes and stoppages of work while disputes were being adjusted. 
Next were `contested' malpractices adding to employers' labour costs. These were 
either allowed for in joint agreements, but with employer opposition, or sidestepped in 
agreements. Contested practices were intimately linked to that range of dock practices 
pejoratively labelled by employers as `restrictive', and often based on custom rather 
than codified. Employers, as making ports less competitive, often denounced them. 
Standing mid-way between the two were those malpractices proscribed in union 
rulebooks. Most forms of strikebreaking came clearly within this orbit, and those 
caught could be `branched. ' Employers tended to leave unconstitutional practices 
for unions themselves to resolve, especially the Stevedores' and Dockers' Union 
(NASDU), which had a reputation as highly disciplined and for stamping down hard 
on members who broke agreements. 
44 Those for New York are contained in the minutes of proceedings for ILA conventions at 
Wagner Labor Archives (microfilmed) 
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Last are those cases that did not cross neat divisions. Legal conceptions of industrial 
malpractices varied between countries, for example, but frequently left questions as to 
where lines lay between the criminal and the non-criminal. The matter of what 
constituted, in law, `extortion' or `blackmail' of an employer in the shipping industry 
was a classic case in point and which made prosecutions or other forms of legal action 
problematical. 45 
Legitimacy questions 
According to Mars, in a classic study, work gangs that pilfered ships tended to grant 
the malpractice `the status of a recognised and regularly occurring activity, and a 
normal part of life. '46 Legitimated malpractices are therefore characterised by their 
`taken for granted' quality rather than by the secondary issue - for those involved in 
them - of whether they were infringements of legal norms and standards of behaviour. 
By means of the legitimacy issue, working practices and the subtle manner in which 
they interacted with malpractices as social aspects of dockwork are understood and 
developed in a fashion unrecognised in most of the extant literature identified above. 
Types of legitimacy 
Further distinctions may be made. Although most often reported, the use of 
malpractices as a way of redressing `hardships' outside of agreements was but one of 
a number of justifications for the involvement of the rank and file in malpractices. 
Pilferage type `entitlement' malpractices were associated with casual earnings. 
as In one case in Britain, the International Transport Workers' Federation used its economic 
leverage in 1978 to compel the master of a Milford Haven tanker vessel sailing under a flag of 
convenience to sign a document. This stated that if the master agreed to pay the union £80,000 
and to pay the vessel's crew the agreed union wages for the work, an embargo would be lifted. 
The money was to be used to compensate for the use by the vessel owners of cheap Asian 
labour, paid well below the rates agreed with the union. The question at issue was whether 
this was a legitimate action by the union in furtherance of a `trade dispute. ' The vessel owners 
took legal action for recovery of part of the moneys paid. In 1982, the House of Lords ruled 
that the action of the union was illegitimate, and an amount of £6,480 paid under 'economic 
duress' was recoverable in law. The document signed under `duress' by the shipowner was 
also ruled as invalid (The All England Law Reports, Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v. 
International Transport Workers' Federation, 1982, vol. 2, pp. 67-96) 
46 Mars, Dock Pilferage, ' p. 225 
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Pilferage studies 
Mars found in his field study of St. John's, Newfoundland, longshoremen that the 
same vessel hatch gang could switch between legal and criminal (pilfering) practices 
without missing a beat. Because the work was in the old days badly paid, pilferage 
was commonly viewed by hold gangs as a form of `rough justice, ' and `the only 
crime, if you can call it a crime, was getting caught at it. '47 
Rather than being abhorred by dockworkers, `pilferage was regarded as a right rather 
than a crime and was virtually ubiquitous. '48 Much of this attitude was excused by the 
`adverse conditions and low rates of pay' of dockworkers, 49 and in both countries they 
`shared an abiding sense of entitlement. '50 In 1970, the New York Times similarly 
claimed that pilferage spoils were `something of a fringe benefit to some 
longshoremen. 51 
Most longshore workers in St. John's `make a sharp distinction between cargo it is 
permissible to steal and that which should remain untouched. 3,52 Thus, `up to an 
agreed level pilfered cargo is seen as a moral entitlement; beyond this, additional 
pilferage is theft. '53 
Judgements made by perpetrators like these, however, owed as much to `hard headed' 
calculations of the cut off point at which the police would be expected to intervene. 
Consequently, both the creation of a culture of `legitimate' pilferage and its 
boundaries were conditioned by wider external structures outside of the control of the 
work gang. Pilferage texts utilising this factor to explain malpractices could also not 
47 Mars, G., Dock Pilferage' in Rock, P. and McIntosh, M. (eds. ), Deviance and Social 
Control (Tavistock 1974) 
'8 Cooke Johnson, L., `Criminality on the Docks' in Davies, S. et al (eds. ), Dock Workers: 
International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970 (Ashgate Publishing 
2000)p. 722 
49 Cooke Johnson, `Criminality on the Docks, ' p. 725 
so Davis, C. J., `Working with the Hook: A Comparative Study of London and New York 
Dockworkers, 1945-1955', The London Journal, vol. 25 pt. 2,2000, p. 89 
51 NYT, 13.4.70 
52 Mars, G., An Anthropological Study of Longshoremen and of Industrial Relations in the 
Port of St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada (University of London, Ph. D. 1972) p. 6/23 
53 Mars, `Dock Pilferage, ' p. 226 
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readily explain immense variations in the incidence of malpractices between ports, 
despite dockworkers experiencing common levels of occupational hardship. 
Other malpractices achieved the status of legitimacy by virtue of their successful 
utilisation over a long period of time, but with few connotations that they were in 
some sense `compensating' for past or present injustices. Accounting for the 
distribution of malpractices in spite of the same sense of grievance among 
dockworkers, this type owed more to `opportunity structures' founded on material 
bottlenecks, and could be seen across the range of dockworkers from those casually 
employed to weekly or regularly paid workers. 
Third were 'legitimated' malpractices that achieved prominence by virtue of the 
crumbling of authority and acceptance elsewhere in a port system. Thus, in Liverpool, 
bureaucratic disciplinary functions lost legitimacy within the ranks of a majority of the 
dockworker population. In other cases, the union may be seen as `not doing their job' 
leading to the men `taking the law into their own hands. '54 
As formal sanctions lost their bite, previous sources of labour regulation and internal 
legitimacy re-emerged, or became stronger, revolving about unofficial leaderships and 
the extra-agreement exercise of industrial clout. 'Through the sporadic publication of 
bulletins and journals, ' Wilson wrote, `and the frequent use of mass meetings, the 
unofficials established better lines of communication than the TGWU. '55 
Assisting a legitimisation process were those circumstances where malpractices were 
allegedly `victimless. ' Last were local variables. Specific payments systems could 
confer legitimacy on malpractices, for example, by obfuscating their illegality. In 
particular, London's heavily pieceworking earnings method lent itself to exploitation 
and became the fulcrum for all manner of abuses. 
sa Interview with LONM, 19.8.99 
55 Wilson, D. F., Dockers (Fontana/Collins 1972) p. 131 
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Thresholds of legality and legitimacy 
Table 2: 3 suggest conflicting ideas of legitimacy in a typical port complex and how 
these underlay much industrial strife, when conjoined with unwieldy adjustment 
systems and facilities. 
TABLE 2: 3 
DEGREES OF LEGITIMACY ASSIGNED TO DOCKS PRACTICES 
DOCKWORKERS 
High Medium Low 
Pilferage* Short-handed Strike-breaking 
Sluggish working working Hiring corruption 
Gambling Union branch abuses 
`Manufactured' 
earnings 
EMPLOYERS 
High Medium Low 
Hiring Continuity rule Welting 
corruption Pilferage 
Gambling* * `Time-wasting' 
Malpractices 
PORT AUTHORITIES 
High Medium Low 
Short handed Hiring corruption Pilferage 
working Gambling Stoppages 
`Job and finish' 
Sluggish working 
`Manufactured' 
earnings 
GOVERNMENTS* ** 
High Medium Low 
Short handed Stoppages 
working Pilferage 
Hiring corruption Sluggish working 
`Created' 
earnings 
* `Within limits' 
** Depending on whether performed when should be working 
*** Public pronouncements 
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The first two types of docks malpractice tended to lead to industrial conflict, since 
employers might well consent to them only under duress. Malpractices and associated 
`indiscipline' problems were normally (though not always) localised, paralleling the 
atomised structure of relations in these ports 56 
`Payoffs' in the situation of high docking charges and in a context of rivalry with 
other shipping firms for business were mutually beneficial in many instances, and in 
this light approved of as the best means by which to maintain or increase company 
profitability. The use of violence as the primary means that port criminals utilised to 
extract payments was not common, as the FBI for example discovered 5.7 And because 
of the `victimless' dimension to many port malpractices, making prosecutions hard to 
stick in court, and even more difficult to uncover, the activities of `racketeers' closely 
resembled those of other occupational crime violators active on the docks. 
Where a disconnection existed between employer perspectives as to `acceptable' 
dockworker conduct and that of the rank and file, a dispute might well erupt, 
involving other workers. Port authorities, the government and employers were 
generally impatient with pilferage and other malpractices operated by dockworkers for 
raising the cost of doing business in these ports. 
Behind much docks activity was endemic class conflict over wages and conditions of 
employment, with organised labour making slow and uneven progress even where a 
`closed shop' existed. Agreements also mirrored the desire of the parties to avoid, for 
example, night working. 8 
Conceptually, employers frequently saw so-called `restrictive practices' as 
synonymous with malpractices when judged by their economic costs S9 Moreover, 
56 Whiteside, `Public Policy and Port Labour Reform: ' p. 78. For London, read: MID: LEDEA 
Box 260 `Riverside Employers' Working Party' (ca. 1968). 
57 FBI records on Joseph P. Ryan, File no. 92-915 
58 U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, To Clarify the Overtime 
Compensation Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as Amended, hearings 81st 
Congress 1st Session 1949, p. 730 
59 A Grace line manager in New York explained that `so-called feather-bedding and standby 
crew requirements under the current ILA agreement amount to virtually the same thing as 
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efforts to avoid the negative effects of restrictive practices caused abuses. Thus where 
labour was comparatively inflexible, although acting in accordance with agreements, 
`overmanning' and `time-wasting' sometimes resulted. Illicit payments could ease 
these tensions in making the men more `open' to re-interpreting agreements or to even 
ignoring them. 
Industrial discipline 
What constitutes a matter for `disciplinary action' will vary by its legitimacy and the 
industrial and political contexts. From the industrial viewpoint, the question depends 
on the likely resistance of staff acting in concert towards management encroachments 
and also in `the interest' an employer will have in curbing a malpractice. 0 
Where the organisation of docks labour was weak or non-existent, employers felt freer 
to impose their own definitions of `correct' industrial behaviour. D'Sena for example 
found that what constituted a `malpractice' on the London riverside during the late 
eighteenth century altered over time, closely linked to the construction of new wet 
docks making previously condoned practices criminal. 1 Clarke in his own study of 
white-collar crime, stressed that `malpractices' which perpetrators consider as `part of 
the job' may be overlooked by an employer, depending upon a host of `background' 
constituents in the field of industrial bargaining 62 
Ideology and the `organized crime' issue 
Leaving aside the meaning of malpractices to practitioners, the spectrum perspective 
can be used to identify `ideological' or moral meanings generally attached to 
industrial operations by political figures and legislators. From 1945, as state controls 
attempted to curb `lawlessness' and rule-breaking on the docks, this assumed an 
carrying phantoms' (U. S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
Waterfront Investigation, hearings 83rd Congress 1st Session, 1953, p. 42) 
60 Turnbull, P. Woolfson, C. and Kelly, J., Dock Strike: Conflict and Restructuring in Britain's 
Ports (Avebury 1992) p. 81 
61 D'Sena, P., Perquisites and Casual Labour on the London Wharfside in the Eighteenth 
Century', London Journal, vol. 14 no. 2,1989, pp. 139-47 
62 Clarke, M. J., 'White Collar Crime, Occupational Crime, and Legitimacy', International 
Journal of Criminology and Penology, vol. 6, May, 1978, pp. 121-36 
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heightened form. Much of the divergence in approach between American and British 
authors reflected a historical dichotomy that perceived wider ranging industrial 
illegality in different terms. 
One example is worthy of note. The attachment of a label of `organized' criminality 
to docks deviance raised the stakes, since it was commonly associated with dangerous 
syndicates that posed a far greater general threat to public safety than did a gang of 
waterfront thieves or (in the Liverpool and London cases) `time-wasting' on board 
ships. But because a precise definition of `organized crime' has not been agreed, the 
American trend, increasingly evident in New York, to categorise docks deviance as a 
form of racketeering behaviour underlined the subjectivity of the term and its 
consequent elasticity. 63 
The insertion of the `organized crime' label when discussing New York docks was 
commonly utilised to denote malpractices that required immediate and radical action 
to protect the public, and whatever the validity of counter-arguments or the resistance 
from vested interests. The case put in Britain before the public was that no matter 
how bad malpractices might be in Liverpool or in London, they did not attract 
`organized criminals. ' Linda Cooke Johnson adopted this tack when writing on New 
York docks corruption, it being, in her view, linked to `strong-arm enforcement that 
commonly included beatings and murder. ' Like almost all versions of this premise, 
though, she drew on secondary accounts for her statements. 
As Smith argued, `organized' crime shares the same basic characteristics as `white 
collar' or occupational crime. For this reason they should be treated in comparable 
ways, and not as a separate category, whether in the language utilised or the concepts 
employed. The organized crime issue has, though, been a popular one for ambitious 
politicians to manipulate. Arranged around ethnicity, `The purpose of organized- 
63 For some of the issues, read: Albanese, J. Organized Crime in America (2od ed. ) (Anderson 
Publishing 1989) pp. 4-5. 
64 Cooke Johnson, L., `Criminality on the Docks' in Davies, S. et al, Dock Workers: 
International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970 (Ashgate Publishing 
2000) pp. 735-6 
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crime theory in the past has been to convey moral judgements, not to facilitate 
objective study. '65 
Official investigative commissions 
Bulmer explained how seemingly authoritative governmental commissions of inquiry, 
as key guides as to how problems should be viewed, could be skewed in ways that 
favoured the status quo or vested interests. Through their composition together with 
the selection of evidence and terms of reference, official commissions are liable `to 
intellectual capture and the structuring of inquiry from the outset in particular 
directions. ' They also `take a great deal of account of the political context in which 
they operate. '66 
`Organized crime' research by official agencies has contained high levels of 
information that `convey moral judgements, ' yet they `affect research and the public 
debates surrounding them. '67 Moore stated that official enquiries in America served 
`to dramatise a particular perspective on a problem and place the prestige of a Senate 
body behind a chosen point of view. '68 
A typical American commission, for example, was over-represented with lawyers and 
former judges tending to view problems to hand by legal standards, while British 
commissions tended to include those `socialised into a closed and fairly secretive 
world of an executive composed of civil servants and ministers. '69 (A former Justice, 
a former Police Commissioner and the Dean of a New York law school, for example, 
headed the New York State Crime Commission looking at the New York waterfront. 
6' Smith, 'White-Collar Crime, Organized Crime, and the Business Establishment: Resolving a 
Crisis in Criminological Theory', pp. 23-38 
66 Bulmer, M., The Uses of Social Research (George Allen and Unwin, 1982) pp. 123-4 
67 Smith, D. C., `Wickersham to Sutherland to Katzenbach: Evolving an "official" definition 
for organized crime, ' Crime, Law and Social Change, vol. 16,1991, p. 151 
68 Moore, W. H., The Kefauver Committee and the Politics of Crime 1950-195 (University of 
Missouri Press 1974) p. 75. 
69 Bulmer, M. (ed. ) Social Science Research and Government (Cambridge University Press 
1987) p. 8 
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Commission staff members included a former prosecutor and counsel to the 'rackets- 
busting' Kefauver Committee. 70) 
Perceptions of wide scale New York docks abuses could become self-fulfilling, heavy 
police intervention in the wake of `scandals' fuelled by commission procedures 
`finding' more criminal behaviour than in ports where no such process had been 
instituted. As Axelrod revealed `no worker in the United States, except employees in 
`sensitive' jobs in government and defence industries, undergoes a more thorough 
check than does a dock worker on the New York waterfront. P71 Chapters five to seven 
will argue that despite their differences, docks practices and malpractices in 
Liverpool, London and in New York had a greater deal in common with each other 
than post-1945 accounts would assume. 
Conclusion 
The Smith framework demonstrates how `subjective' variables shaped the selection of 
empirical information and its use. For this reason, the `empirical' critique given in 
this thesis and the `theoretical' aspects of the thesis that this chapter deals with are 
interwoven. 
The interlacing of industrial and political ingredients varied by country and by 
locality. Cases in which `opportunities' outside the control of individuals or sub- 
groups to create mischief or to extract payoffs will be presented throughout and were 
especially important - when practiced between sections - in industries like shipping 
where the permeability of systems to abuse was well known. 
`Contextual' considerations like these, as Barton and Turnbull assert, require 
explanation, not least in their role in shaping policies. 72 As this work relates dock 
practices across countries, the spectrum alternative supplies a durable tool for 
70 NYT, 30.3.51 - 1.4.51 71 Axelrod, D., Government Covers the Waterfront: An Administrative Study of the 
Background, Origin, Development, and Effectiveness of the Bistate Waterfront Commission of 
New York Harbor, 1953-1966 (Syracuse University DPA, 1967) p. 232 
72 Barton, H. and Turnbull, P., `Labour Regulation and Competitive Performance in the Port 
Transport Industry' European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 8 no. 2,2002, pp. 133-156 
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comparing them on a `like for like' basis, since it hopes to explores them as economic 
phenomena while not overlooking the probability than their representation will be 
shrouded in value judgements. 
The other studies and Smith 
But to argue that the whole of the docks malpractices problem can be assigned to the 
`legitimacy' question is as incomplete an explanation as claiming that the `whole' of 
the problem revolves about economic structures, disregarding their social or political 
meanings. 
What the previous writers failed to acknowledge was the manner in which their own 
analyses were discretely influenced by social values that made observations of 
comparable malpractices in other settings difficult. Nonetheless, some of these 
obstacles can be overcome through the triangulation or multiple strategies 
methodology as described in chapter one, and by taking account of `contextual' 
variables. This is especially evident in the differing emphases chosen and which mark 
out the British and American sources, in which some variables are virtually ignored 
but others achieved a privileged status. 
The nearest to a `purely' economic or structural model comes in the 1989 report. 
Transferable concepts it utilised such as the `susceptibility' of organisations to 
infiltration by criminals, and `opportunity structures' encouraging them to proceed, 
were of value and could be applied to waterfront situations across the board. Even so, 
aspects of the construction report reveal weaknesses, for instance in its exclusive 
concentration on larger malpractices across systems and an elitism in its sidestepping 
of the manner in which the rank and file construction worker viewed the abuses that 
were found. 
In conclusion, an exclusively `subjective' framework in which the `legitimacy' of 
industrial action is advanced as the single cause of malpractices is inadequate and 
inappropriate. By a synthesis of the spectrum perspective to the insights gained 
through the approach seeing `opportunity structures' as the key to explaining 
malpractices, the longevity and the distribution of them is better explained. 
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Inter-country docks practices 
Ideas of the significance of malpractices as `public order' dangers varied. This is not 
to deny, therefore, that `racketeers' for example were not present in New York port 
within local units. What remains in question was their importance within the totality 
of port relations, and consequently the validity of accounts that pose New York as 
`rackets-infested. ' In the same context, we may examine more critically the evidence 
for Britain, which was likely to under-state malpractices in Liverpool and London. 
The way in which docks practices and malpractices were received and presented 
varied by country. Chapters five to seven will attempt to indicate that in the majority 
of instances working practices and malpractices - `economic' constituents to working 
practices and to malpractices - were alike across these ports despite their divergent 
depictions. At this stage, the task is to elucidate political and social contexts in which 
British and New York port practices were perceived and pronounced upon. 
Britain 
After 1945, British dock authorities and governments, to maintain `the peace' with 
organized dock labour, felt constrained to construe `corrupt' waterfront practices as 
involving chiefly the problem of pilferage. Other malpractices were adjudged as best 
left to joint committees to discuss behind closed doors. The language and imagery 
applied to British docks malpractices seemed calculated to diffuse any possible 
connotations of criminality that might eventually draw in the police and courts. 73 
Where action became unavoidable, this often only led to mild criticisms of the TGWU 
as the standard-bearer of docks unionism, but never to policing of the ports of 
Liverpool or London. 
Referring to immediate post-1945 British dock strikes, Phillips initially pointed to the 
`harsher' attitude of the Labour government towards unofficial stoppages while 
concluding that there did exist a political `consensus' with organized labour, 
extending to docks practices. In a clear sign of this, the Conservatives, by tradition 
73 Devin thus referred in his 1965 report to `unwarranted' or `unreasonable' demands by 
portworkers. 
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more hostile to union powers and immunities, `recognised the need to retain the 
confidence of organized labour ... 
in conditions of full employment. '74 Successive 
British governments felt obliged to accept the status quo in this respect. Where, as in 
New York, no such consensus existed, and where political opinion was far more 
fractured, waterfront practices and malpractices were more liable to attack for political 
advantage. 
The British approach was made clear in comments made by Viscount Waverley, the 
chairman of the Port of London Authority (PLA) on the New York dock scandals of 
the early 1950s. Explaining how similar practices could never occur in London, 
Waverley noted how decasualising policies enacted in London promoted `responsible' 
behaviour from the rank and file in the port and encouraged greater work discipline, 
thus implying that an old problem of malpractices had all but ended. Wet docks' 
construction (necessitated by London's large tidal variations) made pilferage more 
easily containable. This complacent scenario was at odds with evidence from 
employers that the overall situation regarding dock labour was, from their viewpoint, 
`worse' than that pre-war. His representation completely failed to address, moreover, 
the central thrust of the problem in New York. 75 
British political parties were highly disciplined and the political process on the surface 
orderly. Most of the work was conducted within anonymous committees and (until 
recent years) the role of the private sector was limited as a likely source of corruption. 
Less decentralised political authority also gave criminals fewer openings to exploit. 
Political corruption, nevertheless, was hardly novel to the British system. In modem 
times, a handful of Members of Parliament were for instance linked to powerful 
criminal syndicates in London. 6 In the sphere of local government misbehaviour, the 
historical evidence is of a wider difficulty. Pinto-Duschinsky, in his 1977 survey, 
74 Phillips, J., The Postwar Political Consensus and Industrial Unrest in the Docks, 1945-55, 
Twentieth Century British History, vol. 6 no. 3,1995, pp. 302-19 
'S Journal of Commerce, 19.2.53; New York Herald Tribune, 14.1.53 
76 See the numerous books on the activities of the Kray crime family in 1960s London, and the 
memoirs of Frankie Fraser (Fraser, F., Mad Frankie: Memoirs of a Life of Crime (little, 
Brown and Co. 1994) pp. 57,110). 
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found that the true level of local government corruption in Britain was `considerably 
greater' than uncovered cases and media coverage might suggest. 7 
What remained consistent was a desire in Britain to minimise perceptions of 
wholesale corruption in the body politic. A central plank of the post-1945 `consensus' 
was the construction of images of institutions as highly stable, lawful and beneficial. 
The premise throughout was `that serious corruption on a broad scale is a largely 
foreign phenomenon ... '78 In this circumstance, British state agencies did not `look' 
for institutionalised or deep-seated corruption in the proactive New York sense 
therefore they rarely found it. 
New York 
Political interest in the New York waterfront was stimulated whenever the possibility 
of `political capital' being gained was a factor and would reap electoral dividends. 
This was particularly so under circumstances where organized labour was on the 
defensive, nationally from 1946.9 
In this process, the `organized crime' and `political corruption' issues assumed special 
resonance as a resource available to opponents of the incumbent political organisation 
in New York City. In the New York setting, the corruption label often emerged 
during hotly contested elections and the Democratic Party machine in Manhattan - 
'Tammany Hall' - became, as a result of its targeting by urban reformers, legendary 
for its sleaze 8° 
77 The T. Dan Smith scandal suggested the susceptibility of local council structures in Britain 
to corrupt practices and was only uncovered by accident during bankruptcy proceedings. 
Smith, the leader of Newcastle City Council, was able to circumvent the existing systems with 
relative ease. The local governmental system in Ulster was an even worse example of the 
turning a blind eye of the British establishment to institutional malpractices, in a manner that 
would probably make an American observer gasp in disbelief (Pinto-Duschinsky, M., 
'Corruption in Britain', Political Studies, vol. XXV, no. 22,1977, pp. 274-84). 
78 Fennell, P. and Thomas, P. A., 'Corruption in England and Wales: An Historical Analysis', 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law, vol. 11,1983, p. 168. 
79 ILA Longshore News, June 1951, January 1952, December 1952, March 1953; U. S. 
Congress, House. Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee No. 3, New York New Jersey 
Waterfront Commission Compact, hearing 83rd Congress 1st Session 1953, pp. 208-16 
80 Doyle, D. N. and Edwards, 0. D. (eds. ), America and Ireland, 1776-1976 (Greenwood 
1976) p. 147 
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The more `shocking' the charges made against the incumbent political organisation, 
the more likely the voting citizenry in New York could be aroused in the desired 
fashion by opponents, whatever the ultimate truth of the allegations 81 Media-savvy 
crusaders could virtually manufacture a `problem' of corruption out of their 
particularistic version of exchanges in the political sphere that lent themselves to 
alternative explanations. 
Where trade unions, such as the ILA, were in alliance with such `corrupt' political 
institutions as Tammany, they risked being tarnished by that association. Political 
opponents of ILA chief Joe Ryan used the opportunities afforded by a forthcoming 
mayoralty campaign in 1937, for instance, to slander Ryan for his supposed closeness 
to both employers and to Tammany personalities. 2 
This is not to claim that there was no problem of political corruption in New York 
City, a subject returned to in chapter seven, only that political pressures on a 
systematic or `institutional' basis existed to overstate its importance. Thus, while 
New York docks union malpractices were extensively covered, those in Britain 
received little publicity. 
When comparing against each other the British and American sources, the clearest and 
most dramatic difference is in how they treated docks unions. While some 
convergence was possible in accounts of the other areas of dock work, no such 
similarity is evident in respect to waterfront union abuses, being downplayed in 
Britain, even more so when set aside the position in New York. This demonstrated 
the acute sensitivity of the area to varying political and social pressures and illustrated 
the underlying dichotomy in approaches to comparable industrial structures 
differentiating Britain from New York. 
A `hands off' policy towards union practices suited all major parties in Britain, 
functioning to submerge discussion. By distinction, no constraining influences were 
at play in New York from 1945 staying the hand of governments, as chapter seven 
81 Griffith, E. S., The Modern Development of City Government in the United Kingdom and 
the United States (Oxford University Press 1927) p. 284. 
82 NYT, 24.10.37 
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details. To bolster this argument, evidence is presented to suggest that malpractices in 
the TGWU were greater than normally admitted in British texts. 
TGWU MALPRACTICES 
This section casts doubt on the presumption made that malpractices in the unionised 
sectors of British ports were as absent as implied in the literature, and that an ethically 
pure docks union leadership would inevitably generate constitutional and `legal' 
practices throughout the union hierarchy. Materials used are gathered on the giant 
Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU), the major port union organisation in 
Liverpool and London. 
The subject of misconduct in British unionism has barely been touched upon within 
published sources. One exception was Mcllroy, who found that financial malpractices 
were marginal to union life and never took on `an organized form. '83 Deductions of 
this sort were largely based on the dearth of readily accessible information on the 
topic, not surprising given the labour movement's sensitivity to this issue. The view 
that serious internal differences in the TGWU, if openly discussed, could damage its 
reputation was pervasive. 4 
It is doubtful from the available evidence that the `total' degree of British union 
corruption matched that in the United States. Because of the uneven nature of the 
evidence, however, few certainties can be made 85 Nor can the precise extent and 
distribution of British malpractices be ascertained from this vantage point. But British 
union malpractices were allowed to persist for much longer without external intrusion. 
83 Mcllroy, J., 'Financial Malpractice in British Trade Unions, 1800-1930: The Background to, 
and Consequences of, Hornby v. Close', Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, no. 6, 
1998, pp. 1-64 
" For example, the TGWU executive carefully rationed disclosure of internal debates of 
`breakaway' movements in 1937 (Daily Worker, 9.7.37; Coates, K. and Topham, T., Trade 
Unions in Britain (Spokesman 1980) p. 265). Those wishing to read TGWU records at the 
Modern Records Centre at Warwick University first have to obtain the written permission of 
the union 
85 As of 1985, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) comprised ninety-six `international 
unions', only a handful of which were believed `influenced' or `controlled' by syndicated 
criminals (U. S. President's Commission on Organized Crime, The Edge, p. 290) 
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Leadership qualities 
Of particular note was the treatment afforded to docks union leaderships in `setting a 
tone' that either encouraged or dissuaded corruption or malpractices. Larrowe and 
Kimeldorf compared New York and west coast waterfront executives, finding in 
favour of the latter. 86 A juxtaposition of honest union leadership, tighter control of 
employers and regular income schemes left the Pacific ports with better labour 
relations, far fewer malpractices and a democratically accountable union, it was 
argued. 87 All post-1945 American accounts of the ILA castigated its leaders for 
complicity in graft and thuggery, adding to an already bad situation caused by other 
factors. 
Pearce thus argued thus that `A strong socialist union would have soon eliminated the 
racketeers ... '88 According to Jenkins and Potter, `In Britain - as throughout most of 
Europe - the ideological roots of the labour movement have proved more than 
sufficient to resist racketeering. '89 Pelling echoed this sentiment inasmuch as `Corrupt 
activities ... owed their existence to the weakness of class solidarity among the 
workers and to the absence of effective law enforcement systems in many cities. '90 
Tied to this was a contrast often made when New York was described between 
conniving union leaders against rank and file union members in the port, who as a 
result suffered avoidable work related hardships. 1 
Formally, British dock union leaders clung to an ideology of workers' control, 
frequently associated with honesty in union affairs. Political action was an inherent 
component in the struggle. 2 Yet Ernest Bevin, a giant figure in the British labour 
86 Kimeldorf, Reds or Rackets? p. 46 
87 Larrowe, Shape-Up and Hiring Hall, chapter 4; Kimeldorf, Reds or Rackets? p. 50 
88 Pearce, G., Crimes of the Powerful (Pluto Press 1976) p. 143-4 
89 Jenkins, P. and Potter, G. W., 'Organized Crime in London: A Comparative Perspective', 
Corruption and Reform, vol. 1,1986, pp. 165-87 
90 Pelling, H., American Labor (University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 147 
91 For a list of shared properties of dockwork across countries, read Miller, R., The 
Dockworker Subculture and Some Problems in Cross-Cultural and Cross-Time 
Generalisations', Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 11,1969, pp. 302+ 
92 Taft, P., 'On the Origins of Business Unionism', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 
17,1963, pp. 20-31; Coates, K. and Topham, T., Making of the Labour Movement: The 
Formation of the Transport and General Workers' Union, 1870-1922 (Spokesman Books 
1994) p. 827 
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movement and strongly identified with dock unionism, had, according to Allen, `little 
faith' in political action until the 1920s, and in `industrial' matters Bevin preferred to 
leave politics out of the equation. 3 Industrial cooperation, not conflict, was the order 
of the day for Bevin, as it was for James Sexton and Ben Tillett before him in 
Liverpool and London. 4 Tillett at the London Dockers' Union looked to the state to 
provide a `fairer' framework within which to operate and, like Bevin, was scarcely a 
revolutionary once in office 95 Intellectuals, Bevin argued, `have no responsibility' for 
the consequences of their actions but union leaders `must be consistent, and we have a 
great amount of responsibility. '96 
Although British docks union leaders were never personally tainted with the label of 
corruption, their ideological outlooks rarely interfered with how they related to 
employers. In this, they resembled the ILA leadership. Neither was it obvious how 
high-minded pronouncements by British docks leaders became translated further 
down their organisations, where malpractices were located and appeared impervious 
to appeals and messages from above. In Liverpool, for examples, the dock union 
membership before 1922 was `largely indifferent to the modest political activities of 
its leaders. 97 There was no reason to suppose that their influence with the rank and 
file who operated malpractices was strong or lasting. 
Financial irregularities 
Chapter six details published data on TGWU predecessor docks union malpractices in 
London. Literature on Liverpool, less complete, is presented in chapter five. TGWU 
records allude to isolated cases of officers who were caught defalcating with branch 
93 Allen, V. L., Trade Union Leadership (Longmans, Green and Co. 1957) pp. 87-8. 
94 Bullock, A., The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin: Volume One, Trade Union Leader 1881- 
1940 (Heinemann 1960), p. 252. 
9s Schneer, J., Ben Tillett's Conversion to Independent Labour Politics', Radical History 
Review, vol. 24,1980, pp. 42-6; Schneer, J., Ben Tillett: Portrait of a Labour Leader (Croom 
Helm 1982). 
96 MRC: MSS. 126/TG/61195/TEMP. 44: letter from Ernest Bevin to GDII Cole of 31.12.35 
97 Taplin, E., The Dockers' Union: A Study of the National Union of Dock Labourers, 1889- 
1922 (Leicester University Press 1985), p. 133. 
59 
funds. If caught, they were removed from office or fined, but only if attempts to get a 
refund failed were the police called in. 8 
Nonetheless, a problem of larger-scale theft of union funds was a `live' one for the 
TGWU leadership almost from its creation. Immediately after its establishment in 
1922, for example, the TGWU executive complained of a `very serious number of 
defalcations on the part of branch secretaries, and in some cases permanent officials. ' 
These had only come to light since the amalgamation and `were obviously in 
existence' beforehand . 
99 
Five years on, Bevin complained about `a large number of defalcations' in one TGWU 
area 100 and at the 1931 Biennial Delegate Conference, he warned that the union was 
having `more than we can contend with as far as misappropriation of Union funds is 
concerned from officers of the Union. ' There were a couple of other major 
misappropriations within the Docks Group of the union, which were only discovered 
by accident when men came to claim their benefits. 101 The 1937 Biennial Delegate 
Conference also heard of `large sums collected' from union members `that we know 
nothing of. '102 
Much of the difficulty came from the union's own constitution, geared as it was to 
giving each of its component - like its Docks Group - considerable autonomy, but 
consequently making effective central oversight that more difficult to achieve. '03 
98 MSS: MSS. 126/T&G/1/1/6: list of defalcating TGWU officers, 1922-27; MRC: MSS. 
126/T&G/1/1: Minutes and Record of the Meetings of the General Executive Council (1927? ). 
The Annual Reports of the TGWU Finance Committee contain the relevant data: MRC: MSS. 
126/TG/1/1: TGWU `Minutes and Record of the General Executive Council and the Finance 
and General Purposes Committee. ' 
99 MRC: MSS. 126/T&G/4/1/1: TGWU 1922 Annual Report. 
100 MRC: TGWU paper on administration and efficiency by Bevin (1927). 
10' TGWU Biennial Delegate Conference 1931, pp. 131-2,227,445 
102 TGWU Biennial Delegate Conference 1937, p. 191. 
103 The TGWU's organisation is detailed in Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin: 
Volume One, pp. 158-61,205; Undy, R. and Martin, R., Ballots and Trade Union Democracy 
(Blackwell 1984), p. 85; Baines, D., The Unofficial Movement on the Docks and the Rivalry 
Between the Blue and the White (Warwick University, MA 1982); Parliament, Ministry of 
Labour and National Service, Unofficial Stoppages in the London Docks, pp. 25-6; Jensen, V. 
H., Hiring of Dock Workers and Employment Practices in the Ports of New York, Liverpool, 
London, Rotterdam, and Marseilles (Harvard University Press 1964) pp. 193-4; Coates and 
Topham, Making of the Labour Movement, pp. 823-5. 
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Each industry or group in the TGWU also retained its own methods of collecting 
subscriptions and distributing moneys, creating `a huge problem' by 1939.104 By 
1947, for instance, there were fifty-one member unions in the TGWU, all with their 
own standards and practices inherited from pre-amalgamation days. 105 
Balloting abuses 
How far these comments and cases reflected a more general pattern of abuse is 
difficult to establish but there was clearly a continuing problem that failed to be 
resolved. The strongest evidence of TGWU malpractices relates to electoral 
procedures. Before the 1980s, secret ballots were unusual in the organisation. 
Elections normally functioned through a `show of hands' at special branch meetings, 
leaving the door ajar to manipulation. 
Goldstein writing in the early 1950s had first pointed out the many ways in which a 
small, and largely self-selecting, cadre of branch members could subvert the TGWU 
electoral process. 106 The context was an apathetic rank and file, characterised by 
unusually high turnover levels like the `casual' docks membership. 107 Where ballots 
were mandated under TGWU rules, this by no means assured a `cleanly' run election. 
For example, during a bitter 1955 inter-union struggle on the Salford docks, it was 
claimed `It is a well-known fact that members have voted many more times than they 
are entitled to do under the constitution. ' 108 
Until the 1980s, the main guard against balloting malpractices was TGWU branch 
`scrutineers. ' Elected by branches, they examined the completed ballot forms for any 
signs of irregularity. Two interviewees recalled collusion between branch scrutineers 
1°4 TGWU Biennial Delegate Conference 1939, p. 279 
1°5 TGWU Biennial Delegate Conference 1947, pp. 158-60 
106 Goldstein, The Government of British Trade Unions 
107 Interview with LONK, 20.1.99. The Daily Worker (22.11.32) remarked upon London dock 
union branches being `shut up and in darkness' when a meeting was scheduled. The editor 
commented that `the same is true of most dockers' branches in London. ' Perhaps twenty 
unionists from 150 might regularly attend, the same faces being re-elected at meetings. Even 
the Devlin Report on the future of the docks workforce attracted only a handful of members in 
the Plymouth TGWU branch to discuss it (MRC: MSS. 126/uncatalogued: copy of 16.9.65 
letter from the TGWU District Organiser to the Regional Secretary on the Devlin Report). 
108 Salford city Reporter, 10.6.55 
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and branch officials to get `their' man (who would be expected to ignore ballot 
abuses) elected to the regional TGWU executive. Both worked in the Docks Section 
of the union in London, and differed only in their assessment of how widespread the 
malpractice was. 109 Even where the branch scrutineer was beyond reproach, he found 
it nigh impossible to distinguish one mark on a ballot paper from another next to a 
candidate's name. Scrutineers uncovered a few cases of ballot abuses, but these likely 
as not represented only a small percentage of the whole. 110 
The net result was sizeable balloting corruption in the TGWU, `which may go 
unnoticed. "" It was suggested by those interviewees who had knowledge of them 
that rather than being motivated by greed, balloting abuses were part and parcel of 
political in-fighting within the TGWU. From 1984, the law mandated tighter controls 
over voting arrangements in British unions. Subsequent scandals - which ran up to 
elections for the General Secretaryship of the TGWU - appear to be continuations of 
past practices that had gone unnoticed. 
Publicity was afforded them during 1985, after which elections for the union top job 
was re-run after allegations of ballot rigging. In 1988, there were also allegations of 
ballot rigging inside Region One in London (the biggest) and in 1990 for the TGWU 
executive, involving the tampering of ballot papers at the union's headquarters in 
London. 112 
Union democracy 
Then there was the question of `democratic' governance of the TGWU. Conflicting 
definitions exist of what trade union `democracy' should look like, but as generally 
applied, the term denotes a greater say in the running of the union by its membership. 
109 Interviews with LONG, 21.10.99, LONJ, 7.7.99 
110 E. g. MRC: MSS. 126/TG/1/1/24: TGWU `Minutes and Record of the General Executive 
Council and the Finance and General Purposes Committee, Vol. =V, 1946' pp. 78-9; MSS. 
126/TG/1/1/23: TGWU `Minutes and Record of the General Executive Council and the 
Finance and General Purposes Committee, Vol. XX111,1945' p. 269. 
111 Goldstein, The Government of British Trade Unions, p. 271. 
112 Times, 30.4.85,2.5.85,13.5.85,13.2.88,10.2.90. 
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Bell for example defined `union democracy' as the systematic decentralisation of 
power and authority to all levels of a union's administration. 113 
Utilising this definition, the TGWU did suffer from a deficit in democratic decision- 
making, resulting in many of the membership problems chronicled in later chapters. 
As Hunter noted, `Many dockers looked upon the union not as an organisation for the 
defence and betterment of the conditions of the dockers but as an `overhead charge' 
for the maintenance of their jobs. '114 In an earlier expression of this unrest, in 1931 
the Glasgow docks membership of the TGWU ceded from the union on the question 
of election of branch officers, which the Bevin was against! 15 
The TGWU constitution was permeated with checks and balances, that - on paper - 
gave the rank and file real and continuing influence over the executive. But a strong 
personality (such as Bevin) could dominate proceedings and ram through contentious 
policies such as decasualisation of union labour with the help of a compliant 
executive, as the ILA elite was accused of doing in New York. '16 TGWU General 
Secretaries could often control the Biennial Delegate Conference and they exercised 
very considerable patronage powers. "7 
On so-called `sweetheart' contracts, for which the ILA leadership became notorious, 
Basil Sanderson, the chief employers' negotiator between the wars in Britain, told 
how the TGWU's Bevin informally sought out his opinion `so that Bevin could steer 
his people from pressing for demands which (the employers) advised to be 
impossible. i118 Accommodations such as these entrenched union organisation, and 
113 WA: Daniel Bell Papers, Box 11: article from the 1973 issue of Antioch Review. 
114 Hunter, B., They Knew Why They Fought (Index Books 1994) p. 20. 
115 In court, the Glasgow Sheriff found for the rank and file. An appeal by the TGWU was 
refused after it was heard that branch rules required the re-election every two years of union 
officials. When the London executive decided to close down the Glasgow office as a 
punishment and to recall the nominated officials, the Glasgow men voted to leave the 
organisation to form the Scottish Transport and General Workers' Union (Glasgow Herald, 
3.12,30,17.12.30,14.1.31,29.5.31,22.6.31,26.12.31,28.12.31). But tension between the 
TGWU and STGWU lingered. The TGWU refused to agree to the admission of the STWGU 
to national negotiating bodies, yet the Scottish dockers were bound by decisions made by 
them. 
116 Johnson, M., Crime on the Labor Front (McGraw Hill 1950) 
117 Undy and Martin, Ballots and Trade Union Democracy, pp. 85-7. 
118 Sanderson, B., Ships and Sailing Wax (Heinemann 1967) p. 142. 
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were justified on that ground. But they uneasily fitted in with the ideal of a union set- 
up that was sensitive to rank and file concerns. 
External controls 
British governments were extremely wary of abrogating union powers and the Trades 
Union Congress (TUC), to which the TGWU and most other major British unions 
belonged, took the position that malpractices were for unions to resolve. Illustrating 
this in Britain was a 1958 scandal within the 241,000-member Electrical Trades Union 
(ETU). The mainstream press, meanwhile, was indifferent to coverage of the topic of 
union misdeeds. 
ETU branch returns were falsified wholesale and legitimate votes improperly 
disqualified. From 650 branches that participated in the election, for the position of 
general secretary of the union, the votes in 112 were later ruled to be invalid. 119 The 
affair was part of a Communist campaign to control the union. Nonetheless, the TUC 
failed to act on evidence of ballot abuses until 1961 and then only after a highly 
visible court case, when the ETU was expelled from the TUC. Critics observed that 
the TUC refused to launch its own enquiry earlier, which Rule Thirteen gave it the 
power to do. 120 
Government unwillingness to become involved in union practices was articulated in 
its passing the buck back to the TUC and ETU to quietly resolve away from the 
political limelight. 121 This stance left the chief external means to control British 
unions in the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, but his ability to regulate union 
practices was severely restricted. 122 
119 Hunter, B., Lifelong Apprenticeship: The Life and Times of a Revolutionary Volume 1: 
1920-1958 (Index Books and Porcupine Press 1997) p. 386. 
120 Manchester Guardian, 24.9.58 
121 Times, 19.2.60 
122 Times, 14.3.60; Wigham, E., What's Wrong with the Unions? (Penguin 1961) p. 18. For 
the High Court libel case, consult: Rolph, C. H., All Those in Favour? (Andre Deutsch 1962) 
MRC files on the ETU case are located at MSS. 127/NU/GS/3/88 and MSS. 292/91/90-94. A 
government-sponsored attempt to regulate British union affairs in the 1980s was a feeble 
shadow of the comparable situation in the United States. Powers given to the Commissioner 
for the Rights of Trade Union Members were confined to assisting individual union members 
with grievances to get compensation. The whole system, even after the `reform, ' relied upon 
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British media interest in union corruption was also nugatory, in contrast to the 
American example. The Times' reaction to the Goldstein revelations of TGWU 
irregularities in 1952 was revealing. In stressing, `It is indeed disturbing to recognise 
by how small a number of its members fail to recognise their responsibility, ' the 
newspaper saved its editorial thunder to criticising the apathy of the TGWU branch 
membership for the malpractices Goldstein found, but there was no equivalent call as 
in New York for police intervention or for reforms to the regulatory process. 123 
Differences 
One area where genuine diversity existed with the New York docks union was in the 
matter of the remuneration of union bosses and private sector participation. As the 
New York State Crime Commission stated, this became associated on the New York 
docks with practices that could compromise union goals. 124 A similar conflation of 
public and private business interests was also seen within the U. S. shipping industry in 
the 1930s. 125 This was alien in the British context, but more common in American 
unions and had been criticised before from inside the ILA. 126 
`The ILA's structure, ' noted the President's Commission on Organized Crime, `allows 
an interlocking directorate of individuals who are handsomely paid. '127 1960s ILA 
President Teddy Gleason, for example, was involved in several union posts 
simultaneously worth $56,405, and had an interest in a resort and import firm. There 
individual union members coming forward, despite the possible damaging consequences for 
them in the workplace or for their future employment prospects. But the Commissioner could 
not initiate investigations, nor could he explore union structures encouraging abuses. The 
Commissioner was also forbidden from involving himself in the task of promoting greater 
`democracy' in British unionism (interview with LIVM, 25.6.99) 
123 Times, 11.7.52 
124 New York State Crime Commission, Fourth Report (New York May 1953) pp. 33-35 
125 During the 1930s, for instance, the U. S. Shipping Board was prone to corrupt relationships, 
in which T. V. O'Connor, a former ILA President and Shipping Board Chairman to 1933, was 
implicated. As in any other industry, British or American, back-door deal making went on. 
116 The 1919 ILA Convention in Galveston listened to charges that Paul Kelly, a union vice- 
president in Brooklyn, owned a construction firm and Dick Butler, another union official, 
owned a detective agency, practices outlawed under the union constitution. Kelly (real name 
Paolo Vaccarelli) was promptly removed from office, and went to found the short-lived 
Riverfront Workers' Affiliation, a protective society that included Emil Camarda, who 
himself went on to become an important personality in the ILA until he was killed in 1942. 
127 President's Commission on Organized Crime, The Edge (March 1986) p. 45 
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were undeniable differences in this with the TGWU. Ernest Bevin, its Secretary, 
received £650 as a salary along with a small expense allowance. 
Conclusion 
Much of the perceived and reported `difference' in vulnerability to corruption in the 
American and British union situations may be put down to divergent ways of 
addressing this issue at union and especially at governmental levels. Until 1980s 
reforms, British trade unions were `pretty much regarded as being self-regulatory. '128 
Posing a contrast between the `corrupt' east coast ILA organisation and British docks 
unions, as Kimeldorf does, is to create a false polarity owing far more to stereotypes 
than to reality. 129 
Ideologically, the ILA's constitution and policies were `progressive' in many aspects. 
As early as 1905, the then-ILA president told his convention that the men should 
receive `the full share of the wealth that their labour creates and the enjoyment of 
humane conditions. ' 130 In addition, the ILA favoured state ownership of the docks, if 
necessary. During the Depression, ILA leader Ryan expounded an 'under- 
consumption' theory of the economic crisis that implied massive state expenditure. 131 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the assertion of Liddick, the Smith paradigm does therefore engage at a 
high level with the subject of social change, by viewing images of industrial 
malpractices as subject to a moving societal and politicised dynamic. 132 According to 
Smith, `organized crime and the crimes of business are the results of the process by 
which political (that is, value-based) constraints are placed on economic activity. '133 
`Who' operates docks malpractices, or what groups they are said to `represent, ' 
128 Interview with LIVM, 25.6.99 
129 Kimeldorf, Reds or Rackets?, p. 50. 
130 WA: 1905 ILA Proceedings, p. 18 
131 Russell, M., Men Along the Shore: The ILA and Its History (Brussel and Brussel 1966) p. 
87; MRC: Report of the Trades Union Congress Proceedings, September 1931, pp. 384-5 
132 Liddick, D., The Mob's Daily Number: Organized Crime and the Numbers Gambling 
Industry (University Press of America 1998) p. 151. 133 Smith, 'White-Collar Crime, ' p. 33 
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become a secondary field of exploration to perceiving docks practices as economic 
enterprises pure and simple. 
The spectrum framework may be subdivided. First is the global strand, in which 
dominant perceptions of docks processes become stigmatised by social and political 
pressures for partisan objectives. Attacks in New York on the ILA's practices can 
therefore be viewed as a barometer of the oscillating political power of organized 
labour in the city and at state level at particular periods of its history. 
A `subjective' approach when applied to localised malpractices involves the notion of 
`legitimate' job actions, sometimes connected to feeling of class hostility and the idea 
of `just rewards. ' As Miller argued, `The belief persists in dockland that employers are 
ruthless, and they care only for profit and are capable of resorting to all kinds of 
trickery and subterfuge in order to exact the last ounce of effort from the 
dockworkers134 
The notion of `legitimate' malpractices as opposed to the legality of practices is a 
departure from the strict application of spectrum theory, but it better captures the 
feelings of the men and, with the existence of structured, `material' opportunities to 
practise them, accounted for the accepted quality of most cases of malpractices. 
Questions over the legitimacy of malpractices are not to deny the fact of objective 
forces supplying a general framework in which they took place and in which issues of 
legitimacy were formed and shaped. Insights stressed in British accounts like 
piecework payments, union difficulties and unhelpful labour markets were of obvious 
importance, exploiting structural and organisational weaknesses. 
Furthermore, neglected port facilities interfaced with day-to-day dockwork, giving 
good enough `reason' for dockworkers to feel aggrieved at their work circumstances, 
and strengthening a case some made that malpractices making up for such 
shortcomings were acceptable uses of their economic power. The also influenced 
dockworkers' willingness to put up with slowly operating adjustment systems tied to 
wider port structures. As Leggett reported, when examining the causes of unrest in 
1 Miller, The Dockworker Subculture, ' p. 309. 
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London, `Although the lack of amenities does not appear to have been a direct cause 
of strikes, it has been a constant source of irritation, and there can be no doubt that the 
general attitude of dock workers t employers and to the community is greatly affected 
by conditions which are so often primitive and degrading. '135 
Although chapters five to seven will delineate various `malpractices' as economic or 
`objective' forms, how they informed policies was subjectively determined. Reactions 
to docks practices and malpractices were inevitably value-laden even though 
economic relations remained relatively constant from one historical epoch to another. 
While political constructions did not occur in a context devoid of economic relations, 
so docks practices were linked to political initiatives that re-engineered them and 
altered their image and legal status. In the process, investigations became skewed, 
with waterfront writers taking their cue from governmental commissions and similarly 
`politicised' institutions. 
Chapter three explores the changing economic and, to a lesser degree, the political 
contexts within which employment practices and malpractices were performed. 
Traditional assumptions about the seriousness of hiring corruption are challenged by 
viewing them as operating within the context of a highly competitive industrial 
scenario. The chapter also stresses divergences interlocking hiring regimes to external 
and internal systems. 
135 Ministry of Labour and National Service, Unofficial Stoppages in the London Docks, cmd. 
8236(1951)p. 29 
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CHAPTER THREE 
HIRING PRACTICES AND MALPRACTICES 
INTRODUCTION 
According to Turnbull and Kelly, control over the docks hiring process lay at the core 
of union activities, as its justification for being. ' The size of the `casual' dock 
population to the `regular' dockworking workforce varied by general economic 
conditions, union policies, customary practices and other initiatives to limit the labour 
supply. Many of these forces and dynamics and any `rake offs' that went with them 
were within the orbit of state action, drawing governments into the question of hiring 
malpractices. 
A second tier of misconduct, once hiring had finished and work commenced aboard 
vessels, is left for chapter four. Hiring systems influenced other waterfront working 
practices. As Hill has remarked, hiring processes were only `the most extreme form of 
a type of social relationship that was inherent in dock work. 'Z Networks of corruption 
started at the hiring stage and reduced the chances that other illicit practices would be 
uncovered. 
In terms of theory, the legitimacy of hiring malpractices was low. Regular workers 
had little need to bribe employers for work, and viewed them with disfavour, while 
those who were its `natural constituents' were divided by the malpractice, depending 
on who `gained' from them. Port authorities and unions were equally opposed. 
Because of this, bribery scams depended almost wholly on `opportunity structures' 
rather than their being underpinned by a strong sense of legitimacy or entitlement. 
1 Turnbull, P. Woolfson, C. and Kelly, J., Dock Strike: Conflict and Restructuring in Britain's 
Ports (Avebury 1992) p. 8 
2 Hill, S., The Dockers: Class and Tradition in London (Heinemann 1976) pp. 19-20. 
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THE HIRING PROCESS 
Most dock labour was engaged on a `temporary' basis. Even the more reliable and 
harder-working labourers could be laid off if there was no work available. When few 
ships were berthed, labour would be discarded in large numbers, though core workers 
were usually given other work to do, perhaps working on a quay, until another vessel 
arrived. 
In New York called the `shape-up', in Liverpool and London the `call-on', the general 
hiring sequence meant the employment of most dock gangs - more rarely individuals 
- on the basis of a minimum engagement time negotiated, after unions gained power, 
through joint committees 3 Out-of-work benefits became available, but these rarely 
compensated adequately for loss of work. In 1967, the decisive break was made in 
Liverpool and London, when most dock employment was made permanent. In New 
York, a four hours' minimum employment among longshore workers achieved after 
1945 was retained throughout. 
Because each pier or dock functioned as a separate market for dock labour for much 
of the period covered, this produced a disjointed hiring system in which the match 
between the demand for labour and its supply was rarely fully met in the fashion 
predicted in classical economic theory. Every pier or terminal `becomes a hiring 
station, and the average longshoreman never knows whether or not he will be 
' Numerous accounts of the typical New York shape-up mode of engagement exist, for 
example those by the U. S. Congress, Committee on Commerce and Committee on Education 
and Labor, Amending the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, hearings 75th Congress 3rd Session 
1938; Vorse, M. H., The Pirates' Nest of New York', Harper's Magazine, vol. 204, April 1952, 
pp. 27-37; Russell, M., Men Along the Shore: The ILA and Its History (Brussel and Brussel 
1966) pp. 95-6; Barnes, C. B., The Longshoremen (Arno Press 1977) chapter 5; Larrowe, C. 
P., Shape-Up and Hiring Hall: A Comparison of Hiring Methods on the New York and Seattle 
Waterfronts (University of California Press 1955) pp. 52-4; Swanstrom, E. E., The Waterfront 
Labor Problem: A Study in Decasualization and Unemployment Insurance (Fordham 
University Press 1938) pp. 27-8; Jensen, V. H., Hiring of Dock Workers and Employment 
Practices in the Ports of New York, Liverpool, London, Rotterdam, and Marseilles (Harvard 
University Press 1964) pp. 21-5. Descriptions of the London call-on are as abundant. See for 
example Anderson, J., Anchor and Hope (Hodder and Stoughton 1980) p. 74; Schweitzer, P. 
and Wegner, C. (eds. ), On the River: Memories of a Working River (Age Exchange 1989) p. 
121; Schneer, J., Ben Tillett: Portrait of a Labour Leader (Croom Helm 1982) pp. 14-5. 
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employed at a given pier or when hired how long he will remain on the job, ' as one 
survey for New York noted. 
THE INDUSTRIAL CONTEXT 
In theory the majority of portworkers could be displaced after about four hourss (the 
precise length depending on the port and time in question). But in reality substantial 
numbers of dockworkers were kept on for longer. Higher skilled or more experienced 
hands for instance stood a better chance of being kept on. Inasmuch as this was the 
case, bribery practices were less significant a factor than allowed for, certainly in the 
American sources and for New York. 
The question then became ones of explaining why accusations of hiring bribery 
assumed the profile they did, notably in New York. Part of the answer lay in political 
developments, while another part of the explanation lay in rank and file hostility to 
key union strategies or the means of achieving them. 
Hiring malpractices - overview 
Hiring bosses could exploit their position to demand or to accept illegal payments. 
Socially isolated gangs and (less commonly) individuals in the jobs market were the 
most susceptible to the malpractice, which could shade across from the more common 
practice of favouritism. Inducements of many kinds could pass, according to reports, 
between men wanting work and hiring bosses with the power to give favours, with 
bribes ranging from straight money disbursements to free drinks in public houses, or 
to the patronage of boarding houses `recommended' by hiring foremen. 
4 'Longshore Labor Conditions and Port Decasualization in the United States', Monthly Labor 
Review, vol. 37 no. 6 (December 1933) 
S U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, no. 550, Cargo Handling and 
Longshore Labor Conditions, Washington, DC. 1932, p. 73 
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Extent of hiring abuses 
Literature sometimes gave an undue influence to the more extreme aspects of hiring 
processes, as representing the norm and requiring imminent state action. This 
distorted their analyses. Outside of specialised or relatively isolated groups, few 
guarantees of work were offered in any of these ports. But this `reality' was obscured 
by rights and practices built up over decades. Through continuity and registration 
(Liverpool and London) and seniority (New York) agreements, employment was 
made less irregular over time, although hiring malpractices were never wholly 
eliminated. 
Better-paid work, for example, could be offered in London and New York to those 
dockworkers making above-agreement `contributions' to those in charge of job 
assignments. Unless the relevant agreement was doggedly enforced, rarely the norm, 
the best work paying overtime, for example, could go to work gangs with 
`connections. '? Historically, this was an improvement on the old problem, which 
centred on a more basic problem of whether men would work or not. 
Leaving aside bureaucratic controls over the hiring function, another major reason for 
a relative stability of employment for substantial parts of the labour force was the need 
by employers to * avoid disruption to timetables caused by dockworker shirking or by 
sheer incompetence. Over time, unions and employers associated better quality labour 
with union men. 8 The non-unionised group was useful though to employers for labour 
disciplining, in their role as strikebreakers. 
In the main, employers prized reliability and performance over either cheapness or the 
ability of budding portworkers to form corrupt relationships with hiring foremen. 
This was the case in all the ports. A possible exception was in the use of fresh or 
`green' hands, who might gain an initial edge or `corner' on the local labour market 
through illegal means. Another situation would be with the less critical work, where 
6 Interview with NYH, 2.4.00; Hill, The Dockers, p. 19 
7 Interview with NYH, 2.4.00 
8 See Bean, R., 'Employers' Associations in the Port of Liverpool 1890-1914, ' International 
Review of Social History, vol. XXI (1976) pp. 358-382 for the situation in Liverpool. 
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sheer muscle power came before the ability to operate safely. Even in these situations, 
nevertheless, a man had to quickly `prove' himself on the job, otherwise he would 
likely as not be passed over at the next hiring episode. 
Employers were loath to let experienced men go. The `open' shape-up in New York 
was adapted over time to take into account a `regular' gang structure .9 By 1919, dock 
labourers in New York could be divided into two groupings - those who secured a 
regular living from a few firms of employers as opposed to the `rest', often used to fill 
in when a regular dockworker there was absent. 10 
One successful and repeatedly deployed alternative to remaining within the ranks of 
casual workers, or to participating in bribery scams, `was to work consistently hard as 
an extra in the hope of being noticed. " Dockworkers who regularly and 
conscientiously reported for work at one pier or dock, even if no work was 
immediately secured, became `known' to hiring bosses for their keenness to work and 
would expect to be selected for employment when available. 12 
As one former portworker in New York summed it up, `you're not gonna hire some 
big fat bloke who you know will put you out of business. '13 John Hovey, a long- 
established contractor in London, also explained how, `the master stevedore who 
could produce the most, best and fastest workers aboard an owner's vessel was certain 
of success. '14 On average, port gang members who knew each other and worked 
together regularly were more likely to develop a good pace to their work, increasing 
profits for a contractor or a shipowner. 
9 Further discussed in chapter seven. 
10 Squires, B. M., 'The Strike of the Longshoremen at the Port of New York', Monthly Labor 
Review, vol. 9 no. 6, pp. 95-115 
11 Davis, CJ., ' Formation and Reproduction of Dockers as an Occupational Group, ' in Davies, 
S et al (eds. ), Dock Workers: International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 
1790-1970 (Ashgate Publishing, 2000), p. 557. 
12 U. S. Office of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Section of Labor Relations, 
Hours, Wages, and Working Conditions in Domestic Water Transportation, p. 143. 
13 Interview with NYW, 6.4.99 
14 Hovey, J., A Tale of Two Ports: London and Southampton (The Industrial Society 1990) p. 
18. 
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`Nepotism' performed a similar stabilising function in regulating hiring practices, 
being first reported in London's nineteenth century private docks, where the custom 
was rife among dock company staff members. 15 Family members were indeed 
preferred where they were available, because kin were expected to impose a high 
degree of group self-discipline, to themselves and to the employers' good. At other 
times, though, family `solidarity' could work against an employer if there was a 
dispute. 16 
The `losers' in this situation, who failed to make the movement from casual to regular 
gang member, could blame their failure on cronyism and to the passing of favours. 
Helping in this were disjointed communications channels. Jealousies were no doubt 
the origin of many rumours of payoffs, though not without enough of a grain of truth 
to give them a constant force. 
One survey, in Manchester docks for instance, found that `corrupt' relationships 
alluded to by some of the portworkers interviewed were `no more than the normal 
social contacts of everyday life'; on the contrary, foremen were always on the lookout 
for reasonably efficient gangs to employ. '7 This conclusion is consistent with that of a 
similar Merseyside study in 1930, in which no concrete evidence was found of 
kickbacks in that port related to employment. 18 
Within the highly competitive docks markets, hiring bosses were not irreplaceable and 
if dockworkers they selected were not up to scratch, foremen could find themselves 
demoted sooner or later back to the ranks (from whence they usually came). 19 Thus, 
although first hiring events could be influenced, on occasion, by illegal `favours, ' 
overarching commercial pressures meant that a man seeking work would probably not 
be re-engaged if he were seen as unproductive. 
is See MID: `Alphabetical Name Index to Private Dock Company Establishment Books and 
Registers' (1988), indicating staff employed with the same surnames 
16 MRC: MSS. 126/EB/PI/22/1-4: Port Labour Inquiry: Draft Report (1930) p. 31 
17 University of Liverpool, Social Research Series, The Dock Worker: An Analysis of 
Conditions of Employment in the Port of Manchester (Liverpool University Press 1956) pp. 
72-4. 
18 Hanham, F. G., Report of Enquiry into Casual Labour in the Merseyside Area (Henry 
Young and Son 1930) p. 14. 
19 MID: BPA Box 254: Devlin Committee of Inquiry (9.12.55). 
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ATTRACTIONS OF DECASUALISATION 
The presentation of dock labour markets presented by the majority of published 
sources, particularly those of U. S. origin, therefore remains at the level of a partial 
understanding. In reality, port relations and engagement patterns offered more 
complexity than they suggest. 
A problem nonetheless existed, at its extreme, for the so-called `casual casuals' who 
often only worked for the minimum engagement time and who faced the most 
hazardous working conditions 2° The provision of accident compensation for the 
highly irregular fraction of the workforce was severely hindered by the system21 while 
the rank and file rankled at the `cattle market' aspects on show in more `casualised' 
ports such as Liverpool. 
The loyalty of irregularly employed men to the industry was, in many cases, fragile 
and conditional. This made casual dockworkers, on the whole, reputedly less reliable 
and prone to indulge in malpractices. 2 Casualism also hindered the growth of union 
organisation and exacerbated the problem of minority interests dominating dock 
branch matters and encouraging malpractices as described in chapter two and 
subsequent chapters. 
BARRIERS TO DECASUALISATION 
Facing would-be waterfront decasualisers were powerful social, economic and 
commercial interests and arguments: 
20 McElroy and McCormack reported in 1944 that `Most of the circumstances which lead to 
accidents in longshore work could have been corrected very easily were it not for the 
industry's two outstanding characteristics - casual employment for short periods and 
continuous pressure for speed' (McElroy, F. S. and McCormack, G. R., `Injuries and Accident 
Causes in the Longshore Industry' Monthly Labor Review, vol. 58 no. 1 (January 1944) p. 4). 
21 U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Compensation for Employees in Certain 
Maritime Employments, 69th Congress, 1 Session 1926, p. 77. 
22 Lord Devlin was most associated with this view (Parliament, Ministry of Labour. 
Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain Matters Concerning the 
Port Transport Industry, Final Report, cmd. 2734 (1965)). 
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" Employer opposition. The labour surplus associated with casual employment 
(although not a necessary correlation with it) kept wage levels down and could 
be used to discipline the men. Idle portworkers were no cost to capital. By 
and large employers, when given a choice, were also against regularisation 
schemes as giving docks unions more power than they thought appropriate or 
safe. 
" Many dockworkers preferred to either work hard for part of the week, on good 
wages, or to take up part time jobs in other sectors while recuperating from the 
physically demanding work. 
" Sufficient numbers of portworkers, which had `discovered a capacity to assert 
their sectional interests, ' were granted semi-permanent or `steady' 
employment status so as to diffuse discontent over the plight of less regularly 
used counterparts. 23 Decasualisation was also a `problem' if it intersected with 
informal arrangements. In 1950, for example, the stevedores' union in London 
refused to cooperate with a major local employer for permanently employed 
gangs to handle its cargoes, since it would mean a `surrender of customs and 
privileges they enjoy. '24 
" Casual dockworkers feared that total numbers employed would be reduced if 
decasualisation were energetically proceeded with. In addition, work 
disciplinary regimes would be tightened up and permanently employed men 
would lose their traditional freedom of manoeuvre. 
" London and New York waterfronts were arguably too large to decasualise 
wholesale. New York's waterfront was as big as London, Liverpool, and four 
other major western European ports combined . 
25 Pre-1945 decasualisation 
schemes such as those on the American Pacific coast tended to be successful 
where the port was comparatively compact, one reason why Merseyside was 
23 Quote from Lovell, J., 'Sail, Steam and Emergent Dockers' Unionism in Britain, 1850-1914', 
International Review of Social History, vol. XXX1 1,1987, p. 249 
24 Journal of Commerce, 14.4.50 
25 Murphy, M. J., An Administrative Study of the Origin and Development of the Waterfront 
Commission of New York Harbor Through 1958 (Masters degree. City College of the City of 
New York 1961) 
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singled out for a pioneering scheme of this type in 1912, but hardly 
representative of London or New York. 26 
" As a rule, decasualisation schemes were more popular with employers when 
trade was strong, by permitting them to more readily crack down on time- 
wasting practices and contain wages, since disciplinary functions would be 
strengthened. Equally, dockers tended to have less use for them when there 
was plenty of work about and they could pick and choose from a choice of 
jobs. 7 
" The major means of spreading out work by joint agreement on the American 
West Coast, in rotational hiring, was seriously flawed according to its critics. 
It made the port concerned less efficient, since employers were compelled to 
take on union labour whatever its skills and experience, according to the New 
York Shipping Association (NYSA) and ILA. Even during wartime, the 
NYSA maintained this line, since it `would bring confusion' and a drop in 
output per man 28 Likewise, London employers argued in the early 1930s that 
`if the foreman has simply got to take in rotation whoever comes forward, he 
will only have a collection of individuals, ' not a tightly knit team that are the 
best for the job 29 
" Unless decasualisation measures were accompanied by the limiting of 
dockworker numbers (a position the ILA was loath to impose on its constituent 
units) all other efforts would fail, since earnings `equalisation' schemes would 
depress average earnings. 
Above all, the movement of most forms of shipping was difficult to predict and any 
grand schemes would run up against a globally fluctuating demand for dock labour. 
Smaller schemes could in large measure absorb variations in demand, but this was not 
the case with London or New York, where because of their scale even dedicated 
26 See for example a comment by NYW that, in New York, campaigners against the `shape' in 
the early 1950s had no clearly defined or `well developed' substitute for it (interview 15.4.00). 
27 Sunday Times, 13.12.64 
28 NYT, 22.11.42, New York State Crime Commission, Record of the Public Hearings-on the 
Recommendations of the New York State Crime Commission for Remedying Conditions on the 
Waterfront of the Port of New York, New York, 8-9 June 1953, p. 221 
29 MRC: MSS. 126/EB/PL: Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Port Labour Committee, 
11.12.30 
77 
reformers thought in terms of income assistance rather than permanency of 
employment until the 1960s. 
Some regularity of employment was evident even where bureaucratic schemes were 
absent. Together, they gave many dock gangs sufficient security of earnings as to 
make the alternatives such as proffering bribery money less relevant. Their chief 
drawbacks were their localism and a lack of powers to enforce them, especially if an 
employer threatened to withdraw from a dock or pier. 
Employer schemes 
Employer-run schemes were of the utmost importance before union controls were 
installed. The most elaborate were found in London. Port of London Authority 
(PLA) clerical and warehouse staff could be awarded, if they proved themselves, 
permanent `staff' status. Since the PLA operation was so large, it provided for a 
series of internal labour markets facilitating better earnings without friction. Oram for 
example recalled how during the depression of the 1930s, the PLA operated a 
`rotation' system for employing its own labourers as a better choice than the other 
option of large-scale layoffs 30 
Conjoined with these initiatives were much smaller schemes, chiefly involving the 
larger shipping enterprises. 1 They tied `better' workers (a minority) to the firm in 
question by offering monthly or weekly engagements, occasionally with a pension and 
paid vacations attached. Unionists distrusted this class of labour as over-dependent on 
an operational employer for their privileges. 2 Although declining in overall 
importance, as late as the 1970s, employer run plans were evident in New York. The 
Grace Line for instance used its own `in house' gangs until it moved operations to 
Florida 33 
30 Oram, R. B., The Dockers' Tragedy (Hutchinson and Co. 1970) p. 134 31 Bean, R., 'Employers' Associations in the Port of Liverpool 1890-1914, ' International 
Review of Social History, vol. XXI (1976) p. 372 
32 Regular dockworkers because of this were reluctant to come out on strike with their 
workmates. 
33 This was the case for example with the Grace lines, that installed permanent `house' gangs 
on the understanding that they would be guaranteed good earnings (with regular overtime) in a 
rotation system, to even out earnings. `Extra' gangs were excluded from the system and its 
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Rank and file work-sharing and seniority schemes 
For rank and file dockworkers excluded from these arrangements, there were other 
alternatives without recourse to bribery. Rank and file sponsored practices could be 
highly effective a tool in asserting traditional rights and prerogatives, alongside threats 
of a downing of tools if challenged. Their biggest drawbacks were their restricted 
scope, and the fact that they could not be enforced through joint committee means. 
The father-son connection was paramount in these exchanges, and was incorporated in 
British dockworker registration systems. On occasion moving almost imperceptibly 
across into `malpractices', informal practices could be unstable. Despite this, the 
force of tradition and a willingness to enforce them through collective action gave 
them a considerable force that employers had to reckon with. 
When unofficial `pier rights' there were not respected by an employer, this accounted 
for an untold number of walk-offs. 4 New York unionised hiring foremen were 
expected as a matter of course to take on union members first whether this was laid 
down in agreements or not. 5 (The New York State Crime Commission viewed this as 
a means by which criminal control of the waterfront was maintained. ) Foremen were 
also enrolled in the TGWU in Liverpool and London, no doubt for the same reason of 
benefits. The scheme created, it was felt, loyalty to the line. (interview with NYN, New York, 
11.4.00). Older examples are mentioned in Swanstrom, E. E., The Waterfront Labor Problem: 
A Study in Decasualization and Unemployment Insurance (Fordham University Press 1938) 
pp. 84-5; Mayor's Committee on Unemployment, Report on Dock Employment in New York 
City and Recommendations for its Regularization (New York, October 1916), pp. 36-7 
m The authority of foremen was, indeed, always conditional on the rank and file `accepting' it, 
as illustrated in 1919 on the White Star Line Pier 60, in which a foreman sacked a man, 
provoking a spontaneous walk-off. The foreman was moved to another pier (U. S. National 
Adjustment Commission, Chairman's Report for the Period Ending December 31,1918, 
Washington, D. C. 1920, pp. 130-1). For the general thrust, read: U. S. Congress house 
Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee No. 3, New York New Jersey Waterfront 
Commission Compact, hearing 83rd Congress 1st Session 1953, p. 229; New York State 
Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5)... Pursuant to the Governor's Executive Orders of 
March 29,1951 and November 13,1952, vol. 4, pp. 2365-9. 
35 Examples of union influence over the selection of hiring bosses were reported in: U. S. 
Congress, Senate. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Waterfront Investigation: 
New York New Jersey: Interim Report, Report No. 653.83rd Congress 1st Session 1953, pp. 
13-4,22; New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 1, pp. 110-1, 
176-81,291,453-4,564-5,589-95; vol. 5, pp. 3770-3; NYT, 9.8.49,14.1.51,4.7.52. 
79 
guaranteeing preference arrangements in hiring. 6 It was not wholly correct, therefore, 
to contend that ordinary portworkers had little or no voice in hiring matters, as British 
interviewees and written sources conceiving the `dockworker-as-victim' were prone to 
imply 37 
There were various unwritten `seniority' rules in Liverpool and London to try to take 
on labour with the greatest longevity but with no means of enforcement in joint 
agreements at least. An interaction of formalised seniority agreements and the 
Guaranteed Annual Income (GAI) in New York from 1966 made the New York 
system more robust, although it remained short of the ideal of permanent employment 
achieved in Britain in September 1967 
New York and Britain compared 
There was also the question of the desirability of compulsory plans, that the ILA at 
most organisational levels was known to be deeply against 38 Decasualisation plans 
developing before 1945 were, like the Liverpool scheme, dependent on the 
cooperation of the joint parties. By sharp contrast, The TGWU elite never seriously 
questioned the wisdom or appropriateness of decasualisation, until it became `almost 
an article of faith within the union. '39 
More so than was probably true in Liverpool or London, New York unions were 
internally divided, giving its constituent units unusual influence. 40 In the absence of 
registration, the ILA pursued its agenda through a unionisation program for hiring 
bosses. It was by no means alone in having authority over the choice as hiring 
36 MID. Minutes of Meeting of Port of London Joint Committee, 16.10.36. 
37 For samples of these views, consult Dash, J., Good Morning Brothers (London Borough of 
Tower Hamlets 1987); Eimers, C. and Warner, A., Dockland Life (Mainstream 1991); Hunter, 
B., They Knew Why They Fought (Index Books 1994) 
See the transcript in New York State Crime Commission, Record of the Public 
Hearings... on the Recommendations of the New York State Crime Commission for Remedying 
Conditions on the Waterfront of the Port of New York, New York, 8-9 June 1953. This was 
Joe Ryan's position (NYT, 14.5.44). 
39 Jackson, M. P., Policy Making in Trade Unions (Avebury 1991) p. 110. 
40 Frankel, E. G. and Marcus, H. S., Ocean Transportation, Cambridge (MIT Press 1973) pp. 
417,420 
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foreman on a job, which was in fact a requirement in other U. S. industries such as 
printing, the meat sector and within other AFL affiliates 41 
One positive by-product of the `casual' system was a relatively good hourly 
remuneration in which, perhaps, a living wage could be earned in three or four days 42 
The New York union therefore adopted a deliberate strategy of negotiating better 
hourly rates `to a level that could provide a decent income, no matter how irregular the 
employment. '43 
Summary 
British employers remained sufficiently hostile, and united, to help delay the full 
implementation of decasualisation proposals into the 1960s, whatever theorists of 
docks malpractices asserted about their `frailty' before allegedly powerful unions. For 
as employer practices were decentralised, so were docks union ones. Standoff often 
resulted, in which the status quo was preserved and malpractices protected 
Formalised seniority agreements in New York developed from 1955, largely operated 
by the union. When properly enforced, they did afford a similar level of security of 
employment to longer serving men to that enjoyed by Liverpool and London men 
before 1967. Although `fall back' income was not provided for, New York seniority 
agreements were designed to combat hiring favouritism by reserving first employment 
opportunities to longer serving men. `Time served' New Yorkers were therefore 
comparatively privileged until 1967, but only so long as the seniority system in the 
port was policed effectively. 
What was omitted was the position of New York's casuals, who remained in a 
comparatively vulnerable situation, and who could be picked out for work, as before, 
at the discretion of the foremen. Thus malpractices were by no means totally 
41 Cook, A. H. and Gray, L. S., 'Labor Relations in New York City', Industrial Relations, vol. 
5 no. 3,1966, p. 93 
42 Citizens' Waterfront Committee, The New York Waterfront, New York 1946, p. 17 
43 Montgomery, D., The Fall of the House of Labor (Cambridge University Press 1987) p. 104 
44Cf. Jensen, V. H., 'Hiring Practices and Employment Experience of Longshoremen in the 
Port of New York', International Labor Review, vol. LXXVII no. 4,1958, pp. 342-69 
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eradicated in New York since they performed a valuable function in spite of the 
general upgrading of longer working dockworkers. In all three localities, 
`backhanders' persisted as a route towards enhanced wages or conditions. 
HIRING MALPRACTICES AND RECOGNITION QUESTIONS 
Waterfront unionism trod a delicate position throughout its history between industrial 
militancy, reflecting a `membership rights' agenda, and the reality that a lasting 
relationship with employers would only emerge from compromise. When perceived 
as resulting in undue caution, the contradiction generated whispering campaigns by 
disaffected and impatient dockworker unionists. Many allegations of corrupt hiring 
practices originated from the friction that union policy produced. Within New York, 
this interrelated with wider political and cultural forces, as understood in chapter two, 
to view the hiring role as riddled in corruption. 
During negotiations, employers always insisted on safeguards from the union side 
requiring fewer downing of tools, better output and better timekeeping from labour for 
concessions on their part, sometimes flying in the face of customary practices 45 
Evidence for this was clear, for instance, from the Shaw Inquiry proceedings in 1920, 
when London employers demanded better tradeoffs for their making moves on wages 
and hours. 6 The Dockers' Union in London had a firm rule that no stoppages were to 
be upheld `until the question at issue has been negotiated ... '47 Bevin, for the TGWU, 
like his New York counterpart ILA President Joseph P. Ryan, viewed agreements as 
sacrosanct, `in which strikes and lock-outs were treated as weapons of last resort. '48 
as CA: D42/C1/285: `Dockers' Inquiry - Safeguards' (13.4.20). " Parliament, House of Commons, Report by a Court of Inquiry Concerning Transport 
Workers - Wages and Conditions of Employment of Dock Labour, and. 55,1920, pp. 13-6, 
PRO: LAB2/688/5: `Report by a Court of Inquiry Concerning Transport Workers Wages and 
Conditions of Employment of Dock Labour', CA: D42/C1/285: `Dockers' Inquiry - 
Safeguards' (13.4.20). CA: D42/C1/285: memorandum of 13.4.20 on the Shaw Enquiry notes 
that the NTWF promised to deliver better discipline and productivity in return for a half-day 
minimum engagement. For the full text of the 1920 Shaw Court award, see MSS. 
126/uncatalogued: The National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry `National 
Agreement of 5th May, 1920 ... ' Enfield, May 1920; also The Liverpool Daily Post and 
Mercury, 7.5.20. 
47 MRC: MSS. 159/3/B/64: letter dated 5.3.09 from Ben Tillett to the ITWF. 
'8 Bullock, A., The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin: Volume One, Trade Union Leader 1881- 
1940 (Heinemann 1960), p. 210. 
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Arthur Deakin, who took over the TGWU after Bevin, stated `We believe that the 
sanctity of agreements, once reached, should be regarded as something we should not 
destroy by action outside the constitutional procedure, which has been mutually 
agreed. '49 
Such a `cosy' relationship between port unions and employers was bound to cause 
unrest and friction with some within the rank and file. Ben Tillett, of the Dockers' 
Union, was an early casualty. In 1895, the Morning newspaper printed an account of 
a meeting in which Tillett was accused of extravagance `while the men were starving' 
on strike. At the end of the subsequent libel trial, it was judged that the newspaper 
had exaggerated the antagonism between Tillett and his members, but also that the 
article was in essence not libellous. The verdict forced Tillett to sell his house so 
Deakin was particularly noted for his dislike of internal dissent and became a special 
focus of rank and file discontent. sl Fact and rumour became entangled in the dock 
grapevine, confusing comparatively few actual hiring malpractices with the larger 
category of misunderstandings (for example related to the employment of family 
members). In the sphere of post-engagement work, more than once the fact that a 
union delegate would see management before the men if there were a dockside 
problem raised eyebrows. Worse were situations where a union representative `would 
talk with the management and they would say one thing and then they would go and 
have a meeting with the men and they would say something totally different. ' This 
was specifically noted as a cause of turmoil in both Hull and Salford/Manchester in 
the mid 1950s. 52 
49 MRC: MSS. 126/TG/3/Sack 45/2: Introductory Statement to be Made by Mr. Arthur Deakin 
(21.10.54) 
° Times, 28-9 March 1895; Tillett, B., Memories and Reflections (John Long 1931) p. 185. 
51 For Tillett read: Schneer, J., Ben Tillett: Portrait of a Labour Leader (Croom Helm 1982) p. 
61 
52 University of Liverpool, Social Research Series, The Dock Worker: An Analysis of 
Conditions of Employment in the Port of Manchester (Liverpool University Press 1956) p. 
141; Salford City Reporter, 10.6.55. MRC: MSS. 371/QD7/DOCKS2: transcript of interview 
with Harry Spaven. Spaven, active in the Hull docks, recalled that during the 1950s, a union 
official accepted an offer of an improved wage from an employer but without consulting the 
men concerned. The official was subsequently removed `though not sacked. ' 
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Unofficial committees composed of disillusioned unionists achieved an extraordinary 
amount of influence in Liverpool and London, partly by utilising the `malpractice' 
issue (pre and post engagements) against the TGWU elite and its representatives. 
When unions sympathetic to their cause of greater `democracy' intruded, activists lost 
no time in voicing their complaints of `corrupt' practices within the incumbent union. 
During the late 1930s, thus, the ILWU began a campaign to oust the ILA from its 
institutional position on the East Coast as sole bargaining agent. This immediately 
stimulated an upsurge of `anti-Ryan' feeling among certain fractions of ILA labour, 
which coalesced around ILA President Ryan's supposedly questionable relations with 
employers in the port53 
Undeniably, docks leaders gave their many critics more than enough ammunition. 
The Devlin report confirmed in 1965 that a root cause of dock problems in Britain was 
the attitude by TGWU bosses that there was `nothing to be done' about complaints 
from members. This led Devlin to find that `on too many issues (the TGWU had) 
failed to develop any clear-cut policy of its own. 54 
Each set of unofficial docks group had its own newsletter preaching the cause of 
In Brooklyn, the fight against the ILA democratic accountability and transparency. 55 
elite from 1934 was couched in terms of demands for West Coast style rotational 
hiring and a `hiring hall' system for setting employment levels 56 
In New York, a powerful combination of external and internal pressure chronicled in 
chapter seven led to a more responsive union leadership from around 1954. Since 
Waterfront Commission regulations progressively addressed the problem of 
regularisation of earnings in New York, the ILA was able to concentrate most of its 
bargaining fire on the wages and benefits questions. 
53 NYT, 13.7.37,26.7.37,24.10.37,11.12.37 
sa Parliament, Ministry of Labour Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into 
Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, cmd. 2734,1965, p. 46 
ss For Liverpool and London was: The Portworkers' News (official journals were The Record 
and News of the Blues); in New York, The Shamrock, The Dock Worker, `The Longshoreman, 
Shape Up, The Clyde Mallory Longshoreman, The Tally and Waterfront News were published 
at various times and in certain waterfront sections (the official organ being ILA Longshore 
News). 
56 NYT, 26.10.40 
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In Britain, employers closely locked any progress towards decasualisation to lower 
demands in other areas, such as wages, making the TGWU appear weak by 
comparison. For this reason, in part, the ILA remained more united than did the 
TGWU. Indirect dock labour costs in New York leaped under the impact of 
aggressive union bargaining, notably those related to the pension and the guaranteed 
income. 7 
A further differentiating influence was an absence in New York of a British-type 
disciplinary system. From 1947, in Britain, union officials consulted closely with 
employers to mete out punishments to dockworkers for infractions of docks 
agreements. But the system became a bone of contention with the rank and file, who 
thought that this compromised the primary duty of unions, which was to represent the 
men. 
The upshot was, as Hunter argued, that `at times the Dock Labour Boards' 
disciplinary powers were used to compel workers to accept conditions of work that 
were formerly accepted only under the threat of unemployment or under state 
compulsion in war time. '58 As union authority in Liverpool, London and other ports 
became problematical, so grassroots support for constitutional means to settle disputes 
waned. 
All of those interviewed in Liverpool, London or New York disagreed with the 
proposition that kickbacks were commonly passed over for work, where this opinion 
was based on direct experience. A few repeated anecdotes related to kickbacks, but 
only so far as `others' were concerned. One Londoner told for example how `A lot of 
the jobs were called off in the pub before you got to the call, ' another related how in 
one particular instance those who bought a foreman drinks were subsequently hired (a 
practice also reported in the literature) 59 Countering this is evidence presented 
throughout chapters five to seven. These reflected comments made by London 
57 NYT, 27.2.77; Frankel, E. G. and Marcus, H. S., Ocean Transportation (MIT Press 1973) p. 
418 
58 Hunter, B., They Knew Why They Fought (Index Books 1994) p. 18. 
59 Interviews with LONC, 25.5.99, LONQ, 26.5.99, Schweitzer, P. and Wegner, C. (eds. ), On 
the River: Memories of a Working River (Age Exchange 1989) p. 122 
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employers in 1930 that the foreman would `take on the men who are, in his 
judgement, the most efficient for his job ... You are bound to get it always. 
60 
Untested charges thrown around from the `casual' era, especially after 1945, have 
heavily coloured scholarly views. In actuality, their major function was rhetorical, as 
a stick with which to beat those union officials who were perceived as `failing' the 
membership. Where they existed, hiring malpractices were localised, mirroring 
broader industrial structures. 
GOVERNMENTAL POLICY 
This section deals with governmental influences on hiring, applicable to all three ports 
and focused chiefly on the era from 1945. Within the realm of hiring processes, the 
influence of the state is difficult to over-estimate. The creation of unemployment 
insurance for the casual end of dock working from 1920 in Liverpool, London and 
other big British ports functioned as a springboard to further state incursions, while 
allegations of hiring misbehaviour fuelled the creation of new control systems, 
buttressed by governments, which acted as much more than a neutral mediator in the 
docks. Instead, they became the strongest and most consistent single constituency 
engaged in reform. 
Macro-economic conditions 
General economic conditions, partly within the control of state actions, markedly 
affected the extent of hiring abuses. Hiring bosses were less likely to demand 
kickbacks during economic upturns, and dockworkers were less expected to furnish 
them. Since hiring malpractices were above all an economic relationship, whenever 
portworkers were in demand and unemployment levels low, the need for illicit payoffs 
to gain work commensurately decreased. 
Between the wars for instance, in Britain, `dock, harbour and canal workers' were 
either the biggest group in unemployment or near the top of this particular `league 
60 MRC: MSS. 126/EB/PL: Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Port Labour Committee, 
11.12.30 
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table. 261 Populated areas where docks were found in London, for example, showed 
consistently high rates of joblessness between the wars. 2 In Merseyside, `Not only 
was unemployment ... heavier than in the country generally, when trade was at its 
lowest ebb, the recovery was much slower in the netter years which followed ... '63 
World War Two 
`If turnaround was crucial to private shipping operators in peacetime it was even more 
central concern to the State in time of war. 'M Governments in World War Two sought 
the cooperation of organized labour to an unparalleled degree to ensure rapid 
turnabout times for shipping. The `promotion' of TGWU General Secretary Ernest 
Bevin to wartime Minister of Labour (1940-45) gave the British `decasualisation' 
movement an enormous boost. At the national level, British union leaders had 
unfettered access to the corridors of power, and sat on wartime committees. U. S. 
labour leaders were at a disadvantage in this respect, never achieving Cabinet status, 
though their collective voice was bolstered 65 
The New York State Legislature in early 1942 extended unemployment insurance 
provisions to all casualised workers when idle, even for a few days. This measure was 
introduced to facilitate the movement of workers across essential war industries and 
went a good way towards treating jobless New York portworkers like those in 
Liverpool or London. 66 Its relatively late introduction reflected the distaste in the 
American polity towards using taxpayer funds to `support' the unemployed. This 
attitude is further explored in chapter seven. 
61 Parliament, Department of Employment and Productivity, British Labour Statistics: 
Historical Abstract 1886-1968 (HMSO 1971) p. 314 
62 The statistics for Bermondsey are given in The New Survey of London Life and Labour 
Volume 111 (1932) p. 357. Also consult, for Poplar, east London, East End News, 12.7.35, 
7.3.39,21.7.39; Daily News 10.9.20, Daily Express 5.4.30, East London Advertiser 5.11.32. 
63 LRO: H338. LAN Lancashire Industrial Development Association `Lancashire and 
Merseyside: A Report by the Association Following Research into the Economic Problems of 
the Area' (1952) p. 16. 
64 Morgan, R., untitled paper (April 1983), p. 9 
65 Wrigley, C. (ed. ), A History of British Industrial Relations, 1939-1979 (Edward Elgar 1996) 
pp. 21,34-8. For more on this, read Minkin, L, The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and 
the Labour Party (Edinburgh University Press 1992) pp. 54-61. For the United States, consult: 
Vale, V., Labour in American Politics (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1971). 
66 The Longshoreman, 20.1.42 
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Wartime labour shortages gave most dockworkers in these ports a scarcity value, and 
hiring `shakedowns' were sharply curbed. But the major effect of wartime conditions 
was to accelerate the gap that had grown since 1920 between hiring practices in New 
York and those in London and Liverpool. Authorities in London, at least, took the 
opportunity to permanently reduce numbers on the register of dockworkers, which had 
fallen due to wartime demands, leaving more work for those left over. 67 New York 
dockworkers operated throughout a fundamentally unmodified shaping system, 
without any bureaucratic means of limiting the supply of dock labour. 
Post-war developments 
The distance further widened post-1945. The emphasis in New York was on control 
measures centred on use of the criminal law, separating it from the British consensual 
approach. The ebbs and flows of the dockworker decasualiation debate, as Phillips 
and Whiteside stressed, closely followed general government thought on industry and 
on employment regimes. Within this, casual dockwork became increasingly 
anachronistic following 1945 `full employment' commitments 
As the economic context improved after 1945, the biggest problem (in London) 
became labour shortages, energising revolts as portworkers realised the industrial 
`clout' this gave them. Meanwhile, the 1950 census indicated that a mere 2.5 per cent 
of the total working age population in New York City was unemployed, though some 
economic sectors were more affected by unemployment than were others 68 Turnbull 
and his colleagues caution, however, against making sweeping statements on the 
causes of British docks unrest from 1945, finding that since labour regulation differed 
by port, so did many `background' influences generating stoppages 69 
67 PRO: LAB 10/569: minute sheet dated 29 June 1945. 
68 Longshore work unemployment could be high and worries over job security impelled 
unauthorised job actions in New York. In 1950, the Cunard Company announced that it was 
leaving its old pier. The men walked out in protest, as they did in March 1951 when the 
Grace line threatened to move away from pier 45, North River (NYT, 3.2.50,24.351). 
69 Turnbull, P. Morris, J. and Sapsford, D., Persistent Militants and Quiescent Comrades: 
Intra-Industry Strike Activity on the Docks, 1947-89, The Sociological Review, vol. 44 no. 4, 
1996, pp. 692-727. The rise in strike activity in British ports between 1950-60 is outlined in 
MMM: PEA Box 174: `Committee of Inquiry into the Major Ports of Great Britain (Rochdale 
Committee) Submission by the National Association of Port Employers: Appendix 11' (Sept. 
1961). The comparable figures for Liverpool are given in MMM: MDI. B Box 3 folder 7. 
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A sharp upward trend in strikes between 1945 and 1951 forced unparalleled state 
intercessions. Unofficial stoppages, of growing intensity, supplied more than enough 
of a motive for governments to intercede, reversing the previously taken light 
regulation policies 70 State-sponsored work disciplinary panels were installed in all 
three ports, under varied guises, in order to break up long established but 
`malfunctioning' and expensive customs and practices that the industry itself had 
neglected to tackle for too long. 
As noted in chapter two, marking the subsequent New York offensive against docks 
disorder from those in Liverpool or London was an emphasis in New York upon the 
`criminal' aspects of dock malpractices, fitting in with anxieties of the era within the 
American polity. In Britain such fears were less obvious in informing state reactions 
to docks stoppages. 
NEW YORK - HIRING IRREGULARITIES AND CRIMINALITY 
As Larrowe pointed out `Until 1953, the New York waterfront furnished the 
fascinating spectacle of an industry which ... remained almost completely free from 
effective public intervention. ' 71 Just as in Britain, a variety of factors pushed 
waterfront malpractices in New York higher up the political agenda, above all the 
harm caused to the international and national economy and political aims centred on 
anti-communism by repeated wildcat stoppages. 
The close identification was almost immediately made, in New York, between malaise 
in the docks (especially but not exclusively revolving around hiring) and the notion of 
wider networks of organized criminality that threatened the very fabric of the industry, 
a vital component in national welfare. The British state, meanwhile, took a traditional 
approach, in seeing the solution to instability and lost production in `joint committee' 
terms, as it had before 1939. 
70 The story of the upsurge in New York docks militancy is dealt with in Larrowe, Shape-Up 
and Hiring Hall, p. 64; Dock strike statistics for Britain may be found in Phillips and 
Whiteside, Casual Labour, p. 236 
71 Larrowe, Shape-Up and Hiring Hall, p. 77. 
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Cold War machinations 
The ILA was careful to avoid a entanglement with the state, achieved by inserting 
itself at the mainstream of politics and national debates and by espousing gradualism 
as the way forward. But this strategy had a limited shelf life when constituents 
outside of ILA control came into play. 
American politics from 1946 took a right-wing `anti-labour' direction. The federal 
Taft-Hartley Act, a measure adopted both to suppress strike action and to control the 
spread of left-wing influence in American labour, supplied the first `model' for 
wholesale state intervention in the New York docks, directly overruling time honoured 
methods of settling disputes. Following on, the remit of the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) was changed. To be eligible to vote in elections as the exclusive 
bargaining agency in a locality, union leaders now had to sign an anti-Communist 
affidavit before the NLRB. The knock-on effect of this could be serious, since a 
union like the ILWU that did not expel Communists or submit to the procedure on 
civil liberty or other grounds was wide open to de-certification and consequently to 
ousting by other unions 
Claims of `organized crime' penetration of the New York docks was seen as requiring 
unusually severe measures, composed as crime syndicates were of un-American 
elements with an objective of spreading chaos to the key water-borne transport areas 
of the economy. This perspective on the menace, and the allied one of international 
communism spreading its tentacles across the globe, influenced all manner of 
representations of the New York waterfront, including negotiations leading to the 
making of the critically acclaimed 1954 motion picture `On the Waterfront. 72 
72 When, in the early 1950s, the writers of the film showed the screenplay to Columbia 
Pictures, it was suggested by the FBI and studio executives that the villains of the piece be 
Communist agitators, not `home grown' mobsters. When this suggestion was rebuffed, 20th 
Century Fox finally released the film in its original form (interview with NYM, 4.4.00; Iiey, 
K. R., 'Ambivalence as a Theme in `On the Waterfront' (1954): An Interdisciplinary 
Approach to Film Study' in Rollins, P. C. (ed. ), Hollywood as Historian, Lexington: Kentucky 
University Press, 1983, pp. 159-189). 
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The Taft-Hartley legislation of 1947 remained the chief federal law regulating 
longshore labour strike actions and the internal workings of unions 73 `Union shops, ' 
in which workers had thirty days in which to join a union, were allowed under the Act, 
forming a basis of future ILA-New York Shipping Association contracts. Where 
adjudged as of national concern, longshore and other strikes were made subject to an 
eighty-day federal injunction process. 4 
The 1950 Magnuson Act, a piece of federal port security legislation, mandated the 
U. S. Coast Guard to issue identification cards to portworkers active in `sensitive' 
areas of waterfronts, and was directly aimed at any `subversives' working in military 
installations 75 In practice, most dockworkers in New York obtained cards, wherever 
they worked. The ILA fully cooperated with the measure, so that `no communist or 
fellow-traveller will get the chance to commit sabotage on the waterfront. '76 
Waterfront Commission rules later mirrored the anxiety over `politically inspired' 
industrial activities, and dock activists could find themselves neutralised in legal 
tangles with the Commission if they were considered as a threat to the free flow of 
trade. 7 
73 `In drafting the Act, ' Estey commented, `Congress rejected the traditional attitude of 
treating unions as voluntary associations whose internal administration was outside the scope 
of legislative interference. ' (Estey, M. S. et a4 Regulating Union Government (Harper and 
Row 1964) p. 29); Lee, R. A., Eisenhower and Landrum-Griffin (University Press of 
Kentucky, 1990) pp. 4-7; Hutchinson, J., The Imperfect Union: A History of Corruption in 
American Trade Unions (E. P. Dutton 1972) p. 343). The Act also prohibited bribery of a 
union official by an employer (section 302) (Taft, P., Corruption and Racketeering in the 
Labor Movement, (2nd ed. ) (New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations 1970) 
63) ý4 
Frankel and Marcus, Ocean Transportation, pp. 469-70. The maritime sector was especially 
targeted by Taft-Hartley injunctions. From 1947, no new four-yearly contract covering the 
port of New York was signed without the ILA first closing down the docks, and Taft-Hartley 
injunctions were issued six times between 1947 and 1968 (Meyers, H. B., "Wrangdoodle' 
Time on the Docks', Fortune, 1 September 1968, pp. 85-6+; U. S. Congress, House. 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Maritime Labor Legislation, hearings 88th 
Congress Ist Session (1963) pp. 130-5 for a list of maritime disputes attracting Taft-Hartley 
injunctions. ) 
75 U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Waterfront 
Investigation: New York New Jersey: Interim Report, Report No. 653.83rd Congress Ist 
Session 1953, pp. 37-8; Ginger, A. F. and Christiano, D. (eds. ), The Cold War Against Labor, 
Volume One, Berkeley (Civil liberties Institute 1987) 
76 ILA Longshore News, July 1950. 
77 Larrowe, Shape-Up and Hiring Hall, pp. 198-9; telephonic interview with NYC, 2.5.01 
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Crime control strategies 
Efforts in New York to regularise dock earnings were closely linked to these 
developments. Several huge unofficial strikes, in New York, like those in Britain 
severely embarrassed the union elite and made the case for greater state control of the 
industry. 78 In distinction to Liverpool or to London, the New York movement became 
highly politicised and embroiled in the fight against crime. 
New York District Attorney Frank Hogan, journalists and independent groups, from 
1946, had noted the supposed nexus between hiring bribery and gangsterism on the 
docks. Hogan sponsored the first bills, in the late 1940s, to abolish the shape-up on 
crime fighting grounds. But this and similar attempts to legislate for dockworker 
security came unstuck, largely because of the lack of Republican sponsorship. 
Adding to the `organized crime' image attached to New York docks malpractices were 
high-profile police investigations. In March 1951, violence surrounding the polling 
process in ILA Local 1247 (Jersey City) offices was given publicity and a new 
election ordered 80 Next to focus upon the illegality question were the nationally - 
shown hearings of the federal Kefauver Committee and more locally the New York 
State Crime Commission. Kefauver's interim report in March 1951 castigated the 
ILA and port employers for serious improprieties. Grand juries examining the 
problem were immediately empanelled on Staten Island and in New Jersey. 1 
The port-wide October-November 1951 strike `tipped the scales' in favour of decisive 
government intervention in severely disrupting the flow of military supplies to Korea 
and of Marshall Aid to Europe. 2 The impact was equally wide-ranging on local 
78 For the results of the 1948 strike, read Raymond, A., Waterfront Priest (Victor Gollancz 
1954); Mello, W., The Origins of the Rank and File Reform Movement on the New York 
Waterfront 1945-1948 (New School of Social Research, Spring 1999). 
79 Axelrod, Government Covers the Waterfront, pp. 22-4. 
8O NYT, 3.3.51 
81 The Staten Island D. A. announced an investigation of pier practices there. A grand jury was 
also empanelled in Hudson County that May to probe Hoboken and Jersey City kickback 
practices (NYT, 29.3.51,28.9.51; U. S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary 
Subcommittee No. 3, New York New Jersey Waterfront Commission Compact, hearing 83rd 
Congress 1st Session 1953, pp. 19-23). 
82 WA: ILA Collection, Box 1- clippings on the 1951 strike. 
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employment opportunities. The Port of New York Authority, in 1956, thus reported 
that at least 430,000 people were one way or another provided with a job by port trade 
and that it supported a quarter of residents living in the port district. 
The Corsi fact-finding report established to look into the causes of the 1951 stoppage 
ended up excoriating a set of undemocratic and lax practices in ILA Locals. But 
Corsi's report was not as strongly `opposed' to the ILA as observers later claimed, 
since it also noted that balloting abuses, the reason for its establishment, were not the 
rule. 4 Nevertheless, and with fears about waterfront crime in the background, the 
New York State Crime Commission had already been ordered by Governor Thomas 
Dewey to investigate the waterfront for signs of widespread illegality affecting 
business. 
Russell pointed out the political basis of this move, as a `publicity bonanza' and which 
were ignored by later sources. 6 The Crime Commission was, as Johnson claimed, 
`created largely as a by-product of partisan manoeuvrings of a Democratic dominated 
United States investigatory committee and defensive strategy of a Republican 
Administration in Albany. 87 
Its `waterfront' reports reflected little of the consensual approach to hiring reforms 
most favoured in Britain. Subsequent Waterfront Commission policy in New York 
emulated the Crime Commission's stress on legal sanctions and upon prosecutions 
under criminal and civil laws, unsurprising since several central Waterfront 
Commission staff members had also served on the Crime Commission. 8 
Because employers and the ILA were considered equally culpable in creating `the 
problem, ' no port interests sat on Waterfront Commission disciplinary panels and 
83 New York Port Authority `The Port and the Community' (1956) p. 1 
84 Cf. 'Report of Board of Inquiry on Longshore Industry Work Stoppage, October-November 
1951 Port of New York', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 5 pt. 3 (April 1952) pp. 
426-38 
85 NY1,30.10.51,2.11.51,21.11.51 
86 Russell, M., Men Along the Shore: The ILA and Its History (Brussel and Brüssel 1966) p. 
155 
87 Johnson, The Waterfront Commission of New York harbor, p. 98. 
88 Johnson, The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, pp. 211-2. 
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Commission procedures were highly legalistic in form. Also in distinction to 
Liverpool and London, Commission agents had powers to investigate improper 
practices without first waiting for a formal complaint from an employer, a practice 
adopted by the Dock Labour Scheme in Britain that probably led to worse disciplinary 
problems. 
Within a year, the Waterfront Commission had initiated a scheme to register all 
portworkers in order to remove those with relevant criminal records or engaged in (or 
associated with) corrupt practices according to its own rules. The number of 
dockworkers was incrementally reduced after Crime Commission censuring of the 
shape-up hiring method as encouraging criminality. As a crime-control strategy but 
similar in effect to British schemes of the same period, and with the same objective of 
raising average dockworker earnings, the casual fringe in New York was reduced. 
Most kickbacks to get work petered out under these reforms and through better 
employment choices as local economic conditions picked up 89 
New York seniority systems and the Guaranteed Annual Income, ca. 1957-1972 
In New York from about 1957, a sophisticated system of allocating labour according 
to length of service on a pier was instituted. When enforced, this was effective in 
denying a role for hirers or employers seeking illicit moneys or prepared to accept 
them. 
After 1964 the Guaranteed Annual Income (GAI) was devised. With the threat of a 
strike looming in the background, the matter of improved out of work benefits for 
older longshore workers who were harmed by rationalisation processes was taken to 
arbitration. A recommendation was made and finally accepted that in exchange for 
the GAI, the ILA would agree to accept a phased reduction in average work gang 
sizes 90 
89 Annual Reports of the New York Waterfront Commission record the progress of its 
schemes 
90 The pivotal report that brought the sides together was: U. S. Department of Labor, 
Manpower Utilization - Job Security in the Longshore Industry Port of New York: Report and 
Findings (Washington, DC: 1 July 1964). 
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Depending on his seniority rating, a longshore worker would expect to receive, when 
unable to secure work, whole or part of the GAI. It gave, for the first time, a good 
level of out of work security in this fashion functioned as the closest equivalent to 
permanent employment in Britain after September 1967. `Core' or permanently 
employed longshore workers were, as before, unaffected by this development. What 
was in doubt was the longer-term viability of the GAI in view of evidence that trade 
had subsequently moved to other east coast ports, in part - so some argued - because 
of its `generosity' of provision. 1 
LIVERPOOL AND LONDON - REFORM THROUGH CONSENSUS 
Registration schemes 
Through decasualisation schemes and joint agreements, the penalty for accepting or 
offering bribes in New York rose, while the likelihood for most individuals or work 
gangs of the alternative, unemployment, decreased. Efforts to combat corrupt 
practices related to hiring in London and Liverpool began in World War One on 
Merseyside, in 1920 for London. State sponsorship, in the form of support for union 
backed registration schemes, was essential. 
Prior to 1939, British port employers were either hostile or lukewarm, in the main, 
towards any attempts to limit their authority over hiring practices and to limit the 
labour supply, and faced with this resistance registration schemes instituted either 
formalised pre-existing customs, or were watered down sufficiently to make them 
acceptable to employers. 2 Calls from unions for unemployed dockworkers to be 
awarded a minimum income by the industry were blocked, with the state unwilling to 
force the issue or to establish a precedent for other industries to follow. 93 
91 Waters, R. C., `Leadership and Its Consequences: Technical Change in the Longshore 
Industry' Industrial Relations, vol. 32 no. 2,1993, pp. 262-71 
92 Some employers though lamented the fact that registration made it more difficult to sack 
unsatisfactory men. 
93 As Wrigley, C. (ed), A History of British Industrial Relations Volume 11: 1914-1939 (The 
Harvester Press 1987) said, `In industrial relations, as with so many other areas of policy, the 
interwar period was significant for what it did not, rather than what it did, change' (p. 187). 
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The 1920 Shaw Court of Inquiry was established because of credible evidence of 
disciplinary problems on the major British docks, such as poor timekeeping and slow 
working, in which casual working had a role. The outcome was a reproach made by 
Lord Shaw for ship-level malpractices that resulted in lost time and output but Shaw 
linked this to unions' calls for the registration of dockworkers and for an income when 
men could not find work. 
After about 1920, work was rarely guaranteed, but unionised workers were in a better 
position to press their claims under joint agreements 94 Registered men reported for 
work at `calling-on stands' scattered throughout the ports, to shipside or to employers' 
premises 95 Where coordination between the Employment Service, helping to run the 
schemes and distributing unemployment moneys, and the local registration-clearing 
house was good, men who were passed over for work, perhaps for refusing to 
96 participate in a hiring irregularity, would stand out and questions asked 
Registration schemes operated in London and elsewhere until the start of the Second 
World War but without much conviction, although port registers were more tightly 
policed in London than apparently was the case in Liverpool 97 As early as 1923, as 
Jackson reports, some men were working on the docks without paying their union 
subscriptions while Dooley notes that many unregistered men worked in Liverpool in 
the 1930S. 98 Most importantly, as registration did not include a monetary payment 
when portworkers were not working, incentives remained in the less `embedded' 
fraction of the docker fraternity to sometimes indulge in illegal activities in order to 
gain or keep work. 
94 There are numerous unpublished histories of British registration proposals and practices, 
including those in: PRO: LAB2/1044, PRO: LAB2/1045/DPL221/4, PRO: LAB2/1040/117, 
PRO: MT10/1866/H685, PRO: MT63/19, PRO: MT10/1853/ii11625, PRO: LAB 8/1379: 
Ministry of Labour and National Service `Memorandum on Dock Labour' (11.9.42); PRO: 
LAB 2/1042/17: `Decasualisation of Dock Labour' (4.2.25), PRO: LAB 76/21: 
`Memorandum on the History of Registration Schemes for Dock Workers' (December 1936); 
MRC: MSS. 126/TG/7/RES/TEMP31; MSS. 126/TG/3/sack 6 
95 PRO: LAB 8/186: National Joint Council for Dock Labour, Standing Advisory Committee 
on Registration and Decasualisation, Fifth Report (1936). 
96 MRC: MSS. 126/EB/PL/21/1-2: Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Port Labour 
Committee, 10.12.30. 
97 MRC: MSS. 126/EB/PL: minutes of evidence taken before the Port Labour Committee, 
11.12.30 
98 MMM: audio tapes: Frank Dooley; Jackson, Policy Making in Trade Union, p. 59 
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Post-1945 developments 
Properties they shared with the New York longshoremen, in a refusal to accept pre- 
war conditions, generated mass strikes by dockworkers in British ports from 1949-51. 
But government response in Britain was of a wholly different character from that in 
the United States. 
The specifics of the British political economy disallowed a frontal assault on union- 
backed dock practices as that seen in New York. Fear of communism in organized 
labour was a weaker political force than in the United States, for example (though not 
insignificant)" whilst `organised criminality' in the sense portrayed by American 
commentators referring to New York was alien to the British context. 
Disturbances on the London docks, as in New York, stimulated a state enquiry. In 
distinction to the Corsi board in New York, Frederick Leggett's committee of enquiry 
in London (1950-1951) chose to concentrate on disciplinary problems that port unions 
had only partial control over and his answer, within the orthodox industrial relations 
matrix, to the problems of ship delays and side-payments supplied little material to 
those favouring police-style `crackdowns. '100 
Leggett himself was a career civil servant, and served as Bevin's wartime aide at the 
Ministry of Labour specialising in efforts to end disputes through conciliation. Given 
this personal profile, he could be expected to produce only mild criticisms of port 
unions. Further conditioning the Leggett Committee's findings was hostility from the 
TGWU towards any investigation. In order to assuage the major interests, a decision 
was taken in Cabinet to consult as widely as possible before and during the enquiry. 101 
99 The TGWU banned `proven' Communists from holding union office, left-wing Members of 
Parliament were viewed with suspicion, and a ban was placed on Communists in the UK civil 
service (Smith, J. D., The Attlee and Churchill Administrations and Industrial Unrest, 1945- 
55: A Study in Consensus (Pinter 1990) pp. 98-9). 
100 Times 30.6.83 (Leggett's obituary). The unpublished records of the Leggett Committee, 
1951, are found in MID: BPA Boxes 155-6, LWA Box 261, LEDEA Box 159, LPEA Box 
137, LPEA Box 115; PRO: BK 2/1215. 
101 PRO: PREM 8/1534: notes of a meeting held on 5.5.50. 
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National Dock Labour Scheme 
Under a 1940 Order, each port in Britain was required to keep registers of dockers, 
while a guaranteed weekly payment was agreed to two years on. From 1942, the 
National Dock Labour Corporation ran the national docks scheme complete with local 
offshoots. 02 In Merseyside and on the Clyde, the Ministry of Transport took over 
waterfront activities as the direct employer of registered dock labour. These schemes 
were prototypes for the landmark National Dock Labour Scheme (NDLS) in 1947. 
Appendix D outlines the structure of local dock labour boards for the larger British 
ports. 
More centralised and mandatory than pre-war hiring structures, but based on the old 
registration process, the NDLS aimed to eradicate the insecurities and hiring abuses of 
the past. Those taken on by employers through NDLB `distribution centres' were 
usually not guaranteed more than the minimum number of hours of engagement but 
could frequently expect more. Weekly-paid or permanent employees of firms were 
not required to report to them. In London, a long-standing system of hiring outside of 
NDLB controls persisted. 103 
These measures went some way towards lessening the need to bribe a hiring foreman 
for work, although the low level of the maintenance income for men with families was 
a problem. 104 Nor, as in New York, could the `British' system prevent payoffs for 
higher paying or steadier work. 105 
Devlin reforms 
By the early 1960s, pressures were building up for further reforms of hiring and 
income upholding schemes. Mass unofficial strikes were again a problem, worse in 
London, docks unemployment was at historically low levels and joint controls denied 
102 McKelvey, J., Dock Labor Disputes in Great Britain: A Study in the Persistence of 
Industrial Unrest (New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations 1953) pp. 28-9; 
Tull, G. J. D., The Port of London Authority 1909 to 1959 (PLA 1959) pp. 126-7; MID: BPA 
Box 369 "The Closed Shop' Docks Industry' (13.10.47). 
'03 Interview with LONM, 5.10.99 
104 Hill, The Dockers, p. 33. 
10S Interview with LONJ, 16.6.99 
98 
employers alternative labour supply sources. In this context, employers felt under 
more pressure than ever to concede improper demands from work gangs, especially 
(so it was claimed) casually employed ones. `In fact, ' they insisted, `the labour 
situation in London has reached a point where there is on many occasions no longer 
any reasonable negotiation and compromise in industrial relations, but merely 
appeasement in varying degrees throughout the port. '106 
Also important were political factors. The Devlin Report gave the newly elected 
Labour government a chance `after thirteen years in the wilderness, to associate the 
party with a humanitarian reform and to prove its working-class conscience at a period 
when economic policies were alienating rank and file support. ' It was also clear from 
the tenor of the debate that the government would impose a solution if the industry did 
not `volunteer' one. 107 
The chief reason for unofficial stoppages in Britain was, in the view of Lord Devlin, 
the casual structure of hiring. Casual `attitudes' pervaded the whole industry, 
expressed in a willingness to indulge in unconstitutional `time-wasting' action. The 
solution adopted was ultimately to offer registered men permanent employment. This 
was expected to remove the reasons for malpractices (whether hiring or post- 
engagement) in irregular employment. 108 
Under Devlin `Phase 1', full-time employment with a registered employer would 
replace casual working. 109 Experiencing the benefits to be had from permanency in 
employment, most portworkers would be expected under Devlin's scenario to feel that 
the `price' of this, in the abandonment of `time wasting' practices, would be worth 
paying. `Phase 2' dealt with the `modernisation' of post-engagement work practices, 
dealt with in chapter four. ' 10 
106 MID: LEDEA 132: Preliminary Report and Recommendations of the Special Sub- 
Committee of London Port Employers, 1961, p. 2. 
107 Wilson, Dockers, p. 12 
108 Parliament, Ministry of Labour Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. lion. Lord Devlin into 
Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, cmd. 2734,1965, p. 
10. 
109 Archival materials on Devlin include MID: LEDEA Boxes 204,227,229,233,236,244-7, 
LPEA Boxes 19,25, LWA Boxes 188,237,294,304,308 
110 MID: LWA Box 304: The Port Employers in London' (1965). 
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1970-1972 
Devlin thereby acknowledged a structural dimension to hiring abuses, rooted in 
casualism, as did waterfront writers from Shaw and Phillips and Whiteside, and from 
Barnes to Kimeldorf. `Devlin was essentially concerned to make good the legacy of 
the past rather than provide, ' as Turnbull and his colleagues summarised, ' any 
blueprint for the introduction of new cargo handling techniques. '" Permanency of 
employment was to be at the heart of relations in the British industry. `Full-time' 
work for all ran counter to the favoured solution in New York, which favoured longer 
serving men over the rest. 
State participation in Britain increased as an employment crisis emerged, becoming 
more evident in the 1970s, particularly in London. The Board of the PLA was 
formally independent of government, but was mindful of national incomes policies 
and other state priorities. Any port investment costing over 11/2 million required the 
sanction of central government, as did a rise in port charges. The 1968 Port of 
London Act extended this role. The Secretary of State nominated people to the two 
top posts in the National Dock Labour Board while the Mersey Docks and Harbours 
Board included members appointed by the Ministry of Transport. 112 
Devlin's report coincided with the rapidly emerging issue of containerisation and the 
commensurate need for lower average gang sizes and a more 'flexible' use of dock 
labour. This kept alive fears of layoffs, regardless of the guarantees Devlin had built 
into his proposals. 113 Undermining efforts to keep up employment levels was a policy 
of increasing numbers of port employers to move their business from 'traditional' 
dock systems to inland depots where cheaper and reputedly more malleable, non- 
registered, labourers were used. 
Structural changes had little effect on longshore wages in New York, where union 
scales predominated wherever employers operated within fifty miles of the port's hub 
111 Turnbull, Woolfson and Kelly, Dock Strike, p. 44 
112 Lynch, A, Weathering the Storm: The Mersey Docks Financial Crisis 1970-74 (Liverpool 
University Press 1994) p. 21. 
113 Mankelow, The Effects of Modernisation and Change in the London Dock, pp. 99-100. 
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and where the ILA was successful in severely abridging management's freedom of 
action in utilising non-ILA labour. In terms of sheer numbers employed, though, 
working longshoremen were drastically pruned, many transferring across to the GAL 
Modem communication networks enabled road transport units to move relatively 
quickly in and out of terminals. 114 The new situation cut deeply into payoffs by road 
haulage firms to quayside workers for quicker servicing. Although shift systems were 
established in these ports, thus eradicating a group of malpractices pertaining to the 
working of overtime or weekend working, the fact that job assignments were often run 
by newly enfranchised shop stewards could raise eyebrows. 
Acting upon a recommendation of the Devlin Committee, shop stewards were 
introduced across the two British ports to bolster the position of the TGWU and to 
settle disputes quickly and effectively without the need for improper concessions to 
ship hatch gangs. In Liverpool and London, suspicion grew that shop stewards were 
abusing this privilege, by booking themselves to the highest paying gang or in putting 
themselves on `no-show' jobs for instance. Employers, aware of the `trouble' that job 
allocating could cause, went along with the malpractice for an easy life. 115 Similarly 
in New York, which had a strong shop steward organisation by the 1950s, there were 
comparable charges of shop steward misconduct. 116 
CONCLUSION 
In the context of the debate began in chapter two over the relative importance of 
`opportunity structures' over the `legitimacy' of docks malpractices, hiring kickbacks 
presented a picture that ultimately favoured the institutional approach. So long as the 
extant hiring market sometimes offered, as it too often did, a number of profitable 
opportunities for foremen to abuse their position, the `legitimacy' of hiring 
malpractices was of secondary concern for those involved. 
114 Mankelow, The Effects of Modernisation and Change in the London Docks, pp. 1134. 
115 Interviews with LIVA, 16.3.99, LIV1,15.4.99, LONA, 30.6.99 
116 Interview with NYB, 29.3.00; MacNair, V., Chaplain on the Waterfront (Seabury Press 
1963), p. 90; Waterfront News, 18.11.55 
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Hiring misbehaviour was never accepted in the same manner as were other 
malpractices. Most importantly, as noted, they led to problems for union organisers, 
and undermined union morale. Employers also viewed them askance since the 
employment of unequipped men merely on the basis of corruption was anathema to 
the objective of efficiency of cargo handling. 
Many other processes than simple market influences were at work in shaping docks 
hiring practices. The dynamics engaged with were more complex, contradictory and 
diverse than admitted in accounts presented by proponents of decasualisation, who 
often gave casual working more prominence than it deserved, and exhibited a position 
that left out the majority opinion in docks. 
Employers were loath to hire men on the basis of their `ability to pay' alone, if for no 
other reason than safety. Dock work could be dangerous at the best of times, utilising 
experienced men and not fresh hands. Even during the depths of the interwar 
depression, the majority of portworkers in London were reported as `firmly 
established' in the trade. "? A `problem' of hiring abuses was probably greater in New 
York, if only because of its consistent lack of a formal means of limiting the numbers 
seeking work there until the 1950s registration drives. 
Not to be forgotten also was that coastwise and inter-coastal ships offered labour 
market stability and a large measure of permanent employment wherever they were 
found. 118 In Liverpool, work on the coastwise trade was prized for this very reason, 
and may have encouraged bribery to acquire employment with a coastwise operator. 119 
In London, the riverside wharves were most linked to these vessels. 
117 Phillips and Whiteside, Casual Labour, p. 210. 
118 Larrowe, C. P., Shape-Up and Hiring Hall: A Comparison of Hiring Methods on the New 
York and Seattle Waterfronts, Berkeley: University of California Press 1955) p. 2; U. S. 
Congress, Senate. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, To Clarify' the Overtime 
Compensation Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as Amended, hearings 81st 
Congress 1st Session 1949, p. 754; Swanstrom, The Waterfront Labor Problem, p. 26; U. S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, no. 550, Cargo Handling and Longshore 
Labor Conditions, Washington, DC. 1932, p. 103; U. S. Office of the Federal Coordinator of 
Transportation, Section of Labor Relations, Section of Research, Hours, Wages, and Working 
Conditions in Domestic Water Transportation, Vol. 1 (1936), pp. 140-1. 
119 Interview with LIVH, 11.3.99 
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Most allegations of hiring irregularities originated from an underlying and corrupting 
mistrust between union leaders and rank and file union members, fuelled by `top 
down' policy approaches and (in New York's case) localised rebellions against the 
hiring regime, though in both cases the true magnitude of the discontent was never 
made clear. The subject matter of hiring malpractices crossed over into more general 
critical comments made over `democracy' in unions, as described in chapter two, and 
of the legitimacy of union actions on the docks when involving those accused of 
unresponsiveness towards the men's complaints, seen at its most extreme in Liverpool 
The weakness of unionism in ports was thereby revealed, belying the portrait of 
muscular union influence offered by some texts, notably when New York's 
malpractices are discussed. 120 `Thus, leaders who shifted too far right on the political 
right or became too cautious or accommodationist, ' commented Broeze, `ran the 
serious risk of alienating their members and losing control over their unions. 121 
Hobsbawm similarly emphasised the run-of-the-mill practical difficulties in 
unionising waterside workers in Britain. 122 
Unlike the image put forward in New York by Larrowe, for example, of a grafting 
union executive 123 the ILA always feared a backlash if they `pushed' decasualisation 
questions against (on the whole) employer wishes and the desires of most of their 
members. To this degree, the ILA was better attuned to members' attitudes than was 
the TGWU. 
120 As Johnson put it, `the longshoremen `charge that Ryan always has shown more sympathy 
for the interests of the industry than for its members. ' (Crime on the Labor Front, p. 153) 
Recommendations to eradicate union criminals from the construction industry were contained 
on the section in the 1989 report titled `Removing Racketeers from the Construction Industry' 
(pp. 156-161) 
11 Broeze, F., 'Militancy and Pragmatism: An International Perspective on Maritime Labour, 
1870-1914', International Review of Social History, vol. XXXVI, 1991, p. 197 
'22 Hobsbawm, E. J., Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour (Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson 1968) pp. 204-230. 
123 According to Larrowe, `Between 1916 and 1945, the amicable nature of collective bargain 
and the union's modest demands resulted in contract provisions eminently satisfactory for the 
employers on the New York waterfront' (Larrowe, C. P., Shape-Up and Hiring Hall. A 
Comparison of Hiring Methods on the New York and Seattle Waterfronts, Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 1955) p. 64) 
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Negotiating structures that on paper heavily favoured organized labour were in reality 
far from impregnable. Moving to the wider perception of docks malpractices, and 
their possible addressing by legislation, should governments prepare docks 
decasualisation drives by galvanising backing for anti-crime policies, as in New York? 
Or should it internalise any investigations of docks malpractices to those immediately 
affected and seek their consent, as in Liverpool and London? 
These options animated reactions towards docks strife in the critical years from 1945 
to 1953, when representations of the significance and meaning of docks malpractices 
were solidified and became a subject matter for theories of industrial racketeering. 
Smith's spectrum approach far better captures these movements and simultaneously 
explains the contextual variables. As Shaw, Devlin and Leggett acknowledged, hiring 
difficulties and scenarios shaded across to other practices and malpractices. Foremost 
among them were problems that occurred on board vessels berthed at terminals or 
docks, the subject of chapter four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SHIPBOARD PRACTICES AND MALPRACTICES 
INTRODUCTION 
Although governments in Britain and the United States placed great emphasis on 
employment stability as the primary solution to the ills of the waterfront, this in 
actuality formed only part of the problem. Unlike those practices centred on hiring 
regimes, few dockworkers wished to many scrap post-employment malpractices, 
characterised as they were by legitimacy on the part of those who practiced them and 
taking advantage of systemic opportunity structures. Because of their acceptability 
among dockworkers, and the systematic nature of the loopholes they exploited, they 
proved extremely hard to eradicate in the absence of government. 
Evidence of pre-1939 illegal payments by employers to shipboard work gangs is 
scanty, especially for New York. Older interviewees entered the docks industry only 
after 1945, and archival sources were insufficiently comprehensive to make good 
comparisons between pre-1939 and post-1945 shipboard malpractices. Following the 
end of hostilities in 1945, they became the object of attention, reflected in a larger 
body of materials. 
Joint agreements in New York and Britain specifically forbade the downing of tools 
while a shipboard dispute was under adjustment! Despite this, stoppages in 
furtherance of a better `price' for the work, so-called `bargaining intervals, '2 were 
commonplace. If agreements were breached this became subject, in Britain, to 
disciplinary proceedings by a local Dock Labour Board. In practice, nevertheless, 
vessel-working labourers were rarely reported for misconduct. 
1 For example, WA: ILA Collection, box 4: "Proposed Agreement, General Cargo" (1 October 
1936) 
2 Turnbull, P. and Sapsford, P., `A Sea of Discontent: The Tides of Organized and 
`Unorganized' Conflict on the Docks' Sociology, vol. 26 no. 2,1992, p. 301 
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Although larger-scale malpractices such as unauthorised stoppages ultimately relied 
on the collective power of the work gang to `enforce' them, this was not the full 3 
story. Of importance to the `survival' of shipboard malpractices was the way men 
were recruited to supervise dockworkers while working. 
Theory 
In the context of structures encouraging shipboard malpractices were sluggishly 
operating dispute resolution mechanisms. When effective, adjustment systems 
restricted the `openings' available for ship hold gangs ('holdsmen') to cause problems 
of slowing down or stopping of work. Among British authors, only Shaw, in 1920, 
devoted significant thought to the topic. 
As a result of his deliberations, an elaborate system based on port and trade was built 
up in the main British ports, extending from local to national disputes resolution 
committees. In 1951, Leggett made no mention of possible improvements to the 
existing system for handling on-ship problems, while Devlin limited his comments to 
recommending more shop stewards in the bigger ports. 
The importance of this area was demonstrated time and again during New York State 
Crime Commission hearings. A whole section of the `final' report from the 
Commission in 1953 was devoted to allegations that New York docks union officials 
had informally smoothed over any problems of cargo handling after the payment of 
`kickbacks' from local employers s After pressure from the Crime Commission and 
resulting difficulties for the union and shipping association, the disputes settlement 
system was refashioned and streamlined in New York in 1955 to prevent `flash' 
strikes from delaying vessels while a satisfactory settlement to cargo handling 
problems was being worked out. 
3 Turnbull, P. Woolfson, C. and Kelly, J., Dock Strike: Conflict and Restructuring in Britain's 
Ports (Avebury 1992) p. 720 
4 Parliament, Ministry of Labour Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. lion. Lord Devlin into 
Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, and. 2734 (1965) p. 
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s New York State Crime Commission, Fourth Report (NY, 20 May 1953) pp. 12-16 
6 Jensen, V. H., Dispute Settlement in the New York Longshore Industry', Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, vol. 10,1957, pp. 588-608 
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Another difference from Liverpool and London was the greater day-to-day vigilance 
over hatch gangs in New York, so as to ensure that the pace of work was not 
7 A foreman or hatch slackened, always a danger where time working was the norm? 
boss might `push' his gangs so as not to incur delays, a practice that appeared 
uncommon in Britain, where on-site supervision over shipboard labourers was likely 
to be looser. 8 
As importantly, tight scrutiny over work practices by the Waterfront Commission in 
New York supplied a permanent brake on shipboard malpractices there. In spite of its 
unusually strong reputation for unsavoury dock practices, New York's longshore 
workers therefore seem to have had less opportunity to practice shipboard 
malpractices from the 1950s in spite of the multiple `loopholes' in the port that were 
exploitable. Two mediating variables - the stringency with which port rules were 
policed, and the finding of means by which stopping of work became less legitimate - 
acted to counteract the sense of legitimacy often accorded to these particular 
malpractices. 
Unlike hiring malpractices, abuses aboard ships and performed by dock labour were 
less affected by the extant economic climate. Nor were they sensitive to 
improvements to hiring regimes, confounding decasualising reformers. 
ORIGINS AND NATURE 
Bottlenecks 
The distinctive port infrastructures of these waterfronts, in a decaying and unreformed 
condition, systematically added to the bargaining power of ship working gangs. 
Together with `restrictive' labour practices that limited the right of employers to move 
labour to where it was most needed, bottlenecks supplied a powerful and enduring 
reason for side-payments and the greasing of palms. 
7 Interview with NYI, 22.3.00 
8 Whether `pushing' of ship hold gangs to maintain a steady pace of work was a normal part 
of the hatch boss's or supervisors' job, or a specialised man was employed for this purpose, 
was never ascertained. One interviewee also referred to `snappers' in this connection 
(interview with NYH, 2.4.00) 
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Physicality problems were probably worse in New York, in part because of the 
manner in which port investments were structured, which arguably starved the port of 
enough money, since subsidies for port improvements came from local taxation. 
While this had advantages, it did leave decisions vulnerable to political in-fighting and 
waterfront refurbishments were a low priority for the taxpaying public. In addition 
were difficulties in road transport vehicles easily or in a timely manner traversing 
Manhattan especially, an island that had a `finger pier' system constructed to cope 
with horse-drawn carriages not motorised vehicles 9 
On the other hand, more so in Liverpool and London, the docks industry revolved 
around `time and tide. ' Vessels that missed a `slot' because of unfavourable tidal 
patterns would likely lose money. In Liverpool, for example, even thirty minutes' 
delay in getting away because of (for instance) labour disputes could set back a sailing 
for three hours if the tide was low. 10 Such matters were less common a reason for 
delays in New York, a port with a very moderate (four to five feet) tidal range that 
rarely held up shipping. This natural feature gave, before and after technological 
developments, the rank and file in London and Liverpool an additional measure of 
pull over employers if they wanted to `catch' the tide. 11 
9 There is a sizeable body of literature on this and on the history of New York pier defects, 
including: 'A Day in the Docks, Scribner's Magazine, vol. 18,1879, pp. 32-47; Bunker, J. G., 
Harbor and Haven: An Illustrated History of the Port of New York (Windsor Publications 
1979), pp. 216-8; Cunningham, B., Port Studies (Chapman and Ball 1928) p. 11; 
Buttenwieser, A. L., Manhattan Water-Bound: Planning and Development from the 
Seventeenth Century to the Present (New York University Press 1987) pp. 57-61; 
McCormack, W. J., The Decline of the Port of New York. A Report to the Mayor (W. J. 
McCormack 1952); U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, no. 550, Cargo 
Handling and Longshore Labor Conditions, Washington, DC. 1932, p. 7; MacElwee, R. S. and 
Taylor, T. R., Wharf Management, Stevedoring and Storage (D. Appleton 1921) pp. 27-8, 
103; Griffith, J. I., The Port of New York (Arco Publishing 1959) pp. 7-8; Lesher, R. A., The 
Problem of the Port of New York', The Dock and Harbour Authority, February 1926, pp. 99- 
103, and March 1926, pp. 136-8 
10 Interview with LIVD, 17.11.00 
11 Interview with LOND, 22.10.99. Phillips and Whiteside made a similar observation, in that 
tides made for a `discontinuous pattern of employment' (Phillips, G. and Whiteside, N., 
Casual Labour: The Unemployment Question in the Port Transport Industry 1880-1970 
(Clarendon Press 1985) p 283) 
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In New York, wet docks were unnecessary, and ships under less pressure to get away 
by a given hour. 12 Counterbalancing it, to a degree, was the fact that specialised night 
gangs were rarely employed in New York because of their cost, like Liverpool and 
London, and the use of tugboats in the port of New York at night was also 
prohibitively expensive. As a result, most shipping moved during daylight hours. 13 
In 1967, the United Nations catalogued defects in port facilities, and argued that 
improving them was `a highly complicated and intricate' task, with no single cause or 
solution. 4 Late starts and long meal breaks in London were blamed by union 
spokesmen on the practical difficulties caused by getting from A to B when docks 
communication and refreshment facilities were so inadequate. 15 Cause and effect was 
difficult to untangle. Was, for example, congestion bad because of hold ups caused 
`inflexible' work gangs, or did causality run in the opposing direction? 
Ship turnabout 
Rapid ship turnabouts were a preoccupation of most waterfront employers. 16 Ship 
owners and shipping lines were desirous of making their time in port as short as 
possible, berthing charges being expensive and with tight schedules to meet. This 
required a cooperative workforce. Pier fees for example were often higher than the 
cost of paying men extras, under various guises. '7 
'2 Telephonic interview with NYD, 2.5.01; Cunningham, B., Port Studies (Chapman and Ball 
1928) p. 129; Brinton, W. C., New York Harbor and the Nation's Foreign Trade', World's 
Work, vol. 31, December 1915, pp. 203-20. 
13 Interview with NYG, 12.4.00 
14 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The Turn Around Time of 
Ships in Port (New York 1967); Journal of Commerce, 24.6.67 
is Parliament Ministry of Labour Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. lion. Lord Devlin into 
Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, p. 20. 
16 Ibid., Parliament, Ministry of Labour and National Service, Unofficial Stoppages in the 
London Docks, cmd. 8236 (1951) p. 3; Turnbull, P. Morris, J. and Sapsford, D., Persistent 
Militants and Quiescent Comrades: Intra-Industry Strike Activity on the Docks, 1947-89, The 
Sociological Review, vol. 44 no. 4,1996, p. 696; Mellish, M., The Docks After Devlin 
(Heinemann 1972) p. 23; Parliament, Board of Trade. Committee of Inquiry into Shipping, 
Report, cmd. 4337 (1970) p. 172; Bown, A. H. J., Tort and Shipping Turn-Round', The Dock 
and Harbour Authority, January 1953, pp. 264-6+ 
17 Morewedge, H., The Economics of Casual Labor (Herbert Lang, 1970) p. 51. See also 
Parliament Board of Trade. Committee of Inquiry into Shipping, Report, cmd. 4337 (1970) 
pp. 172-3 on this point. 
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Within this setting, payoffs made sound business sense. Certain of the resulting 
malpractices were so entrenched that they virtually became part and parcel of the 
industrial landscape. Interviewee LONM, who sat for the TGWU union on many joint 
committees in London, remarked for instance that the employers he dealt with never 
even bothered to deny that they `paid off' work gangs for favours, but they quibbled if 
the men wanted a small advance on their `legitimate' earnings. 18 
`Time lost in port', as Mellish explained, `was generally considered more expensive 
than ad hoc settlements. i19 The mere threat of a delay caused by recalcitrant labourers 
was often sufficient to secure a `deal' favouring the dockworkers20 `The shipowners 
did a simple sum, ' according to one experienced union official, `How much do the 
dockers want, how much does it cost to keep the ship in port per day? That's less than 
that, pay. 21 
As already indicated, a need to get vessels out of port expeditiously did not submit to 
cumbersome conciliation procedures if a dispute arose. With the pressure of time 
often against a vessel owner, back-door dealings achieved an acceptance and 
legitimacy caused by repeated usage 22 Concessions verging into the improper were 
granted, `in order to maintain regular sailings. '23 A thriving market in corrupt 
practices operated by vessel hatch labourers developed, buttressed by unchanging 
variables, such as poor port facilities and transport links. This made the work of 
managing the port that much harder to orchestrate. 4 
Jensen, the foremost New York waterfront scholar, saw similar concessions wrung 
from employers there, and for the same reason of commercial expediency. As in 
Liverpool and London, `under the hat' payoffs to New York longshore workers 
18 This is confirmed in MRC: MSS. 126/uncatalogued: evidence of Timothy O'Leary to the 
Devlin Committee, 14.1.65. 
19 Mellish, M., The Docks After Devlin (Heinemann 1972), p. 23. 
20 Times, 6.1.65 According to MID `Port of London - Restrictive/Protective Practices' (n. d. ) 
it was very difficult to take effective action `when by doing so work in the whole or part of a 
sector or area of the Port might thereby be stopped or delayed. ' 
21 Interview with LONS, 8.7.99 
22 Times, 10.3.50, Hunter, B., They Knew Why They Fought (Index Books 1994), p. 18 
23 MID: LWA Box 333, Minutes of Meeting of Labour Committee and Employer Members of 
Wharfingers Group Joint Committee held 223.56 
24 Interview with LONM, 20.8.99 
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warded off potential and actual slowdowns or stoppages of work. A Brooklyn ILA 
representative once made the same point, that employers were willing to pay over the 
odds for unloading cargoes . 
25 Port capital had `to endure abuses and to comply with 
unreasonable demands in order to keep the ships moving. '26 
`A dozen good reasons could be found each day for industrial trouble' and the 
London dockworker overlooked `no possible opportunity for boosting his daily bill, ' 
in the words of Oram. 27 `Short, unofficial strikes were ... particularly effective on the 
docks as a means of securing piecemeal concessions from employers', wrote Turnbull 
et al, `because the individual employer often lacked the resources to take on the 
workers. '28 A fistful of five-pound notes discretely paid by a shipping agent to ship 
gangs was thought a small price to pay for labour peace. 9 
The question became one of determining what the commodities waiting to be 
processed while in dock were `worth' to an employer. From time to time, for 
example, un-worked for overtime payments would solve any `labour problems. ' In 
Britain, a special incentive for employers making unrecorded payments was that they 
saved on the levy paid by the employer to the Dock Labour Board 30 
Once the vessel was fully loaded or discharged, ship gangs in dispute with their 
employer realised that their bargaining power was curtailed, since `the evidence' had 
sailed away from port. They therefore tended to stop or slow down work while the 
vessel was still berthed, though this was clearly in breach of agreements. The Leggett 
Committee in 1951 concluded that negotiations in the London docks were `too often 
characterised on the men's side by the stopping of the job, in defiance of the advice of 
u Interview with NYJ, 20.3.00. Jensen, V. H., Strife on the Waterfront: The Port of New York 
Since 1945 (Cornell University Press 1974), p. 26; U. S. Congress, House. Committee on 
Education and Labor, Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, hearings 81st 
Congress 1st Session 1949, p. 602 
26 U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Waterfront 
Investigation: New York New Jersey: Interim Report, Report No. 653,83rd Congress Ist 
Session 1953, p. 9 
27 Oram, R. B., The Dockers' Tragedy (Hutchinson and Co 1970), pp. 105,110. 
28 Turnbull, P. Woolfson, C. and Kelly, J., Dock Strike: Conflict and Restructuring in Britain's 
Ports (Avebury 1992), p. 43. 
29 Interview with LONA, 30.6.99, Phillips and Whiteside, The Casual Labour Problem, p. 
233. 
30 Interview with LONS, 8.7.99 
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their Union representative or of a decision arrived at jointly by employers and Union 
representatives through the constitutional machinery. 31 Several union officials 
interviewed for this work spoke of the `greediness' of some of their members in this 
sphere 32 
Worse still for port managers, the men would expect the same favourable treatment 
when another ship owned by the same company docked. 3 The cumulative effect of 
these malpractices became a serious concern for port authorities in Liverpool and in 
London, which feared the economic knock-on effects for trade passing through their 
installations 34 
Before shift systems were introduced on a larger scale in the 1970s, ship level gangs 
could therefore deploy a number of autonomously acting resources to press their 
claims. In primarily `piece working' ports such as London, opportunities for 
generating `extras' were greater through the judicious exploitation of the wages 
system, as described in more detail in chapter six. Non-standardised break bulk or 
`loose' cargo-carrying vessels were most affected by these malpractices. 
Payments of this type in New York were more likely to exist on piers where there 
were already logistical or `technical' problems that made the job difficult. This might 
be the case when, for instance, people from different union Locals worked the same 
pier, causing coordination difficulties. 5 Internal union Local dynamics could be 
31 Interview with LIVI, 15.4.99; Jackson, M. P., Labour Relations on the Docks (Saxon House 
1973), pp. 82-3, Wigham, E., What's Wrong with the Unions? (Penguin 1961), p. 110; Phillips 
and Whiteside, Casual Labour, p. 250, McKelvey, J., Dock Labor Disputes in Great Britain. 
A Study in the Persistence of Industrial Unrest (New York State School of Industrial and 
Labor Relations 1953) p. 47; Parliament, Ministry of Labour and National Service, Unofficial 
Stoppages in the London Docks, p. 6 
32 London interviews with LONG, 21.10.99, LONM, 20.8.99, LONU, 26.7.99 
33 MRC: MSS. 126/uncatalogued: testimony of Tim O'Leary before the Devlin Committee on 
14.1.65 
34 Interview with LONM, 19.8.99; Parliament, Ministry of Labour and National Service, 
Unofficial Stoppages in the London Docks, p. 6; Parliament, Ministry of Labour. Committee 
on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain Matters Concerning the Port 
Transport Industry, Final Report, p. 10 
35 Telephonic interview with NYN, 19.10.00; Tobin, 'Port Facilities at New York', p. 312. A 
study of the process was made in the New York Times (20.5.56). Local 1814 members in 
Brooklyn refused to work with Local 968 men unless they had union books on them. A Local 
968 delegate confirmed the paid up status of his members, and Local 1814 men were ordered 
back to work. There was then a flare-up over the Local 968 hatch boss, who was fired by the 
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another unsettling variable for an employer to deal with 36 Inclement weather could 
also precipitate a downing of tools 37 
Factors such as these gave New York longshore workers a enough `legal' reasons to 
stop or to slow down the rate of work without the introduction of deliberately 
conceived schemes to `squeeze' an employer. But unlike similar practices in both 
Liverpool and London, accommodations with New York labour seem to have taken 
place on an ad hoc basis. Hatch bosses sometimes initiated them but all the gang 
shared in the rewards. 8 
Employer divisions 
Employer disunity was of the first importance in allowing ship level abuses to become 
so embedded. The cold commercial reality, regardless of shows of unity they might 
put on, was that employers were often in competition with each other for work (albeit 
less so in the specialised branches), furnishing a standing incentive for payments, as 
they `threw money at the problem until it went away' particularly when dealing in 
perishable commodities or when time pressures became even more acute (often on the 
last day before a sailing was scheduled). 9 
Within British employer associations, larger, deep-sea firms usually dominated, so 
that `for the whole period 1935-50 the employers organisation may be regarded as an 
organ of ship owning interest'. Before then, stevedore contractors appear to have held 
the upper hand on the National Council of Port Labour Employers, causing rifts with 
ship-owners 40 Shifts in the balance of power were bound to cause constant friction, 
stevedore. Checkers on the pier walked out in sympathy. The matter was only settled when the 
hiring boss was reinstated and the rest were asked to return to work the next day. The episode 
was retold in a Journal of Commerce story (10.5.56) but the angle adopted there was that this 
was part of a feud between Tony Anastasio, Local 1814 President, and ILA President William 
Bradley. 
36 Telephonic interview with NYI, 19.10.00 
37 Interview with NYQ, 28.3.00 
38 Interviews with NYJ, 20.3.00, NYT, 4.4.00 
39 Interview with LONI, 26.5.99 
40 Morgan, unpublished paper (1983) The central dichotomy in Liverpool and London was 
between the deep-sea traders, plying oceanic routes, and the rest (Lovell, J., Stevedores and 
Dockers: A Study of Trade Unionism in the Port of London, 1870-1914 (Macmillan 1969), p. 
78; Taplin, The Dockers' Union, p. 85, Lynton and King, Research in the London Docks, p. 
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as did divisions between those employers who paid their work gangs above the going 
rate and those who refused to so do 41 
Most illegal payments involved smaller firms, these being typified by tight profit 
margins and reportedly encountering stiffer competition 42 They could not afford 
stoppages of any sor t43 and as opposed to the big lines, had fewer resources, and 
employed the most `casual' dockworkers, which were reputed as more ready to 
operate unauthorised or unlawful practices 44 In London, for example, a Departmental 
Committee in 1908 concluded that `Complaints (by their men) are directed chiefly 
against stevedores in a small way of business. Some of these, it is said, are men of 
little substance; they compete with each other for contracts and sometimes cut prices 
so low that it would be impossible, so the workmen allege, for them to make a profit, 
if they were to pay the full amount of wages due. '45 
Smaller firms were among the earliest to cede to unionisation in London, 46 though in 
New York the argument went the other way, that masters in (for example) the 
coastwise traffic simply could not `afford' union scales and conditions. New York 
coastwise employers were consequently late in cooperating with unionism. 
Vessel labour and work discipline 
Industrial indiscipline in all ports rose after 1945. Statistics collected for Britain 
suggested a rising problem. After initial attempts at intervention, Dock Labour 
27; Phillips and Whiteside, Casual Labour, p. 253; McKelvey, Dock Labor Disputes in Great 
Britain, p. 55; MRC: MSS. 367/TSF/1: Shipping Federation `Minutes of Proceedings of the 
Executive Council' (21.11.24)) 
41 On the size and structure, in Liverpool and London, of employers and of employer 
associations, see the interviews with LIVG, 19.7.99; LONF, 30.6.99, LONM, 19.8.99. For 
New York, read Griffith, J. I., The Port of New York (Arco Publishing 1959), p. 115 and 
Jensen's works listed in the bibliography. 
42 Interview with LIVI, 15.4.99 
43 Montgomery, D., The Fall of the House of Labor (Cambridge University Press 1987) p. 103 
44 Parliament, Ministry of Labour Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. lion. Lord Devlin into 
Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, and. 2734 (1965) pp. 
8-10,19 
as Parliament, Departmental Committee on the Checking of Piece-Work Wages in Dock 
Labour, Report, cmd. 4380 (1908) p. 2 
46 Lovell, J., 'Sail, Steam and Emergent Dockers' Unionism in Britain, 1850-1914', 
International Review of Social History, vol. XXX11, pp. 239-41. 
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Boards `accepted the futility of trying to impose mass discipline' by the mid 1950s. 47 
This left `on the job' shipboard controls and employer practices as the primary means 
of keeping `order. ' But this faced two problems, coming from the highly cohesive 
organisation of shipboard gangs and second, a tradition of walking off the job if 
customary shipboard rights were violated or perceived as such. 8 
An important but relatively neglected area by sources49 is the social organisation of 
cargo handling on vessels whilst anchored in port. Once the gang began work on a 
vessel, it was largely left unsupervised, particularly in Liverpool and London. The 
practicalities of hatch work and the way supervision was ordered `allowed them to 
exert considerable influence on the job. 50 
Most supervisory level staff on board vessels and supervising dock labourers working 
in hatches came up through the ranks, whether in Liverpool, London or New York. 
They were thus in a good position to judge from personal experience when `legitimate 
malpractices' were threatened by management instructions. 
Many supervisors were related to, or members of, the same families as those in work 
gangs, making the task of eradicating malpractices more difficult still. `The 
shipworkers could be your brother', as one source commented. In New York, the 
hatch boss could be thought of as `the head of the family', bringing his own relatives 
47 Turnbull, P. and Sapsford, P., `Hitting the Bricks: An International Comparative Study of 
Conflict on the Waterfront' Industrial Relations, vol. 40 no. 2,2001, p. 242. 
48 `Men have walked off a boat because management once placed `watchers' in the hold to 
supervise the unloading of whiskey' (Mars, G., Dock Pilferage' in Rock, P. and McIntosh, M. 
teds. ), Deviance and Social Control (Tavistock 1974) p. 223) 
9 This was noted as a potential difficulty in the 1980s construction reports (the unionisation of 
`front-line supervisors ... may make it more difficult to detect abuses and frauds') (New York State, Organized Crime Task Force, Corruption and Racketeering in the New York City 
Construction Industry: Final Report (New York: December 1989) p. 48). Read also 
Parliament, Ministry of Labour. Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. lion. Lord Devlin into 
Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, cmd. 2734, pp. 10-11; 
I-fill, The Dockers, pp. 18-9 
so Dock theft was widespread but employers were aware that if they cracked down hard, the 
whole gang might down tools (Mars, G., An Anthropological Study of Longshoremen and of 
Industrial Relations in the Port of St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada (University of London, 
Ph. D 1972) pp. 6/20-6/26). 
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down to work 51 Registration regimes in Liverpool and in London enhanced the 
significance of familial connections in securing work, the father/son relationship being 
paramount and enshrined in agreements 52 
Hatch bosses and timekeepers thus trod a delicate path between antagonising their 
own men, who they needed to get the best out of even when this meant turning a blind 
eye on occasion, and of alienating their employer if he was desirous of his labourers 
`doing their job. ' The typical cargo-handling process was remarkably similar whether 
in Liverpool, London or in New York, as Appendix E suggests S3 
Confusion over disciplinary issues was the net result, usually resulting the taking of 
the least line of resistance and in laxity. 4 Unionisation of all levels of the ship level 
hierarchy up to that of `shipworker' could also compromise the dispassionate 
implementation of disciplinary codes, especially when fellow unionists were engaged 
with. A portion of New York employers saw the dangers of a fully unionised 
workforce, when dealing with men paid by the hour. `The theory was', as one 
explained, `that you really needed a non-union superintendent there, who doesn't get 
paid by the hour, to manage and suppress everybody's desire to drag this out as long 
as possible. '55 
For this reason, the New York Waterfront Commission specifically outlawed ILA 
membership by hiring bosses and ship or pier superintendents. The Devlin Report of 
51 Interviews with LONM, 5.10.99, NYN, 11.4.00, NYS, 28.3.00 NYV, a Hoboken longshore 
worker, took over from a retired hatch foreman because he needed a regular income. As a 
hatch boss, he felt like he was `part of their family' (interview, 17.4.00). 
52 Parliament, Ministry of Labour, Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. lion. Lord Devlin into 
Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, pp. 10-11 
53 One exception appears to be the posts of `dock boss' in New York port, with no counterpart 
in Liverpool and London. New York piers also featured `public loaders', unique to the port. 
These supplied labour and equipment with which to load waiting lorries with imports, the 
question at issue being the compulsory (and high priced) nature of their services. 
Timekeepers, the crucial personnel in many malpractices, could also be related to the basic 
level dockworker. Shipworkers (also known as ship foremen), in charge of a vessel and its 
labour, engaged the hiring foremen. They could be related to lower down personnel. and were 
often ex rank and filers. The top ranking was that of ship or cargo superintendent who were 
non-union, usually being former ship's officers or port managers 
54 As one example, a union leader in the 1907 New York dock strike, Nino Sabbatino, was, by 
1922, a stevedore contractor. Hiring foremen could even become ILA delegates upon 
relinquishing their post (NYT, 31.1.22) 
ss New York interview with NYL, 7.4.00 
116 
1965, in Britain, also looked askance at this aspect of relations56 but within British 
unionism, no problems of contradictory roles and responsibilities were recognised. 
The Stevedores' and Dockers' Union (NASDU) in 1951 for instance, set up on the 
south side of the Thames its own stevedore contractor firm in the Surrey Commercial 
Docks, `Associated Stevedores (London) Ltd. '57 NASDU also permitted small 
employers to join, or to remain in, the union so long as they `hung up' their 
dockworker registration books while they were not part of the rank and file. But this 
custom was not compulsory and `Wallaces, ' a well-known London stevedoring firm 
of the 1950s, was in NASD. 8 
Disciplinary problems on board vessels were less of a problem for employers in ports 
such as London where payment by the piece was the norm. If London style hatch 
gangs slowed down, the result of lost production came largely (though not wholly, 
since there could be a time-working, or `minimum wage, ' element under defined 
conditions) out the wages of gangs indulging in the malpractice. Employers in that 
situation could afford to adopt a more `liberal' approach to slackness. 
But not so in ports like Liverpool or New York, where gangs either ended up with 
relatively low `normal' piecework earnings (Liverpool) or were paid the same 
regardless of their speed of work (New York). It may be the case, in addition, that 
discipline was slacker under post-1954 Dock Labour Scheme regimes, as Turnbull and 
his colleagues suggested, than in New York. Certainly, many employers argued that 
abolition of the Dock Labour Scheme in 1989 improved matters in former `Scheme' 
ports. 9 
56 Parliament, Ministry of Labour Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. lion. Lord Devlin into 
Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, p. 107. 
s' Interviews with LONL, 26.7.99, LONU, 26.7.99; Journal of Commerce, 2.10.51 The 
Certificate of Incorporation (no. 490608) was kindly supplied by Les Newman. This venture 
had 115 employees, each holding shares in the company. 
58 Interviews in London with LONG, 15.6.99, LONM, 19.8.99, LONP, 7.7.99, telephonic 
interview with LONU, 24.11.01 
59 Evans, N., McKay, D., Garratt, M., Sutcliffe, P., The Abolition of the Dock Labour Scheme 
(Department of Employment, 1993) p. 28 
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Containerisation and unitisation 
As the effects of mechanisation gathered pace, the need for much lower gang sizes 
became apparent. This was not a novel problem, but it gained in resonance. Over 
time, a number of contentious practices were negotiated away, the first example being 
the Pacific Coast longshoremen's agreements in the early 1960s. 0 Those 
malpractices generated by `choke points' faded in overall significance as shipping 
traffic moved to better-connected sites. 
Not all malpractices ceased. As the New York Times commented in the latter 1970s, 
`Transportation cannot be stockpiled' and `a brief strike is a calamity to an employer 
who sells nothing but time. '61 This economic reality accounted for the survival of 
malpractices in Britain also 62 
STATE PROCESSES AND VESSEL MALPRACTICES 
A strong distinction was made by dockworkers between `legitimate' reforms to the 
hiring structure and those aimed at changing work practices aboard ships once work 
had commenced, which were often judged as sacrosanct. Hiring related reforms were 
relatively easy to secure agreement on, therefore, since (more so in Britain) the major 
vested interests saw this as an advance on casual employment. Employers, less 
initially convinced, were ultimately persuaded by unrest provoked (so the argument 
went) by part-time dockworking and by the threat that government would impose 
`decasualisation' regardless of their objections. 
Critically, the acceptance by British dock unions of the principle and practices of 
decasualisation moved the issue along in a way not true of any changes mooted in 
respect to shipboard practices. This was considered best left for joint committees to 
address. 
60 Cf. Killingsworth, C. C., The Modernization of West Coast Longshore Work Rules', 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 15 no. 3,196: 2, pp. 295-306 
61 NYT, 27.2.77 
62 Interview with LONI, 26.5.99, telephonic interview with LONU, 24.11.01 
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In recognition of the near certainty of stiff resistance to state involvement in post- 
engagement practices, wholesale governmental intervention was ruled out, but the 
state in New York was less inhibited. By the mid-1950s, a unique set of 
circumstances left the ILA in the port with few of any friends in politics and organized 
labour. In this situation, comparatively radical measures were launched with a large 
degree of success. 
Shaw Enquiry 
Over the course of the First World War, according to British employers, `an individual 
Employer was forced singly to pay high rates and then played off against his next- 
door neighbour until rates out of all proportion to time work pay were attained . 163 
Concerns over slack shipboard discipline surfaced in public in Britain in 1920 when in 
the course of the Shaw Enquiry, looking into a Transport Workers' Federation (TWF) 
wage claim, the question arose as to whether improved guarantees of employment 
would reduce malpractices. 
Focused on the illicit use of `go-slow' tactics to boost earnings, it was stated that the 
problem was widespread, as was leaving of work early and late starts, perhaps a 
quarter of dockworkers being involved. Reduced output was the effect and employers 
voiced the opinion that further measures to regularise employment should be 
accompanied by reinforcements to disciplinary systems, this being supported by the 
union, which until then had `little influence with the men concemed. 'M It was feared 
that more regular income would otherwise make the men more militant and less 
concerned to please their operational employers. Other employer demands included an 
end to restrictive practices and the free use of non-unionised or unregistered men 
where suitable alternative labour could not be found 65 
63 Harris, G. G., Memorandum of the Organisation in London in Respect to Port Labour 
Matters, London, 16 July 1937, p. 7 
64 Parliament, House of Commons, Report by a Court of Inquiry Concerning Transport 
Workers - Wages and Conditions of Employment of Dock Labour, cmd. 55,1920, pp. 9-16; 
Shadwell, A., The Problem of Dock Labour (Longman, Green, and Co. 1920) pp. 17-22; 
PRO: LAB 2/688/5: `Report by a Court of Inquiry Concerning Transport Workers Wages and 
Conds of Employment of Dock Labour' 
65 CA: D42/C1/285: `Dockers' Inquiry - Safeguards' (13.4.20) 
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Ernest Bevin at the TWF agreed to use his authority to satisfy some of these demands, 
so long as the root cause of `time-wasting', perceived as emanating from the casual 
system of engagement, was forcibly attacked 66 Registration schemes limiting 
dockworkers numbers, as noted in chapter three, were more widely established. But 
there it ended, until war broke the impasse in 1939. 
World War Two 
Means to tighten up work discipline after men were hired were established in 
Liverpool and London during the Second World War but these proved, more often 
than not, ineffective, since dock labour was scarce and valued. Employers sought to 
retain better gangs by, for instance, inventing work for them to do until they were 
required again 67 Localism of work practices was still a major problem and stymied 
attempts to operate major ports as integrated units. 
Wartime transfers of labourers could have helped to standardise work practices, but 
their use was not widespread, in Britain at least, since labour was scarce everywhere 
and portworkers often refused to move to ports with `worse' working conditions to 
their own. 9 The understanding throughout was that where work practices were 
`diluted' to meet wartime demands, they would revert to the pre-war situation once 
hostilities ceased. 70 
As the National Joint Council stated in Britain during 1942, `There is no uniformity of 
practice nor consistency in policy. '71 Waterfront employers would rarely stand 
together `and in some cases exorbitant rates for overtime were being paid in the 
66 CA: D42/Cl/285 - memorandum of 13.4.20 on the Shaw Enquiry, p. 6 67 Interview with LIVK, 26.11.99 
68 In 1942, the National Council of Port Labour Employers complained that work discipline 
had suffered and that the Council was rarely consulted about local practices (MMM: PEA Box 
44/1: National Council of Port Labour Employers - correspondence: letter of 12.9.42 to 
members of the executive committee of the National Council). 
69 MMM: MDHB/PEC/14/2: `The Liverpool Port Emergency Committee and the Second 
World War' vol. 2 review no. 15 
70 MID: National Joint Council for Dock Labour `Terms of War Emergency Agreement of 
24th June, 1940 ... ' (London, 1940). 71 MID: LWA Box 267: `Resolution for National Joint Council' (1942); MMM: 
MDHB/NDLB Box 2: report of 28.11.42 from Employers' Association of the Port of 
Liverpool. 
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various ports. '72 The British government, in the interests of labour peace, was accused 
of turning a blind eye to known abuses in Liverpool, despite being the direct employer 
of dock labour there. 3 The Shipbuilding and Shipping Record also claimed in June 
1948 that a 1942 report on waterfront malpractices was suppressed in the name of 
good `labour relations. '74 
Accounts suggested that the military conflict also enhanced the importance of `cost- 
plus' practices on both sides of the Atlantic. Stipulating that employers would be 
compensated by the state for the full cost of a docking operation, cost-plus agreements 
could encourage `featherbedding, ' if oversight was lacking 75 Some New York 
employers openly indicated their concern over the inefficiencies and malpractices that 
cost-plus contracts invited. 6 
Where cost-plus carried over into the post-war world, its value continued to be a 
matter of controversy. One interviewee, working in the office of a private contractor 
stevedore in Liverpool, claimed that the arrangement there `was like an open cheque' 
for mischief making and cost over-runs, so they required constant attention and 
surveillance. 7 
Its advantages were evident in situations where the cost of cargo handling was not 
clear, for example when dealing with a new commodity. Cost-plus was flexible 
enough to accommodate loose freight cargoes under `test bed' conditions, or where 
speed of vessel turnabout was more important than its cost, as classically seen in 
wartime. 
72 MID: LWA Box 267: minutes of a meeting of the National Council of Port Labour 
Employers, 20.5.42. 
73 MMM: PEA Box 125 file 9: 31.5.50 report by a Liverpool Dock Manager on 'Discipline. ' 
74 Shipbuilding and Shipping Record, 10.6.48 
75 Green, A 'The Work Process' in Davies, S. et al, Dock Workers: International Explorations 
in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970 (Ashgate Publishing 2000) p. 568; (New York) 
Citizens' Waterfront Committee, The New York Waterfront, New York 1946, p. 38 
76 NYT, 24.4.47; Citizens' Waterfront Committee, The New York Waterfront (New York 1946) 
38 Fi 
Telephonic interviews with LOND, 4.12.00; NYI, 2.1.01 and NYY, 3.1.01; interview with 
LIVD, 17.11.00 (all of them long time dockworkers); Morgan, unpublished paper (1983), p. 3, 
Times, 11.3.50; U. S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
Waterfront Investigation, hearings 83rd Congress Ist Session, 1953, p. 293 
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Post-1945 developments - general comments 
From 1945, it was left to joint committees to address the problem of ship level 
malpractices. The single exception was disciplinary functions, many related to ship 
level malpractices and delegated to Docks Labour Boards from employers. Scheme 
rules for instance mandated it to investigate, and if necessary to punish, any violations 
of `the rules of the port or place where (a dockworker) is working. 78 
Over time, Dock Labour Board disciplinary procedures `gradually lost ... 
momentum. '79 The rank and file, for example, resisted its provisions on `compulsory' 
overtime working in London in 1954, where there was a prolonged walk-off. The 
dispute was only resolved after an official enquiry brought down a compromise 
solution that in effect made overtime 'voluntary. '80 This and similar battles with the 
rank and file sapped the morale of Dock Labour Board officials and made it less likely 
that action would be taken against shipboard transgressors 81 
Since most British employers were mindful of the regressive consequences for labour 
relations of making official complaints, and doubted the effectiveness of making a 
formal criticism to the dock board in the first place, this marked a clear difference 
from Waterfront Commission practices in New York and accounted for some of the 
perceived differences in reports of malpractices on board ships. Nevertheless, even in 
New York, the Waterfront Commission's policies were modified after challenges. 
78 Parliament, Ministry of Labour and National Service, Unofficial Stoppages in the London 
Docks, cmd. 8236 (1951) p. 8 
79 Phillips, G. and Whiteside, N., Casual Labour: The Unemployment Question in the Port 
Transport Industry 1880-1970 (Clarendon Press 1985) p. 252; telephonic interview with 
NYK, 12.3.01 According to the present Legal Counsel for the ILA, the Waterfront 
Commission and ILA are today in relative accord, after the union successfully challenged in 
court some of the Commission's rulings. However, it does seem unrealistic to suppose that all 
tensions between the two organisations have disappeared. 
80 Regular overtime working, before 8am or after 5pm, in order to `finish' a ship was a bone 
of contention in London, partly because earnings without overtime were relatively good in the 
port. The TGWU and NASDU objected on principle to `compulsory' overtime work and 
complained that the London Dock Board had disciplined men for refusing to work it. 
NASDU banned overtime on this issue, without reference to joint committees. The subsequent 
report recommended that they look into the `offending' Clause 8 and that the relevant Scheme 
paragraph be amended to allow this to happen (Industrial Courts Act, 1919, Final Report of a 
Court of Inquiry into a Dispute in the London Docks, cmd 9310 (1954)) 
81 Turnbull, P. and Sapsford, P., `A Sea of Discontent: The Tides of Organised and 
`Unorganised' Conflict on the Docks' Sociology, vol. 26 no. 2,1992, pp. 291-309 
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Following a major strike against it in 1955, it appeared that the Waterfront 
Commission became more accommodating to ILA anxieties, an effect bolstered by 
successful appeals by union lawyers against some of its decisions. 
In all ports, the feeling on the shop floor was that shipboard practices were matters for 
custom and for joint agreement, not state legislation. Such quasi-governmental 
agencies as the Waterfront Commission had to define for themselves how best to 
handle this in relation to standards they were mandated to enforce. 
Reasons for state involvement 
Dock labourers were often the largest single group of workers in waterside areas and 
tended to vote as a bloc for political groupings that promised to preserve or extend 
their interests, which usually meant interventionism. Geographically identifiable 
sections of cities such as the Chelsea district of Manhattan, Red Hook in Brooklyn and 
Wapping in London were commonly identified with waterside occupations and by 
tradition voted for parties of the `left. ' (Liverpool's voting history was more 
complex. )83 
Waterfront unions actively sought out governments for various reasons. Aside from 
policies promoting decasualisation, these included health and safety questions of 
special relevance in such an accident-prone industry. High among the II. A's concerns 
was to secure compensation for dockworkers injured at work, a late development 
compared to Britain. 
Until a means was found of controlling the number of dockworkers on a systematic 
basis, union campaigns were partially effective at best. As Marks explained, `because 
open unions could not influence the labour market from the inside by controlling the 
supply of labour, they focussed on enforcing changes externally, through legislation 
82 Interview with NYK, 11.4.00 
83 Cf. Davies, S., Liverpool Labour (Keele University Press 1996); Adams, T., 'Labour and the 
First World War', The Journal of Regional and Local Studies, vol. 10 no. 1, summer 1990, pp. 
23-47 
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and by threatening employers with the consequences of a complete shutdown of their 
enterprises. ' 84 
Political influence over policing during strikes could make or break them. 
Arbitration could also involve the pulling of strings. A special interest of American 
unions was the removal of federal injunctions against striking, issued liberally before 
1932 by courts biased in favour of employers' interests. 
British state intervention until 1915 on the docks was performed on an improvised 
basis and fluctuated with the political imperative to `do something' and with the 
relative influence of the decasualisation issue, which only became urgent after 1939.86 
As Wrigley argued, `In industrial relations, as in so many areas of policy, the interwar 
period was significant for what it did not, rather than for what it did, change. '87 
After 1947, with a change in government policy, the Dock Labour Board underpinned 
the TGWU on Merseyside as the monopoly representative of registered labour. It 
chose to interpret dock rules in favour of the union, citing a contentious wartime 
regulation as giving it discretion over the closed shop question but with no basis in 
law. 88 
84 Marks, G., Unions in Politics: Britain, Germany, and the United States in the Nineteenth 
and Early Twentieth Centuries (Princeton University Press 1989) p. 47 
85 Clegg, H. A., Fox, A. and Thompson, A. F., A History of British Trade Unions Since 1889, 
vol. 1 (Clarendon Press, 1964) p. 94. In the midst of the 1919 port-wide New York strike, 
Mayor Hague in Jersey City refused to permit scabs to operate on `his' waterfront and 
Hoboken police shunted them back to Manhattan. 
86 Cf. Whiteside, N., 'Welfare Insurance and Casual Labour: A Study of Administrative 
Intervention in Industrial Employment, 1906-26, The Economic History Review, vol. 32, 
1979, pp. 507-22. 
87 Wrigley, C. (ed. ), A History of British Industrial Relations Volume 11: 1914-1939 (The 
Harvester Press, 1987) p. 187 
88 PRO: BK 2/24 `Re: -National Dock Labour Board Employment of Dockers at 
Merseyside. Transport and General Workers Union. Opinion' (21.3.55); MID: BPA 369 "The 
Closed Shop' Docks Industry' (13.10.47) discussed the legal position of dock unions, 
especially on the `closed shop' situation. There was no formal agreement to this effect even 
though the practice was closely observed. See also: Jensen, Hiring of Dock Workers and 
Employment Practices in the Ports of New York, Liverpool, London, Rotterdam, and 
Marseilles, p. 180 
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Employers tended to go along to keep in the good graces of the other interests 89 The 
situation in New York was less open to doubt or to challenge, since the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had repeatedly certified the ILA, according to federal 
legislation dating from the New Deal era, as the exclusive bargaining organisation in 
the port, a situation not seriously challenged until 1954. 
New York 
The atomisation of politics in New York City made the creation of reliable and 
permanent relationships that could offer the ILA long-term security and legitimacy 
difficult. Federal codes to underpin unionism such as the Wagner Act of 1932 
stabilised union organisation, but not wholly, since much activity was localised and 
outside the orbit of Washington's authority. 
Two interacting approaches were at work in New York. First was a stress on the 
illegal aspects of industrial phenomena, inherited from the age of the muckrakers. 
Second was a profoundly decentralised political system in New York City that 
permitted a multiplicity of competing interests to co-exist in the same political 
space 90 Consequent interventions focused on the New York waterfront were more 
explicitly politicised, fragile and anti-crime focused than those in Britain. The ILA 
found it difficult to find reliable partners to argue its case sympathetically when 
overall political circumstances were unfavourable, marking to out from British 
waterfront unions. 
Every major American political party was to the `right' in British terms whether by 
ideology or by economic policy. The one serious attempt to construct a British-type 
`Labour Party' with socialist ambitions, in the American Labor Party (ALP), 
89 Jensen, Hiring of Dock Workers and Employment Practices in the Ports of New York, 
Liverpool, London, Rotterdam, and Marseilles, p. 166 
90 Commentator Joe Doyle told the story of the wife of the president of ILA Local 791, who 
sat on a committee deciding zoning matters when nearby piers were closing in the 1970s in a 
futile campaign to restore the piers to their former use (email from Joe Doyle, 26.1.02; for the 
general point, see WA: ILA 1927 Proceedings - this told how Chelsea section ILA Locals 
were influential in the 15`h Congressional District covering the docks area (p. 127). 
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disintegrated in New York City during early Cold War paranoia 91 The ALP, 
however, was instrumental in aiding striking Brooklyn longshore workers during their 
1951 struggle 92 
Sayre and Kaufman explain how, in New York, `No single, cohesive, enduring group 
or coalition of groups displays interest in the whole spectrum of governmental 
decisions. '93 Built upon in an uncontrolled and chaotic manner, public services in the 
metropolis were overwhelmed by successive floods of immigrants from the late 
nineteenth century. An urgent demand arose for minimal standards, in which the 
urban `political machines' took a pioneering role as a middleman 94 Their reach was 
often exaggerated, as was their `corruption, ' but enough evidence was unearthed to 
9s tarnish such them and cooperating unions such as the ILA 
Periodical crusades against political and union `criminality' were, in fact, a cement 
holding together the body politic, with a proven ability to sway the outcome of 
elections. Waterfront `scandals' featured, especially from 1949 as evidence built of 
docks violence. 
The 1950 Mayoral campaign was particularly newsworthy for its `knock-about' 
quality, in which `underworld' influence in the city's administration was shamelessly 
91 Meyer, G., 'American Labor Party 1936-1956', in Ness, I. and Ciment, J. (eds. ) The 
Encyclopedia of Third Parties in America, (vol. 1) (Sharpe Reference 2000); Garrett, C., The 
LaGuardia Years (Rutgers University Press 1961) pp. 265-7; Galenson, W., The CIO 
Challenge to the AFL: A History of the American Labor Movement 1935-41 (Harvard 
University Press 1960) pp. 294,320; Dulles, F. R., Labor in America (Thomas Y. Crowell 
1966) pp. 313-6. 
92 Interview with NYT, 4.4.00 
93 Sayre, W. and Kaufman, H., Governing New York City: Politics in the Metropolis (W. W. 
Norton 1965). 
94 Lowi, T. J., At the Pleasure of the Mayor: Patronage and Power in New York City, 1898- 
1958 (Collier-Macmillan 1964) pp. 87,178-86; Sayre and Kaufman, Governing New York 
City, pp. 562,581-2,724. 
95 For more, read: Hofstadter, R., The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F. D. R. (Jonathan Cape 
1968); Brownell, B. A. and Stickle, W. E. (eds. ), Bosses and Reformers (Houghton Mifflin 
1973) pp. 1-7; Henderson, T. M., Tammany Hall and the New Immigrants (Arno Press 1976); 
Ostrogorski, M., Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, (vol. 2) (Haskell 
House 1970); Johnson, M., Political Corruption and Public Policy in America (Brooks/Cole 
1982). 
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exploited as a political footbal196 The 1953 mayoral campaign likewise traded on 
revelations of port malpractices made by the State Crime Commission and the 
Democratic candidate, Robert Wagner, promised to drive out the dockland 
`racketeers' if he was elected. 7 
Liverpool and London 
Institutionalised conflict of this kind between government and trade unions was 
downplayed in Liverpool and London. British administrations adopted policies 
seeking to avoid major entanglements with organized labour in strategic industries 
such as the docks, a task that could be compromised by talk of docks criminality that 
required police attention and would run up against the strongest union and rank and 
file objections. 
As a pillar of the post-1945 labour movement in Britain, the TGWU was in a key 
position to exert political influence on Labour governments through its industrial 
strength, huge financial resources and sponsorship activities. 8 For this, and for the 
promotion of wage restraint policies, the TGWU was given a range of general and 
particular concessions, including the landmark 1947 Dock Labour Scheme, 
embodying most of what the union leadership had fought for since its formation. " 
An incoming Conservative administration did not attempt to reverse the gains made 
under Labour. 100 `Shaken by the scale of their 1945 electoral defeat, in opposition the 
Conservatives had come to accept much of Labour's economic and social 
96 The Mayoral contest between Edward Corsi and his Independent opponent Vincent 
Impellitteri was described at the time as `the noisiest, eye-gougiest free-for-all the city has 
witnessed for decades. ' (Time Magazine, 6.11.50) 
97 For the primary campaign in 1953, and the campaign, read: NYT, 3.5.53,17.6.53,27.8.53, 
28.8.53,2.9.53,11.9.53,12.9.53,9.10.53,24.1053 
98 Up to 70 per cent of Labour Party funds came from unions and they sponsored over 30 per 
cent of the entire Parliamentary Party after 1945. The TGWU sponsored a number of Labour 
Members of Parliament and at the Labour Party conference the TGWU had the single largest 
vote among the unions there. 
9' Weiler, P., British Labour and the Cold War: The London Dock Strike of 1949, ' in Cronin, 
J. E. and Schneer, J. (eds. ), Social Conflict and the Political Order in Modern Britain (Croom 
Helm 1982). The period is well covered with reference to the docks in Phillips, J., The Great 
Alliance (Pluto Press 1996) 
100 Smith, The Attlee and Churchill Administrations and Industrial Unrest, pp. 93,110,145 
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programme, ' as Philips stated. '°' Subsequent advancements in the decasualisation 
realm came largely on the backs of Labour governments, though the political 
opposition usually went along with `modernisation' projects until the post-war 
consensus was decisively fractured in 1979.102 
RANK AND FILE RESISTENCE TO INCURSIONS 
The lesson was clear. Governments varied in their willingness or ability to impose 
bureaucratic and standardising standards dock practices, with policies designed to 
interfere with shipboard practices assuming a low priority. This laissez fair position 
rested upon strong ideological objections against interfering in free collective 
bargaining, which all parties shared. But it also mirrored `political' judgements of 
how strongly unionism and the rank and file would fight state encroachments beyond 
those previously accepted as legitimate, in the hiring arena. 
New York 
The interjection in New York of a quasi-governmental agency between employers and 
unions to deal with employment malpractices - the Waterfront Commission - was 
viewed with hostility at first. Heightened sensibilities against `Socialistic' systems, 
such as dockworker registration let alone incursions into shipboard practices, were 
further factors special to New York. But working against this was growing impulses 
in the body politic to address the waterfront criminality issue, which were to become 
irresistible. 
The New York Harbor Waterfront Commission was, like the British National Dock 
Labour Board (NDLB), removed from most directly `political' influences. Although 
chiefly concerned, as was the NDLB in Britain, with engagement questions, the New 
101 Phillips, The Postwar Political Consensus', pp. 310-1 
102 Evidence for Labour government sympathy towards dock labour questions was seen in the 
inquiries of 1924 and 1930, even before the 1947 initiative and the 1967 Devlin scheme (The 
Economist, 9.2.24; Tull, G. J. D., The Port of London Authority 1909 to 195 (PLA 1959) p. 
119; Adams, G., Organisation of the British Port Transport Industry (National Ports Council 
1973) p. 118; PRO: LAB 76/21). 
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York Waterfront Commission had tougher policies relating to those practices aiding 
`criminality. ' 
The ILA especially opposed Waterfront Commission disciplinary powers, since they 
bypassed joint agreements. 103 But Commission spokesmen assured anxious rank and 
file union members that they had nothing to fear from its incursions, and the 
Commission was careful to couple its new controls to registration and to higher 
earnings for `regular' longshore workers. 
In distinction to Dock Labour Boards in Britain, however, the Waterfront Commission 
actively sought out evidence of criminal activities. This may have had a `freezing' 
effect on other dock practices operating at the borderline between the legitimate and 
the criminal, since the penalties for transgressing Commission rules were severe. The 
legal divide, for example, between `bonus' payments made to work gangs and 
`payoffs' to them could be murky. To stave off any possible misunderstanding on the 
part of Commission agents, work practices that could conceivably be defined as 
violations of the Bi-State Compact establishing the Commission were incorporated 
into agreements. 104 
A `showdown' of sorts occurred in September 1955 when the ILA rank and file `hit 
the bricks' against the Waterfront Commission, acting on a union recommendation. 
103 The ILA had no direct role in disciplinary matters when they reached Waterfront 
Commission offices, but the accused could be provided with legal counsel by his union Local 
(interview with NYK, 11.4.00, telephonic interview with NYZ, 13.2.01; WCNY `1993-1994 
Annual Report' p. 10). As in New York, there was a `double' or even a `triple' punishment 
available against offending dockworkers. They could be dealt with in turn by the courts, 
punished by the NDIS/Waterfront Commission and simultaneously their unemployment 
benefits could be suspended, in Britain anyway (MRC: MSS. 126/TG2/: TGWU 'Minutes and 
Reports of the Docks National Trade Group Committee' for 24.1.46). The Longshoremen's 
Journal (Aug. 1960) reported that the ILA was forced by the Waterfront Commission to 
remove from office an official who stole a car as a `joy-rider' back in 1922. Also consult the 
interview with NYQ, New York, 28.3.00, The Brooklyn Longshoreman, Feb. 1975. Another 
contentious area was where ILA members cleared of wrongdoing in a criminal court could 
still be punished under the Commission's own, less stringent standards of admissibility of 
evidence (NYT 1.4.54., Nossiter, B. D., 'Waterfront War. Round Two in New York', The 
Nation, 8 October 1955, pp. 298-302; Waterfront Commission, '1993-1994 Annual Report' p. 
10). 
1°4 A Waterfront Commission official argued to this writer that it only targeted payments from 
employers to union officials. `Bonuses' given to work gangs were ignored, in theory. But in 
order to determine if ILA officials received illegal payoffs, Commission investigators would 
sometimes have to delve into rank and file practices as well. 
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The ILA demanded a hearing on its grievances against the Commission on its 
interpretation of its rules, a hearing on its perceived bias against the union in the 
recent contest with the IBL and on the Commission's role in the hiring process. 
However, the strike was ruled as illegal by the courts, 105 while the Governors of New 
York and New Jersey flatly refused to intervene to help the ILA, as did the AFL union 
federation that the union belonged to until it was thrown out for its criminality. The 
NYSA sensed the weakness of the ILA, that was deeply in debt by this stage106 and 
sympathetic action from other ports was not forthcoming. 107 The Supreme Court 
granted an injunction against the union, with further injunctions (and possible fines) in 
the pipeline. The union's president and general organiser found themselves behind 
bars for contempt. Faced with this unprecedented onslaught, after eight days the New 
York strike collapsed. 108 
Contrary to the impression given by American authors, of a union treasury `waiting to 
be pilfered, "09 the ILA in New York was under-funded and thus ill equipped for a 
prolonged struggle. Membership dues were relatively low, compared to those of other 
AFL unions, leaving little for unemployment, strike or sickness benefits. "" As a 
consequence, the union `was always short of funds, "" accounting along with a 
deliberate policy of rapprochement with employers for the extreme reluctance of the 
union hierarchy to approve strikes. 112 Where criminals attacked union treasuries, this 
was at the union Local level, where there were sometimes surpluses, though never as 
great as supposed. 
105 NYT, 8.9.55 
106 NYT, 9.9.55 The ILA's balance as of 31 December 1952 was $90,480 (`Financial 
Statement International Longshoremen's Association July 1" to December 31x, 1952'). 
107 NYT, 11.9.55 
108 NYT, 14.9.55, New York Waterfront Commission `Annual Report 1955-1956' pp. 13-4; 
Axelrod, Government Covers the Waterfront, pp. 442-3. 
109 Levy, P. B., The Waterfront Commission of the Port of New York: A History and 
Apraisal', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 42 no. 4,1989, p. 511. 
11F WA: ILA 1931 Proceedings, p. 89, Russell, Men Along the Shore, pp. 119-20; AFL 
`Report of Proceedings of the 71' Convention' (1952) p. 223. 
11 Jensen, Strife on the Waterfront, p. 212. 
112 See WA: film series R-7013, reel 8, frame 851 in which 1920s ILA president Anthony 
Chlopek spoke of the ILA treasury being `practically depleted' owing to a strike. 
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The contrast with the TGWU in Britain could hardly be greater. Although a 
breakdown into its constituent trade groups is not given in surviving records, during 
1952 for example, the TGWU as a unit showed a healthy balance in its financial 
accounts. 113 
Liverpool and London 
When post-engagement intercessions were made in Liverpool or in London, therefore, 
it was with union or joint committee agreement. Furthermore, a rash of post-1945 
strikes gave British governments pause for thought over the probable effect of any 
move it might make `against' shipboard malpractices. Also staying their hands was a 
fear of inadvertently giving more power to unofficial rank and file leaders, who had 
gained a significant following. 
Highly controversially, in the major British ports union representatives sat with 
employers on NDLB disciplinary panels, fuelling discontent among the rank and file 
who felt that `their' union should be defending them and certainly not cooperating 
with capital in making its job easier. A number of unofficial stoppages were caused 
by this tension, accounting for a significant share of disputes on the British waterfront 
after 1947.114 
The disciplinary mechanism was as unpopular among most employers, since the fact 
that Board decisions at local level were made on the basis of unanimity could readily 
result in stalemate. The National Association of Port Employers' for instance 
complained that the local boards `have been greatly embarrassed and in some cases 
almost paralysed by inability to reach a common policy, ' and the Economist argued 
113 MRC: MSS. 126fT&G/4/1/31: TGWU 'Report and Balance Sheet for the Year Ended 
December 1952' 
114 Turnbull, who has done extensive work on this, gleaned from dock labour board statistics 
covering July 1947 to July 1955 that 16 per cent of striker-days lost were put down to 
'disciplinary' revolts (Turnbull, P. Woolfson, C. and Kelly, J., Dock Strike: Conflict and 
Restructuring in Britain's Ports (Avebury 1992) p. 17). The first Devlin Report, of 1956, 
noted that 'resistance to obligations under the Scheme' made up 30 per cent of lost time in the 
major disputes occurring in London from 1949-54 (Parliament, Port Transport Industry: 
Report of a Committee Appointed on 27 July, 1955, to Inquire into the Operation of the Dock 
Workers (Regulation of Employment) Scheme, 1947, and. 9813 (1956) p. 16). 
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similarly that the National Joint Council was `hamstrung by the even balance between 
opposing forces. ' 115 
There was thus a strong feeling among many employers that dockworker offenders 
`would get off' if they were unlucky enough to find themselves up before these 
panels. 116 Even if found guilty, the punishment meted out to offenders `was almost 
not worth imposing. ' On the other hand, the most severe punishment meted out to 
offenders could be harsh, including removal upon conviction (and subject to appeal) 
from the industry. 117 
The fear in Britain was always of making matters worse. 118 Summary dismissal of 
strikers for breaching the terms of joint agreements or port regulations would inflame 
the situation and provoke a counter reaction. 119 Prime Minister Clement Attlee 
warned against the `great danger of arousing antagonisms' if disciplinary action was 
taken against unofficial strikers. 120 Legal action would only stiffen the resolve of 
strikers and prosecutions were ineffective when engaged with `mass indiscipline. '121 
The `Canadian' stoppage was a major test of will between the `unofficials, ' the Dock 
Labour Scheme and central government. As the dispute spread to other ports from 
London, the existence of the Scheme, which had done little to quell the revolt, was 
placed in doubt. 122 Nonetheless, the Cabinet agreed that the invocation of existing 
115 The Economist 20.5.50. For the specifics of the NDLB disciplinary function see interview 
with LOND, 16.6.99; MID: LPEA Box 40: `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' 
(4.1.65), PRO: MT81/16: letter from NAPE of 12.4.47 on the draft Dock Workers Order 
1947; Liverpool Echo, 15.3.55,18.10.55, Transport Act, 1947 `Reports by Docks and Inland 
Waterways Executive on Review of Trade Harbours 1948-50' (British Transport Commission, 
1951), p. 45; McKelvey, Dock Labor Disputes in Great Britain, p. 57; Bill, S., The Dockers: 
Class and Tradition in London (Heinemann 1976), pp. 30-1. On employer complaints, read 
MMM: Box 3/No. 3: `National Association of Port Employers' (11.8.49) 
116 See comments in the Liverpool Echo, 17.10.55 
117 Interviews with LIVI, 15.4.99, LONA, 30.6.99, LONL, 26.7.99, LONS, 8.7.99 
118 MID: LEDEA Box 200 `Transport Strike' (21.1.47). 
119 MID: LPEA Box 136: `Discipline' (27.9.48). 
120 PRO: FO 800/495 `The Working of the Dock Labour Scheme' (15.550) 
121 PRO: CAB 128/015: Cabinet conclusions of a meeting on 13.4.49 
122 PRO: LAB 134/176: minutes of a Cabinet Emergencies Committee meeting, 15.7.49; CAB 
128/015: Cabinet conclusions of a meeting on 13.4.49; CAB 128/17: conclusions of a Cabinet 
meeting of 21.4.50; PRO: LAB 134/176: Minutes of a Cabinet Emergencies Committee 
meeting, 15.7.49). For the 1948 strike, read: Weiler, P., 'British Labour and the Cold War. 
The London Dock Strike of 1949, ' in Cronin, J. E. and Schneer, J. (eds. ), Social Conflict and 
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criminal penalties would `merely cause sympathetic strikes elsewhere. ' 123 With few 
cards left to play against the strikers, the government resorted to exhortation. The end 
result was a reduction of `the maximum allowable period of suspension from the 
benefits of the Dock Labour Scheme from three months to four weeks. 9124 
Such problems led Lord Ammon, Chairman of the NDLB, to wam of the government 
against `appeasing' militancy on the docks, but he was sacked for his remarks. 125 Port 
employers (who by and large never wanted the Dock Labour Scheme in the first 
place) 126 ended up either ignoring many infractions of port rules, or reporting them 
directly to the union, as more effective a solution. 127 
Order 1305 prosecutions 
Despite these reservations and the dilution of disciplinary functions against on-ship 
misbehaviour, by early 1951 tensions between the Labour government and 
dockworkers in London and Liverpool had reached a turning point. An unofficial 
dock strike had quickly extended from Birkenhead to other ports, involving thousands 
of portworkers. The outcome was a decision to use the criminal law to control 
practices in British docks, not unlike the invocation of legal sanctions in New York a 
short time later to restore order there. 
The means came from a wartime holdover, `Order 1305' (1940 Conditions of 
Employment and National Arbitration Order). This made it illegal for workers to 
strike for the first three weeks after a dispute been reported and dealt with by 
the Political Order in Modern Britain (Croom helm 1982); Manchester Guardian, 21.7.49; 
MID: LEDEA Box 156, LPEA Box 136; MRC: MSS. 126/TG/3/Sack 30/1; PRO: BK 2/1086, 
BK 2/1214, LAB 10/904, PREM 8/1081, PREM 8/1085 
123 PRO: LAB 134/176: minutes of a Cabinet Emergencies Committee meeting, 12.4.49 
124 Paper supplied by Jim Phillips `Democracy and Trade Unionism on the Docks, 1945-64' 
(privately supplied) 
' Journal of Commerce (Liverpool) 25.9.51 
126 Interviews with LONO, 16.6.99, LONP, 7.7.99; Mankelow, The Effects of Modernisation 
and Change in the London Docks, pp. 34-5; Wrigley, C. (ed. ), A History of British Industrial 
Relations, 1939-1979 (Edward Elgar 1996), p. 168. Cf. MID: LPEA Box 137: `Committee of 
Inquiry into Dock Strikes in London' (1950). John Hovey, in A Tale of Two Ports (The 
Industrial Society, 1990) commented that although the Scheme `was an unqualified blessing' 
for most dockworkers' the benefits for employers were `less evident' (p. 29) 
127 MID: PEA Box 125: `Discipline' (23.5.50); Phillips and Whiteside, The Casual Labour 
Problem, p. 252. 
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compulsory arbitration. Order 1305 had already been successfully utilised against 
striking gas workers, in which ten men were fined. 128 
In February 1951, four London and three Merseyside dockers, all leaders in the 
Portworkers' Defence Committee, were charged under Order 1305 with `inciting' the 
dockers to conduct an illegal strike. 129 The prosecution argued, in April 1951 at the 
Central Criminal Court trial of the accused, that they led a strike the day after an 
agreement was struck with the TGWU. This was tantamount, it was said, to `holding 
the country to ransom by blackmailing the country by accepting the dictates of the 
minority. '130 
Throughout the proceedings were mass strikes and the threat of more to come if the 
men were convicted. The jury failed to agree on the main counts against the 
defendants and the case was eventually dropped. Shortly thereafter Order 1305 was 
repealed. 131 In October 1951, the opposition Tories assumed office but refused to 
reinstate the Order, having `learned the lessons of Labour's failures in this area. ' 132 
During late 1951, the Corsi Commission was sent by the New York State Governor 
into the port of New York with a mandate to explore the causes of an unofficial 
stoppage in the port. Corsi's report focused on `undemocratic' practices in the New 
York dock union, together with possible problems in the balloting process. Although 
many of his findings focused on industrial relations problems and solutions, the Corsi 
Report did note local difficulties requiring remedial action, to which the ILA 
responded in detail within a short period of time. 133 
The situation in London over the same years of 1951-2 could hardly be different. 
Leaving aside the indifferent responses in Britain to Goldstein's revelations of TGWY 
128 Pritt, D. N., The Labour Government 1945-51 (Lawrence and Wishart 1963) pp. 369-70 
129 Pritt, The Labour Government 1945-51, pp. 437-8. 
'30 Evening News (London), 9.4.51 
131 Phillips, The Great Alliance, pp. 127-9; Jackson, M. P., Labour Relations on the Docks 
(Saxon House 1973) pp. 49-. 51. The papers in the case are found in: PRO: CRIM 1/2145: 
Rex v. Harrison, Dickens, Constable, Crosbie, Cowley, Timothy and Johnson, 8.251. 
132 Smith, The Attlee and Churchill Administrations, p. 143. 
133 International Longshoremen's Association, Statement of the International Longshoremen's 
Association, AFL, on the Report, dated January 22,1952, of Industrial Commissioner Corsi's 
Board of Inquiry, New York 1952 
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`corruption', already alluded to, a committee headed by Frederick Leggett looking at 
the causes of unrest in London's port did not touch upon `democratic' practices or 
malpractices in the same manner as Corsi did in New York. Nor did the TGWU, 
which had suffered some criticism by Leggett, use the opportunity of the Leggett 
report to publicly state its case in a separate study. Change was therefore slow, 
matters allowed to drift, and problems left unresolved. 
Devlin 
The first explicit endeavour by government to come to grips with shipboard 
malpractices was made in the mid-1960s. Under Lord Devlin's plans, all Registered 
Dock Workers in Liverpool and London were made permanent employees of shipping 
firms or contractor stevedores, as related in chapter three. The trade-off for better 
average docks earnings was reforms in other areas of dockwork abolishing, in theory, 
those `restrictive practices' associated with casualism. '1 This reassured employers 
that the costs, to them, of permanent employment would be offset by a better 
allocation of manpower. 
The theory adopted was that once the job security associated with `full' 
decasualisation became a reality, the thorny issue of restrictive practices would be 
much easier to address, since their `protective' role was made superfluous. For this 
reason, Devlin Phase 1, dealing with decasualisation, came first. Under Devlin Phase 
2, the wages structure and non-hiring matters in British ports came under the 
spotlight 135 
`Thus employers had moved overnight from a situation, ' writes Hovey, echoing the 
perspective of many employers, `in which they could simply not engage potential 
troublemakers to one in which they were legally bound to engage them and unable to 
dismiss them. ' t36 After 1967, local dock labour boards carried on the task of 
administration of the registration system but employees of permanent employers 
134 Turnbull and Sapsford, `A Sea of Discontent, ' p. 302 
135 Wrigley, C. (ed. ), A History of British Industrial Relations, 1939-1979 (Edward Elgar 
1996) p. 178 
136 Hovey, A Tale of Two Ports: London and Southampton, p. 30. 
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became subject to the disciplinary procedures of that company. 137 Acting on another 
Devlin recommendation, a previously limited shop steward system was extended. 138 
Functioning to settle ship-related disputes more quickly, British shop stewards soon 
developed independent power bases and a large amount of autonomy from union 
headquarters. 139 
They ended up operating the shift or allocation rosters in major ports. Informants in 
Liverpool and London reported that shop stewards were sometimes paid for doing 
non-existent work, especially those paying good bonuses. Employers could also put 
them on lucrative overnight work as a `sweetener, ' because of their considerable 
discretion to interpret port rules. It was also said that in the late 1960s, one large 
shipping line took shop stewards on free cruises in London. 140 
In practice, meanwhile, the reluctance of managers to report dockworker offences 
carried on. This led to wage inflation, as unauthorised payments gained in 
importance. 141 Employers in London worried as to whether `To continue ignoring 
these issues would make it virtually impossible for employers to continue with Devlin 
Stage 11 negotiations. ' 142 Phase 2 was thus a shadow of its effect as envisioned by 
Devlin, while Phase 1 had given the rank and file huge leverage over employers 
through permanency of employment. 
1970-1972 
The effect on docks malpractices of cargo unitisation and containerisation was most 
evident in London and Liverpool, among the chief British ports. Under Devlin Phase 
2, most piece rate structures in London were dismantled because of the disputes they 
137 Hill, The Dockers, p. 30. 
138 Hill, The Dockers, pp. 31-2; Turnbull, Morris, and Sapsford, 'Persistent Militants and 
Quiescent Comrades. ' Until 1967, the only major areas where shop stewards operated were 
on the London wharves and within the PLA structure. 
139 This was a key issue in 1972, when the appeals court ruled that the TGWU was not directly 
responsible for the activities of its shop stewards 
140 Interviews with LIVA, 16.3.99, LIVG, 19.7.99, LIVL, 29.3.00, LONG, 26.5.99, LONJ, 
16.6.99, LONM, 19.8.99, LONU, 26.7.99 
141 Daily Telegraph, 26.8.68 
142 MID: LEDEA 24: Minutes of a Meeting of the London Shipowners' Dock Labour 
Committee (27.9.68) 
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always caused and for their inappropriateness to the new kind of traffic. Liverpool 
moved, ironically, towards more differentiated wage rates, the motive being to supply 
incentives against the dragging out work, while New York's time-focused wages 
structure remained intact. 
Many unofficial sources of income in Liverpool and London passed into history. 
Overtime related malpractices were often made irrelevant with the introduction of 
24/7 shifts. In other cases, however, employers could still request job and finish type 
payments for the perennial reason of their ships getting away promptly. 
Technological advances pitted port against port and section against section. In 
London, for example, an arguably generally better labour relations situation at Tilbury 
away from the central waterfront district helped in part to secure it the bulk of 
containerised traffic, although the decision by employers to go there was as much 
influenced by its modem facilities and communications links. A new container 
facility was constructed in Seaforth, to the north of the established docks in Liverpool. 
In New York, a decline in shipping in Manhattan was compensated for by a sharp rise 
in New Jersey's share of trade and Brooklyn retained a part of its break bulk cargo 
tonnage. 143 But everywhere, employment levels reduced. 
The 1971 Industrial Relations Act gave British workers new rights and a selection of 
`unfair' laws and practices previously acting against unionism were outlawed. 
However, the most important provision of the Act was the proscribing of unofficial 
strikes, this being the focus of public and political attention. 14 Shortly before the Act 
was passed, an Unofficial Shops Steward Committee was formed with a policy of 
opposition to the use of unregistered dock labour even if it meant the use of unlawful 
boycotting tactics. 
This eventually led to the issuing of warrants against five London dockers for illegally 
picketing an inland container depot employing non-registered labourers in May 1972. 
Following a brief incarceration, they were released from Pentonville Prison, London, 
143 New York interview with NYL, 7.4.00 
144 Weekes, B. et al, Industrial Relations and the Limits of Law (Basil Blackwell 1975) pp. 3- 
6. 
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under a legal technicality by the Official Solicitor and - more saliently - after threats 
of a national stoppage on the docks and then in other sections of industry if they were 
kept incarcerated. 145 Repeating the woeful experience for the Attlee government of 
1951, a massive climb-down by the Heath administration brought use of the criminal 
law in docklands practices into disrepute. 
CONCLUSION 
Since there is a large body of material already in the public realm on the causes and 
consequences of mass stoppages, attention concentrated in this chapter on those 
lesser-known malpractices involving work aboard vessels. 146 Ship-level malpractices 
and unauthorised strikes undermined the case for jointly controlled recognition and 
bargaining systems but were viewed with approval by many dockworkers as the 
legitimate exercise of their powers. In the process, an attempt by dockworkers to use 
their economic leverage `against' employers who in other circumstances treated them 
dismissively was a factor. 
But the constancy of these malpractices, even when dockwork was largely made a 
permanent occupation, undermined this argument. Inadequate port facilities, more 
than feelings of resentment, gave registered dockworkers enough of a motive and 
sufficient opportunities to articulate the objective of `making up' earnings, whether 
performed under a casual or under a permanent employment regime. Structural 
bottlenecks explained the persistence into the 1980s of `ghosting' ('the payment of 
(registered dockworkers) for specialist work carried out by the cargo owner's 
employees') and `bobbing, ' in some British Scheme ports. 147 
145 Interview with LONT, 15.6.99; Observer, 30.7.72, Lindop, F., `The Dockers and the 1971 
Industrial Relations Act' Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, nos. 5 and 6 (1998). 
146 For a sample, read: McKelvey, J., Dock Labor Disputes in Great Britain: A Study in the 
Persistence of Industrial Unrest (New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations 
1953); Turnbull, Morris and Sapsford, Persistent Militants and Quiescent Comrades, ' 
Frankel, E. G. and Marcus, H. S., Ocean Transportation (MIT Press 1973) pp. 459-60 
147 The latter meant men leaving work on pay because the negotiated manning levels were too 
high, according to employers (Evans, N., McKay, D., Garratt, M., Sutcliffe, P., The Abolition 
of the Dock Labour Scheme (Dept. of Employment 1993) p. 28 
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`Legitimacy' therefore came through repeated and successful usage and the fact that 
employers in most situations went along with the malpractices to keep on good terms 
with their men. Also smoothing the process of legitimisation was the reality that in 
most cases, the costs of such malpractices could be passed on to consumers. 
Cooke Johnson states, `pilfering was regarded as a natural perquisite and living 
strategy for dock workers under adverse conditions and low rates of pay. '148 But what 
this `entitlement' and the broader `legitimacy' viewpoint could not explain was why, 
after the removal of casualism from the docks, the presumed source of difficulties, 
shipboard malpractices continued. The answer lay in the constant need for 
shipowners to get ships away on time, and the exploitation of this `structural 
weakness' by dockworkers. 149 
Lastly, localised practices and malpractices were the essence of the problem. A 
neglect of this is found in all accounts of the New York waterfront, in spite of the 
unusually segmented system in force there, whereas British writers such as Phillips 
and Whiteside admitted the localism of practices in Britain. iso 
The principle sway of shipboard gang malpractices in Liverpool, London and New 
York was rooted in inefficient delivery systems working with decentralised 
arrangements. Montgomery reported thus that early New York port contractors were 
`susceptible to negotiating their own deals with their particular employees, if need be. ' 
Kimeldorf also alluded to the `developed sectional feeling' in New York. 151 The 
148 Cooke Johnson, L., `Criminality on the Docks' in Davies, S et al (eds. ), Dock Workers: 
International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970 (Ashgate Publishing 
2000)p. 725 
149 The head of the Ecuadorian Line, in Port Newark, testified during the UNIRAC trials that 
he paid off union officials who worked his pier there being aware that labour troubles could 
close his operation in the section (U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Government's Ability to Combat Labor 
Management Racketeering, hearings 97th Congress 1st Session, 1981, p. 399) 
150 Phillips, G. and Whiteside, N., Casual Labour: The Unemployment Question in the Port 
Transport Industry 1880-1970 (Clarendon Press 1985) pp. 113,220 
151 Kimeldorf, H., Reds or Rackets? The Making of Radical and Conservative Unions on the 
Waterfront (University of California Press 1988) p. 46 
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disorganisation of port capital mirrored that of labour152 and this accounts for 
variations between, as well as across, ports. 
Remaining stable was the `fragility' of the cargo-handling process, that could be 
interrupted at any point and was highly susceptible to manipulation. But away from 
these industrial dynamics, the process of constructing a `workable' definition of docks 
malpractices was politically loaded, notably so when ship focused practices and 
malpractices were concerned. As a general point, where waterfront interests were 
deeply entrenched in a given political system, there was less danger of port practices 
being stigmatised for political gain. This affected the likely reaction to post- 
engagement malpractices. 
Governments from 1945 applied two competing paradigms of major dock 
malpractices, the legal/conflictual (associated with New York) and the 
industrial/consensual (focused on Liverpool and London). A legal position became 
associated with notions of `organized crime infiltration' of the sector, with police style 
`crackdowns' and with the stringent use of the criminal law against dock malpractices. 
The British style consensual approach sought to deal with `underlying' problems, but 
with no or little suggestion of criminality. For political reasons, and due to a desire 
not to upset the status quo, successive British institutions chose to view malpractices 
on the British docks as simply `time-wasting, ' or of `lost productivity, ' all of them 
market related definitions that avoided any questions of legality or ethicality that 
could be used to attack unionism. 153 
In New York, the ILA was sufficiently weakened for a time in the 1950s, politically 
and industrially, to allow a permanently expanded state role within the field of ship- 
level malpractices, explicitly in the name of the fight against `organized crime' and 
`racketeering. ' Matters like these were of political and legal significance. 
152 MMM: National Council of Port Labour Employers - correspondence: PEA Box 44/1: 
letter of 16.6.43 on `Re-Amended Draft Constitution. ' 
153 Parliament Ministry of Labour Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into 
Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, pp. 11-12. 
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The question remains as to how these understandings specifically related to practices 
and malpractices within three ports selected. Chapter five begins this process, in the 
port of Liverpool. Liverpool supplies an example of a major docks complex where 
unionism was far from secure, yet where important and large-scale unconstitutional 
and illegal practices were historically entrenched. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LIVERPOOL: MALPRACTICES AND CASUALISM 
INTRODUCTION 
A key ingredient in generating and reinforcing malpractices was `material' dynamics, 
through the economic power they conferred. Over time, if applied with repeated 
success, they assumed `independent' existence from feelings of injustice and 
exploitation. But such sentiments, part of the original justification for malpractices, 
were never wholly absent when casual working had such a long history on the local 
waterfront. Combined with this, in Liverpool, was a payments system that 
inadvertently encouraged the spinning out of work and allied malpractices. 
Chapter five revolves around `out and home' and `welting' practices as the 
embodiment of entrenched malpractices in the docks. While they did not represent the 
totality of improper waterfront practices in Liverpool, they involved the most number 
of dockworkers and employers! Other malpractices were widely recognised as not on 
the same scale either economically or industrially. 2 The port of Liverpool supports the 
case advanced that malpractices in Liverpool and London were at least on a par with 
any found in New York, at least after engagement, and contrary to the received 
wisdom encapsulated or implied in every work cited and outlined in chapter two. 
The assumed effect of a monopolising docks unionism on bolstering malpractices may 
have been over-stated, the Liverpool example suggests. American sources, thus, 
implored that curbs be placed upon the ILA's `closed shop' authority over `the 
waterfront' and the Waterfront Commission cracked down on some of the union's 
1 An interviewee in Liverpool told, for example, of an episode where tonnage statistics were 
`fiddled' so that the gang could get more pay and the quay foreman concerned would `look 
good' (interview with LIVD, 17.11.00). 
`Late starts and early finishes ... are 
irritating, and moderately costly. But the cost is 
nothing compared with the welt' (MID: LPEA 40: `Employers' Association of the Port of 
Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 47). `Secondary' malpractices generated complaints over bad 
timekeeping, inflated manning levels and over-long meal breaks (MMM: D/PEA/2/9 
Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool Dock Joint Committee minutes, 1947-8. For 
the 1930s see MID: BPA Box 292 `Onerous Conditions and Restrictions' (24.2.31). 
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practices, which it was felt were being grossly abused by officials. But if the 
`problem' lay elsewhere, in the overall industrial structure, this was at best a partial 
answer and at worst a diversion of resources. Moreover, where union controls were 
relatively fragile, `anarchy' could prevail, bolstering cases of malpractice outside of 
any formal control. This seems to have occurred in Liverpool from the 1950s. 
UNION HISTORY 
In Liverpool, after 1955 two powerful union organisations, the TGWU, and the 
National Amalgamated Stevedores' and Dockers' Union (NASDU) divided the men, 
based on difficulties among the rank and file over the TGWU's notion of 
`democracy' (see chapter two). For although the constitution of Dock Labour Boards 
afforded some `participation' by the men's representatives in disciplinary matters, 
unlike in the rest of industry, the absence of `practical democracy' in run-of-the-mill 
union matters fuelled continual criticism and feelings of disassociation from union 
procedures generally. 
Devlin in 1965 estimated that non-unionists in the port comprised `maybe one third' 
of the total. Perhaps 4,000 NASD union members worked on the docks in 1963. 
Inside this setting, in which sources of authority, legitimacy and trust were extremely 
diffuse, sheer industrial muscle too often became the paramount consideration in 
labour relations, exacerbating a tendency seen since the 1900s for dockworkers to 
down tools when thought expedient. `In short, ' it was argued, `the employer has kept 
them down and the Union has not brought them up. '5 
Liverpool's docks union history was one of relatively early successes, upset by 
fractures that grew in intensity after 1950. Malpractices that had already taken hold, 
especially in the 1940s, were extended and developed while unionism fought itself. 
Preoccupied with internal rifts, and fearing more problems if the matter of `popular' 
3 The term `practical democracy' comes from a paper by Jim Phillips `Democracy and Trade 
Unionism on the Docks, 1945-64' kindly supplied by the author. 
4 Parliament, Ministry of Labour, Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into 
Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, cmd. 2734 (1965) pp. 
38-9. 
5 MID: LPEA Box 40 `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 8 
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malpractices was pursued with vigour, few assets were made available by union 
organisations to address them. And employers found that sporadic drives they made 
against the major malpractices were stymied by the non-cooperation of key elements 
in their ranks. 
The first attempt to organise Liverpool portworkers was made by the U. S. -based 
Knights of Labor. The Knights, still recovering from their defeat in New York port in 
1887 (see chapter seven), and aware of the extent to which imported non-union labour 
undermined their own campaign efforts, sought to strangle the flow of `free' labour 
from Britain at source. But the Knights' faded from view, their role in representing 
the unionised fraction of the dockworker community being taken over by the National 
Union of Dock Labourers (NUDL). 6 
The NUDL was formed in 1889, first recruiting members on a wide basis throughout 
Scotland (where it began), Belfast and other British ports. Like the majority of 
Liverpool portworkers, the first union chief executives, Edward McHugh and Edward 
McGhee, were of Irish ancestry. 7 A year later, the leadership was pushed into support 
of a work stoppage that was supported by the rank and file despite the fact that no 
claim had been officially formulated, and which promptly collapsed. Conflicts of this 
type between unionists and their leaders, illustrated the complexity and fragility, 
sometimes, of the relationship, and was seen in New York as well. 
Union recognition 
At this point, the Liverpool union's objective, like that of unions in New York and 
London, was limited to the right for unionists with the appropriate skills to be hired 
first at engagement stands. Fractures inside the NUDL made the task difficult, but 
favouring the project were divisions among port employers that functioned, as 
6 During a 1870s New York strike, for example, it was reported that imported Glasgow men 
had helped smash the job action. For the Merseyside saga of the Knights of Labor, consult 
Pelling, H., The Knights of Labor in Britain, 1880-1901', Economic History Review, vol. IX 
(1956), pp. 313-31 and Bean, R., 'A Note on the Knights of Labor in Liverpool, 1889-90, ' 
Labour History, vol. 13 no. 1, winter 1972, pp. 68-78 
Coates, K. and Topham, T., Making of the Labour Movement: The Formation of the 
Transport and General Workers' Union, 1870-1922 (Spokesman Books, 1994) p. 80 
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elsewhere, to offset drawbacks on the labour side. Uniting most labour was the fact of 
irregular earnings, fostering solidarity of action and feeling. 
A few larger shipowning enterprises had offered permanent employment before 1879, 
though this was seen (in common with New York and London) as much in terms of 
suppressing the growth of unionism as in offering a `better deal' to their employees. 
Liverpool employers until the 1900s seemingly held the upper hand in dealings with 
the NUDL, helping to explain their refusal to join the Shipping Federation in 1890 as 
an unnecessary expense, a position underlined by their resounding victory in a strike 
on Merseyside that year. 9 Many smaller Liverpool employers had conceded 
recognition to the union by then however, giving the NUDL a foothold in the port, 
though leaving unfinished the task of convincing the bigger steamship lines on the 
North End docks especially to concede. 10 
Employer hostility to unionism owed much to a strain of individualism within larger 
steamship lines, even more so in Liverpool than in London. " Major exceptions 
existed, such as the Cunard Line, which had accepted unionisation in Liverpool and 
had tacitly given way in Brooklyn, New York, to the longshore union there because of 
its potential to stir up unrest. 12 
The NUDL finally won recognition throughout most of the port in early 1911, and 
before similar arrangements were made with waterfront unions in London and New 
York. This was prior to the industrial militancy seen across the British transport 
industry later that year, and appeared to be the product of changing employer attitudes 
as they sought to remove `the uncertainties produced by the labour situation in the 
port' permanently. 13 
8 Liverpool Daily Post, 3-25 February 1879. 
9 Bean, R., 'Employers' Associations in the Port of Liverpool 1890-1914, ' International 
Review of Social History, vol. XXI (1976) pp. 361-3 
10 Lovell, J., `Sail, Steam and Emergent Dockers' Unionism in Britain, 1850-1914' 
International Review of Social History, vol. III (1987) pp. 230-49 
11 Bean, R, The Port of Liverpool Employers and Industrial Relations' in Anderson, B. L. 
and Stoney, P. J. M. (eds. ) Commerce, Industry and Transport (Liverpool University Press, 
1983), pp. 95-120. 
12 See chapter seven. 
13 Bean, 'Employers' Associations in the Port of Liverpool 1890-1914, ' pp. 382-3 
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The exact causes of the 1911 docks strikes are in dispute, but a few factors were of 
importance. Trade was on an upswing, employers were in disarray; the dispute 
threatened to spread to other sectors. Meanwhile the Shipping Federation, the scourge 
of London port unions, was an insignificant force in Liverpool. Its unifying role and 
expertise therefore proved unavailable when unionism was on an upswing. 14 
Contributing to the process in Liverpool of union recognition, as in London and New 
York, was that unionised dockworkers were presented by the NUDL as more reliable 
and hard working than the surplus, and therefore less risky to employ if a vessel owner 
was desirous of sailing on time and in safety. Safeguards on this were incorporated 
into joint agreements. According to the 1911 joint agreement, `The Union undertake 
to do their utmost to secure that the work shall be carried out efficiently. '15 
Of consequence in altering employer policies on Merseyside was the dock Clearing 
House Scheme of 1912, promoted by central government and requiring a permanency 
in the relationship between local capital and labour. Serving as a model for later 
initiatives in London, unionised portworkers were, in principle, first offered the more 
steady work. The expectation was that any labour oversupply would be rapidly 
identified and allocated to areas of work in which it was needed without difficulty. 
Employers, who would fund the Scheme with the state, expected that a less disruptive 
and strike-prone workforce would emerge from the process. 16 
Clearing House Scheme provisions succeeded in reducing dockworker numbers on 
Merseyside from 31,000 in 1913 to 21,500 in 193217 but it ran into problems after 
many employers refused to join. Port register numbers were also maintained beyond 
that necessary, in deference to rank and file sensibilities against compulsory layoffs 
14 The Federation's activities in Hull are recalled in Brown, R., Waterfront Organisation in 
Hull 1870-1900 (University of Hull 1972) 
15 `Agreement as to Terms and Conditions of Dock Labour in the Port of Liverpool' (August, 
1911) 
16 Taplin, E., The Dockers' Union: A Study of the National Union of Dock Labourers, 1889- 
1922 (Leicester University Press, 1985) pp. 108-11. 
17 New York State Legislature, Preliminary Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on 
Unemployment, Legislative Document (1932) no. 69 (1932) p. 79; McKelvey, J. Dock Labor 
Disputes in Great Britain: A Study in the Persistence of Industrial Unrest (New York State 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1953) pp. 16-18. 
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and by a refusal in the part of the NUDL to sack unionists who had spent their 
working lives in the industry. 18 
With `the most comprehensive agreements' on the British waterfront, those in 
Liverpool stood for a time as an example of what could be achieved. 19 The quid pro 
quo for wider acceptance of union controls by the employers' association was tighter 
discipline over labourers through the joint committee system, and with `quickie' 
unofficial stoppages marked out for special approbation. ° 
Nonetheless, practices remained largely unaffected once employment was secured. 
The 1911 agreement did not abrogate previous `methods of working cargo'21 and in 
view of the inadequacies of the Clearing House Scheme, hiring corruption remained a 
distinct possibility. Additionally, the unofficial strike `became a characteristic 
weapon and persisted after the NUDL was established much to the annoyance of both 
employers and union officials. '22 On the positive side, the NUDL had been formally 
recognised by all major employers. And despite its myriad of acknowledged 
problems, the joint agreement structure did promise more constructive labour 
relations, even if it did not always meet early expectations. 
UNION DIVISIONS 
Waterfront labour in Liverpool nonetheless remained fractured and was hardly in a 
position to make powerful demands on employers. By no means all portworkers were 
registered or unionised for instance, either before or after World War Two . 
23 Non- 
18 Wilson, D., The Dockers (Fontana/Collins, 1972) p. 68; MID: BPA 305 The Port of 
Liverpool Dock Labour Clearing House Scheme (1937). 
19 The terms of the 1911 agreement are set out in `Agreement as to Terms and Conditions of 
Dock Labour in the Port of Liverpool' (August 1911). Kindly supplied by Eric Taplin. 
20 Bean, R., 'Custom, Job Regulation and Dock Labour in Liverpool, 1911-39, ' International 
Review of Social History, vol. XXVII (1982), pp. 271-89; `Rules of the National Union of 
Dock Labourers in Great Britain and Ireland ... ' (November 1889) supplied by Eric Taplin. 21 Lovell, J., 'Sail, Steam and Emergent Dockers' Unionism in Britain, 1850-1914', 
International Review of Social History, vol. XXX1 1,1987, p. 247 
22 Taplin. E., `The History of Dock Labour: Liverpool, c. 1850-1914, ' in Davies, S. et al 
(eds. ), Dock Workers: International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970 
(Ashgate Publishing, 2000) p. 462. 
23 MID: BPA 305 The Port of Liverpool Dock Labour Clearing House Scheme (1937). 
Authors such as Jensen wrongly assumed that a closed shop situation existed from 1911 
147 
unionists (known colloquially as `nonners') became part of the fixture of dock 
relations, mainly employed after unionists but at times taken on when no union 
official was around to police the agreement's clauses on the preference system 24 
In the background, as daily issues, were disparities between union members in the 
port, where `Dockers are often concerned more with the relative fairness of wage 
packets than their absolute size. 'u Agreements would include provisions for a 
multitude of rates and these proved a huge source of discontent and disunity among 
labourers. 6 When union executives appeared unable to control their membership, 
employers every so often suspended joint meetings and even threatened to terminate 
agreements `if there was a sign of serious trouble. '27 
Taplin noted that after 1945, `Liverpool port workers proved to be as militant as their 
counterparts elsewhere. ' A number of major unofficial stoppages on the docks gave 
the Merseyside dockworkers a reputation for striking without hesitation if their 
practices and the union were attacked. In 1945, a walk-off over a wage grievance 
brought the port to a halt while during 1946,200 dockers struck after it was alleged 
that some gangs had been given better treatment. Similar strikes, all of them 
unauthorised by the union leadership, took place throughout the 1950's, often starting 
over some trivial matter to outside observers 29 
Hiring of Dock Workers, p. 179) 
Interview with LONG, 15.6.99, a TGWU Docks Group official, who travelled to various 
ports as part of his duties; MMM: audio taped recording of Frank Dooley; Jackson, M. P., 
Police Making in Trade Unions (Avebury, 1991) pp. 49,59. Warehouse men for example 
could be non-unionists (Hanham, F. G., Report of Enquiry into Casual Labour in the 
Merseyside Area (Henry Young, 1930) p. 111). During the 1930s slump, in excess of 2,000 
registered men found work only irregularly from a total registered labour force of 16,700 
LHanham, Report of Enquiry into Casual Labour in the Merseyside Area, p. 75) 
MID: LPEA Box 40: Employers Association of the Port of Liverpool (4.1.65) p. 9 
26 On the relevant agreements, see, for example, MMM: MDHB/NDLB/Box 5 (booklets) 
National Joint Council for the Port Transport Industry `Terms of Agreement Between the 
National Association of Port Employers ... and the Transport and General Workers' Union 
.. ' (3.7.47). 27 Bean, 'Employers' Associations in the Port of Liverpool 1890-1914; pp. 382-3 
28 Taplin, The Dockers' Union, p. 162 
29 McKelvey, Dock Labor Disputes in Great Britain, pp. 31-2; Liverpool Daily Post, 3.9.46; 
Times, 8.10.53,19.9.55, Liverpool Post, 27.8.56,26.11.57 
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Union democracy 
Interacting with these dynamics was a further element for volatility. The Stevedores' 
and Dockers' Union (NASDU) established a strong beachhead in the port in 1955, 
trading on the burning issue of `undemocratic' practices within the TGWU 30 
NASDU involvement had profound results, since it exacerbated an already troubled 
union structure. 
Almost from the start, the TGWU's predecessor, the NUDL, was criticised for its 
`autocratic' style of governance over members. In 1890 Thomas Kiernan, the first 
NUDL union secretary, distributed a pamphlet accusing then-union secretary Edward 
McHugh and Richard McGhee, the first NUDL president, of being in the `pockets' of 
shipowners. McGhee in fact held a small share in the Irish National Steamship 
Company, which ran boats during a 1889 Glasgow strike. Kiernan was found guilty 
of defamation and ordered to pay the costs of the prosecution 31 
Distrust bordering on hatred of James Sexton, the longest serving NUDL head, for his 
overly `cosy' relationships with port bosses crossed generations of portworkers. One 
interviewee from a long-time docks family still recalled Sexton as `a collaborator, an 
informer, a womaniser. '32 `More than any other trade union leader of his generation', 
Taplin remarked, `Sexton had to endure persistent animosity from disaffected 
individuals and groups within the union. '33 An especially sore point with many was 
the way in which he rammed through the 1912 Clearing House programme in the face 
of opposition and before which no ballot was taken 34 
TGWU officials, who had in 1922 assumed the NUDL's responsibilities, too often 
took on the appearance of sitting back comfortably in sinecures obtained through 
patronage-laden activities, in a manner strikingly similar to that argued in New York 
by those in opposition to the docks leaders in that port. Jack Jones related how, in the 
1930s Garston docks nearby, `Full time trade union officials on the docks were 
30 Sinclair, K., How the Blue Union Came to Hull Docks (privately printed 1995) p. 19 
31 Liverpool Mercury, 19.12.1890; Times, 22.12.1890 
32 Interview with LIVA, 16.3.99 
33 Taplin, The Dockers' Union, p. 165. 
34 Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury, 18.7.12 
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inclined to become tin-pot dictators, upholding the decisions of management and 
resenting any queries or complaints from the men. ' Furthermore, according to Jones, 
`the role of full-time trade union officials was, all too often, to secure acceptance of 
management policies. '35 
By the early 1950s, disaffection with the TGWU was growing. The number of non- 
unionists seemed to be on the rise and NASDU was successful in `poaching' many 
TGWU members. 6A delegate from Liverpool visited the Royal Docks in London at 
this time, concluding `the difference in earnings for work done is to say the least 
ridiculous. ' Much of the blame for the lagging performance was placed on TGWU 
negotiating policies in Liverpool. 37 
Criticism of alleged TGWU misrule extended to nearby ports, for example Salford 
and Manchester docks. Charges levelled against the TGWU there included an 
uninterested attitude in the part of union officials to complaints from unionists and the 
settlement of disputes without any reference back to the membership, creating the 
`deep suspicion and distrust' which flared up in job actions. 8 
In late 1954, at a mass meeting at Birkenhead, across the River Mersey from 
Liverpool, a resolution was passed declaring that the men had `no further confidence 
in the officials and policy or the undemocratic structure' of the TGWU. 39 Thousands 
of Liverpool portworkers rushed to join the NASDU, in mid 1955, `splitting 
families. 40 
Although the NASDU threat was contained after a six weeks long struggle and 
following TUC intervention, a lesson was learned. Accommodation to rank and file 
35 Jones, J., Union Man (Collins 1986) p. 29. 
36 NASDU customs were double-edged so far as employers were concerned. Its means of 
disciplining members was judged as more effective than that of the TGWU. But NASDU 
decision taking was slower and its `overly' democratic system could cause delays. 
37 LRO: 329COM/13/7 `Report Back of Branch Committee Delegates Fact Finding Visit to 
London Docks' (ca. 1950s). 
38 Salford City Reporter, 17.6.55 
39 Parliament, Ministry of Labour Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into 
Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, and. 2734 (1965) p. 35 
ao Interview with LIVA, 16.3.99; MID: LWA Box 127; MRC: MSS. 126/TG/3/sack 45/2; 
PRO BK 2/87, LAB 10/1374, LAB 10/1506, Times 14.5.55 
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interests and anxieties was to become more pronounced, though taking to the 1960s to 
fully bear fruit. Paralleling `reform' developments in New York from the mid 1950s, 
with the election to office of Frank Cousins in 1956 and his successor Jack Jones to 
the TGWU General Secretaryship, power in the TGWU was gradually devolved. 
Relations between union officials and their members did improve, helped by internal 
pressures, criticisms made by Devlin in 1965 and new leaders such as Jones. `In the 
docks, as perhaps elsewhere, ' Phillips recalled, `the `Cousins era' was one of 
transition, a period when the absence of democracy was recognised if not decisively 
addressed by the TGWU. '4' 
Signalling the new policy, in Hull, three full-time TGWU officials were sacked in 
1966 after complaints from the membership over their apparent lack of engagement in 
membership matters and amid indications that NASDU was taking away TGWU 
members. In 1965, NASDU was recruiting `harder than ever' in Hull and the large 
number of wildcat strikes was a clear expression of frustration with the TGWU in the 
port. The officials concerned were found to be in neglect of duty, ignorant of basic 
aspects of their job, and were discovered out drinking when supposedly at work, 
sometimes with employers 42 
Leadership-sponsored TGWU campaigns like this were less related to the sudden 
conversion to the cause of union democracy as to the need to stem the flow of 
members through offering more. A similar movement was evident in New York. As 
chapter two point out, the TGWU was in key respects as `undemocratic' in operation 
as the ILA was. 
Influences on working practices 
Dock working practices were deeply affected by such dichotomies within unionism. 
Whatever the public admonitions against the use of malpractices to achieve better 
earnings, TGWU docks officials feared more defections to the NASDU if they 
al Paper by Jim Phillips, `Democracy and Trade Unionism on the Docks, 1945-64, ' privately 
supplied. 
42 Interview with LONG, 26.5.99; Phillips, J., Democracy and Trade unionism on the Docks, 
1945-64 (privately supplied); Financial Times, 7.10.65; Daily Mail (Hull), 27.9.66,26.1.67 
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cracked down hard on those involved in misbehaviour that had the approval of most of 
the men. 43 The Liverpool waterfront North Side docks became known as a NASDU 
stronghold in the port, though TGWU members continued to work there, while 
NASDU was especially numerous on the South End docks in the latter 1950s. 
Dual unionism in the port caused chaos for employers and their agents. Hiring bosses 
became involved in the difficulties of selecting gangs from the two different unions. 
Where the relevant work gang was composed of a mixture of different union 
members, only TGWU delegates were called to arbitrate a problem. Gangs consisting 
solely of NASDU men or `nonners' had a struggle getting their case even heard 45 
The 1965 Devlin Committee recounted how `If aT&G shop steward takes charge of 
a given area of the docks, the Blue Union will elect another of their own, whether or 
not he is recognised, and every card-holding member of the Blues or even 
sympathisers will demand to be represented by this steward, perhaps inventing 
grievances for the purpose. '46 And some dock labour board employment points were 
unofficially `known' as the preserve of one union or the other. 47 
Labour splits meant that `employers (could) have no assurance that agreements 
entered into will be accepted by the workpeople as a whole. '48 The corroding effect of 
these conflicts also helped to strangle campaigns, for instance to decasualise all 
unionists. 9 
For pragmatic reasons, employers recognised the TGWU for bargaining purposes, and 
excluded the NASDU, fearing the disintegration of the system otherwise. The 
Liverpool Dock Labour Board had cooperated with the TGWU in imposing a closed 
43 PRO: BK 2/66 `Notice to Dock Workers' (April 1951). 
44 Interview with LIVI, 15.4.99 
45 MID: LPEA 40 `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 60 
46 Parliament, Ministry of Labour. Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into 
Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, p. 108 
47 Interview with LIVL, 29.3.99 
48 Parliament Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain Matters 
Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, p. 39. 
49 MID: LPEA Box 40 `Employers Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 37. 
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pre-entry shop 50 The Employers' Association argued that `recognition of the NAS & 
D would in all probability bring down the immensely complicated local structure of 
agreements under which ... the port functions. The imagination boggles at the 
consequences of an industrial free-for-all in the docks, and as to the terms on which 
peace would eventually be restored. '51 
A TGWU-bias in Liverpool's labour relations system mirrored the situation at 
national level, where NASDU representatives were excluded from the National Joint 
Council for the Port Transport Industry S2 Because of this, NASDU was fully 
represented for bargaining purposes only in its London base. A number of 
dockworkers joined both unions in order to maximise their options and earning 
power. 53 
Others used the confusion to let their union membership lapse altogether. On `White' 
docks facilities, men (particularly in the TGWU) who were originally registered on 
the basis of their union membership might pretend to have lost their union card, or 
were supposedly waiting to be issued with a new one, in order to gain work S4 The 
largest single number of man-days lost on Merseyside docks between 1959-64 was 
linked to inter-union disputes and to efforts by the TGWU to expel NASDU from the 
port. In 1962, for instance, the TGWU decided to underline its status in the port by 
instructing its members not to work with the NASDU rank and file. This backfired 
when its men refused to go along and after employers withdrew their backing . 
55 
In 1966, it was estimated that about two thousand portworkers were members of 
neither union 56 With unionism so unstable, the question of reform of work practices 
and of malpractices practiced by the rank and file was placed in abeyance or only 
given cursory attention by the unions. 
50 Jensen, V. H., Hiring of Dock Workers and Employment Practices in the Ports of New York, 
Liverpool, London, Rotterdam, and Marseilles (Harvard University Press, 1964) p. 181. 
51 MID: LPEA 40 `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 33 
52 MID: LWA 304 The Port Employers in London Submission to the Committee of Inquiry 
into the Docks Dispute Under the Chairmanship of Lord Devlin (n. d. ) 
53 Telephonic interview with LONG, 23.4.01 a former high ranking NASDU official who 
travelled to Liverpool on union business 
54 Telephonic interview with LIVG, 17.7.03 
ss Times, 4.6.62 
56 Daily Telegraph, 19.9.66 
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EMPLOYER DIVISIONS 
As elsewhere across these ports, employers were seldom as one voice when 
confronting labour. Lack of consistency and solidarity between them was `a basic 
reason for so many failures to restore normal industrial discipline. '57 
The chief mechanism for drawing together port capital was the non-profit making 
Mersey Docks and Harbours Board (MDHB), which controlled from 1857 the 
infrastructure context in which docks customs and practices functioned, alike in its 
structure to the Port of London Authority (PLA) S8 Most cargo handling remained in 
the private sector, but critics suggested that through its system of licensing port 
operations, Board members, usually shipping entrepreneurs, could strangle potential 
competition at birth 59 
Like their counterparts in London and New York, Liverpool dock employers varied 
greatly in size but were usually concerned on the individual level to avoid time delays, 
sometimes making payoffs to labourers a beneficial decision. Until 1967, for 
instance, there were about 114 registered port employers in Merseyside, mostly poorly 
resourced, only seasonally active and virtually unregulated. The smallest operators in 
the port were reported to `borrow' equipment without authorisation; and `they were 
up to everything. '60 This group of employers along with irregularly berthed ships 
owned by `non-resident principals', who had far less of a stake in orderly 
bargaining, 61 were consequently at the forefront of reinforcing malpractices. 
Employer schisms added to the list of ingredients of a structural nature that made 
malpractices possible and profitable. Overlaying the majority of dock malpractices in 
Liverpool, making it distinctive from the other two ports, were problems of lack of 
employment security, to which we now turn. 
57 MID: LPEA Box 40 `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 38. 58 Although master stevedoring firms, the major employers of labour, were formally 
independent of the Board's deliberations on Merseyside, they were sometimes `represented' 
through associated or owning shipping lines. 
59 Interview with LIVA, 16.3.99 
60 Interview with LIVA, 16.3.99 
61 MID: LPEA Box 40: Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool (4.1.65) p. 27 
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EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS 
Marking out Liverpool was its proportionately larger casual dock population, in which 
employment fluctuations were much greater than those in London or New York in the 
1950S. 62 The central initiative before 1939 to make local dockwork better paying, the 
Clearing House Scheme, had little permanent impact, and `the position of the casual 
docker remained very much the same throughout the years. '63 This comment applied 
especially to prospective shipboard workers rather than to quayside labourers, more of 
who were more likely to be on regular or weekly wages, alike in this respect to New 
York and London. 64 
Casual hiring episodes were a prime cause of malpractice in Liverpool, supplying a 
continued incentive to drag work out beyond the minimum and to indulge in other 
dubious practices. Statistics to be presented indicated the unusual importance of 
irregular work, which customary malpractices such as the `welt' attempted to redress. 
Similarly to the London waterfront, Liverpool operated a `continuity rule' giving men 
(with specified exceptions) longer engagements once hired. Countering this, the far 
smaller waterfront was relatively homogenous in its facilities, having for instance no 
private wharfage facilities like London's, nor a PLA-like structure that offered big 
pockets of longer paying work. 
Larger employers of dock labour, where feasible, offered permanent or weekly 
employment via an internal classification system, ranging from `A' (permanent 
workers) through to `C' (casuals). Individual employers could also offer regularity of 
employment for up to five hundred men, the best of whom were rarely idle for long. 66 
The Elder Dempster Line was one such. 
62 Turnbull, P. et al. `Persistent Militants and Quiescent Comrades: Intra-Industry Strike 
Activity on the Docks, 1947-89' The Sociological Review, vol. 44 (1996) p. 713. 
63 Jensen, Hiring of Dock Workers and Employment Practices in the Ports of New York, 
Liverpoo4 London, Rotterdam, and Marseille, p. 161 
64 Interview with LIVD, 17.11.00 
65 Telephonic interview with LIVD, 29.4.01, interview with LIVG, 1.11.99; Jensen, Hiring of 
Dock Workers and Employment Practices in the Ports of New York, Liverpool London, 
Rotterdam, and Marseilles, chapter V111 
66 Interview with LIVI, 15.4.99 
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LIVI, who worked as a foreman for a steamship company, told how some men once 
complained to him of the great variations in their earnings. His company responded 
by instituting a system whereby the gangs with the lowest weekly earnings were 
offered the best waged work the next week 67 But employer-led schemes like these 
were isolated, and with few if any knock-on effects for other dockworkers. 
Drastically greater fluctuations in dockworker earnings over those in London were 
noted 68 There were, by the mid-1960s, only 1,254 weekly paid workers in Liverpool 
as opposed to 8,713 in London. 9 Of dockworkers on Merseyside who were classed as 
weekly workers, 11 per cent of the totality, the vast majority were clerks, 
warehousemen and supervisors, and not rank and file ship workers. 0 Conversely, 
those on weekly wages in London were perhaps a third of the whole labour force, and 
moreover included all grades of portworker. Of those in the higher income bracket in 
Liverpool, most earned considerably less than their London counterparts. 1 
Overtime earnings 
Liverpool's overtime rates were also higher in percentage terms, at double the straight 
time rate, than those paid in London (time and a half) 72 Overtime earnings were 
never as important in London, or an incentive to hang work out to nearly to the same 
degree. `A much higher proportion of Merseyside's earnings come from working 
overtime than in London, ' the Employers' Association concluded, `and a much lower 
proportion from piecework. '73 Statistics for 1953, for example, showed that overtime 
67 Interview with LIVD, 17.11.00; Taplin, The Dockers' Union, p. 16. This practice echoed 
some `equalisation' practices seen in New York port (see chapter seven). 
68 Turnbull, P., et al. `Persistent Militants and Quiescent Comrades: Intra-Industry Strike 
Activity on the Docks, 1947-89', The Sociological Review, vol. 44 (1996) p. 713 
69 MMM: PEA Box 206 National Dock Labour Board `Ranges of Weekly Workers Fiscal 
Year 1961/62' 
70 MID: LPEA 40 `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 18 
71 MMM: PEA Box 206 National Dock Labour Board `Ranges of Earnings of Registered 
Daily Workers Fiscal Year 1961/62' 
72 Merseyside's rates for overtime, in 1965, were `never less than double time, and on 
Sundays the overtime multiplier ... rises to 4. ' (Parliament, Committee on Inquiry 
Under the 
Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final 
Report, p. 5). 
73 MID: LPEA 40: `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 13 
156 
was far more common in Liverpool and Birkenhead than in London. 4 Average 
earnings in Liverpool during the 1960s were only 70-75 per cent of those in London, 
even after overtime earnings were factored in, engendering the inclination to get as 
much `top up' money as possible through one means or other. 
Employers complained, `The men ... seek systematic overtime to maintain the level of 
earnings they consider essential. '75 Exacerbating the possibility of the systematic 
dragging out of work opportunities was the fact that the timework element in local 
wages was higher than in London, where piece working was the norm. 6 Usually 
Liverpool dockworkers would expect to receive time and a half as the basis for 
overtime pay; in London (for comparable time workers) the rate by 1950 was time and 
a third 77 Furnishing a standing incentive to hang out work for as long as possible; 
Merseyside's rates were `a great inducement to men to spin work out into overtime. '78 
Although piece working had, since the early 1940s, assumed a somewhat greater role 
in Liverpool shipboard working than pre-war, when wholly time working prevailed, 79 
it was still less a force in total earnings than in London until 1967.80 For while the 
port was by the 1950s very largely `pieceworking' when viewed formally, `In 
virtually all cases `a man on timework is simply a pieceworker not working ... above 
the agreed minimum tonnage rate. '8' Londoners received good basic piece rates, 
74 MMM: PEA Box 206: National Dock Labour Board `Analysis of earnings and Hours of 
Work Quarter Ended 3`' October 1953' 
75 MID: LPEA 40 `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 27; 
Parliament, Ministry of Labour. Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into 
Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, p. 17. 
76 Jensen recalled that piece rates were first introduced widely in Merseyside during World 
War Two, but that they became under-utilised after 1945 on most, though not all, cargoes 
(Jensen, Hiring of Dock Workers and Employment Practices in the Ports of New York, 
Liverpool, London, Rotterdam, and Marseilles, p. 174) 
" MMM: PEA Box 105 file 3, schedule from NAPE dated 24.2.50 to the Employers' 
Association of the Port of Liverpool 
78 MID: LPEA 40 `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 13 
79 MMM: Box 1/Vol. 4: `Piecework' (16.4.46); MMM: MDHB/PEC/14/2: `The Liverpool 
Port Emergency Committee and the Second World War' vol. 2 review no. 15 
80 In the 1930s, almost all Liverpool men were on timework compared with just twenty per 
cent in London (MMM: MDHB/PEC/14/2 `The Liverpool Port Emergency Committee and 
the Second World War' vol. 2 review no. 15; MMM: Box 1/vol. 4 `Piecework' (16.4.46). 
During 1941, a national agreement stipulated the negotiation of piece rates to improve output 
levels via `payment by results' incentives (Parliament, First Report from the Select Committee 
on National Expenditure Session 1941-1942, cmd. 20 (1942)) 
81 MID: LPEA 40: `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 13 
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without the same need for overtime, and this most likely fuelled the 1954 dispute 
among NASDU men over `compulsory' overtime, since in many cases overtime 
working was not needed in London. 2 
Taken as a whole, therefore, Liverpool men had to work for longer to make anything 
like comparable wages with those on offer in London. 3 Understandably, work gangs 
in Liverpool were powerfully motivated by the operation of the local wages system 
aboard ships to illegally or to unconstitutionally `expand' the available work to get 
into overtime hours. 4 
Hiring bribery 
In view of the relatively inadequate earnings available to dockworkers in the port, the 
(albeit fragmentary) evidence suggests a surprisingly small number of recorded 
instances when `bribes' were paid for work. Religious discrimination was 
insignificant as a basis for employment in spite of a history of sectarianism in the 
city85 
One hiring supervisor was noted as open to being `treated' (bribed) by dockworkers 
who wanted a share of the better dock work. Aside from this individual, a ship 
foreman by the nickname of `Joe the Blow', few cases was mentioned in Liverpool 
interviews. His patronage was prized above all since he offered good rates for 
weekend working, with plenty of overtime work thrown in. He was said to have 
accepted free drinks from would-be shipworkers. But if men `crossed' him, he would 
not hire them again. 86 
82 Industrial Courts Act, 1919, Final Report of a Court of Inquiry into a Dispute in the London 
Docks, cmd 9310 (1954) 
83 Hunter, B., They Knew Why They Fought (Index Books, 1994) p. 33. 
84 Wilson, The Dockers, p. 228; Shipbuilding and Shipping Record, 10.6.48; MMM: PEA Box 
105, file 3, schedule from NAPE dated 24.2.50 to the Employers' Assn. Of the Port of 
Liverpool; MMM: PEA Box 206 National Dock Labour Board `Ranges of Earnings of 
Registered Daily Workers Fiscal Year 1961/62'; MMM: PEA Box 206 National Dock Labour 
Board `Analysis of Earnings and Hours of Work Quarter Ended 3`d October, 1953. Overtime 
was based, in Liverpool, on the standard time rate plus tonnage determinations. Only the time 
rate would rise with overtime working (interview with LNG, 1.11.99). 
85 Taplin, `The History of Dock Labour: Liverpool, c. 1850-1914, ' p. 467 
86 Interviews with LIVI, 15.4.99, LIVJ, 6.4.99, LIVL, 29.3.99 
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One possible cause of this `differential' from London and certainly New York may lay 
in the greater publicity accorded to such malpractices on the other waterfronts. 
Additionally, as noted, a disproportionate number of Liverpool portworkers used 
Dock Labour Board controls to seek work, and their `policing' was probably more 
rigorous than that on the open stands, seen more commonly in London, where hiring 
corruption was reported. New York's system was a continuation, until the 1950s, of 
traditional hiring `pitches' found at front of piers. Dock labour board control officers 
in Liverpool could use their own initiative to indent men with lower earnings to jobs 
that they might not have had if the open market mechanism was allowed to determine 
outcomes. 7 
Customs 
Work preserving customs, with rank and file influence, were observed in the 1880s, 
though as with all such schemes if an employer chose to disregard them, there was 
little the men could do. 8 But since Liverpool's waterfront was not on nearly the 
same geographical scale of that in London or in New York, being a mere seven miles 
in length and was much less diverse in terms of its physical outlines, the importance of 
local differences of practice was not as great. And because `casual' dockwork was so 
prevalent in the port after 1947, Dock Labour Board practices assumed greater 
authority and importance. 
Over the course of the interwar years, customs such as weighing cargo at the shipside 
upon discharge were seen across the port. Hiring arrangements could differ by trade 
or specialism (the 1930s corn porters' stand system being different for example from 
those in the rest of the port) 89 The `continuity rule' was also different in its operation 
on coastwise shipping 90 Other unofficial practices were firm specific. A group of 
shipowning companies (one example being the Clan Line) engaged hiring bosses as 
87 Telephonic interview with LIVD (2.1.02); MMM: oral tapes: Brian Jacques (n. d. ) 
88 A clear example was reported in 1886, when a docker was fined for threatening a hatch 
foreman when he refused to take on Birkenhead men first The foreman's firm replied that 
hiring practices were their sole prerogative to determine (The Daily Albion (Liverpool) 
23.11.1886) 
89 Jones, D. C., The Social Survey of Merseyside (Hodder and Stoughton, 1934) p. 134. 
90 Jensen, Hiring of Dock Workers and Employment Practices in the Ports of New York 
Liverpool, London, Rotterdam, and Marseille, p. 176 
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`staff' members, while others returned them back to dock labour board controls when 
not required 91 
Since the port, like London and New York, handled a wide variety of cargoes, some 
practices were limited to particular docks or piers, as Ronald Bean describes. 2 Jensen 
further recorded how the MDHB, `although it has no standing under the law or even 
by formal agreement, ' decided which ships, accordingly types of dock labour, were to 
be given priority on its docks, in cooperation with the local TGWU and Dock Labour 
Board 93 
`Mustering' (engagement) times were similar in most Liverpool Dock Labour Board 
areas according to interviewees. But even so, variations emerged. Number 1 `pen' 
(employment point) became that of first choice among most employers, composed as 
it was of the `best' gangs, while no. 3 pen - nicknamed `The Kremlin' - was utilised 
by employers only as a last resort because of its militant reputation. 4 The amount of 
work also varied by the type of vessel served by specific pens, coastwise lines offering 
the more regular work, a feature common to the same traffic in London and New 
York. 95 Over time, as in London, official hiring controls tended to cater to 
specialisations (that at Mann Island was largely the preserve of short sea trade 
workers) or to those seeking work for particular companies or with certain 
commodities. 
Although Liverpool and London did not operate the New York-style `public loader' 
system, Master Porterage firms in Liverpool had existed since the nineteenth century 
to shift cargoes to and from vessels on the quayside (as opposed to loading waiting 
lorries, the preserve of the public loaders in New York). The service was unique to 
91 Telephonic interview with LIVD, 2.1.02 
92 Bean, R., 'Custom, Job Regulation and Dock Labour in Liverpool, 1911-39, ' International 
Review of Social History, vol. XXVII part 3 (1982), pp. 271-89 
93 Jensen, Hiring of Dock Workers and Employment Practices in the Ports of New York, 
Liverpool, London, Rotterdam, and Marseilles, pp. 156-7. 
94 Interviews with LIVD, 17.11.99, LIVI, 15.4.99 
95 Interview with LIVJ, 6.4.99; Jensen, Hiring of Dock Workers and Employment Practices in 
the Ports of New York, Liverpool, London, Rotterdam, and Marseilles: - `for practical 
purposes the gangs are regular, inasmuch as the employer hires the same ones all the time' (p. 
176) 
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Liverpool in the British setting. There were an estimated 128 Master Porterage 
companies, licensed by the MDHB, in 1965.6 
Given the incomplete evidence to hand, informal work practices and hiring 
irregularities in Liverpool were not an extensive or as significant to the ordinary 
dockworker as were those in London and New York, more so still after 1947. Areas 
with the greatest variations in working practice and malpractice - the wharves in 
London, for example - were relatively insignificant a factor in the Liverpool situation. 
SHIPBOARD MALPRACTICES 
Special to Liverpool was `the welt. ' Aside from its sheer breadth, the welt was 
unusual insomuch as it crossed all three types of malpractice as conceptualised in 
chapter two and became highly contentious, although greatly valued by its 
practitioners. The Employers' Association stated that `the `welt' is by far the most 
important aspect of spinning out work out in the interests of getting enough 
overtime. '97 
Unofficial practices such as the welt was defended with force and, if necessary, by 
strikes. Six unauthorised stoppages locally from 1959-64, for example, cost about 
18,310 man-days of production due to revolts against `disciplinary action. '98 
Criticised by local unions as making their work harder, welting practices were 
`unpopular' with all parties except for the rank and file. Yet although vocally 
condemning it, the TGWU felt constrained from mounting joint offensives against the 
welt with employers because of the anticipated response of the rank and file. 
Employers feared the effects of crusades on company profitability. 
96 Not unlike the `public loaders' in New York, their use was compulsory and the charges 
demanded by Liverpool Master Porters came in for sharp criticism, although set by central 
government and the port authority (MMM: MDHB newspaper clippings in Box 174, private 
correspondence with LIVL, Jan. 1999). 
97 MID: LPEA 40 `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 24 
98 MID: LPEA Box 40 `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 23. 
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The `Welt' 
`Custom and practice', stated one interviewee, `meant one thing and that was the 
welt. '99 Welting malpractices - which were also practiced on quays, but did not attract 
the same attention - remained the chief reason for employer discontent with joint 
controls and were the primary cause of union embarrassment. 100 
In normal usage, the welt denoted `the practice whereby half the gang (or in some 
cases a greater proportion) absent themselves for an hour; when they return the other 
members of the gang leave the job for an hour; and so on through the working period. ' 
But `bunging off' could last for a whole work period and `even night on night off' has 
been rumoured. "ol Welting malpractices achieved a stable quality, though if it 
threatened a sailing, a `veiled threat' might be made by an employer to check for 
unauthorised absenteeism on board ships as one way of partially restoring 
discipline. 102 
Ship gang workers would generally take it in turns to leave the vessel without 
authorisation. 103 Alternatively, as a timekeeper during the 1960s, when welting 
practices were considered to be in their heyday recalled, `I would book the men on 
and the men would toss up to see who would go home and who would stay and that 
became a situation on a daily basis ... he'd have to book on, at 1 o'clock and then of 
course he'd go home. ' 104 
As welting would necessarily leave the gang short on manpower, overtime became 
essential for employers to get the work complete on time. Thus the large amounts of 
overtime required to make up normal earnings, as indicated above, was achieved. As 
one employer stated, `the work was carried on by the remaining men, ' if they were 
99 Interview with LIVI, 15.4.99 
100 E. g. Journal of Commerce, 25.9.51 
l°' MID: LPEA 40 `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 25 
102 LIVL, in private correspondence, wrote that `If the slings became smaller or slower, the 
ship's foreman via the Superintendent would often call down - any more like that and the 
timekeeper will be round! A veiled threat to book any absentees' (January 1999) 
103 Parliament, Report of Inquiry into the Locally Determined Aspects of the System of 
Payment and Earnings Opportunities of Registered Dock Workers in the Port of Liverpool 
(including Birkenhead) byA. J. Scamp (October. 1967) pp. 6-7. 
104 Interview with LIVI, 15.4.99 
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welting, but `who would then be guaranteed an earlier finish the following night. "05 
Long working hours functioned as a substitute for the higher earnings made during 
`straight time' working hours in London. 
Local employers saw few material benefits for themselves from welting, but went 
along with them for fear of the probable effect of action attempting to counter it. 
Union officials viewed welting with distain as well, though when involving most local 
dockworkers, as it did, the reassertion of industrial discipline on their members was 
considered unrealistic an ambition. 
Overtime working became inescapable. On average, men worked two hours' 
overtime per day while some, `for months on end, ' worked fifty-two to sixty-four 
hours a week. 106 For the dockworkers, `You couldn't survive without overtime, 
really, ' and `creating overtime was dead easy to do. ' 107 
Unauthorised absences were reported as prevalent in Liverpool by 1911 while a 
`milder' form of the welt, `spelling, ' was seen before 1939.108 But the origins of the 
welt as it became recognised probably developed during World War Two, when 
refrigerated vessels became more commonplace in the port yet could not be worked 
for long periods without respite. Workers on non-refrigerated ships quickly exploited 
this `loophole' to argue that they too needed frequent rests. A deceleration in output 
resulted, though not without vigorous protests from supervisors whose complaints 
reached The Times. 109 Alternative explanations of the origins of the welt looked to the 
interwar slump, when work was scarce and it emerged as a form of benign work 
sharing. 
The existence of welting malpractices (debatably) made Liverpool less able to 
withstand competition from newer facilities worked according to pure `efficiency' 
105 Interview with LIVL, 29.3.99 
106 MMM: PEA Box 160: `Report of Working Party on Unauthorised Absence, Late Starts, 
Early Finishes' (2.6.64) 
107 Interview with LIVD, 17.11.00 
108 Bean, 'Custom, Job Regulation and Dock Labour in Liverpool, 1911-39. ' 
109 Times, 15.8.42,21.8.42 
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norms. In this view, the welt was `a form of restrictive practice that costs Merseyside 
many times the man hours of all recorded stoppages put together. ' 110 
Timekeepers would often only make a perfunctory job of checking to see if all those 
who should be have been on duty in a vessel hold were, in fact, at work. They could 
also be bribed to falsify timesheets. 111 `No show' and time-wasting practices were 
hardly limited to Liverpool. `Welting or bad time keeping are not unique to 
Liverpool, but the extent of the malaise is peculiar to this port, ' employers argued. 112 
London had its so-called `dinting', a milder form of the welt, for example, while 
smaller ports in Britain such as Hull were not immune from `manufactured' overtime 
malpractices. Welting may have been less prominent in Birkenhead docks, 
purportedly because of tighter work discipline imposed on hatch gangs there. 113 
With consistently high unemployment rates in the urban economy surrounding the 
docks, and with casual earnings common, portworkers fought for the right to practice 
the welt as an effective if formally disapproved work-sharing tactic. Combined with 
this were other factors, such as lax discipline and many of the self-same reasons for 
malpractices in the broader sense. Registered dockworker numbers in Liverpool, 
though in decline from the 1950s, did not decrease to the same extent as within 
London and New York, perhaps suggesting a unusual resistance in the Liverpool 
situation to attempts to layoff registered men, in view of the lack of work 
opportunities outside of the docks. 114 
'lo MID: LPEA Box 40 `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 26. 
111 Interview with LIVK, 26.11.99. An American observer recalled the Liverpool welt, in men 
`sitting down doing nothing half the time. ' (interview with NYG, 12.4.00) 
112 MMM: PEA Box 160 `A Straight Look at the Welt' (1965)). Interviews with LIVH, 
11.3.99, LOND, 22.10.99, LONO, 16.6.99; Lynton, R. P. and King, S. D. M., Research in the 
London Docks: Interim Report, 31 December 1948 (PRO: LAB 8/1709). In King's Lynn, for 
example, ship gangs conveniently knocked off work just after 5pm, thus guaranteeing 
themselves two hours overtime pay. 
113 Interview with LIVI, 15.4.99. This was disputed by a second interviewee, also familiar 
with Birkenhead, in terms of the Birkenhead lines he once worked for (interview with LIVD, 
17.11.00) 
114 Annual Reports and Accounts from the National Docks Labour Board, 1960-66, indicated 
that the `Average Workers' Register' in London was better adjusted to the demands of the 
port than that in Liverpool, by around two to three percentage points 
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Other malpractices 
`Out and home' payments, identical in substance to `job and finish' fixtures in 
London, were not explicitly outlawed in joint agreements but nonetheless were viewed 
with hostility by employers as eroding their authority and, arguably, adding to the cost 
of doing business in the port. The fact that out and home payments were at times 
made only after gangs had on occasion deliberately slowed their speed of work down 
in order to demonstrate what `could' happen if they were denied a `top up, ' did not 
make employers feel any more disposed towards them. 115 For if a work gang felt 
cheated, it could `always find some problem to stop the ship working. '116 
The type of employer could influence reactions to malpractices, directly comparable 
in this respect to London or New York. Shipping lines only occasionally utilising the 
Port of Liverpool for example tended to accede malpractices or to acquiesce in 
welting practices rather more readily, since the repercussions would not normally 
affect them. 117 
Rushing work in order to make up wages did constitute a health and safety hazard, one 
reason for the lack of enthusiasm of union officials for out and home payments. Such 
malpractices were also an attempt by shipowners to get the work done when twenty- 
four hours production was not the norm. 118 
Payments for `obnoxious' or dangerous cargoes were seen in Liverpool, London and 
in New York, as a constitutional way of compensating dockworkers for handling 
problematic commodities. But the system could be manipulated without too much 
difficulty. Cases of gangs in Liverpool downing tools in a ship's hold in `protest' 
after a dead rat, placed there by the ship hatch men precisely for this purpose, was 
`found, ' were repeated in interviews as one tactic successfully deployed to squeeze an 
115 Interviews with LIVG, 1.11.99, LIVK, 26.11.99, LIVI, 15.4.99 
116 Interview with LIVD, 17.11.00 
117 MID: LPEA Box 40 `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 27. 118 Interviews with LIVD, 11.3.01, LIVG, 1.11.99 
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employer. 119 Although many employers viewed them as a `malpractice, ' the men 
viewed them as a relatively victimless way of supplementing earnings. 
The unconstitutional use of `short-handed' work gangs was less a feature of Liverpool 
than it was of London. Structurally, the agreement on wages contributed to this 
difference, inasmuch as the bonus element in overall earnings, the chief incentive to 
participate in the depleted gang size malpractice in London, was smaller on 
Merseyside. 
Moreover, the docks in Liverpool were much more concentrated than those in either 
London or New York. This reduced the incentive for employers to cooperate in short- 
gang practices due to the relative convenience, in Liverpool, of moving individuals 
required across the port, to make up work gang numbers. 
WORK DISCIPLINE 
From the perspective of employers, the welt `is cheating on the contract of 
employment which requires a reasonable effort for wages received. "20 The men 
countered that bonuses under agreements for `dirty' cargoes were far too low, for 
instance, and that washing facilities were grossly inadequate, necessitating their 
absence to clean themselves. Mechanisation in a ship's hold was primitive and 
employers insisted that overtime was `compulsory' regardless of the wishes of their 
121 employees. 
In this context, trust was destroyed and employer efforts to discipline those who 
operated malpractices came to little. Various reasons accounted for the embedded 
nature of the welt. Leaving to one side the wage system that encouraged a dragging 
out of work, another was an imbalance between the industrial strength of ship gangs 
and that of employers. Improper practices in Liverpool, in this sense, mirrored those 
in London or New York. 
119 Interviews with LIVD, 17.11.00, LIVK, 5.3.99 
120 MMM: PEA Box 160: `A Straight Look at the Welt' 
121 Liverpool Echo, 18.10.55 
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The magnitude of `skiving' off the job was acknowledged, since `in other places, in 
other industries it would be quite impossible to have such a large proportion of the 
labour force just knocking off work or failing to start without suffering a cut in pay or 
disciplinary action. '122 Ship bosses railed against the welt from its inception, their 
argument with dockworkers occasionally spilling out into the public domain. 123 It was 
condemned in the press, as `a shameful business that sounds hardly believable when 
set down in black and white. t124 
Beneath these criticisms by employers was the fact that, unlike other practices such as 
`out and home, ' there were no offsetting advantages to the welt for most of them. 
Employers noted that, `In nearly all cases the men simply do not operate that part of 
the deal which requires a concession by them, but insist on the operation of that part 
which represents a concession by the employers. ' 125 
Although welting and other malpractices were theoretically well within the orbit of the 
Liverpool Dock Labour Board's disciplinary regime to address, it made no significant 
effort to combat malpractices outside of pilferage. Seven attempts made by employers 
acting alone from 1941 to 1964 to confront the welt head-on but all ended in 
recrimination and exasperation. The lesson employers learned was to `leave well 
alone rather than attempt to impose discipline for its own sake on labour in isolation 
from other factors. '126 
`It is such a troublesome business to censure a man, they say, that, inevitably, 
offenders are allowed to carry on unchecked, ' according to a report in the Liverpool 
Echo. 127 A twin track approach was adopted at various junctures, but the first of them, 
122 MMM: PEA Box 160 `A Straight Look at the Welt' (1965) 
123 Shipbuilding and Shipping Record, 10.6.48 
124 Liverpool Echo, 18.10.55 
125 MID: LPEA Box 40 `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 16. In a 
minority of cases, the welt worked to the advantage of an employer. It sometimes paid a 
master stevedore for instance to employ five gangs at half speed than three complete gangs at 
full speed. 
126 MMM: PEA Box 160 `Report of Working Party on Unauthorised Absences, Late Starts, 
Early Finishes' (2.6.64). 
127 Liverpool Echo, 18.10.55 
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to `buy out' the welt by offering the men positive inducements, collapsed. 128 This left 
crackdowns on indiscipline as the only other approach but that was equally 
ineffective, since everyone realised that if it was pushed hard, work gangs had the 
capacity to stop or to derail production. 129 As Devlin stated, `an ultimatum would 
probably result in mass indiscipline. '130 
Employers rarely stuck together in the face of this danger. Thus: `Every employer had 
given way when occasion demanded' and a serious campaign based on tightening 
discipline `would lead to a strike. '131 Similarly, `some Employers applied discipline 
only when it suited their purpose so to do, ' making common cause against the welt 
more remote than ever. 132 
In the face of such defeats and lack of common action on the part of non-labour 
interests, welting malpractices achieved `acceptance, ' albeit grudgingly decided by 
employers. The Chief Officer of the Cunard company in Liverpool fell foul of the 
system in the early 1950s when he insisted, in the face of this local custom, on 
timekeepers faithfully recording when men were missing rather than following the 
usual practice of signing men in regardless. An angry Head Office general manager 
removed him from the scene by a transfer to the port of Southampton. 133 
From 1967, the Merseyside wage structure moved towards greater wage differentials, 
since the extant rewards system made the spinning out of work a viable alternative to 
greater earnings during straight time hours as in London. Based on the Scamp Report 
of late 1967, the reform to wages followed a prolonged strike over plans to abolish the 
welt but without giving the men sufficient compensation in their eyes for the resulting 
128 Journal of Commerce, 10.7.65; MMM: PEA Box 160 `Notice to Dock Workers' (April 
1951). 
129 MID: LPEA 40 `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' p. 27. 
130 Parliament, Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain Matters 
Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, p. 18. 
131 MMM: PEA Box 160 `Working Party on Unauthorised Absence, Late Starts, Early 
Finishes' (14.4.64). 
132 MMM: PEA Box 160 `Discipline' (15.64); MMM: PEA Box 160 Working Party on 
Unauthorised Absence, Late Starts, Early Finishes (6.4.64). 
133 Interview with LIVB, 18.5.99 
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loss of income. 134 Scamp argued that `perhaps the extension of pieceworking' and 
regular employment under Devlin Phase 1 might remove the problem at its roots. 135 
A form of the welt, nevertheless, remained into the 1970s. For while the original 
impetus for welting customs lay partly in casualism in engagements, it was just as 
much a product of the economic power and the control that shipboard gangs had over 
their `background' conditions. Wilson noted that changes to local wage determination 
did deter gang members from leaving the docks on the welt. However, they did not 
stop `on-board' vessel welting malpractices. 136 
Union branch malpractices 
Standards of conduct in some port branches of the NUDL and its successor union, the 
TGWU, left much to be desired. Regulation of local docks union units by the parent 
union was largely ineffective, whatever official pronouncements claiming otherwise 
was. 137 Cases of branch officers misappropriating union funds in the port were 
periodically uncovered. But the question, in keeping with a key theme of this thesis, 
remained one of structural weaknesses that may have allowed a much larger and 
under-recoded problem to emerge and to develop. 138 
As in New York and London, the dilemma of how to effectively control branch 
matters without antagonising branch memberships was a potentially divisive one. 
Since no port-wide branch audit was ever made public, the full extent of financial 
abuses is impossible to even estimate accurately. 139 Like much of the union-related 
material for London, what does exist for Liverpool is extremely patchy, often 
anecdotal and lacks a reliable baseline. 
134 Hunter, They Knew Why They Fought, p. 71; MRC: MSS. 126/T&G/Sack 63/1: letter dated 
10.10.67 to Frank Cousins from the TGWU Regional Secretary 
135 Parliament, Report of Inquiry into the Locally Determined Aspects of the System of 
Payment and Earnings Opportunities of Registered Dock Workers in the Port of Liverpool 
including Birkenhead) by A. J. Scamp (October 1967) p. 6 
'36 Wilson, Dockers, p. 215 
137 Taplin, The Dockers' Union, p. 45; information supplied by Eric Taplin, 1999. 
138 See for one example, MRC: MSS. 126/TG/1/1/29: TGWU `Minutes and Record of the 
General Executive Council and the Finance and General Purposes Committee' (1951) p. 19. 
139 Taplin also observed that NL1DL records for Liverpool were discarded in the 1950s 
(Taplin, The Dockers' Union, p. xv) 
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Two early Liverpool dock union secretaries had disappeared with union funds and the 
NUDL shortly became embroiled in controversy. The 1890 Kierman case showed the 
inadequacy of branch record keeping, when it was revealed that Edward McHugh on 
the union executive took funds from each branch without written authorisation. 14° 
The Liverpool Trades Council followed the proceedings against Kierman, and 
according to one anonymous writer, the full facts had been `suppressed. ' The court, a 
writer alleged, did not hear evidence about union accounts and he spoke of an `attempt 
to bribe me to break bail and leave the country for £150 ... we wish to show up the 
full facts to the public. This we were not allowed to do. '141 
Even the vote for the amalgamation of the NUDL into the new TGWU in 1921 had, 
according to a source, all the hallmarks of being `fixed. ' In order to satisfy the legal 
requirements on thresholds upholding the 1917 Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act, 
requiring that half of the membership of each union vote in order to effect an 
amalgamation, ballot papers in Liverpool were allegedly tampered with to guarantee 
the `right' outcome so far as the NUDL executive was concerned. 142 
Amalgamation into the TGWU made little difference to how dock union branches 
were run. Jack Jones (a future TGWU chairman) described how in the 1930s, his 
Garston union branch was taken over by the son-in-law of a senior union official of 
the time `although he had no experience of the docks. "43 Grievances put before union 
branches by the membership could be conveniently `overlooked', and only those 
matters of personal interest to branch officials were passed on for further action. 14 
For reasons centred on the reformed hiring system, redevelopment and changing 
housing patterns away from the docks, waterfront branches became run-down after 
1945. Branch life slowly atrophied, part of their functions being acquired by union 
140 Liverpool Mercury, 22.12.1890 
141 LRO: 331 TRA2/89: letter of 1891 to the Liverpool Trades Council 
142 Taplin, The Dockers' Union, p. 155, Goldstein, J., The Government of British Trade 
Unions (George Allen and Unwin, 1952) p. 105. By law, fifty per cent of the union 
membership needed to vote in order for the amalgamation to proceed. The first ballot was 
below this threshold, so a second ballot took place at which the rumoured ballot rigging 
occurred (private communication with E. Taplin) 
143 Jones, Union Man, p. 60. 
144 Rumours also spread, after 1965, that a person was `elected' to a TGWU post by the 
branch membership without them knowing of it (interview with LIVA, 16.3.99) 
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delegates working on docks. The pace of change was such that some docks branches 
were left with a skeletal membership. a fact that the TGWU was late on picking up on, 
but which Jensen noticed in 1964.145 The central union made few attempts to `stock 
take' branches in this period, echoing the laissez faire atmosphere prevalent in the 
port. 
146 
Road haulage malpractices 
The opportunities to indulge in shakedowns of road haulage drivers using Liverpool's 
docks were not lost on many quayside workers. Well-recognised within the industry 
were relatively small sums that added up, paid for priority treatment to quayside 
workers who controlled entry to dock estates. 
Similarly to London or New York, road travel became the dominant mode for taking 
goods to and from the waterfront. 147 Caused by narrow roadways leading to the docks 
and the size of trucks using them, lorry queues leading to the docks waiting to be 
serviced were legendary for their length. 148 Indicating the seriousness of the problem, 
in September 1964, The Liverpool Echo devoted a front page to an expose of truck 
lines under the headline `Congestion as Ships are Diverted: Only 100 Yards 
Movement in Four Hours. "49 
To get unloaded without delay, truck drivers saw an obvious benefit in slipping `a 
fiver' or `ten bob, ' perhaps supplied by firms for this purpose, to a quay foremen so 
that his lorry could move to the front of a lengthy queue of vehicles outside the 
gas Jensen, Hiring of Dock Workers and Employment Practices in the Ports of New York, 
Liverpool, London, Rotterdam, and Marseilles, p. 159 
146 Interviews with LIVG, 1.11.99,16.7.03 LIVG, a Liverpool port worker in the 1960s, 
became aware of this when he became a regional TGWU officer in the late 1990s, when 
procedures in the TGWU were being tightened up and computerised systems installed to keep 
track of union members in arrears. 
147 MMM: MDHB/PEC 5/1-1 `Quay Conditions' (18.7.51) 
'48 Liverpool Echo, 25.10.61 
149 Liverpool Echo, 25.9.64 
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docks. 15° Birkenhead was as affected by this practice as Liverpool. It was rumoured 
that shop stewards working on the quays also shared in the spoils. '5' 
Part of the fault was laid at the door of the MDHB, responsible for upgrading port 
installations and for ensuing their efficient use, as was the PLA in London and the 
Docks Board in New York. Within this question, a contradiction emerged between 
the role of shipowners on the MDHB, who as businessmen were desirous of low 
berthing charges, and their role as Board members. In the latter role, they were 
responsible for improving dock utilities, which required extra investment, a large part 
of which would have to come from higher docking fees. In the end, they refused to 
pay more as shipowners, leaving many of the physical aspects of the docks under- 
capitalised and in decay. '52 
A similar contradiction was evident in London153 but not so New York, with its 
predominantly external sources for funding improvements. Although fees for berthing 
were levied, much of the New York waterside was resourced from local taxation, as a 
`general good' to its citizens. 
Gambling and pilferage 
Regardless of its illegality in Britain until the early 1960s, off-track gambling on the 
Liverpool docks estate was recognised as widespread. 154 As dock wages improved, so 
card game playing rose, for example. Welting practices also gave individuals enough 
time to entertain themselves away from work `on wages. ' 
The majority of gambling was conducted during breaks, thus avoiding the censure of 
employers and keeping the docks police (who tended to act after complaints were 
150 Interviews with LIVA, 16.3.99, LIVD, 17.11.00, LM, 15.4.99, LIVK, 26.11.99, LIVL, 
29.3.99 
's' Interview with LIVA, 16.3.99 
152 Interviews with LIVA, 16.3.99, LIVL, 29.3.99; Financial Times 14.12.70 
153 Pattison, G. W., The London and India Dock Companies 1864-1909 (University of London 
Ph. D. 1970) p. 9; Parliament, Ministry of Transport, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
the Major Ports of Great Britain, cmd. 1824 (1962). 
154 Liverpool Post, 19.10.42; Liverpool Echo, 24.4.48; Journal of Commerce, 5.3.45 
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made to them) away. 155 Card games were conducted in control points, while waiting 
to be taken on, or in canteens, and with bookmakers 'runners' present throughout the 
port. 156 Dice games were said to be more popular on the South End docks. 
Part of the gambling activity was centralised and involved a measure of aggression. 
Joe Martini, a working docker, operated a `toss' school in Gladstone docks on 
Saturday nights, taking a percentage of the proceeds. Martini took over after ousting 
the previous operator, a boxer named Billy Duncan. Although `not a bully', Martini 
could be violent. 157 
Money lending was evident under various guises. Much originated in gambling debts 
and in irregular wages. Men were, prior to 1939, compelled to pledge their `tallies' 
with loan sharks until monies were given over. 158 Court cases periodically exposed 
159 loan-sharking on the docks. Like gambling, however, most incidents went 
unreported and unrecorded. 
Pilferage became an accepted part of the waterfront backcloth, in which police 
officers allegedly participated on occasion. In 1919, in Birkenhead, for example, 
`dockers continued to provide most of the arrests in the town. 160 During the 1930s, 
Ayers reported that dockworkers were in league with `certain dock policemen who 
would look the other way for a share of the goods. '161 In 1955, two police officers 
stood trial for helping a third man to steal from the docks for £20 each. One 
interviewee further told how, more recently, docks police and customs officials helped 
themselves to stolen bottles of whiskey. 162 There were no signs than professional 
155 Interview with LIVI, 15.4.99 
156 Interviews with LIVA, 16.3.99, LIVE, 17.2.99. The Liverpool Echo, 24.4.48, told how 
police raided `a miniature casino' in the North Gladstone Dock. Also Liverpool Post, 19.3.55 
s' Interviews with LIVA, 16.3.99, LIVC, 23.2.99, LIVE, 17.2.99, LIVJ, 6.4.99, LIVI, 
15.4.99, LIVE, 5.3.99,26.11.99 
158 Sexton, Sir James Sexton, p. 225. 
159 E. g. Liverpool Post, 24.4.53, Evening Express, 18.2.55, Evening Express, 26.6.57, 
Liverpool Echo, 18.7.61. 
160 Smithies, E., The Black Economy in England Since 1914 (Gill and Macmillan, 1984) p. 44 
161 Ayers, P., The Liverpool Docklands (University of Liverpool, n. d. ) p. 65 
162 See interviews with LIVD, 17.11.00, LIVL, 29.3.99; various issues of the Watch 
Committee for the City of Liverpool `Reports on the Police Establishment and the State of 
Crime' (Liverpool); MMM: MDHB/N 121 vol. 4; Liverpool Post, 15.12.55, Journal of 
Commerce, 4.3.46,24.12.46, April 1948,25.2.52, Evening Express, 13.10.55 
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criminals shared in the profits, in spite of a similar industrial landscape to that within 
New York's port. 
POLITICAL INITIATIVES 
Adams has noted the industrial significance of the `port transport industry' in the 
Merseyside economy during the 1920s, employing as it did over 27 per cent of the 
male working population. 163 But the Labour Party did not benefit from this in terms 
of election outcomes as much as it did in the riverside wards of London. 164 Primarily, 
as in London and New York, governments intervened in the docks situation in 
Liverpool only at times of perceived crisis or with wider ambitions in mind. 
Like the Dockers' Union leadership in London, James Sexton allied his NUDL with 
the Labour Party locally and then nationally. The advantage of having a sympathetic 
ear in the Liverpool City Council was made apparent in 1905, when a strike involving 
union dock labour was crushed. 165 Sexton, like Ben Tillett in London, ultimately 
secured high office in the labour movement and for twenty-five years, Sexton sat on 
the local council and became, in 1918, a Member of Parliament! " 
Wartime schemes 
The long-term effects of wartime conditions on work practices, as a catalyst for 
advancement, were profound. The status of the NUDL was enhanced during the First 
World War, as was that of the TGWU between 1940 and 1945. In agreeing to an 
industrial truce in time of war, which by and large held, government and employer 
confidence in agreements struck with the union rose, articulated through the 
dockworker registration system. 167 
163 Adams, 'Labour and the First World War, ' p. 35. 
164 Davies, S., Liverpool Labour (Keele University Press 1996) p. 234. 
165 Waller, P. J., Democracy and Sectarianism: A Political and Social History of Liverpool 
1868-1939 (University of Liverpool Press 1981) pp. 213-4. 
166 Dictionary of National Biography, 1931-40, pp. 802-3; Taplin, The Dockers' Union, pp. 
50-5. 
167 Taplin, The Dockers' Union, pp. 125-33. 
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The global objective for the NUDL elite was to accept the unpredictable pattern of 
shipping while, to the maximum extent, stabilising dockworker incomes when no 
work was on offer. During wartime, when faced with a shortage of labour and with 
state injunctions to keep ships moving, indiscipline was a growing problem. 
This seems to have bolstered, in Liverpool, welting malpractices. These were exposed 
in 1942 when the introduction of piecework rates supplied a reason for the demanding 
of `exorbitant' sums on new types of cargo. 168 Signs that welting had taken hold and 
was widening became evident in complaints over worse timekeeping. 169 A Times 
series reported on the `dodging work and of slowness by dockers ... and laxity in 
control' in the port. 170 The MDHB replied that welting was practiced on refrigerated 
ships only, though in some cases it was admitted that elderly or unfit men caused 
absenteeism when they struggled to put in a full working week, as now required. 171 
This view concurred with that of the local TGWU, which added that employers were 
motivated to make these claims to discredit the wartime labour scheme, to which they 
were opposed from the start. 172 Systematic over-manning of vessels also became a 
deeper problem than previously, the hiring foremen sometimes taking on more gangs 
than necessary so that dock labour could be immediately available for his next job and 
at a time when it was in demand. 173 
1945-1969 
National Dock Labour Scheme hiring practices were quickly instituted in Liverpool, 
as across other larger British ports. But the impact of the Dock Labour Board was 
usually peripheral to malpractices taken as a whole. 
Devlin Committee proposals that would mean the end of the earnings-boosting effects 
of the welt in Liverpool (and of the continuity rule in London) were fiercely resisted 
16'3 MMM: Box 1/vol. 4: `Dock Labour Wage Rates' (17.8.44) 
169 MMM: PEA Box 160: Report of Working Party on Unauthorised Absence, Late Starts, 
Early Finishes (2.6.64). 
170 Times, 14.8.42 
171 Times, 15.8.42 
In Times, 21.8.42 
173 Interview with LIVK, 26.11.99 
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by union memberships. In September 1967, men in both ports struck against union 
advice. The six-weeks stoppage in Liverpool only ended after the government met 
official and unofficial dock leaders in the city to hammer out a compromise. 
Set up as a result of this, the Scamp committee examined the `flat' wages structure as 
the primary cause of unrest and of malpractices in the port. Larger differentials based 
on performance were recommended, following which the men returned to work. 174 
But the new payments schedules made the port susceptible to small strikes, a bane of 
London's port and where traditional payments by results systems were rejected in 
1970 for this very reason. 175 
1970-1972 
Industrial strife rose in line with efforts by employers to shift much of their business 
away from `Scheme' ports, to supposedly cheaper, accessible ports not employing 
registered portworkers. Chapter four recounted how the 1971 Industrial Relations Act 
measures related to picketing and boycotting collided with the need of registered 
dockworkers to keep work to `older' ports, where they were based and had security of 
employment. 
In 1971, the Liverpool men were put on a rotating shift system, with a small but 
permanent night gang presence, making overtime-related malpractices superfluous. 176 
Welting customs faded in their customary form, as did out and home remunerations, 
since a combination of better piece payments after Scamp and the institution of shifts 
had given employers the continuous production they wanted but without quite the 
same need to pay `on the side. ' 
174 Wilson, Dockers, p. 71; MRC: MSS. 126/T&G/Sack 63/1: letter of 10.10.67 to Frank 
Cousins from the TGWU Regional Secretary; Liverpool Echo, 26.10.67; Parliament, Report of 
Inquiry into the Locally Determined Aspects of the System of Payment and Earnings 
Opportunities of Registered Dock Workers in the Port of Liverpool (including Birkenhead) by 
A. J. Scamp; Hunter, They Knew Why They Fought, p. 71 175 Wilson, Dockers, p. 278 
176 Wilson, Dockers, p. 279 
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In line with Devlin's recommendations, shop stewards were established across the 
docks in order to end smaller scale disputes. 177 TGWU shop stewards subsequently 
operated as autonomous units on the Liverpool waterfront, largely outside of TGWU 
sanctions, as later admitted. 178 
As already noted, shop stewards ended up operating firms' shift rotation systems, 
leading to suspicions of discrimination (in their favour) in the allocation of higher 
paying work. In one case, the men only discovered by accident that a shop steward in 
charge of assignments for the Seaforth container facility had put himself on twice the 
normal duty. A steward could just as easily book himself on a lucrative job such as 
handling tomatoes, where there was a good bonus element, but where his presence 
was not required. Another case was mentioned, where a shop steward was paid - but 
never worked - as a stacker driver, one of the best paying positions on the grain berth 
on the waterfront. 179 
Road haulage payoffs and industrial strife 
Even Hunter, in other circumstances sympathetic to the plight of dock labour, became 
critical of the role of shop stewards in this light. 180 A recurrent theme of the thesis is 
the effects of political and legislative changes on the perception of dock practices. 
Often, the reality of dockwork altered only slightly in response to these initiatives 
since the law was sometimes unclear and many times gathered dust. 
However, in relatively rare cases, the pull given to a waterfront employer could be 
enhanced by legal developments, if utilised to its fullest. In a rare example of this 
177 LRO: H331.2856 DOC: Port of Liverpool (Including Birkenhead) Dock Labour Joint 
Committee `Principal Provisions of agreements Governing Hours of Work, Rates of Pay and 
Conditions Applicable to Registered Dock Workers' (Sept., 1967); MMM: PEA Box 127 
`Shop Steward System Within Member Companies (Stevedoring Section) of the London 
Ocean Trades Employers Association Limited' (10.4.69). 
178 This was confirmed in a House of Lords judgement of 1972, when the TGWU was fined 
for the illegal activities of its Liverpool shop stewards under the Industrial Relations Act. But 
on appeal, it was ruled that they had acted on their own initiative (Weekes, B, Industrial 
Relations and the Limits of Law (Basil Blackwell, 1975) pp. 107-8). 
179 Interviews with LIVA, 16.3.99, LNG, 19.7.99, LIVI, 15.4.99, LIVL, 29.3.99 
180 Hunter, They Knew Why They Fought, p. 90 
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type, corruption on Liverpool's docks was exposed and made answerable to the 
criminal law. 
Heavily informed by the changing political and industrial dynamics of the time was a 
Crown Court case in Liverpool. A road haulage firm, Craddock Road Services, had 
refused to cooperate in a campaign launched at the Gladstone Dock by Liverpool shop 
stewards over the unionisation of lorry drivers using the port and their payment of 
union wage scales. Craddocks was also accused, even worse, of association with an 
inland stripping and stuffing base depriving the registered men of jobs. Upon being 
boycotted at the docks, the firm was awarded an injunction against the TGWU under 
the 1971 Act. Docks quayside staff, nonetheless, continued embargoing its trucks. '8' 
Such was the charged industrial backcloth to the prosecution of two shop stewards and 
a TGWU docks official in Liverpool, for demanding `an unwarranted demand with 
menaces. ' The prosecution alleged that they had promised to lift a planned three 
months' long embargo on Craddocks' trucks using the dock after a payment of £200 
were made (in cash). Defence counsel claimed that the demand was made on the 
condition that it would go into a shop stewards' fund to `compensate the boys for loss 
of earnings' caused by the existence of Craddocks' inland depot activities. What was 
not in dispute was the fact that a payment of this type was not included in any 
agreement and, in fact, was roundly condemned by the TGWU when discovered. 
An agent of the haulage firm delivered the money to a hut on the quayside in which 
the accused were seated. The boycotting of the firm's three lorries was to be 
immediately lifted, one of the accused assured Craddock's depot manager. Police, 
tipped off by Craddock's management, who apparently wanted to take the offensive to 
the dockworkers, were watching the transaction nearby and arrested the three men. 
But the prosecution could not prove that the £200 went into the pockets of the 
accused, who were acquitted and released. 182 
181 Wrigley, C. (ed. ), A History of British Industrial Relations, 1939-1979 (Edward Elgar 
1996) pp. 222-4. 
182 The Liverpool daily press, 31 October-7 November 1972, Times, 31.10.72,10.11.72, 
Liverpool Daily Post, 31.10.72 
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CONCLUSION 
As the 1972 episode demonstrated, it required a highly unusual combination of 
politics and industrial variables in order for British malpractices to be highlighted and 
subject to criminal prosecution. Work practices and malpractices in Liverpool showed 
the contextual nature of their operation and of their reception. 
`There is no doubt, ' the employers' concluded, `that the welt is both cause and 
consequence of many of Liverpool's ordinary working problems. '183 Liverpool's 
malpractices varied for instance by the degree to which they were to be considered as 
`invisible' or `victimless. ' Singular variables affecting outcomes and their perception, 
unconsidered in the American sources for New York, included the prevailing 
payments system and the legitimacy of malpractices. 
The Liverpool waterfront was characterised by a `loose' closed shop. Sporadic 
campaigns for example to oust NASDU from the port were unsuccessful! 84 A strong 
case could be made for more, not less, union powers over registered dockworkers, by 
distinction to the arguments used by critics of the ILA in New York. Bean recorded 
for Liverpool how in 1911, work gangs would walk off to enforce their demands, in 
violation of joint agreements that were sometimes weakly enforced 185 
Origins of malpractices in Liverpool were as diverse as in other locations. 
Intermittent earnings, which were more common in Liverpool than on the other two 
waterfronts, were a major barrier towards the acceptance that constitutionalism was 
always the best path. Although `legal' means to settle disputes, for example, assisted 
unionism in gaining recognition, but they did relatively little to raise average pay 
packets, even after a `closed shop' was imposed. 
183 MID: LPEA 40 `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) pp. 27-8 
1M MID: BPA Box 32 `Transport and General Workers' Union Activity in Liverpool' (4.7.61) 
185 Montgomery, D., The Fall of the House of Labor (Cambridge University Press 1987), p. 
103; Bean, R., 'Custom, Job Regulation and Dock Labour in Liverpool, 1911-39, ' 
International Review of Social History, vol. XXVII part 3,1982, pp. 275-6 
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Legitimacy issues 
More so than in the other ports, chronic lack of confidence by the rank and file in 
union-backed `constitutional' means to resolve problems may have fuelled widespread 
malpractices, in particular the welt. The TGWU's difficulties in retaining the loyalty 
of local dockworkers from about 1950 are well documented, these giving rise to an 
extremely hesitant position on malpractices, since they tended to be `beneficial' to 
rank and file earnings, even while undermining TGWU authority. The union was also 
loath to highlight some malpractices since they sometimes exposed overmanning, an 
186 argument used by employers. 
As the employers professed, `The failure of the employers and the Union to engage 
the dockers' sympathy and interest has naturally driven him to even closer bonds with 
his mates. 187 Where formal authority, whether within the TGWU, inside the Dock 
Labour Board or in relation to employers, was so shaky in relation to the rank and file, 
it was but a small step towards a broader disregard by local dockworkers of joint 
agreements. Despite its dilemmas and problems, the terms of agreements were more 
closely watched and adhered to in London's enclosed docks, as was its version of the 
closed shop. Employers, after the failure of their own moves - apparently with no 
support from the Dock Labour Board - against welting, were not eager to replicate the 
experience. 188 
Where authority moved away from constitutional means to resolve differences, 
perceived as ineffective in meeting their demands, dockworkers were willing and 
`able to seize available opportunities, most notably the `variability' inherent in the job 
and the commercial pressures on stevedoring companies to turn vessels round. "89 
`The habit of spelling (another term for welting) which started during the war, ' 
186 `... the welt itself is the clearest evidence of overmanning. ' (MID: LPEA 40: `Employers' 
Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65): p. 47) 
187 MID: LPEA Box 40: Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 8 
188 Captain Faulds, a local employer, `expressed the fear that if another discipline drive was 
instituted, some employers would find themselves unsupported by the others as had happened 
in 1958. His Company had become thoroughly disliked by the men and that feeling still 
existed' (MMM: PEA Box 160 `Working Party on Unauthorised Absence, I-ate Starts, Early 
Finishes' (14.4.64) 
189 Turnbull, P. Woolfson, C. and Kelly, J., Dock Strike: Conflict and Restructuring in 
Britain's Ports (Avebury 1992) p. 720 
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employers concluded, `has become, after 20 years, ingrained in the men's minds as 
something which is not wrong in a moral sense. "90 With accommodating material 
variables, legitimacy factors probably accounted for the breadth of welting 
malpractices in particular, and their longevity over smaller scale operations in London 
and New York 
Material variables 
The justification given by practitioners for welting practices lay in casual earnings and 
widespread complaints about bonuses under agreements for `dirty' cargoes, lack of 
mechanisation, overtime and washing facilities on the docks. 191 Associated reasons 
centred on the dilapidated state of port facilities and the long hours worked, 192 making 
it impossible for all the men to work on ships at once. 193 But employers noted that 
`welting goes on whether there is congestion, delay or not. ' 194 
The welt over time developed an autonomous dynamic of its own from local 
bargaining, labour supply and wage systems, in which pressure on employers was 
exerted by indiscipline and the threat of disruption to shipping timetables as the 
primary factors involved `Its origin lay in expediency, ' according to employers, `and 
its continuance mainly lies in the failure of the employers as a whole to exercise their 
simple duty to manage and maintain normal industrial discipline in their labour 
force. '195 
During the 1960s, moreover, a difficulty existed of labour shortages in the port; by 
that stage, `the reasons which could once be used to try to excuse the welt, such as 
spinning out the job to avoid "signing" when it is finished, no longer apply. '196 
Consequently, the men saw little to lose and much to gain by disregarding agreements 
190 MMM: PEA Box 160: `Discipline' (1.5.64) 
191 Liverpool Echo, 18.10.55 
192 Parliament, Ministry of Labour Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into 
Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, p. 16; MMM: PEA 
Box 160 `Discipline' (1.5.64). 
193 MID: LPEA 40: `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) pp. 27-8 
194 MID: LPEA 40: `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 28 
195 MID: LPEA 40 `Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool' (4.1.65) p. 26 
196 MMM: PEA Box 160: `a Straight Look at the Welt. ' 
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and in repositioning themselves into a direct `market' relationship with employers, in 
which they held most of the cards after 1945. What could not be overlooked were 
time elements. These ultimately dominated employers' reactions and accounted for 
the longevity of welting malpractices even after the demise of `casual' employment 
and congestion in the port. 
Chapter six turns to the port of London, with its vast waterfront and hinterland. 
Greater variation existed in the structure and type of working practices and 
malpractices than those found in Liverpool. London also illustrates those 'victimless' 
malpractices that had the energetic support of employers. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
LONDON: SHIP TURNAROUND AND PIECEWORK 
INTRODUCTION 
Working practices in Liverpool furnished examples of both `victimless' and of 
`predatory' types of improper practices though veering towards the latter, for instance 
in welting. Because steadier work was more available, class tensions in London were 
lower, making `deals' with employers less problematic for the parties. Malpractices 
operated with a greater base of legitimacy, and thus higher invisibility, explaining in 
part the lower profile of malpractices in London's port. 
Wage determination systems were as critical as in Liverpool in shaping malpractices. 
The biggest difference with Liverpool, however, was in the far large variety of dock 
facilities, therefore practices and malpractices. Municipal and central government 
influences were more obvious in London, befitting its unique importance to the 
national economy. 
THE PORT OF LONDON 
The largest port in the country, including the numbers of dockworkers employed, 
markets handled and its physical scope, London's waterfront boomed after the 
construction of massive wet dock systems from the 1790s. 1 Trading in all sorts and 
sizes of commodities, a great variety of `malpractices' emerged. 
1 There are numerous published accounts on the operation and demise of the nineteenth 
century London docks, including those by Devonport, Viscount, The Travelled Road: Some 
Memories of a Busy Life (privately published. ca. 1935); Pattison, G. W., The London and 
India Dock Companies 1864-1909 (University of London Ph. D. 1970); Porter, S. (ed. ), Survey 
of London Volume XLIII: Poplar, Blackwell and the Isle of Dogs (The Athlone Press 1994); 
Potter, B., 1887, The Dock Life of East London', The Nineteenth Century, vol. 22,1887, pp. 
483-99. For a good review of the London docking structure as of 1900, consult London 
County Council `Port of London Dock Accommodation' (London, January 1900) in the 
Greater London Records Office. 
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By distinction to the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, a monopoly supplier of 
licensing and infrastructure delivery in Liverpool's system after the mid-1800s, fierce 
competition initially characterised London's dock structure, centred on wet - more 
commonly known as `enclosed' - dock complexes, built because of similar tidal 
difficulties to those in Liverpool. 
The private docks system in London degraded as outdated facilities and over rapid 
expansion curtailed or destroyed their profitability. Dock systems were amalgamated 
but the decline continued. Inside this context, George Burt, the manager of the 
Millwall Dock Company, which had suffered from commercial decline more than 
most, was given nine months hard labour in 1899 for falsifying the balance sheets of 
the enterprise to make it appear that it was trading healthily. 2 
Until the establishment of the Port of London Authority (PLA), as Lovell states, the 
sixty-nine miles of developed London waterfront `was merely an unregulated 
meeting-place for a vast number of diverse interests ... 
0 In 1908, facing the incipient 
threat of loss of trade to German and American ports, the Liberal government of the 
day created the PLA to rationalise port services in the service of efficiency and 
economy and to include under one roof all the major interests involved. 
Congestion 
Although docks warehousing in London was adequate, the roads leading to dock 
facilities were something else. As in New York, a thriving river `lighterage' trade, 
with smaller boats ferrying commodities to various parts of the shoreline did alleviate 
river movement blockages. In addition, the availability of riverside warehouses and 
canals connecting the docks directly to the hinterland helped get commodities from 
the immediate docks area comparatively quickly. 
But these networks could not compensate for severe roadside congestion, a problem 
never adequately resolved. With a situation described as `appalling', `Nowhere, ' the 
2 Times, 12.4.1899,15.5.1899 
3 Lovell, Stevedores and Dockers, p. 30 
4 PRO: MT 63/203 `Report by Mr Frank Pick on His Visit to the Port of London' p. 5. 
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Times remarked, `in the whole of London is road traffic so congested or subject to 
such vexatious delays. '5 Roadside tie-ups gave exactly the leverage many quayside 
workers required to make something `on the side. ' 
The PLA, acting as the nominal leader among employers, felt its hands tied in 
advancing the cause of improvements, in part because it could not act to widen 
existing roads or to construct new roads without the permission and cooperation of 
nearby local authorities and the Ministry of Transport 6 Buck-passing on the costs of 
improvements made for stalemate. 
In 1923, Lord Devonport, at the PLA, estimated that each year `well over 100,000 
hours' of working time were lost to vehicle snarl-ups. The London Chamber of 
Commerce stated that goods could be landed at Southampton and then moved to 
London quicker than goods landed directly in London. 7 By 1964, frilly 54 per cent of 
export traffic was coming to the docks by road and up to 1,000 vehicles were, daily, 
queuing for up to several days waiting to be unloaded! 
Road haulage malpractices 
Severe road congestion combined with the need for road hauliers to move in and off 
the docks rapidly to generate malpractices akin to those seen in Liverpool and New 
York. For quayside workers, the `fact' of severe tie-ups created the conditions under 
which haulage funs or drivers would offer payments. 
The abuse, even more clearly that others, depended upon an `opportunity structure, ' 
rooted in docks delivery failures and which was ready-made for manipulation 
regardless of its `legitimacy. ' And unlike shipboard malpractices, it could not be 
justified with reference to the casual system of engagement, since most quayside 
labour was regularly employed or weekly paid. 
s Times, 2.10.28 
6 The MID archives' scrapbooks are filled with clippings on this, e. g. Lloyd's List, 9.7.23 
7 Lloyd's List, 9.7.23; Morning Post, 9.10.23; Lloyd's List, 24.10.23 
S MID: LEDEA Box 168, LPEA Box 112; MRC: MSS. 126/TG/3/Sack 113/2: `Port Transport 
Industry Study Group' (Jan. 1966); Sunday Times, 13.12.64, Lloyd's List, 12.9.64,16.9.64. 
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Pattison reported an early case of favouritism in the queuing system .9 Lorry drivers, 
as in Liverpool, would illicitly pay portworkers to get ahead of the truck line. Most of 
the smaller haulage firms were considered involved in this practice. 10 There was never 
a lot of cash involved, but it added up. " One indicator of what was going on occurred 
when certain lorries were whistled ahead of time in the queue, `so you knew 
something was up. '12 
In the mid-1960s, the PLA introduced a modified system whereby the waiting drivers' 
shipping notes were stamped and lorries that were not handled on the first day of 
waiting would then be able to move to the front of the lorry line the next day. 13 But 
the system buckled after quay foremen `signed up' for their favoured truck drivers and 
clerks issued tickets, to foremen, specifically kept back for the purpose. 14 
As much as in Liverpool, employers sized up the costs of this and judged them far less 
that the expected gains in getting lorries in and out on, or ahead of, time. Grateful 
lorry drivers or road haulage firms who played the game, moreover, were hardly likely 
to make complaints to the port authority, especially if they had to use the docks again. 
This malpractice rarely surfaced in official or media reports, and was `legitimated' by 
its repeated use and with little pretence of in some sense compensating for employer 
policies harming the men's pay packet. 
LONDON DOCKERS' UNION 
The first and foremost obstacle to union mobilisation was the relatively poor market 
position of much of the workforce, paralleling Liverpool's experience. Control over 
the hiring process by waterfront unions, as the primary method of their organising and 
expanding organisationally, was consequently a difficult but vital task. 
' `Kearly and Tonge vans never queued when Lord Devonport was PLA Chairman' 
(Devonport being a major partner in the firm) (Pattison, G. W., The London and India Dock 
Companies 1864-1909 (University of London Ph. D. 1970) p. 243). 
lo Interview with LONM, 19.8.99 
11 Interviews with LONM, 20.8.99, LONN, 19.8.99 
12 Interview with LONI, 19.8.99 
13 Ports and Terminals, January 1965. 
14 Interviews with LONM, 20.8.99, LONN, 19.8.99 
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For brevity, the full title of the major London dock workers' union representing 
`unskilled' dockworkers from the 1889 strike to 1922 (when it joined the TGWU), the 
`Dock, Wharf, Riverside and General Labourers' Union, ' (DWRGLU) is abbreviated 
hereafter to the London `Dockers' Union. ' It represented most labour in the port after 
1914 from its 1889 inception in spite of some overlap from the 1920s with the 
Stevedores' Union in the port. Ben Tillett, the General Secretary of the Dockers' 
Union, was quickly identified with it, as its chief spokesman and executive. 
What was unique to London, among the three waterfronts, was the longer-term co- 
existence of several union groupings. Nonetheless, the relationship between London 
port unions was more positive than that between the TGWU and NASDU in Liverpool 
and non-unionism was an insignificant problem. Despite this, divisions between 
dockworkers rather than unions were, if anything, more severe than in Liverpool. 
Early history 
Only fragmentary accounts survive of the first London port unions. Their brief 
histories, however, demonstrate an abject failure to become embedded in waterfront 
relations, the chief problems being that of `blacklegging' and of disunity. In 1853, for 
example, 3,000 labourers in two docks struck for a wage rise. Trade was brisk, 
temporarily increasing the bargaining power of labour. Upon the stoppage becoming 
known, however, strikebreakers were imported to replace the men staying out. 
Employers also split the portworkers by accepting the demands of one group while 
refusing the claims of others. In 1864 a second major strike, in the Grand Surrey 
Docks and in the Commercial Docks, was crushed by similar methods. Chastened 
strikers threw themselves on the mercy of employers, claiming that they had been 
`misled' into downing tools. ls 
Central to the history of the port was the 1889 strike. Its details have been well 
rehearsed elsewhere, so only the main salient points are repeated. Although the 
origins of the walk off, in August-September 1889, are contentious, conditions were 
ripe, McCarthy argued, for `a revolt against all the grievances which had long rankled 
15 Times, 9.8.1853, Times, 26.8.1864 
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in the minds of dock labourers. '16 These included problems over casual employment 
in the port and grumbles over being short-changed by contractors. The malpractice of 
having to `treat' (bribe) employers for work was another impetus for action. " Unlike 
previous strikes, this was a success, mainly due to outside help (funds from Australia 
and donations made by the public) and sympathetic action given by the powerful 
stevedores' union. 
Major concessions were wrung from the private dock companies and wharf operators, 
including a rise in the time-based wage, a minimum four hours' employment once 
hired, together with a limit to the number of daily engagements. The union won, for a 
short time, a closed shop and foremen were obliged to join it. But the privilege was 
supposedly `abused' as unionised and therefore more secure labourers slackened their 
pace of work, reawakening fears by employers about the probable effects of a union 
closed shop if it was granted on a permanent basis. 18 
Struggle for recognition 
The establishment and expansion of the Dockers' Union was always a balancing act. 
In a phenomenon equally seen in Liverpool and New York, the union leadership 
sought to assure waterfront managers that their agreeing in the institution of union 
controls would not damage profitability while attempting to appeal to union members 
through the language of militancy and class conflict. 
The Shipping Federation, instituted in 1890 and representing most large lines outside 
of Liverpool, was at the forefront of countering docks unionism. 19 Under poor trading 
conditions and under attack by employers, by 1900 the Dockers' Union was left with 
`barely a foothold in the port' in spite of its astonishing growth ten years previously? ° 
16 McCarthy, T., The Great Dock Strike 1889 (Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1989) p. 81 
17 See the bibliographies in McCarthy, The Great Dock Strike 1889, and Schneer, J., Ben 
Tillett: Portrait of a Labour Leader (Croom Helm, 1982) 
18 Parliament, Royal Commission on Labour, Fifth and Final Report, cmd. 7421 (1894) p. 
146; Times, 11.2.1891. 
19 Broeze, F., 'Militancy and Pragmatism: An International Perspective on Maritime Labour, 
1870-1914', International Review of Social History, vol. XXXVI (1991), pp. 165-200 
20 Lovell, J., 'Sail, Steam and Emergent Dockers' Unionism in Britain, 1850-1914', 
International Review of Social History, vol. XXX11(1987), p. 248 
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Perhaps a majority of London dockworkers were outside of any union system. 21 
Incremental advances were made during successive years, but as late as 1920, the 
union was making slow and uneven progress compared to similar organisations in 
Liverpool and in New York. 
Until the First World War, the chief employers of port labour felt uninhibited in hiring 
non-union alongside union labour in London. This policy was not, under their 
definition, `union busting' since it simply removed the previous bias to the advantage 
of unionists. 2 The Dockers' Union was on the back foot with employers until 1914, 
when wartime demands intervened in its favour. 
1914-47: registration schemes 
During World War One, tradeoffs on the waterfront included no-strike deals in 
exchange for a closed shop and a new legitimacy with governments, standing the 
union in good stead in the aftermath of war. In distinction to Liverpool, there were no 
wartime registration schemes in force in London but after the Shaw Report was 
released, these were rapidly instigated. 
`Full time' dockworkers, invariably union members, were central to registration 
proposals, as detailed in chapter three. Employers would ideally see the benefits in 
terms of tighter work discipline while registration also went a considerable way 
towards achieving the goal of `decasualisation' of waterfront labour. 
Statistics showed a steady rise in the number of dockworkers registered in London, 
these totalling as many as 36,000 in 1933.23 But this still left over ten per cent 
unregistered, including perhaps 4,000 unionised men. Kickbacks for work continued 
21 Thompson, P., Socialists, Liberals and Labour: The Struggle for London 1885-1914 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967) p. 107. Tillett himself estimate that only about fifty per 
cent of dockworkers in London were unionised by 1909 (MRC: MSS. 159/3/B/64: letter of 
5.3.09 from Tillett to the ITWF). 
22 Parliament, The Industrial Council, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Industrial 
Counci4 cmd. 6953 (1913) pp. 569-72; MRC: MSS. 367/TSF/1: Shipping Federation 
`Minutes of Proceedings of the Executive Council' 12.6.12). Illustrative of the sometimes 
hostile atmosphere towards unionism were cases reported, as late as 1914, of union delegates 
being refused entry to the docks by policemen 
23 PRO: LAB 8/44 `Statistical Statement No. 5' (1933). 
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to have a role and without strict enforcement, non-unionists could be employed before 
union men. But as in New York, for example, the most vulnerable to demands for 
money for work were non-unionised. Schweitzer and Wenger noted that after 
registered men were taken on, the hiring boss `threw the tickets in the air and watched 
the men scramble and fight for them, ' a scene almost straight out of the New York 
centred motion picture film `On the Waterfront. '24 
A `closed shop' condition was limited to the post-1945 years, and was achieved only 
after heavy government intercession articulated in the NDLB system and facilitated by 
favourable port authority interpretations of wartime rules and regulations. 
Connections such as these to the port `establishment' were vital to underpin union 
authority and controls. 
UNION DIVISIONS 
Although union ruptures seldom broke into the open in London, historic divisions 
based upon occupation, custom and union association were powerful determinants in 
reducing the collective strength of waterfront labour. They explained the caution of 
union executives when bargaining with management. 
A huge range of distinctions grew up in the port and proved hard to eradicate once the 
need for unity became clearer. Several union blocs with long histories were protective 
of their heritage, and in existence before the Dockers' Union. Although rarely in open 
competition with one another, as in Liverpool, nonetheless they stymied radical 
reforms . 
25 TWGU ('white' union) leaders were aware that strong moves on their part 
against customary practices - even those contrary to agreements - could invoke mass 
defections, particularly following the decision in the late 1920s of NASDU ('blue' 
24 Schweitzer and Wegner, On the River, p. 121. Interview with LONI, 26.5.99; PRO: LAB 
8/186: National Joint Council for Port Labour, Standing Advisory Committee on Registration 
and Decasualisation, Fifth Report (1936); PRO: LAB 8/182: National Joint Council for Dock 
Labour, Standing Advisory Committee on Registration and Decasualisation (ca. 1936). 
Gillespie, Economic and Political Change in the East Eno p. 144 
u MRC: MSS. 126/EB/PL/21/1-2: Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Port Labour 
Committee (10.12.30); MID: LWA Box 304: The Port Employers in London Submission to 
the Committee of Inquiry into the Docks Dispute under the Chairmanship of Lord Devlin 
(n. d. ) 
190 
union) to admit general dockworkers into its ranks. Standoff normally resulted, as in 
Liverpool, with neither unions nor employers in a strong enough position from which 
to restructure work practices. 
Occupational differences were expressed for example in the variable length of 
engagements and in the spread of earnings. The grain ports and teak handlers had 
their own closed shop and rosters, as did NASDU. `Lightermen', who moved on the 
Thames goods taken from the sides of ships to waterside warehouses and other points, 
enjoyed a similar local arrangement. NASDU stevedores were the `royals' in the port 
with their own hiring and employment arrangements. Grain porters, crane drivers and 
similarly `semi-skilled' workers below them in the pecking order meanwhile 
considered themselves apart from, and superior to, rank and file generalists. Ship 
workers were of higher status than quay workers, while exporting quay hands were a 
distinctive group too. 6 Development of the piecework system created huge anomalies 
between grades and acted against lower waged but more steadily employed quayside 
workers such as clerks and checkers. 7 
In early 1922, the Dockers' Union joined the TGWU, but inter-union sectionalism 
remained significant an effect on practices. Confusion resulted when TGWU and 
NASDU men worked together, as in Liverpool. The PLA docks for example 
`belonged' to the TGWU by tradition. 8 In the Surrey Commercial dock on the south 
Thames, ship work was customarily left for NASDU members, while the reverse 
arrangement dominated at Tilbury docks 29 On Canary Wharf, the TGWU was 
dominant, but other wharves took on NASDU men first. 0 Like Liverpool, there could 
be practical problems when blue and white members worked in the same gang. 1 For 
26 Lovell, Stevedores and Dockers, p. 43; MID: BPA Box 292 `Dock Labour Costs - Onerous 
Conditions and Restrictions' (17.2.31).. 
27 Interview with LONM, 19.8.99 
28 Jensen, V. H., Hiring of Dock Workers and Employment Practices in the Ports of New York, 
Liverpool, London, Rotterdam, and Marseilles (Harvard University Press, 1964) p. 193; MID: 
LEDEA Box 209 `London Ocean Trades - Restrictive Practices' (n. d. ). 29 Turnbull, P. Morris, J. and Sapsford, D., Persistent Militants and Quiescent Comrades: 
Intra-Industry Strike Activity on the Docks, 1947-89', The Sociological Review, vol. 44 no. 4 
1996), p. 711; Hill, The Dockers, p. 130. 
Interview with LONN, 19.8.99 31 Parliament, Ministry of Labour and National Service, Unofficial Stoppages in the London 
Docks, cmd. 8236 (1951) p. 23. 
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this reason, they were kept apart where possible. 2 If there was a dispute, the two 
unions could call for their own delegates. 3 Means of disciplining errant members 
also diverged by the relevant union 34 
Particularistic traditions and customs created all the ingredients for inertia in union 
reactions to questionable practices operated by their memberships. Employers, for 
their part, were as divided and sensitive to the possibility of `trouble' if customary 
rank and file privileges and docks `rights' built up over the years were confronted. 
PORT EMPLOYERS 
An incredible variety of employers plied their trade in London, more so than in 
Liverpool. Employer groups were broadly distinguished by the type of waterside 
installation they utilised and by type of vessel. 5 The riverside wharfs employed the 
single largest number of labourers after the PLA and they both used, more than did the 
enclosed docks, regularly hired men. 
Statistics tell the general story, but should be used with caution insofar as they 
frequently included inactive firms and operations of vastly different sizes. In 1908, it 
was reported that 115 riverside wharves existed, each with their own workers. 6 The 
figure for registered port employers during the first half of the 1960s varied between 
318 and 444 37 By the 1930s, ocean shippers and stevedore contractors together 
employed twice as many men as did the PLA. The wharves and granaries gave work 
32 MID: London Shipowners' Dock Labour Committee, 20.2.39 
33 Telephonic interview with LONU, 24.11.01 
34 Interview in London with LONL, 9.9.99 
35 These were listed in PRO: BK 32/12 `Dock Labour Scheme for the Port of London'. 
Comparable figures for numbers of London waterfront employers are included in: Charity 
Organisation Society, Special Committee on Unskilled Labour, Report and Minutes of 
Evidence, London: June 1908, p. 29; Mess, H. A., Casual Labour on the Docks (G. Bell and 
Sons, 1916) p. 18; Transport Act, 1947, `Reports by Docks and Inland Waterways Executive 
on Review of Trade Harbours 1948-50' (British Transport Commission, 1951) p. 37; PRO 
LAB 8/1707 `Human Factors in the Dock Area' 2.8.49; PRO: LAB 2/1044/A88/1924. 
36 Charity Organisation Society, Report and Minutes of Evidence, p. 29; Mess, Casual Labour 
on the Docks, p. 18. 
37 Times, 6.1.65; Parliament, Ministry of Transport, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into 
the Major Ports of Great Britain, cmd. 1824 (1962) p. 35; Parliament, Committee on Inquiry 
Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, 
Final Report, p. 52; MID: LWA Box 304 `The Port Employers in London' (ca. 1964) 
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to 15,000 dockworkers; the highest number in the port collectively, though they were 
also the most varied in size. 8 
All key constituents of waterfront capital sat on the PLA from 1908, but its Board did 
not deal, except in the case of its own staff, with wages and conditions of service of 
port labour. These issues were left to the appropriate private sector joint committees. 
The Board included a few representatives of public bodies and of unions, designed to 
safeguard the wider interest, but employers, who largely paid the bills, heavily 
outvoted them. 9 
Like the New York docks regulatory system, the PLA did not involve itself in most 
loading or unloading activities 4° PLA chairmen, befitting the indigenous class 
structure, were exclusively recruited from the social, business and administrative elites 
and could be counted upon not to disturb the status quo. The PLA was `progressive' 
in its early use of shop stewards, and it maintained a tradition, inherited from 
predecessor dock companies, of employing sizeable numbers of permanent workers in 
its warehouses and elsewhere 41 
Nonetheless, the PLA was but one part of a huge port-wide negotiating process. 
Successive layers of administration, reaching from National Councils to regional and 
local joint committees, bargained with organized labour on a systemic basis. London 
38 The Journal of Commerce `London Shipping Who's Who? ... ' (published from 1924 in 
London) 
39 Parliament, Joint Select Committee of the House of Lords and the House of Commons on 
Port of London Bill, Minutes of Proceedings (1908), London: House of Lords Records Office; 
Bryant, A., Liquid History (London 1960) pp. 42-3. 
°° MID: LPEA Box 136: Ministry of Transport Working Party on Shipping Turnround in 
British Ports (10.11.47); see also Harris, G. G., Memorandum of the Organisation in London 
in Respect to Port Labour Matters (London, 16 July 1937); Jeffery, A. E., The History of 
Scruttons (privately printed, 1971) p. 35 
41 The three PLA Chairman to 1947 were Lord Devonport, a wealthy merchant, Thomas 
Wiles, a JP, Privy Councillor and vice-chairman of the Corn Exchange and latterly John 
Anderson, a top-level civil servant and former Governor of Bengal (Shipping World, 9.1.46, 
The PLA Monthly, February 1946). There are several detailed accounts of the organisation of 
employing interests in London, including those in Jensen, V. H., 'Prospects for Labour Peace 
on the London And New York Docks', in McGill University, Industrial Relations Centre, The 
Dynamics of Change: Labour Relations on the Montreal Waterfront (Montreal, 1970); MID: 
LWA Box 304: `The Port Employers in London' (ca. 1964). On PLA shop stewards, see the 
interview with LONS, 8.7.99. On the PLA hierarchy, consult Hill, The Dockers, p. 179; 
MOL: DK/88/72/1/A: Tim O'Leary 
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was uniquely served in this respect, with separate negotiating structures for each trade, 
type of facility and trade union. 42 
Such a complex and convoluted structure was bound to be divisive. In spite of the 
official line that all elements on the PLA Board were as one when it came to `the 
port', there was indeed internal discord. 3 One such conflict was between owners of 
ships ('vessels') and merchants ('goods'). Early on and throughout the 1920s, for 
instance, shipowners complained that merchants on the Board had more voting power 
44 despite the fact that shipowners paid more towards the running of the port The 
Wharfingers were in particular disagreement with the rest `owing to the difference of 
their problems and methods of working. '45 
rri 
On joint committees, power was similarly fought over. On the National Council of 
Port Employers, shipowners were seen as `disproportionately powerful. '46 At other 
times, wharf interests were perceived as detached from the deliberations of other 
Council members, `owing to the difference of their problems and methods of 
working. '47 With London joint committees, it was claimed at one stage that the big 
shipowning lines dominated proceedings. 8 
Factionalism made wage negotiations and discussions over the reform of working 
practices and malpractices fraught with practical difficulty 49 Consequently, a 
42 See Harris, G. G., Memorandum of the Organisation in London in Respect to Port Labour 
Matters, London, 16 July 1937. Museum in Docklands archives 
43 See interviews with LONS, 8.7.99; Dick Butler (MOL: DK/88/56) 
44PRO: MT 48/90 `Analysis of Register of Voters for the Years 1913-1928'; `Report of the 
Committee of the London General Shipowners' Society for the Year 1919-20' on the 1920 
revision to the 1908 PLA Act. PRO: MT 48/90: letter of 5.7.28 from the London General 
Shipowners' Society to the Minister of Transport. Proportions are given in PRO: MT 48/91 
`Memorandum. Port of London Elections' (ca. 1930). Consult also: MID LWA Boxes 63 
and 65 for PLA electoral arrangements 
as MMM: PEA Box 44/1: National Council of Port Labour Employers `Re-Amended Draft 
Constitution' (16.6.43) 
Morgan, unpublished paper (1983) 
47 MMM: PEA Box 44/1: National Council of Port Labour Employers `Re-Amended Draft 
Constitution' (16.6.43). 
48MRC: MSS. 367/LDS/1/1: London Deep Sea Tramp Shipowners' Association Minutes, 
6.3.45. 
49 Interviews with LONP, 7.7.99, LONS, 8.7.99; communication with J. Hovey, 1.10.99 
Wilson, Dockers, pp. 40-1; Jeffery, The History of Scruttons, p. 40; Transport Act, 1947, 
`Reports by Docks and Inland Waterways, ' p. 45. 
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`consensus' of sorts developed, in which reforms to malpractices were sidestepped for 
fear of the turbulence any frontal assault on them would likely cause. Changes in the 
ways cargoes were shifted were at best incremental and deflected back to joint 
committees, where recommendations were usually buried. 
HIRING MALPRACTICES 
Unlike Liverpool, the institution of Dock Labour Board hiring regimes in London did 
not impinge greatly on customary methods of labour engagement. As late as 1967, 
traditional `free calls' operated apart from Board hiring centres. As a rule of thumb, 
unwanted labour reported to dock labour board controls, where it was processed. Men 
were then obliged to take any suitable work to which they were allocated while the 
rest were guaranteed a minimum income so 
As noted in chapter five, a higher percentage of registered dockers in London were 
employed on a regular or permanent basis than was the case in Liverpool, about a 
third of the total sl Devlin's more detailed survey claimed that approximately 35 per 
cent of those on the register in the early 1960s were weekly engaged, while 25 per 
cent more were regular followers of the same employer S2 The proportions were even 
larger in certain specialised areas of work such as lighterage, where there after 
permanently employed men, about 40 per cent. of the remainder were described as 
`regular followers' of employers s3 
On most facilities the longest servers could normally expect to be taken on where 
there was work and for the reasons outlined in chapter three. 4 Local customs also 
so Parliament, Ministry of Labour and National Service, Unofficial Stoppages in the London 
Docks, cmd. 8236 (1951) p. 3 
s' MID: LEDEA Box 132: "Preliminary Report and Recommendations of the Special Sub- 
Committee of London Port Employers, 1961" (May 1961) 
52 Ministry of Labour. Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain 
Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, 1965, Final Report, cmd. 2734 (1965) p. 103 
53 MID: LWA 304: The Port Employers in London Submission to the Committee of Inquiry 
into the Docks dispute Under the Chairmanship of Lord Devlin( n. d. ) 
54 Interview with LONG, 21.10.99. 
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helped to spread out finite work opportunities 55 However, this did not match the 
robustness of `seniority' systems in New York, since the London system - as with that 
in Liverpool - was rarely codified, thus could not be enforced by means of joint 
committees 56 
Also pertinent was that the larger private dock companies in the late nineteenth 
century had instituted their own employment regimes 57 But each dock had different 
mixtures of permanent and causal labour. The use of contractors to engage men 
varied, with the Victoria and Albert Docks being used more by master stevedores than 
the London and St. Katherine's docks. Those working for the PLA on a steady or 
58 permanent basis had to abide by its particular standards. 
Differences also emerged in their susceptibility to hiring bribery and other forms of 
discrimination. Thus at the St. Katherine's Docks, in about 1891 a foreman took on 
fifty-seven men named `Donovan' in a single day `until the men themselves 
threatened him with violence if he took on any more relations. ' 59 
But the fact that their systems functioned inside a vast internal labour market, in 
which men could be moved around where required, limited its value as a potential 
model for the rest of the industry, characterised as it was by far smaller installations 
unable to move labour to other sites where required 60 
Tilbury Docks, twenty-six miles downstream from east London, was practically self- 
contained in its labour requirements by the 1930s. Larger employers across the port 
hired men in the low hundreds on a regular basis (though they could still be taken on 
daily). The Blue Funnel Line and its associated Glen Line, berthing in King George 
Dock, between them employed perhaps 300 regular dockworkers in over twelve work 
ss The London casual corn porters for example were employed `on the basis that the first gang 
to finish a job takes the first fresh job available. ' (MRC: MSS. 126/EB/PL/21/1-2: Minutes of 
Evidence Taken before the Port Labour Committee (10.12.30)) 
56 Telephonic interview with LOND, 4.12.00 
57 Telephonic interviews with LONC, 17.11.01 LONH, 17.11.01 
58 Interview with LONU, 26.7.99; Lynton, R. P. and King, S. D. M. Research in the London 
Docks: Interim Report, 31 December 1948, p. 9. 
S9 Booth Collection Second Series vol. 111 Collection Part V, Chapter 1 
60 Stedman Jones, G., Outcast London (Penguin, 1971) p. 318. 
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gangs. 1 Next in importance to the PLA in furnishing steady work were probably the 
wharves, where coastwise and inter-coastal plying vessels often used their own 
facilities. Within particular enclosed docks, furthermore, it was known that 
employment opportunities varied. 2 
So-called `choice' work became more available during the 1920s, likely as an 
outgrowth of the newly established registration system 63 Before 1967, it was 
estimated that a substantial proportion of the labour in the port worked on a regular 
basis weekly, maybe up to two thirds of the total. Some figures published were lower, 
but these only included workers who stayed with one employer as opposed to those 
work gangs and individuals who moved about in search of a job, a common way of 
keeping in work. " The 1965 Devlin survey recorded for instance that about thirty- 
five per cent of London registered dockworkers were `engaged' on a weekly basis and 
twenty-five per cent more were regular followers of the same employer. 65 
Nonetheless, improper hiring activities though did not stop after the institution of 
hiring centres in 1947. An `accommodation' with particular foremen remained 
extremely useful in winning better or longer lasting work, reflecting the New York 
situation well 66 The biggest and best-paid ship hold (usually no. 2 hatch) reportedly 
became a preserve in the enclosed docks of one or two elite gangs, regardless of the 
friction this caused and the stimulation to hiring corruption it caused. 7 Wharf 
practices also showed a poor distribution of earnings, with top earners coming from 
clearly identifiable gangs who had established themselves over the years. 
61 Telephonic interview with LONP, 20.11.01 
62 In the `Royal' group of docks, after 1945 the vast majority of dockworkers were in `fairly 
stable' gangs (Lindop, F., 'Unofficial Militancy in the Royal Group of Docks 1945-67', Oral 
History, vol. 11 no. 2 (1983), p. 22). The Surrey Commercial Docks on the south bank of the 
river, meanwhile, was characterised by many smaller stevedores unlikely to take on large 
numbers of regular gangs. 
63 Gillespie, J. A. Economic and Political Change in the East End of London During the 
1920's (University of Cambridge. Ph. D. 1984) p. 119. 
64 Telephonic interview with LONU, 26.7.99; interview LONP, 20.11.01. MID: LEDEA Box 
132 `Preliminary Report and Recommendations of the Special Sub-Committee of London Port 
Employers, 1961' 
65 Parliament, Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain Matters 
Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, cmd. 2734 (1965) p. 52. 
66 Hill, The Dockers, pp. 17-8. 
67 Telephonic interview with LONP, 20.11.01 
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During the 1960s, therefore, London stood perhaps midway between New York and 
Liverpool in terms of overall stability of ordinary hiring episodes, and so of associated 
hiring malpractices, these being inter-connected to the availability of work. Most 
reported cases of corruption at the hiring stand in London dated from the pre-1945 
period. One observer of the interwar years in London wrote: `The pubs opened at six 
thirty in the morning, and you'd find all gangers in there picking up the men before 
the eight `clock call. Instead of going on the call, he'd say to the men, `Get round to 
the Acorn Yard, or the Albion Yard, Number Four Berth, so and so ship. 68 
Wharf working practices 
Customary practices in London took on their most diverse form on the riverside 
wharfs Wharf practices were, in most respects, autonomous from those on the 
enclosed docks. 
Owners or operators of wharves usually did their own stevedoring work, and each 
riverside installation had its own dedicated `free call. ' Innovations there included 
early functioning shop steward systems helping to adjust disputes, uncommon 
elsewhere aside from within the PLA organisation 69 Enclosed dock practices were 
under closer union scrutiny. The wharves, less visible in this regard, developed their 
own norms. 
Wharf relations were less conflictual than those in the docks, reflecting the high 
number of weekly workers, about 70 per cent of the total in the mid 1960s, 70and the 
more amicable relationships that developed between employers and their labourers, 
68 Schweitzer, P. and Wegner, C. (eds. ), On the River: Memories of a Working Rive (Age 
Exchange, 1989) p. 122 
69 Interview with LONM, 20.8.99; Charity Organisation Society, Report and Minutes of 
Evidence, p. 30, Daily Worker (London) 22.11.32; MID: Minutes of Meeting of the Port of 
London Local Joint Committee, 8.6.33. 
70 Parliament, Ministry of Labour Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into 
Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, cmd. 2734 (1965) p. 
103 
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many of whom were virtual fixtures. 1 Because of this, stoppages were less frequent 
than on the enclosed docks, where fault-lines of were more apparent. 
Dealing in the main (but not exclusively so) with smaller, `as regular as clockwork' 
docking vessels, 72 wharf workers could expect four days or more of work per week. 
Mark Brown's wharf, for example, on the south bank of the Thames, offered work to 
up to three hundred men daily and there was even a `waiting list' of people hoping to 
join the top earning gangs, individuals having to work as `fill-ins' for a time until a 
regular gang member retired 73 This and other practices on other wharves assured 
good quality labour and a certain loyalty to the operator concerned, though this did not 
always avert unrest or the `squeezing' of individual employers. Bonus payments were 
also better than those paid on the enclosed docks. 4 
Customs 
Empirical evidence matches the standard theoretical approach in respects, but not in 
all, since internal waterfront norms and practices were often more important than were 
differences between port practices. The port of London was the site of countless 
informal methods of organising the movement of cargoes. Over time, jurisdictional 
rights developed, as each section of the waterfront established its own working 
`rights' that became dangerous to dislodge even where unconstitutional or illegal. 5 
Before 1939, London wage determination was far from standardised. Scruttons, the 
biggest private stevedoring firm, discharged pine cargoes on `day' (time) work with a 
bonus element for example. 6 As late as 1947, tariffs for discharging the same 
71 As Roy Mankelow noted, many wharf owners were on first name terms with their own 
labourers, and wharf owners would `work alongside his men when occasion demanded' 
Mankelow, The Effects of Modernisation and Change, pp. 111-2) 
PRO: ZLIB 2/107 `Port of London Emergency Committee Report' February 1937; 
Fairplay, 28.11.35 
73 Telephonic interviews with LONC, 17.11.01, LONU, 24.11.01 
74 MID: LWA Box 229 `The Port Employers in London' (n. d. ); Parliament, Royal 
Commission on Labour, Digest of Evidence Taken Before Group B, vol. 1. cmd. 6708-11 
(1892) p. 278; Parliament, House of Commons, Report on Dock Labour in Relation to Poor 
Relief, cmd. 4391 (1908) p. 9. 
75 MMM: PEA Box 44/1: letter dated 16.6.43 on `Re-Amended Draft Constitution. ' 
76 MID: Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Ocean Shipowners' Group Joint Committee, 
22.4.32. 
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commodities varied significantly by locality or firm and, allegedly, standard schedules 
were only developed in the early 1950s. 77 The Leggett Inquiry of 1951 also noted the 
lack of an agreed schedule of piece rates paid for warehousing work. 78 
Employing concerns stepped warily when challenging customary working methods, 
since these would almost always be defended with spirit. In 1931, for example, the 
London short sea traders warned that action `runs the risk of all the men forming the 
gang with which the man is associated refusing to work. ' One such instance was in 
1934, when 2,000 dockworkers struck for two weeks after redundant clerks were 
given positions as dock labourers against the unofficial norm on the dock. Men 
walked off when new machinery was introduced, over a lack of consultation, over 
wage parity, when fellow dockworkers were disciplined or sacked, and for a 
multiplicity of other causes. 9 
SHIPBOARD MALPRACTICES 
Matching the situation in Liverpool, ship-working dockers in London had ample 
opportunities to make back-door deals. When combined with poor supervision, 
`problem' was easily created. 
But the shape of malpractices once work started in a ship's hold was also determined 
by the extant wage payment method. Where time paying wages, or flat `piece 
working' payments, were the vogue, as in the other two ports, malpractices were 
usually centred upon the deliberate dragging out of work. London's payment by 
results system generated countless small disputes over bonuses that could easily upset 
77 Interview with LONP, 7.7.99 
78 Parliament, Ministry of Labour and National Service, Unofficial Stoppages in the London 
Docks, cmd. 8236 (1951) p. 4. 
79 MID: BPA Box 292 `Dock Labour Costs - Onerous Conditions and Restrictions' (17.2.31); 
MID: LEDEA Box 129 `Rochdale Committee on Inquiry' (24.8.61); MID: LPEA Box 115 
`The Port of London' (ca. 1951); MID: BPA Box 292 `Breaches of National Agreement 
Stoppages of Work (Mainly Unofficial)' (April 1933); MID: Minutes of Meeting of the Port 
of London Local Joint Committee, 8.6.33; Times, 26.5.34,8.2.47, Journal of Commerce, 
16.8.57. The Financial Times (4.1154) told how thousands of men in two docks struck over 
the non-union status of truck drivers entering the docks. The strikers were initially suspended 
but then reinstated when they returned to work. News of this did not reach dockworkers in 
other sections quickly enough and they downed tools in the mistaken impression that they 
were helping their mates. 
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shipowner timetables and furnished incentives for the acquiescence by employers in 
various malpractices to break real or potential logjams. During World War Two, for 
instance, it was estimated that 70 per cent of wage disputes in London were related to 
pieceworking 80 The inflationary effects of malpractices lead, in part, to the 
abandonment of pieceworking there. ' Ship focused malpractices in London also 
assumed a collaborative tone with employers, in distinction to welting malpractices on 
Merseyside. 
Piecework related malpractices 
Hourly working was discarded on the docks in London, the process starting after the 
1889 stoppage but accelerating during World War Two, when payments by results 
`spread to almost all operations. '82 Pieceworking became the normal method of 
payment of vessel hatch workers in London, but minority categories of labour were 
excluded. (Most quay work for instance was by the hour, as were the checking and 
lighterage functions. )83 In spite of the advantages of piece working for productivity 
and earnings, they were not without inconvenience for employers and were the cause 
of many payoffs in order `to keep the job going. 'TM During the Second World War, 
most London waterfront disputes were related to this. Many strikes from 1947-50 
were said to be due to the slow working or to the failure of arbitration methods when 
faced with pieceworking disputes that required instant solutions. 85 
80 PRO: LAB 76/21 `Labour in the Port Transport Industry from the End of 1942 to the 
Passing of the Dockworkers Act, 1946' p. 86 
81 Mellish, The Docks After Devlin, p. 19; Parliament, Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. 
Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, 
23. 
82 MID: LWA Box 333 `Minutes of Meeting of Labour Committee and Employer Members of 
Wharfingers' Group Joint Committee Held at 2/30 pm Thursday 22od March 1956 at 17 
Crosswall EC3. ' 
83 Lindop, Unofficial Militancy in the Royal Group of Docks 1945-67', pp. 21-33; Gillespie, 
Economic and Political Change in the East End of London, p. 117; MMM: PEA Box 135: 
letter of 15.11.63; MID: LWA Box 333: Minutes of Meeting of Labour Committee and 
Employer Members of Wharfingers Group Joint Committee, 22.3.56. 
8' Interview with LONG, 21.10.99; McKelvey, J., Dock Labor Disputes in Great Britain: A 
Study in the Persistence of Industrial Unrest (New York State School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations, 1953) p. 54. 
85 PRO: LAB 76/21 `Labour in the Port Transport Industry from the End of 1942 to the 
Passing of the Dockworkers Act, 1946' p. 86; PRO: LAB 8/1709 'Dock Disputes' (March 
1950). 
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Although many minor ship board disputes were `settled with expedition' and without 
recourse to the official conciliation machinery, problems occurred when new 
commodities were involved, requiring a joint inspection committee visit to the vessel 
concerned in order to determine the `correct' speed of work and to suggest the 
appropriate rates which were then submitted to the Joint Piecework Committee for 
confirmation. Other disputes were referred to Joint Area Committees. The Ocean 
Shipowners' Group Joint Committee dealt with cases brought to it by Area 
Committees, these used extensively. The highest bodies adjusting disputes in London 
was the Port Labour Executive Committee, followed by the National Joint Council. 6 
Complex piecework scales governing ship working requiring constant adjustment and 
were filled with anomalies. Extra money would be paid to ship gangs for example, as 
in Liverpool or New York, for cargoes that were adjudged to be `difficult' or 
`hazardous. ' But as Gillespie wrote, `some deviation from the ideal norm could be 
found in most cargoes, ' producing anxiety among employers and eventually creating a 
situation where malpractices to bypass potential or actual difficulties over rates for the 
job became economically 'sensible. '87 
`The grounds on which the additions are granted' were `often quite fictitious, ' the 
London Deep Sea Owners in London claimed. 8 Devlin and Hill termed these awards 
`unjustifiable' and they `became a way of buying industrial peace, since management 
had no more control over the men than did the foremen. 189 Port employers further 
noted that `it must be admitted that individual Employers, acting under pressure from 
principals, often foreign shipowners, have made unofficial concessions, since the cost 
of settlement may be fractional compared with that caused by delay to a particular 
ship. '90 
86 MID: LEDEA Box 159 `Industrial Conciliation Machinery - London Ocean Trades' 
22.6.50) 
7 Gillespie, Economic and Political Change in the East End of London During the 1920's, p. 
118. 
88 Lynton and King, Research in the London Dock, p. 28 
89 Hill, The Dockers, p. 119. 
90 MID: LWA Box 304 `The Port Employers in London' (ca. 1964) p. 5 
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`There seems to be a tacit understanding, ' argued Lynton and King, `that the rates 
should yield earnings 75 per cent higher than day wages. '91 Both Oram and Hovey 
similarly stated that work gangs in London would have in mind before beginning 
work a specific sum they expected to earn and would settle for nothing less. 2 In the 
latter 1950s, it was reported that piecework earnings were commonly enhanced by a 
staggering fifty per cent 93 
A range of rewards given to hatch gangs who looked as though they would cause 
difficulties over rates was wide. Among them could be a tacit understanding with 
management to be able to knock off work before the agreed time (perhaps after 
handling a pre-determined tonnage); payment for work not performed; an assurance of 
overtime employment before work commenced and the outlay of overtime wages 
when no overtime work was performed. The system might permit men to hold down a 
second job off the docks such as minicab driving. 4 
The cost of giving way was much less than the price of giving way to a demand from 
ship workers that could be, in any case, justified if queried as part and parcel of the 
process of local bargaining. Joint agreements stipulated that `on-vessel' or `side of 
vessel' negotiations involving representatives of the employers and of the hatch gangs 
were wholly legitimate means of settling disputes, but only so long as work continued 
and the outcome stuck to agreements. 5 
91 Lynton and King, Research in the London Docks, p. 19 
92 Hovey, J., A Tale of Two Ports: London and Southampton (The Industrial Society, 1990); 
Oram, R. B., The Dockers' Tragedy (Hutchinson and Co., 1970). 
93 MID: LWA Box 235 `Report on the Present Position Regarding the Holding of View 
Committees' (Feb. 1958). 
94 Another example was where the work gang was attached to a berth where a ship was 
working they would be paid the highest tonnage for that ship, even if they might never see the 
ship. These malpractices were also informally labelled `dollar sessions' (interview with 
LONF, 30.6.99) 
95 For a sampling of the joint agreements, consult MRC: MSS. 126/uncatalogued `Agreement 
Between the London Short Sea Traders' Association and the Transport and General Workers' 
Union' (12.6.28), MSS. 126/uncatalogued `Port of London. Ocean Trades `Piece-Work Rates 
to be Paid by the Shipowners or their Contractors' (15.10.56); MID: PLEC Box 7 `The Ocean 
Shipowners; Group Joint Committee Piecework Conditions Operating On and After Monday, 
2nd July, 1928. ' The Museum in London archive contains numerous files related to London 
piecework disputes, for instance in Minutes of Meeting of the Ocean Shipowners Group Joint 
Committee in July, 1933. 
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Local variations 
The type and size of employer had a marked bearing on their willingness to go along 
with shipboard malpractices. PLA managers would frown upon them because of the 
precedent they set in raising shipping costs in London port. If an employer using PLA 
facilities was caught, for instance, his ships might be moved away from the central 
markets, resulting in a loss of profits 96 But few such cases were uncovered, 
especially in the stevedoring contractor sector where the bigger problems arose. 
Larger foreign shipowners seemed more accommodating towards improper practices, 
as in Liverpool. Smaller stevedores in particular docks, such as those in the Surrey 
Commerical and the Millwall enclosed docks complexes, were also considered more 
likely to participate in malpractices, as told by interviewees. John Hovey recalled 
how, when he operated as a Millwall dock master stevedore in the 1960s, he would 
personally `grease the palms to varying degrees of the masters, mates and ships' 
clerks, the employees of the cargo-superintending firms who were responsible for 
making the official returns of cargo handled to the owners. '97 
Wharf labourers, although thought on average `less greedy' than their enclosed dock 
counterparts, were not above treating themselves to improper payments where made 
available. In 1931, public wharf owners for example noted that employers utilising 
their facilities gave way under pressure to the men and that wharf labourers declined 
to do Saturday working if Sunday work was not on offer. Smaller boats, mostly 
owned by their captains and tending to use the wharf facilities, were unusually 
sensitive to stoppages and therefore quicker to concede to payments of this sort. 98 
Rank and file practitioners favoured the day before the vessel was due to sail as the 
right time to find a previously `unforeseen' problem on which to hang a demand. That 
said, hatch gangs were `always' on the lookout for anything that could raise earnings" 
96 Interview with LONS, 8.7.99. 
97 Hovey, A Tale of Two Ports, p. 34 
98 Interview with LONA, 30.6.99. 
99 MRC: MSS 126/uncatalogued (Minutes of Meeting of the Ocean Shipowners' Group Joint 
Committee, 1932-3) and MSS. 360/NMLH/SO/01/02/001. One interesting case, in Stepney, 
involved men deciding to work on time-wages as a response to disciplinary action. It was 
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using piece-working payments arrangements as `an excuse for delay and a seedbed for 
argument. ' 100 
`So when you think of all the ingredients there were for industrial trouble, ' recalled 
Dick Butler, a senior manager in the PLA, `you couldn't have designed it if you 
wanted to. 'lol Unofficial practices eroded the legitimacy of joint agreements, and 
were therefore condemned at port level but often quietly acquiesced with by local 
union officials as a popular means to make up income and in which even `regular' 
work gangs participated if opportunities came along. 102 
Area Committees 
Machinery was further developed from 1920 to settle enclosed dock shipping disputes 
without the need for stoppages (the wharf system was separate). Each major British 
port including Liverpool was subject to new arrangements building on previous 
structures, but these tended to be disproportionately used in piece-working waterfronts 
because of the direct relationship between commodity and earnings. 
Each sector of the port had its own committees that oversaw dock or wharf 
arbitrations if there was the threat of a downing of tools from work gangs, and with a 
means to take the matter to a higher level if no agreement could be reached there and 
then. 103 If an Area Committee was convened but its award was rejected, the gang had 
the right in London to switch to `day work', a reversion to payment by the number of 
claimed by the men concerned that piecework under the circumstances was optional (MID: 
LPEA Box 113: London Short Sea Traders' Association `Minutes of an Emergency Meeting' 
(6.6.47)) 
100 Hovey, A Tale of Two Ports, p. 51. 
101 MOL: DK/88/56: Dick Butler. 
102 MID: LWA Box 304: The Port Employers in London, Submission to the Committee of 
Inquiry into the Docks Dispute Under the Chairmanship of Lord Devlin (n. d. ); National 
Council of Port Labour Employers comments in MID: National Council of Port Labour 
Employers `Port Labour Costs' (n. d. ). 
103 MID: LEDEA Box 159 `Industrial Conciliation Machinery - London Ocean Trades' 
(22.6.50); MID: LPEA Box 137 `Committee of Inquiry into Dock Strikes in London' (1950); 
Harris, G. G., Memorandum of the Organisation in London in Respect to Port Labour 
Matters, London, 16 July 1937. 
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hours worked, which decelerated the tempo of work. 104 For this reason, employers 
avoided it where possible. The prospects of gangs going on day work `was always a 
nightmare' for employers and gangs were well aware of the pull this gave them. '°5 
A ship cargo, under dispute conditions, was going nowhere until a satisfactory 
arrangement for the rank and file was forged. The balance of advantage in this 
situation lay with the men, whereas once the ship was gone, it was felt that the final 
adjustment would be less agreeable because of the obvious fact that the cargo under 
dispute was not longer available to inspect. 106 If an employer refused to agree to a 
rate for the job put forward by a union official for example, this was `often followed 
up with an implied threat of a stoppage by the men if they do not get what they want. ' 
Faced with the reality of lost production, many employers gave whatever was 
necessary as `a way of buying industrial peace. '107 
Shipowners could, it was argued, always put up their prices to reflect the costs of 
extra-agreement earnings. `All sorts of deals would try to be struck to make it work 
out. '108 Once `the immediate problem' for a shipowner was resolved, its repercussions 
were not considered. 109 
1967-1972 
Piecework as the chief method of calculating London dock wages became obsolete a 
few years after Devlin Report recommendations. From 1970, an `upstanding weekly 
wage' was adopted, based on full-time working for a single employer and weekly 
104 Dash, Good Morning Brothers, pp. 58,109; MID: LPEA Box 159 `Revision of Piecework 
Discharging Schedule and Manning Scales' (6.7.53); MID: Minutes of Meeting of the Ocean 
Shipowners' Group Joint Committee, 6.1.55; MID: LWA Box 238: Minutes of the Meeting of 
the London Association of Public Wharfingers (7.1.65) 
105 Wilson, Dockers, p. 232. 
106 MID: LWA Box 235 `Report on the Present Position Regarding the Holding of View 
Committees' (Feb. 1958). 
107 Hill, The Dockers, p. 119. 
108 Interviews with LONA, 30.6.99, LONG, 26.5.99, LONT, 15.6.99, letter from J. Hovey, 
1.10.99, Hill, The Dockers, p. 122; MID: LWA Box 238: The London Association of Public 
Wharfingers Ltd. (7.1.65). 
1°9 Parliament, Ministry of Labour and National Service, Unofficial Stoppages in the London 
Docks, cmd. 8236,1951, p. 6 
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wages replaced piece payments, in part to eradicate the previous corruption but as 
much in recognition that unitised cargoes were inappropriate to payment by results. '1° 
Negotiations by this stage were conducted with the presence of a government 
committed to `modernising' cargo-handling methods on the British docks. 11' 
Tradeoffs for a radically improved employment package included a pledge by the 
TGWU and NASDU leaderships to help end `restrictive' practices, some of which 
moved across the dividing line into `malpractices. ' The riverside wharves, not 
handling container traffic, did not need a change to its payments regime or to its 
working practices. Traditional forms of practice and malpractice were unaffected. 
One reason for the urgency was the quandary over illegal payments, which was felt to 
be getting out of hand. 112 The upstanding wage would replace, in the enclosed docks, 
most other types of payments such as `job and finish. P113 Shift work was introduced, 
the continuity rule abandoned, manning scales reduced and men disallowed from 
refusing to work if they were short-handed. ' 14 `Dirty money' disbursements were, 
however, retained. 115 The manipulation of weekend working excepted, fewer 
openings existed for additions to the basic wage, though improved time rates were 
expected to make the job financially attractive. 116 
In London, an arbitration chairman system was set up after Devlin Phase 2 to speed up 
the process of dispute adjustment. This was felt a necessity, since the weekly wage 
structure invited `slacking off' n the same way it did in New York. 
The accepted and matter-of-fact quality of ship related payments in London is at first 
surprising given a comparative lack of publicity afforded them, a product assigned to 
political factors in large part. Yet in their breadth, they seem to have dwarfed any 
problems New York had in this respect, although the evidence there remains 
incomplete and to an extent contradictory. 
110 Wilson, Dockers, p. 235. 
111 Wilson, Dockers, p. 218; Times, 18.9.68 
112 Interview with LONB, 17.6.99 
113 MID: LEDEA Box 260: `Riverside Employers' Working Party. ' 
114 Hovey, A Tale of Two Ports, p. 70. 
Its Interview with LONJ, 16.6.99 
116 Telephonic interviews with LONE, 20.11.01, LONP, 20.11.01 
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Manning malpractices 
A local `malpractice' that employers actively cooperated with was in the intentional 
under-manning of working gangs. Collusion over manning scales for ship labouring 
often suited both employers and gang members. For this reason it was unusually 
under-reported as a violation of port rules to unions and dock labour boards. The 
malpractice extended between the riverside wharves and the enclosed docks. '17 
Manipulation of joint agreements on correct gang sizes was also a way of creating 
`goodwill' on the docks. 118 Agreements stipulated that where a dock gang was under- 
strength, it should still start work until made up. When other employers could not 
help, labourers would be requisitioned from Dock Labour Board centres to make up 
the shortfall when the relevant men became free 119 In reality, a range of alternatives 
to these existed. Some gangs flatly refused to even start work until fully made up, in 
contravention of joint agreements, or they demanded `exorbitant payments to perform 
the work' in the meantime. 120 One gang might also refuse to merge with another to 
resolve the employer's dilemma. '21 
By 1952, `the present National Agreement on shorthanded working was being 
observed in very few ports and certainly not in the principal ports. '122 A deciding 
factor for employers when deciding what to do was the cost of securing additional 
dockworkers. This, in a time of near full employment and/or the non-availability of 
the right sort of labour, could be a headache for any employer. Furthermore, the 
immense size of a port like that of London and New York formed a number of natural 
geographic barriers to the easy movement of labour across it where required. 
"' MID: LWA Box 229: `The Port Employers in London' (10.6.66) 
118 LONM, however, related how twice in his experience a whole wharf was punished before 
the TGWU executive for unconstitutional short-handed working malpractices (interview, 
19.8.99). 
119 MID: LPEA Box 136: Ministry of Transport Working Party on Shipping Turnround in 
British Ports (10.11.47); MID: LEDEA Box 159 `Revision of Piecework Discharging 
Schedule and Manning Scales' (6.753). 
12° MID: LWA Box 304 `Port Employers in London' appendix 7 (1965). 
121 MID: LEDEA Box 209 `London Ocean Trades - Restrictive Practices' (n. d. ) 122 MID: LEDEA 26: Minutes of a Special Meeting of the London Shipowners' Dock Labour 
Committee (27.3.52) 
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Inadequate public transport further fuelled problems of getting `fill-in' gang members 
across the docks in sufficient time to be of much use. 123 
Wharf facilities were particularly prone to this difficulty due to their distance from 
centres of economic activity. Smaller gang sizes also translated into a lower levy to 
the Dock Labour Board from employers and travelling expenses would have to be 
paid by the operational employer if they requisitioned control board labour. 124 From 
an employers' viewpoint, the balance came firmly down in favour of collaborating 
with gangs in the functioning of depleted gang malpractices. 
Workers who adapted to employer needs were offered lucrative inducements. Some 
was justifiable, since fewer men could not move as much cargo, and this affected their 
earnings, for which they wanted compensation. Hence, under another heading in 
company accounts, it was a practice to pay the colluding work gang the missing man's 
wages for the day, or to give the gang overtime despite it being un-worked for or to 
give them a day off on pay. A variant on this was the situation where agreements 
stipulated that extra men above the usual gang size should be taken on for special 
work. Where this occurred, no more men would be in fact employed, and the gang 
members would divide wages allocated for the `additional' or `phantom' 125 
Ultimately, employing negotiators blamed the problem on inflated gang sizes that 
unions had refused to seriously discuss. Joint agreements encouraged `ghosting' and 
`featherbedding, ' since they were inbuilt into their provisions. The answer lay in a 
systematic pruning of gang sizes. To this suggestion, unions were loath to concede. 
Also pertinent was the embarrassing reality that if gangs could work without a loss of 
productivity with fewer men than assigned, the unions' case for maintaining intact 
traditional gang sizes would be undercut. 126 
123 Parliament, Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain Matters 
Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, p. 19; MID: LEDEA Box 26: Minutes 
of a Special Meeting of the London Shipowners' Dock Labour Committee, 27.3.52 
124 Interview with LONH, 30.6.99. 
125 Interview with LOND, 22.10.99 
126 The London Shipowners' Dock Labour Committee commented that `it would present the 
Employers with an excellent case for applying for reductions in manning' (MID: LEDEA Box 
26: Minutes of a Special Meeting of London Shipowners' Dock Labour Committee, 27.3.52) 
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Riverside wharf malpractices were less evident than those in the docks. Since union 
oversight was weaker, and labour generally more amenable to the needs of individual 
employers (`wharfingers'), `there wasn't a wharf that actually carried out the 
wharfingers agreement. '127 
Wharf gangs were more mobile than those working the enclosed docks and were 
willing to work in other jobs aside from their `principal' one. This made the task of 
detecting deliberately under-strength working more difficult still for union officials, 
even where they were suspected. 128 (Shipboard workers, for instance, might work as 
checkers the next day. ) 
Work in the enclosed docks was normally less secure and full gangs seen as a critical 
component in propping up employment levels. 129 But there were exceptions. Tilbury 
docks, for example, was a full twenty-six miles downstream from the central 
waterfront, hence a site of short-handed ganging. There was a nearby dock labour 
board hiring point, but if the right labour was unavailable, the next was up to fifteen 
miles away, and it could take suitable `fill-in' labour one and a half hours to get to 
Tilbury. 
Continuity rule 
`Continuity' working practices were, for the structurally less favoured ship workers, a 
`prized possession' that, as Dash argued, gave a greater regularity of employment 
even to the most casually engaged gang. They simultaneously curbed hiring 
corruption. 130 
Continuity agreements stipulated that where a gang started work on a vessel, they 
would have to carry on until the whole `job' (defined as a hatch or a ship) was 
finished, and labourers affected could not be laid of after the minimum engagement 
127 Interview with LONG, 21.10.99. 
128 Telephonic interview with LONU, 24.11.00; MID: LEDEA Box 159 `Revision of 
Piecework Discharging Schedule Manning Scales' (6.7.53). 
129 Interview with LONJ, 16.6.99; telephonic interview with LONH, 17.11.01 
130 Dash, J., Good Morning Brothers (London Borough of Tower Hamlets, 1987) p. 56; 
Lynton, and King, Research in the London Docks; Oram, The Dockers' Tragedy, p. 183. 
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period. For this reason, in militating against `casual' engagements, rank and file 
activists defended the practice with extraordinary energy and gusto. 
The continuity rule did not apply to quayside portworkers and NASDU observed its 
own continuity practices. In London, the rule did not apply to tally clerks, lightermen, 
to quayside deliveries or to the delivery of cargo over the side of a vessel. 131 Each 
riverside wharf had its own variation. 132 An identical practice operated in Liverpool, 
but seems to have been used more in London, since Liverpool interviewees rarely 
mentioned it without first being prompted, and continuity in Liverpool does not 
feature in the literature. 
From 1944, the continuity rule was entered into joint agreements, seeking for 
employers to guarantee uninterrupted production, as it sought to remove the advantage 
that elite gangs ordinarily had in terms of the better-paying hatches on vessels. 
Employers gained by having a steady supply of labour working their vessels, a 
valuable service not lost on them. 133 
`Continuity' rules created malpractices when gang members or employers felt short- 
changed by their provisions. Attracted by a better paying cargo on another berthed 
vessel, individual gang members might `break' continuity for their own convenience, 
for instance by going off sick and thereby risking a fine or other sanctions. Such 
seems to have been a malpractice identified, for example, on Canary Wharf among 
some of the non-PLA men. 134 Employers might bend the system in trying to keep 
their `better' gangs together, even paying them for time they did not work so that they 
would be available a little down the line, termed 'hoarding. ' 135 
131 Interview with LONT, 15.6.99 
132 Telephonic interview with LONC, 17.11.00 
133 Interview with LONS, 8.7.99. 
134 Interview with LONG, 21.10.99 
135 Interview with LONP, 7.7.99; telephonic interview with LONP, 20.11.00; MID: Minutes 
of Meeting of the Ocean Shipowners' Group Joint Committee, 14.1.60; Parliament, 
Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord Devlin into Certain Matters Concerning the 
Port Transport Industry, Final Report, p. 15; Turnbull, P. and Sapsford, P., `A Sea of 
Discontent: The Tides of Organized and `Unorganized' Conflict on the Docks' Sociology, vol. 
26 no. 2,1992, p. 306 
211 
Formalised continuity provisions furnished protection, in theory if not always practice, 
against `queue jumping' in the hiring process and were an undoubted improvement on 
the New York situation, where no such rule existed. Against this were the divisions it 
caused between men and employers who indulged in continuity related malpractices 
and those who refused. 
`Job and Finish' arrangements 
As in Liverpool, shipowners paid bonuses for more rapid servicing, or to avert 
deliberately slow working. `Very frequently, ' the London shipowners dock labour 
committee explained, `when a shipowner was in a hurry for his ship on the last day of 
her loading or discharging programme, a job and finish offer was a most useful 
incentive. ' 136 Nevertheless, job and finish could be activated at any time a vessel was 
docked. 137 
The existence of this type of payment was long recognised and accepted and as in 
Liverpool was not explicitly proscribed in joint agreements, according to 
interviewees. 138 But threats to stop work or similarly disrupt the free movement of 
cargoes, these being against port rules, were evident in conditioning employers' 
willingness to acquiesce. 
Material rewards furnished by employers for quick service could take a variety of 
forms. It might imply time off on pay (commonly applied) and could amount to only 
working three days for five days' earnings. Guaranteed Sunday working was another 
return that could be made available. 139 Job and finish could be paid to single hatch 
gangs or to all the gangs working a vessel. 
Most London employers were involved at one time or other in the practice, in the last 
analysis it shaving perhaps a day off time a vessel spent in dock (and if performed on 
136 MID: LEDEA Box 26: Minutes of a Special Meeting of the London Shipowners' Dock 
Labour Committee, 27.3.52. 
137 Telephonic interview with LONC, 17.11.01 
138 Identically functioning `plus' money was noted on the late nineteenth century London 
docks (Schweitzer and Wegner, On the River, p, 136). In Glasgow, `job and finish' was 
termed `job and knock' (email from W. Kenefick, 29.10.98). 
139 Interviews with LONN, 19.8.99, LONS 8.7.99; telephonic interview with LONU, 17.11.01 
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a Friday, maybe a whole weekend). 14° `Job and finish' payments were also the 
clearest demonstration of dockworkers' control over the work process after 
engagement. Job and finish practices equally illustrated working practices that while 
not criminal or even unconstitutional, depended on similar factors associated with 
malpractices. 
`Short night' payments 
Night-time dockwork largely involved the continuation of work by day gangs into 
overtime, since there were (until the 1970s) few dedicated night gangs in either 
Liverpool, London or, indeed, in New York. '4' Outgoings for employers described as 
`short night' were those, as in Liverpool, in which the ship gang worked up to perhaps 
midnight, but were paid to 8am the following morning, in accordance with 
agreements. '42 
In spite of their `legality', they were clearly open to abuse. As in New York, gangs 
staying on were guaranteed by agreement and contract a certain monetary sum 
whether worked or not, in compensation for the personal inconvenience the practice 
caused, and because short night working dockworkers might not be able to report for 
work at the first call-on of the next day. 
Short-night practices were lucrative and there was no shortage of volunteers to work 
them. One tactic deployed by dockworkers to secure a short night payment was the 
deliberate going slow of the work rate during normal hours. '43 It was also alleged that 
gangs would refuse to work short nights unless guaranteed sums `greatly above the 
140 Telephonic interview with LONG, 23.4.01 
141 The normal workday in Liverpool and London was from 8am to Spm (to noon on 
Saturdays) (MID: PLEC Box 7: The Ocean Shipowners' Group Joint Committee `Piecework 
Conditions operating On and After Monday, 2°d July, 1928'; Lynton and King, Research in 
the London Docks, p. 17). 
142 Interview with LONG, 21.10.99; MID: `Agreement Concluded by The Enclosed Docks 
Employers (LOTEA and PLA) with the Transport and General Workers' Union and the 
National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers' (9.6.67); Lynton, and King, Research in the 
London Docks, p. 17 
143 MID: LWA Box 304 `The Port Employers in London' appendix 7. 
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agreed overtime increment. " Employers also complained of a shortage of 
permanent night and evening working gangs to solve the difficulty, looking back with 
affection to the era before 1939 when labour was more plentiful, and pliable and 
before `restrictive' practices such as the ending of night-working gangs fully took 
hold. The TGWU retorted to this that the poor wages of that era forced the men to 
work on weekends and nights, but that the post-war boom had made this 
unnecessary. 145 
Specific arrangements for short night working might vary. In NASDU, the custom 
was that men working long nights had to take the next day off. TGWU men were only 
allowed to work two short nights in a row if the ship was due to sail. On the wharves, 
the practice was to pay short nights on the final night the ship was in port. 146 
Although an expensive option for the employer, short night gangs were sometimes 
useful, in that they guaranteed that the right gangs were `on tap' late into the day in 
case of an unforeseen emergency. `Long nights' - where ship labour could actually 
work the full number of hours it contracted for - were unpopular for obvious reasons 
and less so attracted volunteers. 
BRANCH IRREGULARITIES 
Branch affairs in London indicated the loose nature of union controls at local level. 
Central union headquarter oversight of branch practices was never strong, matching 
the situations in Liverpool and New York. Although most published criticisms of 
Dockers' Union branch malpractices centre on the earliest period, enough is known to 
suggest that an institutional problem remained into the 1970s. 
Commentating upon the origins of London waterfront unionism, Matthews argued that 
`the new unions were a shambles, with records badly or not kept at all ... ' and with 
144 MID: LWA Box 304: The Port Employers in London, Submission to the Committee of 
Inquiry into the Docks Dispute under the Chairmanship of Lord Devlin (n. d. ). 
145 MID: LPEA Box 136: Ministry of Transport Working Party on Shipping Turnaround in 
British Ports `Port of London Interim Report by Visiting Team' (10.11.47) 
146 Interviews with LONL, 26.7.99 LONM, 5.10.99, LONU, 24.11.01; MID: Minutes of 
Meeting of the London Agreement Joint Committee, 6.12.35 
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financial probity `not a strong point. '147 Evidence of the union's high administrative 
costs was made public in 1895, when expenses drawn from Dockers' Union accounts 
were admitted to have exceeded income. 148 It was also reputed that Ben Tillett, 
president of the Dockers' Union, was `hopelessly overloaded' with his duties and 
delegated much routine work to others. 149 The bulk of branch funds were kept for 
branch use, generating suspicion of misappropriations! " 
By 1920, the situation was alarming, as Executive Council members complained of `a 
good deal of leakage' in union finances and of the cursory and slipshod nature of 
branch audits. Many Dockers' Union branch accounts were never properly 
scrutinised, branch officials in charge of finances being appointed `because of their 
strength' rather than due to their expertise at sparsely attended meetings, while the job 
of branch auditor or branch secretary was unattractive to most union members. The 
Executive had gone into branches `on more than one occasion' when a branch audit 
was disputed. In 1919, one branch audit was rejected; those participating in the 
irregularities were prevented from taking any office in the branch for a year. 151 
The few surviving branch records also show the extent of poor branch attendance in 
London, no doubt strongly affecting the problem of bad practices inside branches, 
since it was left by and large for a small group of unsupervised officials to oversee 
practices and standards. In July 1920 it was reported that in the Tower Bridge 
(London) Branch of the union only thirty members were present at a meeting; in April 
1921 it was noted that `no more than 20 can be called active members. ' On 3 May 
1921 an uninterested membership was again noticed; and in May 1922, just one 
147 Matthews, D., '1889 and All That', International Review of Social History, vol. XXXVI, 
25-58 
' Matthews, D., '1889 and All That', p. 32; The Morning Post (London) 28.3.1895 
149 Lovell, Stevedores and Dockers, p. 116. For the structure of the union, consult: LSE 
Archive, Booth collection, B140 pp. 14; Schneer, Ben Tillett, p. 47 
150 The 1890 report of the Dockers' Union dealt with the `unsatisfactory state' of London 
branch accounts and voiced a doubt that all monies were being forwarded to area headquarters 
(DWRGWU 1980 Annual Report, pp. 13-15) 
151 MRC: MSS. 126/DWR/4/3/2: `Minutes of the Triennial Delegate Meeting' of the 
DWRGWU, 18-22 May 1920, pp. 79-84 
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nomination was put down for representative to the Area Trade Group Committee in 
the TGWU. 152 Other TGWU branch malpractices were covered in chapter two. 
PILFERAGE AND GAMBLING 
Largely away from the eyes of union officials, rank and file dockworkers invented 
their own means of supplementing the basic wage and of keeping themselves busy 
during quiet periods. Like that in Liverpool and New York, pilferage on the London 
153 waterfront was always a substantial problem. 
During the immediate post-1918 years, theft cases reached serious proportions, in 
once case drawing in three docks policemen. 154 H. M. Customs prosecuted the entire 
crews of two lighters in 1925 for smuggling fifty-two bottles of whiskey. lss Over the 
course of the 1930s, thefts persisted. 156 As one interviewee remarked, `I wouldn't say 
(pilferage) was bad, but it was bad enough. '157 
Highly organised meat theft was a particular problem to London during the 1960s. 
Unlike most types of pilferage, which were for personal consumption on a dock estate, 
this involved overseas meat unloaded at the Royal Group of docks being imported to 
receivers outside the docks - `It wasn't pilferage, it was wholesale theft. ' 158 A 
quayside tally clerk would team up with a corrupt truck driver and local butcher to 
take meat carcasses from the docks undetected and then to distribute it. '59 
Local newspapers and dock labour board records would periodically report pilferage 
cases detected. 160 But statistics grossly under-stated the true magnitude of the 
152 MRC: MSS. 126/DWR/4/3/2 `Minutes of the Triennial Delegate Meeting' of the 
DWRGWU, May 1920, pp. 79-84 
'53 Cf. Morton, J., East End Gangland (Little, Brown and Co. 2000) pp. 239-40. 
154 Bates, L. M., The Spirit of London's River (Gresham Books, 1980) p. xii; Smithies, E., The 
Black Economy in England Since 1914 (Gill and Macmillan, 1984) p. 45 
155 PLA Minutes of Proceedings, 17.12.25 
156 MOL: 85/368: E. W. Robinson. 
'57 Interview with LONU, 26.7.99 
iss Undon interview with LONS, 8.7.99 
159 Interviews with LONB, 17.6.99, LONH, 30.6.99, LONI, 26.5.99; Times, 9.11.65 
160 PRO: BK 1/245, BK 1/246, BK 1/247, BK 1/248, BK 1/249, BK 2/1099; Surrey Times, 
1.9.51; East End News, 21.4.61 
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problem. Heavy-handed police presence on the docks could trigger a walkout, as in 
1946,1953 and 1960.161 
Local community reaction to those accused of pilfering in London was likely to be 
sympathetic. Because the relatives of dockers were said to sit on local juries, low 
conviction rates were blamed on this. 162 Violence often attributed to the New York 
docks situation was very largely absent in London, but `professional teams' were 
reported by one source as setting up stall outside the docks estates for a short 
period. 163 
Gambling activities were, in the word of one participant, `to pass the time of day. '1M 
Akin to Liverpool, most was carried out at break periods or between work episodes in 
canteens. In 1955, one official report claimed that professional gambling was being 
conducted inside the Royal Docks hiring centres. 165 There were bookmakers' agents 
active on the docks, but the sums involved were small. 
GOVERNMENT ATtENTION 
The earliest links between the London waterside and political processes were 
dominated by capital. After 1908, obvious political involvement by port employers 
decreased and the initiative thereafter lay firmly with the Dockers' Union. From 
roughly 1915, central state policy rapidly assumed priority over local government 
initiatives, paralleling developments in Liverpool. Evidence of political interventions 
is more profuse for London than is the case for Liverpool. 
161 MID: LEDEA Box 200 `Report of Stoppage of Work' (August 1946); Evening Standard 
26.10.60, Times 11.4.53. They were over, respectively, police searches when the men were at 
lunch, police questioning related to the theft of canned meat and problems over the `frisking' 
of men during a search. 
162 MOL: DK/87/27/1/A: Glyn Hardwicke. Hardwicke was the PLA prosecuting solicitor in 
the 1960s. 
163 Interviews with LONE, 25.5.99, LONM, 20.8.99 
164 Interview with LONC, 255.99. 
165 PRO: BK 2/89 `Gambling - London' 8.11.55 
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Private docks companies and the PLA 
New York's answer to the question of integration of waterfront services was a 
politically responsible `Docks Board. ' Despite its shortcomings, the Docks Board 
system did lay accountability squarely at the door of political figures, which could be 
removed for non-performance by the electorate. In London, private sector influence 
in the administration of the port was predominant. Fears over `inefficiencies' and the 
social disturbance that a `politicisation' of docks operations would bring were a 
perennial concern. This explained why organized labour was given so little real 
influence on the Port of London Authority (PLA) Board. 166 
The `undemocratic' form of the PLA Board as it was eventually constituted was 
attacked by the Dockers' Union and then the TGWU, but it never changed. 167 
Campaigns were stymied by the argument that any labour representation on the Board, 
no matter how small, was an advance. 
Yet, nineteenth century enclosed dock enterprises were long involved in political 
activity. Through ownerships linking them to the wider capitalist economy, the 
interests of investors and directors were safeguarded. City of London financiers, 
aldermen and councillors and riverside constituency Members of Parliament were 
scattered through the old docks systems as investors or directors. 168 Despite being 
riven with internal conflicts of interest, 169 they formed, as a collective trend, a 
`conservative' bloc with which to take on emergent dock unions and to fight for lower 
municipal taxes affecting dock earnings. 
166 PLA Archives scrapbooks reflect this worry. They included accounts of the Fitzroy Docks 
in New South Wales, Australia, where misbehaviour was connected in 1903 to skulduggery 
between the local union and politicians (e. g. Daily Telegraph (Australia) 9.7.03). Even 
supposedly `progressive' dock operators such as Sydney Holland labelled plans to raise the 
profile of municipal interests on the PLA Board `a wastrel programme' (Daily Telegraph, 
13.11.07). 
167 One such effort was made in 1924 to alter the Board's makeup (PRO: MT 48/82: minute 
sheet, interview with Tillett on 1.5.24; The Dock and HarbourAuthority, July 1924). 
168 Names and positions are given in Page, R., The Dock Companies of London 1796-1864 
(University of Sheffield M. A. 1959) p. 128; Clarke, E. T., Bermondsey: Its Historic 
Memories and Associations (Elliot Stock 1903) p. 251; Ellis, A., Three Hundred Years on 
London River: The Hay's Wharf Story 1651-1951 (The Bodley Head 1952) pp. 89-90 
169 Halstead, K. A., The Economic Factors in the Development of Urban Fabric of London's 
Docklands 1796-1909 (City of London Polytechnic Ph. D. 1982), pp. 36-7 
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Concern by docks executives over local taxation levels came out in 1908 when it was 
revealed that docks companies gave a total of £221 to the London Municipal Society, 
in furtherance of its objective, as major ratepayers in such areas as Wapping and 
Bermondsey, of `economy in local administration. ' Joseph Broodbank, the chief 
executive of the London and India Dock Company, took a direct role in the process as 
president of the Municipal Alliance, a local formation of anti-socialists 170 
The port management and supervision structure erected after 1908, however, was not 
one calculated to permit the exposure in public wrongdoing or irregularity in the 
manner in which the port was run. A predecessor of the PLA, the Thames 
Conservancy Board, tasked with regulating the river's facilities, came in for sharp 
censure in 1863 when a Parliamentary report labelled it secretive, not properly 
answerable to Parliament, and its accounts open to criticism. Board members (from 
the City of London) were laxly re-elected and one had an interest in a wharf he was 
partly charged with regulating. 
The report authors found that no action was taken against an obstructive pier since the 
owner, a former Lord Mayor, sat on the Conservancy Board. Contract awarding was 
also loosely controlled. 171 Independently from this, apparently isolated cases of 
corruption were also uncovered in the enclosed docks management regime. 172 
PLA administrative arrangements were a creature of state development of the age with 
all the limitations this implied, as demonstrated in a predecessor infrastructure 
endeavour, the Metropolitan Board of Works that collapsed amid tales of scandal. 173 
170 Marriott, J., The Culture of Labourism, p. 54; Daily Chronicle, 22.10.09; Stratford 
Express, 29.4.08; Hansard, 18.4.07 
171 Details are found in: Parliament, House of Commons Paper 454 Select Committee on the 
Thames Conservancy, Report... Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of 
Evidence, Appendix, and Index ordered to be printed 16 July 1863. 
172 The head of the Engineers' Department at the West and East India Docks and his son, in 
the 1850s, were sacked for overcharging for work to the value of over £12,000 (Porter, S. 
(ed. ), Survey of London Volume XLIII: Poplar, Blackwell and the Isle of Dogs (The Athlone 
Press 1994) p. 260 
173 A model was that of the MDHB and also the Metropolitan Board of Works (MBW), a huge 
public works organisation of the latter nineteenth century. Political divisions inside the MBW 
were discouraged and for most purposes, the organisation was self-governing. Its downfall 
came when serious cases of corruption came to light, largely through the efforts of the press 
(for more, consult Clifton, G. C., Professionalism, Patronage and Public Service in Victorian 
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Thus PLA malpractices were handled internally. Because of this, a complete analysis 
of its performance in this area is impossible to make. But glimpses of the problems 
caused came to light. The PLA's design co-opted all major waterfront elements into 
its deliberations. Whatever its merits of this, critics pointed out that it helped ward off 
attacks even before they began, since if mistakes were made, all PLA Board members 
were as `guilty' as one another and would not be anxious to make them public. 174 
Adding to the difficulties of the PLA was that most private dock company staff 
transferred straight across to the Authority, apparently bringing with them a loose 
attitude towards conflicts of interest and gift-acceptance. Viscount Devonport, the 
PLA chairman in its formative years, Consequently instituted a stricter regime from 
the start. The practice of stewards of the Natal Line giving tins of milk and sugar to 
PLA employees was forbidden, for instance, and an Atlantic Transport Line foreman 
was sacked for giving a Authority policeman pony fodder. A tradition of firms doing 
business in the docks giving Christmas presents to dock employees was prohibited. 175 
Devonport, in his autobiography, wrote of one episode (for which no supporting 
documentation has survived) in which the PLA's General Manager corruptly colluded 
with the Chairman of the Staff Committee in appointing and promoting employees 
during 1913. The former had come direct from the Thames Conservancy 
organisation, where malpractices were perhaps more common. Although the case 
against him was proven, in November 1914, the head of the Staff Committee was 
allowed to quietly retire with a £2,000 annual pension. No further action was taken. 176 
Reports to Parliament on the PLA's activities were vague in important details and the 
relevant Minister's approval for PLA strategy was usually only a formality. In 
London (The Athlone Press 1992); Owen, D., The Government of Victorian London, 1885- 
1889 (The Belnap Press 1982)) 
174 The arguments are ventilated in: Sayre and Kaufman, Governing New York City: Politics in 
the Metropolis, pp. 320-40 
175 MID archives - uncatalogued materials. 176 Devonport, The Travelled Road, pp. 161-3. The `general manager' concerned was 
probably Robert Philipson, who had worked at the Thames Conservancy since 1899, 
becoming its Secretary and known as a shrewd operator (The Municipal Journal 2.4.09). 
Philipson retired on medical grounds in November 1913 (Times 21.11.13, MID: PLA Minutes 
of Proceedings 1913-14, p. 231). Charles F. Leach was Chairman of the PLA Staff 
Committee over the relevant period (The PLA Monthly, March 1943). 
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essence, the PLA was self-determining in spite of a technical Parliamentary oversight 
function. Successive governments nodded through for instance questions of port 
charges and capital expenditure on the London docks. 177 Following the rationalisation 
of dock labour from the late 1960s, however, government interest heightened as the 
pressure for the PLA to take on surplus dock labour grew apace with the closure of 
docks and wharves. 
Comparative secrecy in operation was a hallmark of the London, as indeed the 
Liverpool, approach to port administration. Whether their structures were either more, 
or less, `corrupt' than their counterpart in New York was an open question, since cases 
coming to public notice were a poor guide to the underlying reality. 
London Dockers' Union 
London as a whole was not a union stronghold. Within it, however, were deep 
concentrations of unionised labour, including on the docks, tending to vote for Labour 
Party candidates. `Politically, ' as Gillespie argued, `the dockers provided the Labour 
Parties of each riverside borough with their most solid phalanx of support and most 
active members. ' 178 
Steady advances in dock labour representation were made from the 1889 strike. The 
experience of the stoppage, and similar ones such as that in Hull in 1893, stimulated 
the search for political alliances because of the established political parties' nugatory 
assistance when help was needed. Historians considered Dockers' Union weight 
important in the formation of the Labour Party in Britain. 179 
Shipping Federation counter-offensives against his union `sharpened the class 
consciousness' of Tillett to the need for political involvement if his organisation was 
177 Robson, W. A., The Government and Misgovernment of London (George Allen and Unwin 
1939) pp. 366-9; MRC: MSS. 126/TG/3/Sack 29/166/d: `Facts About the Port of London 
Authority. ' 
178 Gillespie, Economic and Political Change in the East End of London, p. 156. 
179 The 1889 strike occurred with great fanfare, in the centre of the nation and it therefore 
received massive and perhaps disproportionate attention. In the course of the strike, the TUC 
refused to substantially help the strikers and appeals to Liberal Party politicians fell on deaf 
ears. 
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to advance. 180 In 1890, for example, he urged his members to become involved in 
municipal politics, or to endorse candidates espousing a labour platform. Almost all 
Union branches shortly became affiliated to the London Trades Council, which 
became more radical and shortly thereafter set up its own political fund. 181 First on 
the London County Council, the Dockers' Union won electoral successes at the 
municipal level. 182 
From 1892, the Union executive was looking at the possibility of independent political 
activity. 183 Tillett successfully moved a resolution at the TUC Congress calling for 
the creation of a fund to help Labour candidates in elections, and was at the founding 
of the Independent Labour Party two years later. Tillett latterly became the Member 
of Parliament for Salford North and served between 1921-9 on the TUC General 
Council. '84 
On the eve of the First World War, dockworkers were the largest group of workers in 
West Ham and Poplar and the second largest in East Ham and in Stepney, giving them 
immense political power, especially when later part of the TGWU. 185 The Dockers' 
Union was more directly involved in Bermondsey council affairs, and by 1934, 
Bermondsey was `100 per cent Labour. '186 With a single exception, all South London 
Parliamentary seats were by then in Labour hands, as were the councils in the area. 187 
In Poplar and Stepney, Labour's overall or near complete control was achieved 
throughout the 1930s and into the 1950s. 188 
iso Schneer, J., Ben Tillett's Conversion to Independent Labour Politics', Radical History 
Review, vol. 24,1980, pp. 42-65. 
'81 Thompson, Socialists, Liberals and Labour, p. 102. 
182 Thompson, Socialists, Liberals and Labour, p. 103. 
183 MRC: MSS. 126/DWR/4/1/1-4: Third Annual Congress of the Dockers' Union (Sept. 
1892) pp. 36-7. 
184 Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 1,1972, p. 180. 
185 Gillespie, Economic and Political Change in the East End of London, p. 169. The large 
size of the dock labour force in the wards of Poplar, Stepney and Bethnal Green was 
illustrated by 1921 statistics, those varying from 17.4 per cent to 24.1 per cent of the total 
male workforce in these boroughs (Adams, `Labour and the first World War, ' p. 35). 
186 Goss, S., Local Labour and Local Government (Edinburgh University Press 1988) p. 19 
187 Goss, Local Labour and Local Government, p. 19. 
188 London Borough of Newham, West Ham 1886-1986 (The Plaistow Press, 1986), East 
London Advertiser, 7.11.31,6.11.37; 15.5.53,15.5.59, Stratford Express, 18.5.51. Poplar 
covered the Millwall Docks and the East and West India Dock, West Ham included the Royal 
Victoria and Albert and King George V docks system. 
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Docks were hard hit by unemployment, more so after 1921, and public relief policies 
were of major interest to keep idle dockworkers busy. 189 Unlike neighbouring areas, 
Labour-run municipalities observed a minimum wage and `unofficial strikers were 
afforded relatively sympathetic treatment at the hands of relief agencies in the 1923 
stoppage, notably in Poplar, Stepney, West Ham and Bermondsey. "90 Aside from 
relieving distress, these policies acted as counter-cyclical influences when dockside 
trade was on a downturn. 191 
Local councillors attended dock union branches, and personalities such as Bob 
Mellish, the post-1945 Labour Member of Parliament for Bermondsey, were 
dockworkers themselves once. 192 The NASD was not nearly as involved in political 
activity as the TGWU, although Peter Shea, sitting on the NASDU executive, was a 
1930s Poplar councillor. 193 
Taken together, Dockers' Union links to the political machinery were strong. Serving 
to prop up decasualisation and other schemes, they helped to establish a consensus on 
what the `correct' role of government on the London docks was and should be. 
In view of the practical and ideological difficulties in `attacking' malpractices outside 
of hiring outcomes, unions were not enthusiastic participants in the engagement 
projects. Nor did they invite government probes into this sphere. Such attitudes left 
the problem of malpractices for the most part for joint committees to define, to 
address and to resolve. 
189 In Bermondsey, for instance, in 1932 the `official' unemployment rate was put at 17.8 per 
cent (Turner, J. E., Labour's Doorstep Politics in London (Macmillan, 1978) p. 87). 
190 Gillespie, Economic and Political Change in the East End of London, p. 167; Branson, N., 
Poplarism 1919-25: George Lansbury and the Councillors' Revolt (Lawrence and Wishart 
1979) pp. 188-9; Topham, T., The Unofficial National Docks Strike of 1923: The Transport 
and General Workers' Union's First Crisis', Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, no. 2 
1996, p. 52. 
191 Gillespie, Economic and Political Change in the East End of London, pp. 75-7 
192 Interview with LONM, 20.8.99 LONG, the product of a long line of London dockworkers, 
told of a couple of his relatives being elected as councillors pre-1914 (interview, 21.10.99). 
193 East London Advertiser, 10.11.34 
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CONCLUSION 
In common with Liverpool were prolonged difficulties facing the primary trade union 
in winning recognition across the docks systems, stemming from which more 
collaborative polices emerged, with consequent cries of collaborationism. Inside a 
tangled and delicately balanced situation, neither unions nor governments had the 
stomach for a fight with dockworkers over on-site conduct. 
Institutional `loopholes' in the way business was historically conducted led to, as in 
Liverpool, malpractices, giving employers every reason to proffer illegal expenditures, 
or for waterfront labourers to expect them, in order to sidestep the impediments they 
caused or threatened to do so. As the former Director of Planning at the PLA candidly 
observed, shipowners `always preferred to pay rather than to face a stoppage. ' 194 
Establishment of the weekly time wage system on the enclosed docks did not herald 
the complete end of malpractices, when `time and tide' meant, as before, so much. 195 
Special to London were its huge diversity of local practice and the effects of piece 
working in moving malpractices in a particular direction. Localism took more of a 
centre stage than in Liverpool, and contrasted with the standardising versions of port 
relations characterising many of the British texts identified in chapter two. The 
Leggett Report, for instance, emphasised the `general' problem in London or ship 
malpractices but which failed to do justice to variations from the `norm. ' 
Pieceworking legitimated all manner of malpractice. Piecework negotiations in 
London could be similar in appearance to those not intimately involved in them 
whether they infringed agreements or not. Agreements allowed for many additions to 
basic rates, leading to extreme complexity and finely attuned judgements. 
In this context, the unambiguous identification of `illegal' earnings was difficult. 
Liverpool's `flatter' earnings distribution pattern had fewer openings to exploit for 
illegal ends without becoming noticeable and arousing suspicion and where `on site' 
'94 MOL: DK/88/52/1/A: Noel Ordman 
195 A group of employers would carry on with the malpractice of paying gangs for a swift 
service (telephonic interview with LONU, 24.11.01; interview with LONA, 30.6.99) 
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negotiations were less complex in form or outcome. Deviations from the norm were 
more difficult to defend, if spotted, in Liverpool. 
Because a sizeable portion of London dockworkers were engaged on a 'semi- 
permanent' or on a `permanent' basis, the continuation of malpractices directed at 
shipowners owed more to the fact of systemic `opportunity structures' to make up 
earnings than it did to notions of `entitlement. ' The `legitimacy' of most London 
abuses ultimately relied on outdated delivery systems and material obstacles to the 
efficient turnabout of boats. In their origins, the malpractices in the majority of cases 
thereby conform to the concepts denoted in the 1989 New York Report, above all in 
the local industry's `susceptibility' to malpractices through its sometimes misfiring 
economic and bargaining systems. 
Chapter seven continues the exploration of `criminality' in port relations, but in a 
heightened setting where ideas of, and sensibilities over, dock relations were heavily 
coloured by perceptions of malpractice. The site chosen is the Port of New York, 
where the worst forms of waterfront crime were reported. 
Because the literature on malpractices in New York is so extensive, and theoretical 
models depend so much on evidence uncovered in the port, allegations of criminality 
within the New York waterfront is dealt with in more length than malpractices in 
Liverpool and London. Chapter seven is therefore longer than other chapters of this 
thesis. Where possible, and as with the rest of the thesis, original sources are utilised 
in formulating arguments and in making judgements. 
225 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
NEW YORK: MALPRACTICES, MAFIA and MYTHS 
INTRODUCTION 
London supplied an example of a wide range of work practices and malpractices 
based on a generally drawn contrast between wharf and docks facilities, though with 
overlaps. Due to its size, local practices were of greater importance than those in 
Liverpool, where (from the 1940s at least) variation was smaller. New York's 
situation even more varied than that in London because of, for instance, its ethnic 
mixture and the lack of a central `focus' to docking activity, such as the enclosed 
docks in London. 
New York's public status could not be more different than those of Liverpool or 
London. An image of embedded criminality in the port has persisted, made explicit 
from the 1940s in every major study by American sources and again in recent 
academic works. ' The few inter-country studies made have been marred by biases in 
their reporting of New York. Davis, for example, utilised State Crime Commission 
evidence to sketch a portrait of the docks that conformed to that painted by the 
Commission itself. 2 
Theory 
Much material exists in the form of published and unpublished works to make 
balanced judgements are to the `legitimacy' of malpractices in Liverpool and London. 
1 Johnson, LC., `Criminality on the Docks'. in Davies, S., Dock Workers (Ashgate 2000), pp. 
721-745; Mello, W., Pete Panto: Rank and File Radical on the Brooklyn Waterfront (New 
School of Social Research, October 1997); Mello, W., The Origins of the Rank and File 
Reform Movement on the New York Waterfront 1945-1948 (New School of Social Research, 
Spring 1999); Woodiwiss, M., Organized Crime and American Power: A History (University 
of Toronto Press, 2001). 
2 `Thus the shape-up was, ' Davis asserted, `for the most part a sham' since giving bribes to get 
work was `standard practice. ' (Davis, _J., ` Formation and Reproduction of Dockers as an 
Occupational Group, ' in Davies, S et al (eds. ), Dock Workers: International Explorations in 
Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970 (Ashgate Publishing, 2000) p. 551) 
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In New York's case, however, the principle sources of information are more obviously 
value-laden and came from an explicitly `reform' direction. `Alternative' perspectives, 
from the viewpoint of dockworkers, were absent, and no published materials from 
rank and file longshoremen in New York, for example, exist. Neither were there any 
archival materials that could challenge the received wisdom. Davis' article is one of 
the very few, for example, on `grassroots' perceptions of pilferage but no comparable 
accounts exist for other malpractices in the port. Interviewees, no doubt because of 
the continuing tight policing of the port, were reluctant to discus the `legitimacy' of 
malpractices they were once engaged in during the field research. 
As a preliminary observation, and in the absence of other data, the likelihood was that 
malpractices before the early 1950s achieved the same levels of legitimacy as those in 
Liverpool and London, sharply fragmenting after 1953 with the creation of a new and 
aggressive policing agency to suppress malpractices. In the process, opportunities to 
exploit structural weaknesses became dangerous to enact, although in New Jersey a 
serious problem over pilferage carried over across the epochs, 4 as did irregularities 
related to queuing road transport drivers. The latter was given a veneer of 
`respectability' since, like similar malpractices, they were hard to detect and involved 
relatively small sums being passed over. 
Nor were malpractices the central reality for most longshore workers. The majority 
experience in New York was not one of racketeering and corruption and the sole 
union in the port, the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA), was not as 
rackets-ridden as its many detractors suggested. This chapter primarily focuses, 
therefore, on shortcomings in the published evidence rather than presenting a mass of 
newly discovered materials. A politicised re-defining and labelling process emerged, 
shaping the evidence given to the public and to scholars, as detailed in chapter two. 
' Davis, C. J., `Working with the Hook: A Comparative Study of London and New York 
Dockworkers, 1945-1955', The London Journal, vol. 25 pt. 2,2000, pp. 79-95. 
4 Interview with NYE, 12.4.00 
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THE PORT OF NEW YORK 
Strategically located on the Atlantic Coast, New York port became the greatest single 
concentration of general cargo piers designed for deep-draft vessels anywhere, in its 
heyday handling perhaps twice as much traffic as all the other Atlantic ports 
combined s `Its channels, ' according to Sanderson and Porter, `are deep enough to 
accommodate the largest ships afloat. Tidal movements are moderate and the Port is 
relatively free from fog and ice. '6 By 1926, by value of trade, the port exceeded that 
of London. Particular sections of the port became known for specialising in certain 
commodities. The Chelsea area on the west side of Manhattan, for example, largely 
dealt in transatlantic passenger and cargo ships, while Brooklyn was recognised for its 
general cargo traffic. 8 
Although barges connected Manhattan and Brooklyn to the New Jersey shoreline, 
most commodities were moved in and out of the docks by road, a point of similarity 
with the other ports 9 With few railroad termini, long lines of roadside delivery 
vehicles waiting to be discharged were a persistent feature throughout this historylo 
The importance of road communications increased. " From 1898-1913, foreign 
commerce in the port rose by 131 per cent but wharf space by a mere 25 per cent. 12 
s Griffith, J. I., The Port of New York (Arco Publishing, 1959) p. 27. See, for statistics of 
imports and exports, Rush, T. E., The Port of New York (NY: Doubleday, Page and Co. 1920) 
pp. 125-31 
6 Sanderson and Porter `Study of the Port of New York' New York State Crime Commission, 
1953, p. 17 
7 Cunningham, B., Port Economics (Pitman, 1926) p. 123 
8 NYMA: James J. Walker, subject file 1926-32 Box 257, p. 3. Brooklyn alone, in 1922, 
moved through its piers 25 per cent of total American commerce (The Port of New York, April 
1922). 
9New York State Crime Commission, Record of the Public Hearings... on the 
Recommendations of the New York State Crime Commission for Remedying Conditions on the 
Waterfront of the Port of New York, New York, 8-9 June, 1953, p. 191. NYN, in interview, 
put the figure today at 90 per cent of all traffic coming into and out of the port as carried by 
road (11.4.00). 
'o Cunningham, B., Port Studies (Chapman and Hall, 1928) p. 11 
u `In recent years, ' noted Sanderson and Porter, `there has been an increasing trend in the 
amount and proportion of inbound and outbound pier freight handled by trucks' (Sanderson 
and Porter `Study of the Port of New York' New York State Crime Commission 1953, p. 19) 
12 Bunker, J. G., Harbor and Haven: An Illustrated History of the Port of New York (Windsor 
Publications, 1979) p. 216; MacNair, V., Chaplain on the Waterfront (Seabury Press, 1963) 
pp. 90-1. 
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Waterfront related `choke-points, ' leading to rationing and abuses of the type 
demonstrated in Liverpool and London, were in abundance. New York pier 
conditions were as early as the 1860s described as `disgraceful', being narrow and 
space for working was extremely limited. Cargo would be left `piled in the street in 
all sorts of weather, ' with passageways serving as impromptu `open warehouses. ' 
Streets adjacent to them were said to be in a state of `constant blockage' from the 
pressure of drays carrying goods backward and forward. 13 
Only `her magnificent harbor' could be relied on to give the port an advantage over 
rivals. 14 But delays were a major influence on the decision by major employers, in 
the 1960s, to move the bulk of water-borne commerce from Manhattan to New Jersey, 
where open, cheap land space was available and with fewer problematical connections 
to metropolitan markets. 
Road haulage payoffs 
By 1921, trucks could stand in line for up to thirty-six hours. 15 The inadequacy of 
approach roads leading to the piers in Manhattan, usually only fifty feet wide, made 
unrecorded payments - Johnson termed them `hurry-up' monies16 - to quayside gangs 
a necessity for many firms or owner-drivers if they wished to get serviced and away 
within a reasonable time. The problem was most acute for drivers who were classed 
as self-employed and who could not afford to wait out the time until their turn came to 
be serviced. Trucking companies usually gave their drivers the fifty dollars or so this 
bribe cost. 
I' NYT, 14.11.1866. See also `The Address of George F. Noyes, Esq., Counsel for the 
Citizens' Association Before the Committee of the Senate on the Subject of Wharves and 
Piers' (New York, 1866); `Reports of the New York Harbor Commission of 1856 and 1857' 
(New York, 1864); `Improvement of New York Harbor 1885 to 1891' (New York, 1893); 'A 
Day in the Docks, Scribner's Magazine, vol. 18,1879, pp. 32-47; MacElwee, R. S. and 
Taylor, T. R., Wharf Management, Stevedoring and Storage (D. Appleton, 1921) p. 103; 
Scientific American, 20.3.20; Collins, F. A., Our Harbors and Inland Waterways (The 
Century Co. 1924) p. 128 
14 1VYT, 22.11.1866 
is MacElwee and Taylor, Wharf Management, Stevedoring and Storage, pp. 282-5 
16 Johnson, M., Crime on the Labor Front (McGraw Hill 1950) p. 115 
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It is unknown when payoffs by lorry drivers for quick service started, but by 1947 the 
`modem' form of the racket was prominent, possibly a by-product of the heavy use 
made of the harbour in the immediate post-war years. 17 New York Waterfront 
Commission agents were alert to the problem and sporadically removed the 
registration papers of those labourers implicated. A determined effort was launched in 
1964 when the Commission subpoenaed trucking executives, after which major road 
hauliers announced that they had decided to stop paying the illegal tax. Checkers 
were often involved. At other times, dock bosses and pier guards took part. 18 
Within the new container terminals in New Jersey, as within those in Liverpool and 
London, roadside delays and the necessity to make kickbacks were less of a feature. 
A new quayside malpractice however emerged, in the form of improper outgoings by 
truck drivers to bypass bureaucratic hurdles. The question of the right documentation 
to be furnished by drivers, along with safety issues such as tyre defects, was at the 
fulcrum of scams in container bases. A side-payment would speed along the process 
and smooth over any difficulties 19 
EARLY UNION HISTORY 
To an extent unknown in Liverpool or London, the ILA was tarnished with 
accusations of criminality. Throughout its existence, it has been accused of virtually 
every type of criminal and moral offence, heavily informing theoretical models. 
Supposedly strong and enduring ties between the union hierarchy and racketeers were 
the most serious of the allegations made. Belaying this image were the huge 
difficulties in organising and mobilising New York longshore workers, which had a 
lasting impact on union leaders, encouraging caution in their dealings with capital and, 
17 NYT, 24.4.47 
18 Interview with NYH, 2.4.00; Waterfront Commission `Tenth Report 1963-1964' p. 9, 
`1975-1976 Annual Report' p. 8; NYT, 14.8.64,13.9.64; Axelrod, D., Government Covers the 
Waterfront: An Administrative Study of the Background Origin, Development, and 
Effectiveness of the Bistate Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 1953-1966 
(Syracuse University, D. P. A, 1967) pp. 347-8; Schulberg. B., The Waterfront Revisited', 
Saturday Evening Post, 1 September 1963; Hutchinson, J., The Imperfect Union: A History of 
Corruption in American Trade Unions, (E. P. Dutton, 1972) p. 351) 
" Email from C. Molino, February 2002 
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as shown in chapter three, generating complaints over this policy by the rank and file 
union membership. 
Perhaps the earliest recorded strike in the New York docks occurred in 1836, when the 
men were duly defeated and returned to work `under much the same conditions as 
when they struck. '20 Imported labour could be relied upon to destroy strikes as also 
occurred in 1874. After five weeks, the men returned empty-handed. 21 
The ill-fated 1887 stoppage exposed many of the weaknesses of docks unionism at 
this historical juncture. According to Kelley, fifteen different waterfront organisations 
were active between 1853 and 1900,22 but by 1887, the Knights of Labor, a trade 
confederation embracing all types of American waged labour, had recruited large 
numbers of New York waterfront workers. 
The 1887 dispute supposedly began over a minor issue - like the 1889 London 
stoppage - the exact cause being as unclear. Two stoppages, involving only a few 
hundred unionists, merged into one and were made `official' by the local Knights' 
leaders. But belated attempts at arbitration by the Knights failed, key workers refused 
to come out or were assuaged by employers, the strikes became disengaged and 
longshoremen working deep-sea vessels found themselves isolated. 
Upon the collapse of the strike, a previous preference apparently given to union men 
was withdrawn as a punishment . 
23 The strike's collapse signalled the end of port 
unionism until the 1890s. 4 In 1897, the International Federation of Ship, Dock, and 
20 Kelly, J. W., Labor Problems of Longshoremen in the United States (Boston University. 
Ph. D. 1941) p. 8 
21 NYT, 11.11.1874; Kelly, Labor Problems of Longshoremen, pp. 13-6 
22 Kelly, Labor Problems of Longshoremen, pp. 9-10; Walsh, N. G., The Effects of Labor 
Racketeering in the Marine Transportation Industry of New York Harbor (State University of 
New York Maritime College. M. Sc, 1982), p. 2. 
23 NYT, 29.7.1887. According to the New York Times, `Those corporations which give out that 
they will not re-engage any unionists ask every applicant foe reinstatement if he is a union 
man. He is rarely known to give an affirmative answer' (NYT, 16.2.1887). 
24 Secondary source accounts of the `Big Strike' of 1887 include those in Russell, M., Men 
Along the Shore: The ILA and Its History (Brussel and Brussel, 1966) pp. 31-41; Commons, J, 
et al, History of Labor in the United States (Macmillan, 1926) pp. 420-1; Squires, B. M., The 
Strike of the Longshoremen at the Port of New York', Monthly Labor Review, vol. 9 no. 6, pp. 
95-115; Barnes, C. B., The Longshoremen (Arno Press, 1977) pp. 101-9; Kelly, Labour 
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River Workers sent Edward McHugh, formerly allied with the NUDL in Merseyside, 
to organise the port, one reason being an experience of New York employers 
importing Scottish labour during an earlier strike. By 1898, McHugh had 15,000 men 
enrolled. 
Matching the advances already won on Merseyside, the chief aims of ALU were to 
raise wages, to improve safety standards, to limit the number of shape-up 
engagements and to achieve a minimum of four hours' employment once men were 
hired. The other objective was to gain preference at the hiring point for ALU 
members. An encouraging start was shattered when the union official in charge of 
collecting subscriptions absconded with its funds, causing the ALU to fold within a 
short period. 25 
Taking up part of the void was a revitalised Longshoremen's Union Protective Union 
(LUPA) organisation, which had lain semi-dormant since the 1860s. But an ill fated 
six-weeks strike in 1907 that belatedly drew in the union executive severely dented its 
authority and left the door open for the ILA's challenge. 26 
Union recognition 
Since the standard framework on industrial malpractices highlights the allegedly 
pernicious aspects of the union's monopoly control over the supply of waterfront 
labour, this is addressed from the viewpoint of New York. From its inception, the 
ILA sought, in common with the other port unions analysed in this thesis, enough 
Problems of Longshoremen, pp. 17-21. The official account of the strike is contained in 
volume nine of the 1887 New York State Assembly documents, no. 69 `Report of the Special 
Committee Appointed to Investigate the Cause of Exorbitant Prices Charged for Coal in the 
Cities of New York and Brooklyn, and also the Cause of Strikes Among Coal Heavers, 
Handlers or Longshoremen. ' 
u Barnes, The Longshoremen, pp. 110-2; New York Tribune, 25.5.1897,26.5.1897; NYT 
25.5.1897,27.5.1897; New York Evening Post, 285.1897). McHugh died in Birkenhead in 
1915 aged 62. 
26 For details of the 1907 stoppage, consult: Barnes, The Longshoremen, p. 80; Montgomery, 
D., The Fall of the House of Labor (Cambridge University Press, 1987) pp. 106-7; Fenton, E., 
Immigrants and Unions, a Case Study (Arno Press, 1975) p. 253; Russell, Men Along the 
Shore, pp. 55-57. The strike began when the men walked off in a wage row with employers. 
Vast numbers of non-unionists came out too. A secondary cause seems to have been the 
demand by Italian members of LUPA for better treatment in the matter of the appointment of 
an Italian-speaking business agent. 
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stability on which to mobilise and to grow. This fostered a number of associated 
problems. 
Winslow labels ILA president T. J. O'Connor 'opportunist, '27 and 1950s writers 
severely criticised Joseph P. Ryan, a successor as ILA President, on comparable 
grounds. Johnston argued, for instance, that `under his leadership the ILA has become 
the greatest longshore union in the country, but one which has never concerned itself 
unduly with the welfare of its members. '28 Contract negotiations were said to 
routinely exclude the rank and file from any consideration, and relationships in the 
industry were `shot through with deals and understandings. '29 Johnson in a 
representative statement argued that `the men say angrily that Ryan has sold them out 
again, accepting wage agreements and other contractual provisions without even 
bothering to consult them. 30 
Daniel Keefe formed the International Longshoremen's Association in Chicago in 
1877, but until the 1910s the base of operations was on the Great Lakes. 1 Taking all 
classes of waterfront labour unlike the segmented London union structure the basic 
administrative structure of the ILA remained the same and is reproduced in Appendix 
F. The first ILA Local in the port of New York, Local 791, opened in 1908.2 
" Winslow, C., 'On the Waterfront: Black, Italian, and Irish Longshoremen in the New York 
Harbor Strike of 1919', in Rule, J. and Malcolmson, R. (eds. ), Protest and Survival: Essays for 
E. P. Thompson (Merlin Press, 1993) pp. 355-393 
2' Johnson, M., Crime on the Labor Front (McGraw Hill. 1950) p. 152. Read also Larrowe, 
Shape-Up and Hiring Hall, p. 75; Kimeldorf, H., Reds or Rackets? The Making of Radical 
and Conservative Unions on the Waterfront (University of California Press 1988) pp. 14-15; 
Kimeldorf, H. and Regensburger, W., Insurgent Workers: Studies of the Origins of Industrial 
Unionism on the East and West Coast Docks and in the South During the 1930s (University of 
California Institute of Industrial Relations 1987) p. 8 
29 Carpenter, J. T., Employers' Associations and Collective Bargaining in New York City 
(Cornell University Press, 1950) p. 233; Jensen, V. H., Strife on the Waterfront: The Port of 
New York Since 1945 (Cornell University Press 1974), p. 18. 
30 Johnson, Crime on the Labor Front, p. 153. On the ILA's `collaboration' with employers 
also see Kimeldorf, Reds or Rackets? p. 15 
31 Hoffman, M. E., A Contemporary Analysis of a Labor Union: International 
Longshoremen's Association AFL-CIO-Canadian Labor Congress, Development-Structure- 
Functions (Temple University, 1966) p. 8. The name given the union was changed 
periodically, but from 1908 became the International Longshoremen's Association (see 
Barnes, The Longshoremen, pp. 121-2). For convenience, the title `ILA' is used throughout 
this thesis. 
32 ILA organisers had first come to New York in 1901, but returned to the union's Buffalo 
headquarters discouraged by the sour attitude of the rank and file towards unionism after the 
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With organisation building uppermost, union executives tended to turn a blind eye to a 
number of malpractices, a group of them indeed crossing the boundary line into 
criminality. In addition, the positive attitude of ILA leaders towards joint ventures 
with management did not sit well with its early radicalism, or with the position of 
some in the union. 
Like the NUDL and the London Dockers' Union, New York dock unions stressed to 
employers both the reliability and good work of their members. Union men often 
replaced imported `blackleg' labour after a dispute finished, on safety and efficiency 
bases, as seen on the North River oceanic trade in 1887 33 The large oceanic lines 
were at the forefront of unofficially recognising LUPA controls in the 1900s, as were 
the larger shipping lines in Liverpool (some such as Cunard were active in both ports) 
in acknowledging the authority of the NUDL. 
As the Cunard Line in New York recalled, `there is not a foreign steamship dock in 
New York where the work is not more or less controlled by the Union. ' LUPA was 
not recognised formally, but in view of the mischief that its members could make, 
pragmatism dictated that union members were given priority at piers where they had a 
good presence 34 
The ILA was especially susceptible to industrial fractures and making the union even 
more cautious than its counterparts in Britain whenever it interacted with its 
constituent elements. On the other hand, it was experienced in the administration of 
Great Lakes port relation. The union accepted many core demands of port managers, 
as did LUPA, while aware of the problems this posture could cause with the union 
membership. Its policy, in the Great Lakes, of allowing non-union labour to take the 
McHugh debacle. (MRC: MSS. 159/5/3/1184: ILA Annual Convention, 14-19 July 1902; 
MRC: MSS. 159/3/B/49: letter to the International Transport Workers' Federation of 2.12.09 
from the ILA - `We are starting a campaign in Greater New York and vicinity next week, 
with the object in view of lining up all longshoremen ... ' 33 Barnes, The Longshoremen, pp. 126-8. Following the 1887 strike, almost immediately 
employers were talking of quietly reinstating unionised strikers, since non-union hands were 
found to be less productive and could be dangerous to vessel stability. What had changed was 
a post-strike requirement that the men before being re-hired declare themselves free from 
union `shackles' (NYT, 7.1.1887,29.7.1887) 
m CA: D42/C1/64: letter of 23.7.12 from the Cunard Steamship Company to Alfred Booth. 
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place of ILA men who struck without authorisation was an illustration of how far the 
leadership was prepared to go in order to win acceptance with employers 35 
By the 1910s, the had ILA secured agreements with New York employers on the basis 
that union members would be industrious and sober, and as a standard clause in every 
contract, would not interrupt the workflow while a dispute was being adjudicated. 
The ILA promised to furnish competent men for `a reasonable scale of prices for the 
work' and employers would now be able to avoid `a doubtful pick-up crowd of saloon 
hangers-on, who are liable to hold them up for extra pay whenever there is chance. ' 36 
Strike action was carefully filtered37 and an early functioning shop stewards system 
operated to spread constitutional practices. 38 
In return, Keefe and his successors demanded formal recognition across the 
waterfront. In 1914-5, the ILA mounted a successful `takeover bid' for LUPA, 
thereafter becoming the major and later exclusive bargaining agency in the port and 
by this means putting more pressure on employers. The impetus for the merger was a 
realisation that the two unions were hampering each others' organising work, that the 
ILA was the only one with AFL affiliation (and thus could reach out to other unions 
35 Commons, Types of Labor Unions', pp. 59-85 
36 The Longshoreman, 2.7.1896 
37 As the ILA stated in 1896, shipowners would find it in their own interest to `deal with 
responsible, sober, intelligent men rather than with a contractor who hires the worst class of 
waterside bums and pays them in bad whisky' (The Longshoreman, 1896). MRC: MSS. 
159/5/311183: ILA `Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Convention' (1901) p. 62; WA: ILA 
1902 Proceedings, p. 11; MRC: MSS/159/5/3/1185: ILA 1903 Convention, p. 89; MRC: 
MSS. 159/5/3/1189: ILA `Address to 14`h Annual Convention by Daniel J. Keefe, President' 
(1905) p. 9; U. S. Congress, House, Reports of the Industrial Commission on Labor 
Organizations, Labor Disputes, and Arbitration, and on Railway Labor, 57th Congress, 1st 
Session, 1901, pp. 264-5; WA: ILA 1908 Proceedings, p. 18; WA: ILA 1917 Proceedings, p. 
24 
38 Although the port of New York had a long-standing shop steward tradition, without a 
foolproof system for ensuring that the designated shop steward was picked at the shape, but 
thereby giving the man concerned an unfair advantage over his mates in the shape-up, the 
system could become discredited. This problem was fudged for a time, but since most shop 
stewards were also long serving dockworkers, thereby usually being hired according to 
seniority custom, it solved itself in most cases. 
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for sustenance and endorsement) 39 and that employers were exploiting splits in the 
ranks of labour. LUPA was also heavily in debt 40 
This did not mean that the ILA (or even more so LUPA) represented the majority of 
dockworkers in New York. In 1914, only an estimated quarter of the men were 
unionised, and unionism was unevenly distributed 41 This marked a distinction from 
Liverpool and London during and after World War One. 
As labour became more organized, and in order to underline a profits boom when the 
Allies ordered military supplies through the port, the 1916 contract gave the ILA most 
of what it wanted in the way of preference in employment for its members and in 
negotiating rights. Not all employers however accepted ILA authority, with a group 
`actively discouraging' organization in the port. 42 It did mean, however, that the 
majority of employers were more ready than in the past to deal seriously with the 
union. 
By 1919, with state encouragement for waterfront unionism a force, the bulk of ILA 
membership was in New York. That year, about 22,000 ILA members struck against 
an award made by a wartime body, the National Adjustment Commission (NAC). 
The NAC could have provided the foundation for a `semi-corporatist' solution to 
industrial questions on the New York docks, as occurred in Britain during the 1920s, 
but the strike scuppered it by suggesting its ineffectiveness in times of crisis. With it 
went plans for greater regularity of employment through registration. 3 
39 This was also a criticism by the ILA of the ALU, another independent union (ILA 1899 
Convention Proceedings, pp. 6-7). 
40Barnes, The Longshoremen, pp. 106-8; U. S. Commission on Industrial Relations, Final 
Report, p. 2196; The Longshoreman, November 1913, May 1914. 
41 U. S. Commission on Industrial Relations, Final Report, p. 2124. The Longshoreman, April 
1916. 
42 The full text of the agreement is contained in: (New York City) Mayor's Committee on 
Unemployment, Report on Dock Employment in New York City and Recommendations for its 
Regularization, New York, October, 1916. 
43 For a month, shipping in the port was held up over an NAC award. The ILA blamed 
`Bolsheviks' for agitating against the shipping lines, as did the media and mainstream political 
opinion. Blacklegs were brought in, and a conciliation committee was established which 
persuaded the men to return to their jobs. In December 1919, a better award was issued to 
diffuse the situation. Accounts of the 1919 strike are prolific including Larrowe, Shape-Up 
and Hiring Halo pp. 11-14; Kimeldorf, Reds or Rackets? pp. 47-9; Squires, B. M., The Strike 
of the Longshoremen at the Port of New York', Monthly Labor Review, vol. 9 no. 6, pp. 95- 
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New Deal and World War Two gains finally secured the ILA's future in New York. 
Union sympathisers who were blackballed returned to the New York waterfront after 
federal labour laws were enacted. One such figure was Thomas (Teddy) Gleason, 
ILA President in the 1960s, who returned to the New York docks as a checker and 
longshoreman in 1933 following his earlier removal from the docks for union 
activities. The few `company unions' still active on the local waterfront were 
dissolved. The Banana Handlers Association, for instance, was compelled to deal 
with the ILA, but only after three men were dismissed for agitating against the 
company union. Clerks, timekeepers, general maintenance men and the coastwise 
labourers were unionised by 1940.44 
In 1937, rebel members of ILA Local 791 on the west side of Manhattan demanded 
greater democracy in the Ryan organisation, that financial reports be made more 
widely available and that proper audits be made of the Locals' books. These demands 
were part of a wider struggle for hegemony in the port with the west coast ILWU 
longshore union organising in New York. 45 
Federal guarantees in the mid 1930s mandated employers to negotiate with the union. 
All portworkers were, in 1942, ordered to register with their nearest Coast Guard 
station, a procedure administered through ILA offices in New York, further 
strengthening its authority and scope. The number of non-unionists by this time is not 
known precisely, but the number belonging in New York to the ILWU was 
miniscule 46 
After 1947, the NYSA-ILA contract laid down that dockworkers had to join the ILA 
after thirty days of service, a post-entry `union shop' agreement allowed under the 
Taft-Hartley Act. Every major docks employer used union labour by 1951 - `They 
115; Drury, H. B., The Labor Policy of the Shipping Board', Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. XXIX no 1 (1921) pp. 1-28. In the New York Municipal Archives, read the manuscripts 
in Mayor Hyland Papers, Box 187 
44 NIT, 15.11.35. U. S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, To Clarify 
the Overtime Compensation Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as Amended, 
hearings 81st Congress Ist Session 1949, p. 633 
as ., 24.10.37; 11.12.37,18.2.38; ILWUBulletin, 10.3.38 
46 U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Waterfront 
Investigation, hearings, 83rd Congress 1' Session, 1953, pp. 411,471 
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had to, or they would shut them down. 47 Smaller employers, or temporary workers, 
might be `non-union', though they were statistically insignificant. 48 
UNION DIVISIONS 
Employment segmentation 
Although the ILA eventually became an accepted part of docklands' structures, the 
underlying vulnerability of the union was exposed time and again, outside of its major 
centres 49 Furthermore, income differences based on custom, market position or 
formal agreements, were strongly characteristic of New York port, akin to those in 
so Liverpool or more so to London 
A New York hatch boss, clerk or quay employee had greater regularity of earnings 
than most longshore workers, but their hourly rate was commensurately lower. Ship 
work was often more lucrative than pier work because of the greater chance of 
overtime. When mobile or `roving' gangs were allocated to a different area to which 
they were accustomed, they demanded the rate paid in their usual section, so long as 
47 Interview with NYH, 2.4.00 
48 Interviews with NYH, 2.4.00, NYI, 22.3.00, NYL, 7.4.00; U. S. Congress, Senate Special 
Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, Organized Crime in 
Interstate Commerce, hearings part 7,1951, p. 734 
49 Galveston, Texas, dockworkers were victimised in 1915 for even talking of unionisation, 
while in Philadelphia and Baltimore, the union made few advances until after 1920 (WA: ILA 
1915 Proceedings; Kimeldorf, H., Battling for American Labor: Wobblies, Craft Workers, and 
the Making of the Union Movement (University of California Press 1999) p. 49) 
50 The Longshoreman, August 1915; MacElewee and Taylor, Wharf Management, Stevedoring 
and Storage, p. 57; U. S. Office of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Section of Labor 
Relations, Hours, Wages, and Working Conditions, Vol. 1 (1936) p. 215; (New York City) 
Mayor's Committee on Unemployment, Report on Dock Employment, p. 14). For a good 
sampling of port and local agreements, read: NYMA: Mayor Hylan papers, Box 187: the 
agreement of October 1919; `Longshore Labor Conditions in the United States - Part 1' 
(1930); WA: ILA Collection, Box 4 `Proposed Agreement, General Cargo' (1.10.36); U. S. 
Army Corps. of Engineers and United States Shipping Board, Port Series No. 20. The Port of 
New York Part 1: General Report, Washington, D. C, 1926; U. S. Congress, House. 
Committee on Education and Labor, Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938; 
U. S. Congress, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Maritime Labor 
Legislation, hearings 88th Congress 1st Session, 1963, pp. 907-10; U. S. Office of the Federal 
Coordinator of Transportation, Section of Labor Relations, Section of Research, Hours, 
Wages, and Working Conditions, vol. 1(1936) pp. 144-5 
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this meant uprated earnings New York's wage differentials were wider than those on 
the Pacific coast, where longshore labour was more united. 51 
Several other elements were peculiar to New York. Manhattan Locals usually 
criticised the ILA for internal `democracy' problems rather than for hiring difficulties. 
This may be one reason why Brooklyn men were usually at the forefront of protests 
against the injustices of the engagement system. It may have partly accounted for the 
results of an Honest Ballot Association referendum in 1953, in which those calling for 
a change over hiring were disproportionately concentrated in Brooklyn 52 
Another singular influence was seniority agreements. Seniority agreements replaced, 
over time, the patchy and informal priority systems active on most piers. Nonetheless, 
even when policed (by no means always the case), seniority agreements created 
divisions between men, depending on their length of service and the locality in which 
seniority was effective. Such questions grew in importance with a pier closure 
program in many sections. 
Each craft working the waterfront had its dedicated post-engagement seniority set up, 
making movement between them difficult. The clamour grew for a port-wide system 
but this call ran up against the uneven pace of pier closures in the 1960s pitting union 
Locals against one another. And those with a lower seniority classification sometimes 
resented the fact that longer serving union members could choose the pick of the best 
jobs, so long as they were trained and competent enough 53 
sl U. S. Office of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Section of Labor Relations, 
Section of Research, Hours, Wages, and Working Conditions in Domestic Water 
Transportation, 1936, Vol. 1, p. 145 
52 Lower unit labour costs were said to be a powerful factor in the decision by shipowners to 
move much of their work to Brooklyn. Approximately 6,000 Brooklyn Local members were 
reported by one source as having been afforded `fairly' regular work by 1949, and another 
6,000 regularly employed. For sources on these themes, consult U. S. Congress, Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, To Clarify the Overtime Compensation Provisions, 
p. 488; U. S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Waterfront 
Investigation, p. 331; New York State Crime Commission, Record of the Public Hearings... on 
the Recommendations of the New York State Crime Commission for Remedying Conditions on 
the Waterfront of the Port of New York, New York, 8-9 June 1953, pp. 114-5 
53 Telephonic interview with NYK, 12.3.01; XIIR: Box 2 folder 55: letter of 9.1.65. Most 
seniority was confined to the section of the waterfront in which the man or gang concerned 
had longest served its time (New York Shipping Association Progress Report 1959, pp. 20-1). 
The position of the `A' seniority men after 1960 was complex. Although guaranteed first shot 
239 
Union organisation 
The ILA often seemed more than a coalition of disparate interests than a genuinely 
unified organisation. `The union often appears to be not so much democratic', stated 
Meyers, `as anarchic, and Gleason (the then ILA President) rules mainly by dint of 
delicate and ever shifting alliances with powerful barons of the union's locals. '54 
As each waterfront trade or specialisation was incorporated into the union, they 
retained many of their old craft distinctions, just as unions within the TGWU amalgam 
retained theirs. The coastwise men, for example, were organized later and differed 
from the longshore workers in terms of their greater regularity of employment and 
hourly earnings ss Five `coastwise' piers in lower Manhattan included a section 
running from the Battery to around 13`h Street S6 Powerful Local leaders were able to 
emerge, on occasion leading wildcat actions against their own union executive. 7 
Although conflict between ILA Locals was therefore not a novel issue, it had especial 
resonance when piers were closing in a divisive pattern. 8 As trade moved away from 
the old hub piers in Manhattan, so diminishing employment opportunities - where they 
remained - concentrated in South Brooklyn and New Jersey. 
9 
at many jobs, as noted, they had to accept any `suitable' work. This could leave them with 
little more than they would receive through the Guaranteed Annual Income, as described in 
chapter three. An alternative deployed was to offer them the most lucrative work, with 
overtime, so that their earnings would be made more attractive. But this scheme sometimes 
came up against co-existing earnings equalisation schemes. 
54 Meyers, H. B., `Wrangdoodle' Time on the Docks'. Fortune, 1 September 1968 
ss U. S. Congress, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Maritime Labor 
Legislation, hearings 88th Congress 1st Session, 1963, p. 107; International Longshoremen's 
Association, Brief of International Longshoremen's Association (AF of L) in Support of its 
Labor Policies in the Port of New York with Particular Reference to War-Time Needs and in 
Opposition to Proposals for Industry Committee for Marine Shipping industry, 28 May, 1943, 
p. 11; U. S. Maritime Labor Board, Report to the President and to the Congress March 1, 
1940,76th Congress 3rd Session. House Document No. 646,1940, p. 112. On New York 
coastwise labour, see WA: 1931 ILA Proceedings, p. 25. 
56 U. S. Congress, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Labor Management 
Problems of the American Merchant Marine (hearings 84th Congress Ist Session 1955) p. 836 
57 One such was Gene Sampson, of Local 791, and it was said that his rift with Ryan resulted 
in twelve flash strikes as Sampson tried to embarrass the union president (NYT, 24.10.51) 
S8 Jersey Journal, 21.12.70 
59 NYT, 20.7.63 
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Inter-union challenges 
Although the ILA was officially recognised in the port after 1915, two substantial 
challenges were launched against it. Union rivals presented themselves as different 
from the ILA in their `intolerant' policy towards corruption and un-democratic 
practices. During the struggle for control, opponents tarnished ILA practices, 
repeating a line pursued by union dissidents and `rebels. ' As in Liverpool and 
London, charges of waterfront neglect and of union misrule proved a powerful 
weapon. 
West Coast union president Harry Bridges mounted the first of these attacks in the 
latter 1930s, gaining a minority support for such policies as union-controlled hiring 
halls and rotational hiring to stop employment scams 60 But `breakaway' movements 
were relatively weak in New York, and would remain so. In part an effect of the 
relative flexibility of the union's constitution and practices, opposition to the 
leadership could be contained without rupturing its structure, in contrast with the 
situation in Britain as revealed in the enduring hold of unofficialism. 
A more serious challenge came in the form of the International Brotherhood of 
Longshoremen (IBL), implicitly backed by the Waterfront Commission and a creature 
of the AFL, complete with a policy designed to attract those who were fed up with the 
ILA 61 Nonetheless, in three supervised elections between December 1953 and 
October 1956, the ILA retained its bargaining rights over the port despite the forces 
ranged against it. 
An important influence on the result was a newly discovered reformism in ILA 
leadership ranks. What also tipped the balance in favour of the ILA was the power of 
the more steadily employed dockworkers, which feared the loss of seniority and jobs 
to the seafarers' union if the IBL took over. 62 (National Maritime Union truck drivers 
had, in fact, already brought in scabs to the docks, past ILA pickets. ) Added to this 
60 The impact on the Brooklyn rank and file movement is mentioned in NYT, 28.9.40 
61 Waterfront News, 13.1.56 
62 New York interviews with NYB, 29.3.00, NYK, 11.4.00; Goulden, J. C., Meany: The 
Unchallenged Strong Man of American Labor (Atheneum, 1972) pp. 192-4, Larrowe, Shape- 
Up and Hiring Hall, pp. 207-13; Raymond, Waterfront Priest, pp. 233-55. 
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was a long tradition among portworkers of endorsing and defending `their' union 
come what may against interlopers. 
Ethnic cleavages 
Of all elements tending to fragment docks labour in New York port, compared to that 
in Liverpool or in London, religious and ethnic differences were the most significant. 
Racial divisions were a constant problem for ILA headquarters, though diminishing in 
overall significance after 1945, as in the other ports. 
The impact of ethnicity was double edged. For while it formed a basis for solidarity 
and for occupational identity, as during the 1919 stoppage `uniting Irish and Italians, 
blacks, Hungarians, Swedes, Russians, '63 port racketeers could conceal themselves 
behind the badge of a shared cultural heritage. Waterfront criminals were often 
related by kinship or marriage to other dockworkers " Within `corrupt' union Locals, 
for instance, the membership was often reluctant to oust the `racketeering' leadership, 
one reason (it was argued) being that they and many of the membership came from the 
same region in the Old World, a case with South Brooklyn Locals identified with the 
Camarda crime family. 65 
Hiring may also have been influenced by ethnicity, with newly arrived dockworkers 
reportedly the most affected by hiring corruption, 66 though a productive worker would 
generally be taken on regardless of nationality 67 Use of family connections to find 
work was equally as commonplace as in other sectors of American industry; the 
63 Winslow, C., 'On the Waterfront: Black, Italian, and Irish Longshoremen in the New York 
Harbor Strike of 1919', in Rule, J. and Malcolmson, R. (eds. ), Protest and Survival: Essays for 
E. P. Thompson (Merlin Press 1993) p. 359. 
64 The sister of Eddie McGrath, a major crime figure on the west side, was the wife of John 
Dunn, another racketeer and McGrath's partner in loading concessions. When John Guistra, a 
prominent racketeer in Brooklyn, was slain in the early 1930s, relative Tony Romeo 
immediately took over his Local 929, stealing an estimated $20,000 from the treasury (New 
York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 3, pp. 1568-70, vol. 4, pp. 2454- 
2508) 
65 New York State Crime Commission, Record of the Public Hearings... on the 
Recommendations of the New York State Crime Commission for Remedying Conditions on the 
Waterfront of the Port of New York, New York, 8-9 June 1953, p. 37. 
66 Interview with NYF, 26.3.00. 
67 NYD, in Brooklyn, and NYV, in Hoboken, both `bucked the trend' for instance, by gaining 
steady work in a supposedly hostile ethnic environment. 
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printers, carpenters, electricians, bricklayers, and harbour pilots for instance were as 
`guilty' as the ILA on this score. `There are clubs today in New York City that, if you 
belong to that club, you'll be very well connected to better jobs and things like that 
through the connections you make in that club' stated one interviewee. Another, who 
joined the industry in the early 1970s, argued `If your father worked on Wall Street, 
chances are you might also. '68 
No hard and fast ethnic demarcation lines existed - Irish workers would be found for 
example on 'Italian'-identified piers69 - but class solidarity in many cases came 
secondary to ethnic loyalties, as Davis argues. 0 The top job in the ILA, for example, 
usually went to an Irishman, despite a large Italian membership. 1 New York coastal 
communities were as rooted in ethnicity; in Red Hook, for instance, where major 
installations once existed, the Sicilian population was strongly represented `with 
numerous Italian stores, churches, social groups and mutual aid societies. 72 
The job of the ILA President was, in part, to assuage ethnic tensions as they revealed 
themselves. In 1915, the press recorded how `German agents' were planning to use a 
prominent Boston Irish-American businessman with anti-British sentiments to offer 
New York ILA leaders $1 million to ferment trouble on the docks, so depriving the 
allies of vital munitions. The money was to be employed paying striking 
dockworkers. Not insignificant in this connection were the large number of Irish and 
Italian dockworkers, along with longshoremen in Hoboken, New Jersey, from 
Germany, some of who could be expected to be sympathetic to the Boston 
businessman's cause. In the event, the Secret Service tipped off the ILA and the plan 
collapsed even before it had started. 3 
68 Interviews with NYG, 12.4.00, NYL, 7.4.00, NYS, 28.3.00 
69 Interviews with NYO, 29.3.00, NYV, 17.4.00 
70 Davis, C. J., `Working with the Hook: A Comparative Study of London and New York 
Dockworkers, 1945-1955', The London Journal, vol. 25 pt. 2, pp. 79-95. 
7150 per cent of AFL Vice-Presidents (1900-1918) were also of Irish descent. 
72 Smith, S. T., Red Hook Section of Brooklyn (New York School of Social Work) August 
1942. 
73 Gompers, S., Seventy Years of Life and Labour (Hurst and Blackett 1925) p. 346; World, 
13.9.15; O'Connor, R., Hell's Kitchen (Alvin Redman 1958) pp. 198-9. Dick Butler argued that 
the full facts behind the affair did not come to light and that it was even possible that the 
`scandal' was a `put up job' designed by persons unknown. 
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In 1918, that there was a danger of a split in the union between the Italians and the 
English-speaking men, only assuaged when Italian ILA vice-president Paul Kelly's 
brother, Nick, and other Italians were `put on the payroll' of the union. During the 
late 1940s or early 1950s, the ILA organised annual pilgrimages for its Hudson River 
membership to the shrine or Our Lady of the Hudson. Non-Irish were not welcome, 
although there was no formal bar on them attending the event. 4 
Ethnic dimensions also impacted on legislative and reform efforts. West side clerics 
of Irish origin such as Fr. John Corridan, for example, who sought to remove casual 
dockwork, shared a Irish identity with the bulk of dockworkers in the Chelsea district 
of Manhattan. Ties to the dominant political organisation for the first half of the 
twentieth century, Tammany Hall, were also cemented by the Irish heritage of ILA 
executives and Tammany leaders. 
On the British docks, few foreign-born dockworkers were found, since immigration 
was tiny compared to the vast flows entering the United States over the same period, 
although the Irish had gained an early and lasting foothold in the docks. This factor 
was more than offset by their diffuse political and social identity within urban settings 
in Britain. 
The British dock registration process also heavily biased recruitment towards 
indigenous populations, inescapably and institutionally linked as it was to the `older' 
generation of dockworkers who supplied access to the registration procedure. Where 
ethnicity seems to have had a visible effect was on succession in the TGWU as well as 
NASDU. NASDU, in Liverpool and London, was `known' for an Irish identity 
through the chief officers 75 But a number of factors militated against the same scale 
of ethnic differentiation in British docks as seen in New York. 6 Top TGWU Docks 
Group officials were also by and large of Irish descent. 77 
74 Telephonic interview with NYF; Barnes, The Longshoremen, p. 10; ILA 1919 Proceedings, 
344 ýS 
Taplin. E., `The History of Dock Labour: Liverpool, c. 1850-1914, ' in Davies, S. et al 
(eds. ), Dock Workers: International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970 
(Ashgate Publishing, 2000) pp. 468-9; Lovell, J., The Irish and the London Dockers', Bulletin 
for the Society for the Study of Labour History, vol. 35,1977, pp. 16-7. 
76 The London Irish', Blackwell's Edinburgh Magazine, vol. CLXX, no MXXIX, July 1901, p. 
124-34; Webb, B., My Apprenticeship (Penguin 1938) p. 355; ISE Archive: Booth Collection, 
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Within politics the British Irish, while representing the single largest group of 
immigrants, were not a political force per se, and could not mount unified campaigns 
based on a mutual ethnicity and religious solidarity as in New York. They also 
displayed no consistent party line that could buy them special privileges 78 
The Italian community in New York City - the `five boroughs' - was the largest in the 
United States, larger than that of several medium-sized Italian cities, and creating `the 
same densely packed, overwhelmingly insular southern towns and villages they had 
just escaped. j, 79 In 1890, fully 42 per cent of the population of Manhattan was 
foreign-born. City politics was saturated by ethnic differentials, with the Irish, Italian 
and Jewish lobbies the biggest 80 Each immigrant community faced discrimination, 
tending to encourage a closing of ranks against outsiders. Most Italian immigration 
was from the south of Italy, where `mafia' traditions were strongest, posing a problem 
for law enforcement then and later. 
Evidence for London undermines an argument made by Kimeldorf that Roman 
Catholic docks union leaders inherited a `cultural baggage' predisposing them 
ideologically towards conservatism in their official roles 81 Taplin makes a similar 
point, this time in Liverpool, but only insofar as Catholic Church leaders was 
concerned in the late nineteenth century. Contradicting this, Ben Tillett, of Irish 82 
B143, p. 15; Potter, B., `The Dock Life of East London', The Nineteenth Century, vol. 22, 
1887, p. 489. 
77 LIVD told how, as late as 1960, it was his recollection that in Liverpool, many employers 
were Protestant, and that several hiring bosses were known as `Orange Men' who would tend 
to hire fellow Protestants (interview, Liverpool, 17.11.00). In Liverpool, after 1947, the 
Catholic coal-heavers in the port were given time off to go to mass on Sundays (interview 
with LIVE, 17.2.99). Timothy O'Leary and Tom Cronin were two examples offered by 
interviewees as exemplifying the Irish trend in the TGWU Docks Group at upper levels. 
78 Cf. O'Day, A., `The Political Representation of the Irish in Breat Britain, 1850-1940' in 
Alderman, G. (ed. ), Governments, Ethnic Groups and Political Representation (New York 
University Press 1993) pp. 31-83; O'Day, A., The Political Organization of Irish in Britain, 
1867-90, ' in Swift, R. and Gilley, S., (eds) The Irish in Britain 1815-1939 (Pinter 1989) pp. 
183-209; O'Day, A. `Irish Influence on Parliamentary Elections in London 1885-1914, ' in 
Swift, R. and Gilley, S, The Irish in the Victorian City (Croom Helm 1985) pp. 98-105) 
79 NYT, 7.6.71; Nelli, H. S, From Immigrants to Ethnics (Oxford University Press 1983) p. 63 
80 Italian immigration to the United States for example grew from 12,354 in 1880 to 215,537 
in 1910. 
81 Kimeldorf, Reds or Rackets? p. 43 
82 Taplin. E., `The History of Dock Labour: Liverpool, c. 1850-1914, ' in Davies, S. et al 
(eds. ), Dock Workers: International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970 
(Ashgate Publishing, 2000) p. 450 
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stock in London's Dockers' Union, and Liverpool's James Sexton routinely espoused 
`radical' causes such as a greater state say in unemployment issues and in port 
functions as part of `socialist' agendas. 
PORT EMPLOYERS 
Greatly facilitating the growth of unionism in New York, and of malpractices, were 
divisions between the major employing interests. Splintering within the collective 
bargaining process was a characteristic of New York port from the start, and a 
powerful hook upon which improper demands could be made. 
As Jensen remarks on the attitude of New York Shipping Association (NYSA) 
members, `expediency has been the usual hallmark. '83 The NYSA from its inception 
in 1932 conducted negotiations for the whole port. Yet, many of its 170 or so 
members were in direct competition with each other for business, and `often viewed 
each other with suspicion and narrow-mindedness. '84 The Shipping Association was 
`split on most issues, according to the operating interests and the requirements of its 
differing competitive companies. '85 NYSA authority was limited to New York, 
though wages and conditions negotiated there set the benchmark elsewhere on the east 
coast 
86 
Smaller firms were also, as in London and Liverpool, more prone to indulge in such 
petty malpractices as the short-changing of dockworker wages, as reported too in 
London prior to unionisation. Of note was the fact that waterfront racketeers of the 
1970s as a rule avoided directly taking on the largest companies. Their attacks were 
instead mounted against the smaller enterprises. 7 
83 Jensen, Strife on the Waterfront, p. 34. 
" Lonschein, A. J., 'On the Waterfront', Portfolio, (New York), vol. 4 no. 2,1991, p. 4 
85 Jensen, Strife on the Waterfront, p. 35 
86 Most steamship lines on the NYSA were, in fact, non-American by flag; there were also 
many coastwise and inter-coastal owners and operators, stevedore contractors who were 
owned by steamship lines and independent operators. Many stevedores were family-owned, 
as in Liverpool and London. 
87 Welling, KM., 'On the Waterfront: from Maine to Texas, a Crescent of Corruption', 
Barron's, vol. 60 (21 January 1980) 
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Before the ILA took command of port labour, the men complained of unwarranted 
deductions by contractors from pay and of unwaged work. Tales were also told of 
employers being allowed to `win' at card games to keep in their favour. A quayside 
contractor `could have been a guy with fifty able-bodied people, with a bunch of 
hand-trucks, with a lease on a New York City pier for thirty days with no capital 
requirement. ' 88 
The NYSA was ineffective as a body that could tackle malpractices partially because 
of its refusal or inability to negotiate realistic local contracts, where the bulk of 
misconduct was found. Even this problem might have been overcome, but more 
debilitating still was the tendency of employers to ignore agreements when they found 
them inconvenient of related to profits. 
WORK DISCIPLINE 
The quid pro quo for recognition beyond that of the individual employer was therefore 
a tightening of the strictures against shirking and other misbehaviours affecting 
output. Flash strikes, the best example, were a cause of anxiety for both employers 
and the ILA. 
Any number of causes could trigger a downing of tools. When a company, contrary to 
unwritten practice, brought a new superintendent on a pier in 1949, the men stopped 
working. In 1950, baggage gangs on a pier refused to work until charges laid against 
a dockworker of assaulting a security guard were dropped. That October, Pier 54 men 
walked off until an assault charge was withdrawn. Local 824 members struck in 1955 
when the Cunard Line suspended a man for absenteeism. After learning of the men's 
complaining, he was reinstated 89 
88 Interview with NYL, 7.4.00. Unsanctioned deductions by smaller employers were the cause 
of at least one strike (Barnes, The Longshoremen, p. 33; (New York City), Mayor's 
Committee on Unemployment, Report on Dock Employment, p. 15; U. S. Commission on 
Industrial Relations, Final Report, p. 2195; NYT, 13.7.1881). For the same experience in 
London, read Parliament, Departmental Committee on the Checking of Piece-Work Wages in 
Dock Labour, Report, cmd. 4380 (1908) 
89 New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 1, p. 129; NYT, 31.7.47, 
8.8.47,16.4.48 
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Because of the inadequacies of the pre-1950s system for speedily settling industrial 
disputes, work gangs would, if left unsupervised, tend to operate at a sluggish pace, 
drawing their hours into overtime. This danger for an employer no doubt helped 
explain the reported use of strong-arm men as hiring bosses and hatch foremen by a 
category of shipowners into the 1940s. Jarka, the largest stevedoring company, to 
instil `some order and discipline, ' used Albert Ackalities, a reputedly violent Pier 18 
hiring boss, on their Jersey pier. Before he was hired, `half the men were across the 
street drinking, and practically no work was done. i90 
Post-Crime Commission pressure moved the ILA and the NYSA into a new 
partnership, articulated in the installation of the Labor Relations Committee (LRC) 
that suppressed unofficial job actions. Statistics indicated the effectiveness of the 
LRC system in resolving disputes without resolve to unofficial practices 91 
CUSTOM AND LOCAL AUTONOMY 
The union was forced to adopt a highly decentralised structure by the nature of the 
work, the composition of the membership and by the port's huge dimension. 
Interacting with this were heavily supported but localised customs and practices, by 
and large outside the scope of union leadership controls. TGWU docks branches had 
much less discretion over `permissible' internal practices, on paper at least, since these 
were laid down by Standing Rules conferences 92 
New York union Locals varied immensely on how they dealt with employers and in 
their methods of remuneration. The `poorer' and/or smaller union Locals would 
probably see union officials working part-time as ordinary longshoremen. A Local 
90 New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 1, p. 72 
91 Jensen, Dispute Settlement in the New York Longshore Industry, ' p. 596; New York 
Shipping Association, Progress Report 1959, pp. 11-18; Jensen, V. H., Prospects for Labour 
Peace on the London And New York Docks', in McGill University, Industrial Relations 
Centre, The Dynamics of Change: Labour Relations on the Montreal Waterfront, Montreal, 
1970; U. S. Congress, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Labor- 
Management Problems of the American Merchant Marine, hearings 84th Congress Ist 
Session, 1955, pp. 822,829. See also a series of articles in the New York Times, including 
those on: 25.1.55,9.3.55,20.5.56 
92 `Constitution and Rules of Order As Amended at the 34th Convention Held in New York 
City July 14-18,1947' p. 37 gave New York Local unions the right to `fix its own wage scale, 
unless such scale adversely affects other Locals or Branches of the trade. ' 
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President could also double up as the Business Agent. In a group of cases, only the 
fact that Local officials were in receipt of the GAI kept them performing. Similarly, 
some union officials were more influential than were others 93 
In the context of the capital-labour conflict, customs did not `implicate fundamental 
rights' (as was also the case in London and Liverpool). 4 Unofficial practices 
nonetheless did at times stabilise the chaos of dock labour markets. At the other end 
of the spectrum, the pressure was always to look for ways in which dock and ship 
gangs could `make up' earnings. The manipulation of customs eventually became 
embroiled in considerations of competitiveness, as an upward pressure on costs 95 
Extras for overtime, weekend, night working and for handling `obnoxious' cargoes 
were the sole ones allowed for under contracts. 
Unauthorised `job rights' in New York varied by their interpretation and operation, 
depending for instance on the policies of the Local having jurisdiction and how hard 
they were pushed. In the early 1950s in Brooklyn, men might be hired above a 
garage. Jersey City and Hoboken Local 1261 (checkers and clerks) operated a novel 
system wherein the first checkers to report to the Local office got first call on work 
that day. When night work became available in 1940 on Pier 32, extra gangs worked 
the day shift and the regular gangs the nights 96 
New York style customs encompassed the trivialities of when breaks were taken (only 
certain piers, long ago, had coffee breaks) 97 through to dispersed `understandings 
related to individual piers, terminals, or companies. '98 Before the widespread 
adoption of joint committee standards, Barnes claimed that `every pier is a law unto 
itself' so far as cargo handling was concerned Y 
93 Telephonic interview with NYT, 3.1.01; interview with NYK, 11.4.00; New York State 
Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 2, p. 878, vol. 3 pp. 328-3 1; NYT, 4.5.55 
94 Interview with NYB, 29.3.00. 
95 Interview with NYL, 7.4.00. 
96 Telephonic interviews with NYD, 6.9.00, NYH, 2.4.00; U. S. Congress, Senate Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Waterfront Investigation, p. 103; XIIR: Box 11 folder 
38 
97 Informally known as `high water' breaks (interview with NYT, 4.4.00) 
98 Jensen, Strife on the Waterfront, p. 146. 
99 Barnes, The Longshoremen, p. 28. 
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Sizeable segments of the New York labour market were thus protected from the full 
force of market forces and such systems, seen in Liverpool and London as well, 
mitigated the need to pay off for work. Less nobly, customs could be used as a 
hammer via which to `squeeze' employers into payments beyond those agreed through 
normal channels. 
EMPLOYMENT MALPRACTICES 
The shape-up and `casual' employment 
Conventional wisdom postulated that casualism was the norm in the port and from this 
flowed all manner of abuses. As a supposed basic feature of dock work, the New 
York shape-up system facilitated `gang rule' on the New York waterfront and morally 
demeaned the men, U. S. sources agreed. 100 
Many descriptions of the New York `shape-up' hiring process creating and aiding 
corruption exist. 101 Such a system, when unmodified, was known as the `open' 
shape. 102 Individuals and those working in gangs presented themselves at stipulated 
times before hiring bosses and were chosen, or passed over, for work until the next 
hiring event, perhaps four hours later. In this scenario, dockworkers wholly depended 
on the patronage of the hiring boss for employment. As a consequence, opposition to 
the system was inhibited, as dockworkers sought to keep in favour with hiring 
foremen. 
Published works indicating the precarious character of New York port hiring date 
from the early 1900s. The 1911 New York State Senate report told of the irregular 
100 Johnson, Crime on the Labor Front, pp. 133-149; Davis referred to the `humiliating shape- 
up system' (Davis, C. J., New York City and London Dockworkers: A Comparative 
Perspective of Rank-and-File Movements in the Post-Second World War Era', Labour 
History Review, vol. 65, no. 3,2000, pp. 295-316) 
101 (New York City) Mayor's Committee on Unemployment, Report on Dock Employment in 
New York; New York State Senate, Report to the Legislature of the State of New York by the 
Commission... to Inquire into the Question of Employers' Liability and Other Matters: Third 
Report - Unemployment and Lack of Farm Labor, Senate document 1911, no. 49; U. S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, no. 550, Cargo Handling and Longshore 
Labor Conditions, Washington, DC. 1932. 
102 See the bibliography for descriptions of the New York shape. 
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nature of most dock work at that time, as did Barnes a few years later in his classic 
study. 103 `Preference' men, typified by better average earnings, existed but were 
recorded as not common. 104 In 1914, the Industrial Relations Commission heard from 
a union organiser of kickbacks to foremen. 105 Over the years, variants on the theme of 
improper exchanges for work in New York ranged from direct cash payments to free 
drinks for `the boss' through to bogus `Church' donations. 106 
Although union controls took the edge off the worst aspects of the shaping-up system, 
what remained true - in common with much `regular' dockwork in the British ports - 
was that even `regularly' employed gangs, those that could expect to work four days 
or more a week, could be and were stood down if the volume of shipping on their pier 
was small. 107 As one former Hoboken ship worker summarised, `If the ship worked 
three days, you worked three days. '108 
The 1930s economic downswing in the United States was more severe in its effect 
than the British equivalent. New laws giving trade unions more security together with 
agreements to give ILA members first crack at work, buckled under the weight of the 
numbers drifting to the waterfront, and reports of kickbacks rose. Sensational 
accounts of `over $25m yearly' paid out in waterfront graft came to public attention. 
Various dodges were noted and men who refused to accept the system of grafting for 
work were blackballed. 109 The ILA's preference scheme embodied in agreements 
favouring union men, like that in Britain, was half-heartedly enforced. 110 And with its 
lack of registration to limit the numbers seeking dockwork, the likelihood was that 
shakedowns were greater in New York than in Britain over the course of the 1930s. 
103 Barnes, The Longshoremen, pp. 170-1; 'Longshore Labor Conditions in the United States - 
Part 1', Monthly Labor Review, vol. 31 no. 4 (October 1930) pp. 1-20. 1°4 New York State Senate, Report to the Legislature of the State of New York; Barnes, The 
Longshoremen, pp. 55-75. 
105 U. S. Commission on Industrial Relations, Final Report and Testimony, pp. 2190-5. 106 On bogus `Church' contributions, see the interview with NYX, 28.3.00, a member of the 
predominantly negro Local 968 in Brooklyn from 1949. 
07 See, for example, U. S. Commission on Industrial Relations, Final Report and Testimony, 
2063 
108 Interview with NYV, 17.4.00. 
109 Daily Worker (NY) 27.5.33; NYMA: Kings County D. A., Murder Inc., box 5. 
110 Private correspondence with Sam Madel; Swanstrom, The Waterfront Labor Problem, p. 
28 
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Pre-registration employment schemes 
By the 1870's, several bigger New York shipping lines were hiring men by the week. 
In 1876, Anchor Line and State Line men for example had `practically permanent 
employment', though still paid by the hour. A few of the larger lines, such as the 
North German Lloyd and the Hamburg Lines went further, in offering their weekly 
men pay whether they worked or not, and even instituting sickness and invalidity 
pension schemes 111 
Such systems became of less relevance over time. The Bull Lines in 1950's Brooklyn 
thus worked its twenty gangs `practically ... day and night steady. ' Duration of 
employment depended as well on the class of vessel serviced. Often ignored as well 
in the literature described in chapter two were the many coastal and inter-coastal 
vessels offering mainly regular work, as did their Liverpool and London 
counterparts. 112 
At pier level, individual hiring foremen initiated their own work-sharing projects, as 
the Industrial Relations Commission reported. During the 1940s investigation of the 
celebrated murder of dockworker Peter Panto, it was discovered that the terminal on 
which he worked, Pier 15 in Brooklyn, practised a rough and ready equalisation plan 
run by the company foreman. 113 Similar systems became embedded in South 
Brooklyn and on Manhattan piers. 114 
Local 791 had operated a regular employment system for its members prior to 1953, 
with a small coterie of men used as fill-ins only. Upper west side gangs were reported 
to use the same structure in 1955, as did the lower east side based Local 856 from the 
early 1940s 
111 New York Tribune, 1.8.1876,30.1.1887; NYT, 20.1.1887,26.1.1887; U. S. Commission on 
Industrial Relations, Final Report and Testimony, p. 2116 
112 New York, Port of Authority, Economic Importance of Coastwise Shipping to the Port of 
New York District: Preliminary Report, New York, 1946, pp. 5-18. 
113 Telephonic interview with NYN, 19.10.00; NYMA: Kings County D. A. Murder Inc. Box 
5: People vs. John Doe, 24.9.45. 
114 In the area above 42°d Street, for instance, in 1963 a system operated whereby gang 
earnings were evened out and by this means the use of casuals was strictly limited. On the 
North Side of Manhattan meantime, the Penn Stevedoring firm, one of the largest in the port, 
had a large core of long serving workers, about 60 per cent of the total used on their facility. 
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Most extant evidence relates to South Brooklyn's Local 1814, the largest union 
organisation in the port. From about 1957, according to interviewees, criticism of the 
former system whereby a few gangs hogged the best paying ship hatches (normally 
holds 2 to 4) led eventually to a new arrangement. Under it, shop stewards operated a 
`rotation' system in which assignments on piers covered by the Local were adjusted 
on a daily basis, so that low earning labourers (including all overtime payments) were 
given the `best' or most profitable hatch work the next day. 115 
Criticisms of the orthodoxy 
Including all categories of dock labour and less formal means to adjust wages, the 
extent of regular gang working in the port was thereby considerable, certainly more so 
than recorded in most texts identified in chapter two. The process was facilitated by 
the unionisation of hiring foremen. 
As the New York Times remarked as early as 1904, `a nucleus of steady and more or 
less skilled men' formed the centrepiece around which others would gather. 116 By the 
1930s, when unemployment generally was on the rise, it was reported that foreman 
tended to choose the same employees at the shape, `using extra employees only in the 
case of unusual activity. ' 117 
`Extra' gangs supplied fill-in labourers when regular members were unavailable. The 
authors of 'Longshore Labor Conditions in the United States - Part 1' commented that 
over half of New York dockworkers at that point were `regulars. '" The Department 
115 It might involve, for instance, low earners finishing off the highest earning hatch in a ship. 
This system was most suited to periods when work was scarce and cargoes were 
homogeneous, and thus in which all the work gangs were as proficient as each other. 
Productivity in this situation did not suffer from the practice. Where, on the other hand, 
mixed cargoes were the norm, a `rotational' system could be more problematical, since few 
gangs could handle all cargoes equally well (telephonic interviews with NYC, 2.5.01, NYD, 
4.1.01, NYT, 3.1.01, NYY, 3.1.01) 
116 NYT, 22.10.04 The U. S. Commission on Industrial Relations heard, in 1914, of the regular 
gang systems used on the trans-Atlantic lines while Barnes wrote of the regular nature of most 
`foreign commerce' work. 
117 U. S. Office of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Section of Labor Relations, 
Section of Research, Hours, Wages, and Working Conditions, Vol. 1 (1936) p. 143. 
"'Monthly Labor Review, vol. 31 no. 4 (1930) 
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of Labour also described in 1932 large amounts of regular work offered119 and Ogg, in 
1938, recounted how steady gangs would get work, if available, on most west side 
Manhattan piers. 120 
Better statistics on earnings became available after 1945, though they proved 
ambiguous in their conclusions. Those opposed to the shape quoted statistics on the 
comparatively low weekly or annual earnings of the majority of dockworkers, the cut- 
off point being those achieving above or below 700 hours of work annually (the 
minimum to qualify for the industry pension). But where these referred to a single 
employer, the figures could be misleading, since a practice, seen in Liverpool and 
London too, was for temporarily unemployed gangs and individuals to travel between 
piers and firms to make up working hours. 121 
Rules from 1945 made with the NYSA gave `men who regularly work on a pier ... 
preference in hiring'122 and since hiring foremen came normally, according to custom, 
from the rank and file, this practice crossed over the years. John Lyon, NYSA 
chairman, for instance, held before the Crime Commission that while 24,000 men 
earned under $1,400 a year, a further 15,000 men earned over the $2,800 yearly 
earnings benchmark judged as satisfactory compared to work away from the local 
waterfront 123 
The ILA told the Waterfront Commission that port employers had, for a number of 
years previously, unofficially given preference to gangs regularly following `their' 
home piers or terminals. After these were hired so-called `regular extra' gangs who 
were utilised as second-stringers but still often received good earnings. 
11 U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, no. 550, p. 75 
120 Ogg, Longshoremen and Their Homes, p. 18 
121 For appropriate statistics and different perspectives, consult: U. S. Congress, Senate. 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, To Clarify' the Overtime Compensation Provisions 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, pp. 271,729; U. S. Department of Labor, Manpower 
Utilization - Job Security in the Longshore Industry Port of New York: Report and Findings, 
Washington, DC: 1 July 1964, p. 6; U. S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, Waterfront Investigation: New York New Jersey: Interim Report, Report 
No. 653.83rd Congress 1st Session, 1953, p. 8. 
122 Larrowe, Shape-Up and Hiring Halo p. 51; U. S. Congress, House Committee on Education 
and Labor, Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, p. 360. 
123 New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 1, p. 69 
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A number of shipping industry witnesses appearing before the Crime Commission 
told how the shape was rarely used `as commonly understood. ' 124 Nossiter, in a well- 
researched article, confirmed in 1955 that, `the notorious shape-up is used to hire only 
a fraction of longshore labour. '125 Waterfront Commission interventions in the 1950s 
furthered the cause of regular earnings, through registration processes. 126 
`Continuity' practices 
Contributing to a wider or fairer distribution of earnings were `continuity' type 
conventions. These were important in Liverpool and London, as seen, but assumed an 
even greater significance in the absence of registration schemes, the situation in New 
York until 1953. Against this, no formal agreements on continuity of employment 
existed across the port. 
In an early reported characteristic of New York dockwork, the same ship hatch gangs 
would often be asked to stay on until a cargo was loaded or discharged, as a response 
to the need to get a ship in and out of port without delay. This seems to have been a 
long-standing custom, criticised by Barnes and others before 1917 as resulting in the 
systematic overworking of the men. Poole in 1908, according to Winslow, also 
related how the men had to work with few rest breaks for long periods 127 Jensen 
recorded how a formalised form of continuity established itself in the port during 
World War Two, and explained how winchmen `often virtually worked around-the- 
clock, because it was deemed more efficient to use gangs continuously until the ship 
was finished, rather than bring in new men unfamiliar with the work. '128 
124 New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 1, p. 449, pp. 635-6. 
125 Nossiter, 'Waterfront War: Round Two in New York ; New York State Crime Commission, 
Record of the Public Hearings, pp. 42,45-6,82. 
126 Groom, P., 'Hiring Practices for Longshoremen', Monthly Labor Review, vol. 88, p. 1296; 
U. S. Congress, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Maritime Labor 
Legislation, p. 925 
127 Winslow, C., "'Men of the Lumber Camps Come to Town": New York Longshoremen in 
the Strike of 1907, ' in Winslow, C. (ed. ), Waterfront Workers: New Perspectives on Race and 
Class (University of Illinois Press 1998) p. 71 
128 Jensen (Strife on the Waterfront) mentioned that a form of continuity was introduced in 
World War Two in New York (pp. 38-9). The tale of the New York winchmen is told on 
pages 38-9. 
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For employers this practice made sense, since the men had by then built up a good 
pace of work and needed no coaching in what to do next, unlike the situation when 
using new gangs. It was also probably safer than the alternative of importing gangs 
after, say, four hours had elapsed. 129 
But maintaining `continuity' within particular cargo holds was a problem where it 
conflicted with earnings equalisation programmes, as it did on the piers operated by 
Local 1814 in the latter 1950s. For where `continuity' meant that a few gangs 
monopolised the better paying hatches in a vessel, it was decided to limit it to a single 
day. Thereafter, a lower earning outfit would take over the work. 13° 
These practices still left hiring bosses with some economic clout. Graft could, for 
example, be useful despite continuity to get a position in a regular gang, since 
membership of work gangs changed over time. It was also rumoured that to get a 
slice of the jobs paying regular overtime required a `connection' with the appropriate 
hatch boss. 131 
Hiring and union policy 
Arguably, the ILA better represented the majority view among its members in the port 
with respect to the existing employment system than did either the TGWU or 
NASDU. Surveys and the results of ballots suggested that many dockworkers in New 
York indeed accepted the limitations of the shaping-up system while the alternative on 
offer of `hiring halls' was rejected as open to political manipulation. 132 
129 In 1874, it was reported that those engaged were to carry on until the work was finished 
and testimony before the Commission on Industrial Relations in 1914 disclosed that it was a 
common to work the same men for long stretches until a vessel was done. This also appeared 
to have been the case in the 1930's, when gangs were said to be kept `intact until the work of 
loading or discharging has been completed', even if that meant very long workdays (U. S. 
Commission on Industrial Relations, Final Report and Testimony; U. S. Congress, To Clarify 
the Overtime Compensation, pp. 762-3. 
129 U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, no. 550, p. 75; 'Longshore Labor 
Conditions and Port Decasualization in the United States', Monthly Labor Review, vol. 37 no. 
6 
130 Telephonic interviews with NYC, 2.5.01, NYI, 2.1.01, NYY, 3.1.01 
131 Interview with NYT, 4.4.00. 
132 NYT, 22 553,9.6.53; Morris, G., A Tale of Two Waterfronts (The Daily Worker 1952) pp. 
23-4 
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When the chance came in supervised elections for the ordinary New York dock union 
member to voice his opinion, he tended to come down in favour of the `shape', and 
against `state direction' in the hiring function 133 Instead, a successive advance in 
hourly wages was the favoured strategy adopted by the union leadership. 134 This 
strategy dovetailed with the union's well-known opposition to left wing or 
`communist' ideology and state `controls' over labour, via compulsory registration for 
example. 135 
The situation was thus more complex than American versions suggest, with the single 
exception of Russell in 1966,136 in which a corrupted union leadership was depicted as 
defending the shaping-up structure simply as a way of lining the pockets of its 
officials. According to Johnson, the shape-up `leaves the hiring of dock workers 
entirely up to the union and opens the gates wide for every type of racket and 
malpractice. ' 137 
State policies, 1917-45 
Government interest in the New York docks was barely discernible until the late 
1940s. For a number of reasons, thereafter waterfront practices became a political hot 
potato that was not, as in Britain, deflected into joint committee systems and into 
official reports that saw reform in terms of incrementalism, to foster stability. 
133 ILA Longshore News, June 1953; XIIR: Box 11: `Minutes of the New York District 
Council Special Meeting, March 10,1953'. 
134 (New York City) Mayor's Committee on Unemployment, Report on Dock Employment, p. 
31. 
135 During the second world war, those such as Tony Anastasio who opposed the official 
leadership were branded as Communists (International Longshoremen's Association, Brief of 
International Longshoremen's Association (AF of L), 28 May 1943, pp. 25-6; International 
Longshoremen's Association, Statement of the International Longshoremen's Association, 
AFL, on the Report; AFL `Report of the Proceedings of the 72°d Convention Held at St. Louis, 
MO September 21 to 25, Inclusive 1953' p. 487). On the ILA and communism, read also: 
WA: ILA Collection, Box 4, folder `ILA Boycotts'; FBI file on Joseph P. Ryan, file no. 63- 
914 (Intelligence File, 19.4.54); U. S. Congress, Committee on Commerce and Committee on 
Education and Labor, Amending the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, hearings 75th Congress 
3rd Session 1938, pp. 1064-93; U. S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, Waterfront Investigation, pp. 447-9. 
136 Russell, M., Men Along the Shore: The ILA and Its History (Brussel and Brussel 1966) 
137 Johnson, Crime on the Labor Front, p. 133 
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As explained, the tripartite National Adjustment Commission (NAC) was created in 
late 1917 to keep shipping and military supplies flowing from the east coast ports to 
Europe and was of unquestioned success in maintaining wartime labour peace. 138 The 
U. S. Employment Service also planned to centralise the hiring of labour in the port 
139 due to its recognised fragmentation, but this experiment was abandoned after 1918, 
while a planned New York Port War Board hoping to better coordinate interests on the 
waterfront hardly had time to establish itself before hostilities ceased. 14° 
A lengthy unofficial stoppage in New York during 1919 ended NAC hopes of 
registering dock labour with a view to regularising wages. '41 Thereafter, each section 
of the port reverted to its pre-1917 hiring system. 142 American industrial policy 
moved to the containment of price inflation and towards a reversion to laissez faire in 
industry policy. The 1920s were typified by `open shop' movements and 
decentralised industrial practices. '43 `Outdoor relief' as apparently available to 
classes of casual longshore labour, but was heavily stigmatised and had a low take-up 
rate. In Ogg's sample, for example, only 29.3 per cent had ever been on public 
welfare rolls (as `the last resort') while the average time spent on relief was only five 
months. "' 
Between 1942 and 1945, when the most revolutionary changes were being made to 
hiring relations in Liverpool and London, the New York longshore industry structure 
remained in every sense that inherited from the 1930s and beyond. Neither the NYSA 
138 U. S. National Adjustment Commission, Report of the Executive Secretary ... for the Period January 1,1919 to June 30,1920 (Washington, D. C 1920) 
139 N YT, 8.6.18,11.6.18; U. S. National Adjustment Commission, Chairman's Report for the 
Period Ending December 31,1918, Washington, D. C. 1919, p. 147 
140 Strongly influenced by the federal government, its membership represented labour, 
management and state, tasked with easing problems of port congestion. The War Board, like 
the New York-New Jersey Port Authority from 1921, provided a basis for coordination under 
which all installations would come under its supervision (New York Times Annalist, 12.11.17). 
141 U. S. National Adjustment Commission, Report of the Executive Secretary, p. 38. 
142 On the history of the NAC, read: Squires, B. M., The National Adjustment Commission', 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 29,1921, pp. 564-9; Drury, H. B., 'The Labor Policy of the 
Shipping Board', Journal of Political Economy, vol. XXIX no 1, p. 8, U. S. Shipping Board, 
Report of Acting Director of Marine and Dock Industrial Relations Division, 1 August 1919. 
The Shipping Board itself carried on to 1932 but its Industrial Relations Division was wound 
down earlier. 
143 Mikhailov, B. Y. (ed. ), Recent History of the Labour Movement in the United States 1918- 
1939 (Progress Pub 1977), pp. 139-42 
144 Ogg, E., Longshoremen and Their Homes (Greenwich House 1939) pp. 35-36 
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nor the ILA was keen on change. The ILA repeated that most longshore work was, by 
then, performed by gangs in `fairly steady employment' who had `grown to know and 
understand their employer and have become familiar with the types of ships to be 
loaded, the character of cargo to be handled, the care required to load in the order of 
ports of call, etc. '145 
Still, for most of the war longshore labour was in demand, with payoffs consequently 
curtailed. 146 Where the military took over piers, more continual employment was on 
offer. In Brooklyn, the Armed Forces instituted a regular gang system, for example, 
in some sections. 
Post-war reforms 
From 1946, rising anxiety was expressed about the effects of the shape-up system in 
fostering waterfront violence and racketeering. Claims were underlined by a 1947 
`gangland' murder case involving west side Manhattan docks. 147 Yet the favoured 
solution, in the complete removal of the shape, was unacceptable to large numbers of 
the docks workforce. In these proposals, reformers articulated the concerns of a 
minority of dockworkers. 148 
Following stinging criticism by the State Crime Commission, dealt with below, 
supervised balloting arrangements were extended to all union Locals, supervised by 
145 XIIR: Box 2 folder 58: `Subject: Labor Problems Concerning the Employment of 
Longshoremen' (17.4.42) 
146 International Longshoremen's Association, Brief of International Longshoremen's 
Association (AF of L), 28 May 1943. An exception was in 1942, when German submarine 
activity forced shipping to divert to other ports on the east coast. 
147 During January 1947, members of the `Bowers' mob were convicted of the murder of a 
North River hiring boss. 
148 The issue of `waterfront priests' and their contributions to reform is discussed in: Fisher, J. 
T., 'John M. Corridan, S. J., and the Battle for the Soul of the Waterfront, 1948-1954', U. S. 
Catholic Historian, vol. 16 no. 4,1998, pp. 71-87; Budd Schulberg `Waterfront Priest', 
Commonwea4 3.4.53, pp. 85-91; Raymond, A., Waterfront Priest (Victor Gollancz 1954); 
Velie, L., 'A Waterfront Priest Battles the Big Port's Big Boss', Collier's, vol. 129 (16 
February 1952), pp. 18-19+; Davis, C. J., "Launch Out into the Deep and Let Down Your 
Nets': Father John Corridan, S. J., and New York Longshoremen in the Post-World War 11 
Era', Catholic Historical Review, vol. 86, January 2000, pp. 66-84. Corridan's stance helped 
reverse the position of the Catholic Church in New York in staying away from industrial 
problems, and probably reflected the Church's perception of a greater Communist threat. 
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independent monitors. 149 Local 1814 went further in `democratising' its organisation, 
fining men who did not attend union meetings. 150 Newly emerging ILA leaders, 
notably Tony Anastasio, president of Local 1814, allied themselves with the cause of 
decasualisation and of stronger rights for ordinary dockworkers. 
Captain William Bradley, who took over after Joseph P. Ryan, campaigned on a 
platform of revitalising the union and controlling the activities of union Locals more 
closely. '5' Material results of this `new deal' given to union members were shown in 
better fringe benefits and wages, although their ultimate effect on employment levels 
was a matter for debate. 152 After an external review concluded that it had addressed 
all major criticisms, the ILA was re-admitted to the AFL in 1959, following its 
expulsion in September 1953 for being slow in addressing Crime Commission 
condemnations. '53 
Seniority agreements and the Guaranteed Annual Income 
Specifically designed to suppress hiring malpractices in the port, seniority 
arrangements were formalised and eventually dovetailed with Waterfront Commission 
regulations. Through it, longer serving union men on a particular pier or section 
gained the right under agreements to insist upon being hired for the first available job 
to which they were qualified to perform. However, they created new problems when 
acting alongside the Guaranteed Annual Income (GAI). 
Frankel and Marcus told how the seniority system worked well in those sections 
where work was still available, but much less so in industrially declining ones. If 
Manhattan longshore workers, for example, travelled to better employing areas, they 
would lose seniority, or might not find work at all. Men who worked on 
comparatively stable piers or terminals would not generally welcome `outside' 
149 Interview with NYT, 4.4.00. 
110 Waterfront News, 18.5.56 
'51 Journal of Commerce, 31.1.56 
152 Waters, R. C., `Leadership and Its Consequences: Technical Change in the Longshore 
Industry' Industrial Relations, vol. 32 no. 2,1993, pp. 262-4 
153 The full text is found in: WA: ILA Collection, Box 4: `Report and Recommendations of 
AFL-CIO Executive Council Committee Respecting Application of International 
Longshoremen's Association for Affiliation with the AFL-CIO' (17.8.59). 
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competition for work and competitors could find themselves assigned `to the hardest 
and dirtiest job when they seek work in another part of the harbor. "54 
In common with Hoboken, once the chief point of embarkation for U. S. troops off to 
fight in Europe, throughout the 1970s a once thriving Lower East Side riverfront of 
Manhattan quickly decayed. 155 The south Brooklyn waterfront also decayed, though it 
retained some of its traditional break bulk cargo trade. Those wishing to feed off 
corrupt practices found themselves without a constituency. On the west side of 
Manhattan waterfront for example, Irish `docks' mobsters were forced to expand into 
non-waterfront activities, but at no point was their power comparable to that of the 
gangsters they replaced. 156 
The GAI was a solution to foreseeable problems with unitisation and mechanisation, 
the idea coming originally, according to one of its architects, from the British system 
of income maintenance. 157 The ILA fought hard for the GAI on the premise that the 
men `would not be left to bear alone the costs of increased productivity or progress 
from which you most handsomely profit. '158 
A subsequent agreement mandated for the GAI and better holiday arrangements, in 
exchange from the union side for gang size reductions where appropriate, 159 more 
flexibility, and the closure of the dockworker register to restore a supply-demand 
balance. The GAI was finally introduced in April 1966, paid for by employers, with 
longer serving dockworkers benefiting the most (as with seniority arrangements). 16° 
In a fuller attempt to preserve work, the union won the right to use its own labour to 
load ('stuff') and unload (`strip') containers within a fifty mile limit of a port and 
154 Jersey Journal, 21.12.70; Frankel, E. G. and Marcus, H. S., Ocean Transportation (MIT 
Press 1973) pp. 425-6; NYT, 15.6.67 
155 Buttenwieser, A. L., Manhattan Water Bound: Planning and Development from the 
Seventeenth Century to the Present (New York University Press 1987) p. 219. 
156 English. TJ. The Westies (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1990) 
157 Interview with NYW, 15.4.00 
iss ILA `Twenty-Four Years of Progress: A Report by Thomas W. Gleason, President' New 
York (n. d. ). 
159 Many commodities required the `full' twenty-one-man gang both before and after the 
1960s. 
160 WA: ILA Collection, Box 2: `International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union: 
ILA Wage Guarantee and Hiring Procedures' (6.10.70). 
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containing cargo belonging to more than one shipper or consignee destined to, or 
coming from, ports within the fifty mile area. This was achieved in 1968. 
Collectively, these reforms gave the average New York dockworker a high degree of 
income, and sometimes earnings, stability. In this environment, engagement-related 
payoffs were mostly irrelevant if focused on the obtaining of work in the first 
instance, and the fear of `losing' seniority for an infraction of port rules inhibited 
some post-employment misconduct. 
STATE CRIME COMMISSION HEARINGS 
Central to any analysis of waterfront practices in New York is the New York State 
Crime Commission. Crime Commission conclusions became, in effect, the `official 
version' of relations in the port, stamping its image on subsequent accounts. This 
section deconstructs the evidence advanced by the Crime Commission, in concluding 
that it was important as much for what it left out as to what it revealed. 
The cultural impact of the motion picture film `On the Waterfront, ' drawing heavily 
on Crime Commission materials, was hard to over-estimate. 161 Yet, Budd Schulberg, 
who wrote the screenplay for the film, had only marginal experience of the docks, 
getting his evidence from others such as Crime Commission witnesses and dissident 
elements in union ILA Locals 791 and 824. 
Schulberg became interested in waterfront practices after reading Malcolm Johnson's 
`rackets busting' articles and following a meeting with the crusading Jesuit priest Fr. 
Corridan through Johnson. Schulberg functioned for `a good two and a half years' as 
Corridan's aide and fully shared his perspective on the docks. 162 The presence of the 
Waterfront Commission in the aftermath of Crime Commission revelations kept the 
image of powerful waterfront criminality with public order implications alive, as did 
161 Directed by Elia Kazan, the New York Times informed its readership how the film 
`revealed the horrible truths' of the port and, on the plight of the tragic and exploited casual 
longshore workers, how the State Crime Commission helped `bring some light into their dark 
lives. ' (NYT, 29.7.54) 
162 Telephonic interview with B. Schulberg, 17.1.01 
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occasional court cases and (in the 1970s) federal investigations of port shakedowns on 
the east and Gulf coasts. 
The New York waterfront was described by Bell as a `protected political enclave' 
sheltered by a corrupt political machine. 163 Raymond stuck to the Crime 
Commission's negative depiction of the ILA and of industrial malpractices, adding a 
figure of `over 100 unsolved deaths' associated with `the struggle for the control of 
(the rackets) by gangsters. i1M Larrowe and Kimeldorf did not unpack the extant 
evidence for docks corruption, though the latter's work included more variables in 
`explaining' the trouble areas. What was never in doubt across the texts was the depth 
and seriousness of the problem. 
Hiring malpractices 
The lasting imprint given by the Crime Commission hearings was one of rake-offs and 
exploitation at the point of engagement - the shape-up. The Fourth Report from the 
Commission in May 1953, its `final word' on malpractices, stressed, as did writers 
from 1946, the shape as the primary cause of other difficulties in the law enforcement 
sphere. 
According to the report, `The power to hire not only enables an unscrupulous hiring 
foreman to exact tribute from the dock worker but also makes it possible for him to 
dispense patronage to relatives, friends and criminal associates. '10 A star witness 
before the Crime Commission, for example, `John Doe', told how after he stopped 
paying kickbacks to certain hatch bosses in Brooklyn, he was fired from his steady 
earning job. Complaining to his union delegate led to a further half-day engagement, 
but he did not regain his old position. To add insult to injury, his hiring foreman 
replaced the witness with the foreman's nephew. 166 
163 Bell, D., 'Last of the Business Rackets', Fortune, June 1951 
164 Raymond, Waterfront Priest, p. 23 
165 New York State Crime Commission, Fourth Report, p. 43 
166 New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No 5), vol. 3, pp. 1787-91. 
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But the most compelling evidence of a serious problem over hiring was found in New 
Jersey, where high-level political figures intervened in the process in Hoboken and 
nearby Jersey City, involving the placement of friends of the Mayor and others as 
dockworkers by the resident ILA Local. Local 1261 officials on occasion also sold 
union books illegally, while ward leaders compiled lists of those to be given work by 
hiring bosses. Control over jobs led to feuding in which political levers were pulled 
by the protagonists. 167 
Crime Commission hearings were immediately followed by a 1953 U. S. 
Congressional investigation of labour problems at the huge U. S. military installation 
at Claremont, New Jersey, some of the evidence repeating points already made by the 
Commission. U. S. Senators heard how waterfront jobs were sold, gangster influences 
moved across the Hudson River to the base and how much hiring was performed on a 
political recommendation! " 
The strongest evidence presented of significant problems surrounding the hiring 
process therefore came from New Jersey's waterfront, where supplemental evidence 
also suggests that the worst employment malpractices probably occurred, on a more 
regular basis. A Local 1261 shop steward was accused in 1954 of accepting $100 for 
work and then forcing a longshoreman to pay, every month, for his job and with 
Christmas-time payments thrown in. Two longshoremen had also done repairs to the 
house of his girlfriend in company time. In 1955, six dockworkers in Port Newark's 
Leonardo Naval Base, including four gang foremen, were proven to have participated 
in kickback schemes. 169 
167 New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 2, pp. 853-7,933-1040, 
1316-61. 
168 U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Waterfront 
Investigation, pp. 116-7. 
169IVYT, 14/15.12.54,22.10.55,8.2.56 
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Critique 
Although hiring malpractices clearly occurred, other evidence suggests a localised 
problem. Examples taken from parts of New Jersey and Brooklyn were not `typical' 
of the whole, as Russell and Jensen claimed. 170 
Vulnerable dockworkers shared several quite distinct features, usually disconnecting 
them from established docks communities, where work was easier to find. Immigrant 
labour was at the front of those who might be expected to `pay-up' if they wanted 
work. 171 `The toothpicks behind your ears, that was mostly the foreigners', as one 
man who worked on the docks wrote in reference to a way to gain the attention of a 
hiring foremen. 172 
Susceptible dockworkers that were American-born were the subject of more 
sophisticated scams reflecting some `sensitivity' in the manner this group was dealt 
with. `Those, however, that are American born and of Italian descent give an indirect 
kickback in that they must purchase tickets for affairs that are never held, and must 
pay a fee for a barber service which is never given, etc. ' 173 Another important 
characteristic of the majority of those exploited was their non-union status. 174 Also of 
extreme relevance was the fact that `when it came to the hard, back-breaking work, 
there were no kickbacks. '175 
Interviewees recalled how jobs were acquired and held through various other means 
than kickbacks. A sample had pre-existing family ties to the docks, others became 
known as `grafters', and a third group received work from both sources. NYC, for 
example, told how he began work on the South Brooklyn piers in the early 1950s with 
loo Russell, Men Along the Shore; Jensen, V. II., Hiring of Dock Workers and Employment 
Practices in the Ports of New York, Liverpoo4 London, Rotterdam, and Marseilles (Harvard 
University Press 1964) p. 30 
171 Daily Worker (NY) 27.5.33 
172 Kisseloff, You Must Remember This, p. 518; Doyle, J., 'Striking for Ireland on the New 
York Docks', in Bayor, R. H. and Meagher, T. J. (eds. ), The New York Irish (The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1996) p. 35. 
173 NYMA: Kings County DA, Murder Inc. Box 5 `People vs. John Doe' (no. 1377/1945); 
Daily Worker (NY) 27.5.33 
"a New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 3, p. 1801. 
175 Interview with NYB, 29.3.00 
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no contacts to help him out, but after several months of hard grafting as a casual hatch 
gang member, he was taken on - without bribery - in another gang with reasonably 
steady earnings. John Dwyer (who later led a revolt against the ILA on the west side) 
was adamant that he never `paid' for work and he was a `positive it never happened on 
the West Side' pier in Manhattan he worked on 176 
As chapter three explained, competitive imperatives operated, in the longer run, 
against the hiring of labourers simply because of their willingness and ability to grease 
palms. '77 This was as true of New York as it was of Liverpool or London. 
There was no suggestion that higher echelon ILA leaders shared in hiring payoffs, 
though they were certainly guilty of laxness in not dealing promptly and effectively 
with suspected abuses. However, data taken from a series of 1950s Waterfront 
Commission reports suggests that in proportion to the number of registered 
dockworkers, the problem of hiring malpractices was a small one, though its criminal 
nature implied under-reporting. l7$ 
Union-management improprieties 
Also littering testimony before the Crime Commission were charges of improper 
payments by port employers to ILA officials. Such payments were traded against a 
guarantee from local union officials that enough of the right labour was available at 
unsocial hours, to get `good' labour, to head off unrest or to ensure that union officials 
would help settle disputes at awkward times 179 
176 New York interviews with NYB, 29.3.00, NYD, 6.9.00, NYH, 2.4.00, NYS, 28.3.00, NYL, 
7.4.00; Kisseloff, You Must Remember This, p. 517 
177 See, for example, International Longshoremen's Association, Brief of International 
Longshoremen's Association (AF of L), 28 May, 1943 
178 Taken from Waterfront Commission `Annual Reports' (various years), between 1953-4, for 
instance, there were ten applications for hiring agent and pier superintendent positions denied 
while twenty-three stevedoring firms did not quality for a license. Over 1954-5, licenses were 
denied to ten hiring agents and pier superintendents, and in 1955-56, two hiring agents were 
disqualified. Two more hiring agents and three pier superintendents withdrew their 
applications during investigation into their suitability to work on the docks. 
19 New York State Crime Commission, Fourth Report, pp. 12-16 
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Although massive rake-offs were not proven, material presented before the State 
Crime Commission indicated that small, frequently ad hoc, payments were made to 
union officials in some parts. The truth about many of these payments is hard to 
discern. Many were made in cash and unrecorded, suggesting that the principals were 
at least aware of their borderline legality despite denials. In other instances, the Crime 
Commission overstated the case made that they were corruptly motivated. 180 
First, cash was paid to avoid stoppages, for example by ensuring that a sympathetic 
union official was available. From time to time linked to Christmas gift making, these 
were at times described as `goodwill' payments. 181 Pittston Stevedoring made these, 
perhaps totalling $10,530 between 1947-1952, in part to recruit `good men' from the 
union. Unionist John Beecher received small sums at Christmas in trade for his 
furnishing `good gangs. ' At other times, payments were made to ensure that union 
officials were present at all hours in case of unforeseen problems 
Strikes could be avoided by the employment of `ghosting' (or `phantom') workers, 
who while paid for a full day's work rarely showed up but had considerable influence 
over the rank and file. The source of their authority, and the means they employed to 
avert strike action, was never ascertained. Most cases involved a single stevedoring 
outfit, Huron. 
On Pier 58, John Scanlon appeared on the payroll of the Huron Company but would 
`fade away' after an hour's work. Similarly shady background figures were employed 
on another two Hudson River installations to ward off the threat of strikes. Another 
`ghost' worker, a Local 791 delegate, offered to go easy on Huron when it came to the 
enforcement of the contract. There was no direct evidence however that top company 
Aso This was the case, for example, with the Jarka vice-president who testified that his 
payments from petty cash to a Port Newark ILA delegate were, he was advised, legal (New 
York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 3, pp. 79-81) 
181 New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings, vol. 3, pp. p. 1681,1843-52 The 
Jarka concern argued before the Crime Commission that payments they made to ILA officials 
in 1949-50 were in `appreciation' for their helpfulness when they required gangs at awkward 
times and which were, strictly, not `part of their regular hours of work. ' 
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executives had known about this malpractice and the Waterfront Commission 
eventually gave Grace Lines, which owned Huron, a license to carry on operating. 182 
In December 1952, employees of a Brooklyn stevedoring firm pleaded guilty to 
payroll padding and were imprisoned for up to three years. Thomas May, an associate 
of Local 856 delegate Mike Clemente, extorted nearly $7,000 from a stevedoring 
venture between 1950 and 1952. Aniello Ercole, in Brooklyn, was ailed in a phantom 
job racket. 183 The precise relationship of cause (the handing over of money) to effect 
(a strike free operation) was difficult to prove, but employers involved took the line 
that prevention was better than cure. 
Second were cases in which the employer and union official developed a close 
personal bond, expressed (so it was argued) in the passing of cash, but without any 
strings attached. This situation was relatively uncommon in the evidence. Mike 
Castellana at the Sottnek concern was shown, in the major example, to have close 
financial ties to Mike Clemente, a delegate with the East River Local 856, even 
loaning Clemente money for his daughter's wedding and paying a hotel bill for 
Clemente when they went on vacation together. 
In addition, there were witnesses who denied giving inducements for any particular 
reason, except that it was `traditional' to so do, notably during festive periods. Such 
payments were at times divided out among Local members for social functions and in 
the cause of their welfare. Local. 791. business agent John Sampson explained how 
Christmas gifts that came his way were shared out between older union members 
unable to work as well as on a Christmas bash. 
Clemente, one of the toughest operators in the industry, told the Crime Commission 
that Christmas gifts he received, in cash, were spent on a party for his union members 
and that the rank and file Local members knew all about them. Joseph Mangiameli, 
182 Between 1953 and 1954, a number of men were jailed for `ghosting' such as Timmy 
O'Mara, a boss loader on two Hudson River piers. ILA Local 791 official Jay O'Connor also 
put the squeeze on Huron, being offered a cushy sinecure for a promise by him to interpret the 
agreement to the firm's advantage (U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, Waterfront Investigation: New York New Jersey: Interim Report, pp. 42- 
3; U. S. Congress, Waterfront Investigation, pp. 12-29,44-50,61) 
183 NYT, 23.12.52,14.2.53,7.4.53,15.12.53,6.5.54 
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who took $1,740 from employers in gratuities, also claimed that the membership of 
his Local was informed. Local 338-1 delegate Jerry Anastasio spent the Christmas 
money from contractors with the boys in his Local 184 Because of this practice, they 
were highly legitimate a form of malpractice among dockworkers. 
The Jules S. Sottnek Company took this benign view 185 while the vice president of 
Dade Brothers denied any adverse interpretation to be drawn from their buying of 
tickets for the testimonial dinner for an ILA business agent. 186 Commensurate 
rejections of sinister motives behind payments to unionists were littered throughout 
Crime Commission evidence. 187 The union leadership refused to accept, in the vast 
majority of cases, that employers were `buying' services from its officers, and even 
queried the illegality of such payments. 188 
James O'Connor, a Local 791 business agent who was ultimately prosecuted and 
pleaded guilty to coercion, told the court how he had not questioned the legality of 
payments made through him by the Grace and Huron Lines to a mysterious `Thomas 
Plunkett, ' amounting to $3,600 a year. When the criminal nature of the transactions 
189 was explained him and to the Local, they were immediately discontinued. 
1" New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 3, pp. 2127-31,1614-8, 
vol. 4, pp. 3086-3100, vol. 5, pp. 3156-8 
185 New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 3, pp. 193-203. 
186 U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Waterfront 
Investigation, pp. 318-9. 
187 Costantino Scannavino, another ILA official, admitted to receiving Christmas and Easter 
monies to the value of $8,520 yet with no expectation of a return. Daniels and Kennedy 
allocated $1,500 a year to ILA President Ryan `for no reason particularly, ' except to continue 
a benign long-running custom. The company secretary told the Crime Commission that since 
the 1930s, this was `established practice' in the firm. The North Atlantic and Guld Steamship 
Corp. gave Mike Clemente a cash Christmas gift of $100. Alex DiBrizzi, the head of Local 
920, admitted to receiving over $2,000 from employers, and Christmas gifts, while insisting 
that they demanded nothing back. Patrick Connolly, an ILA executive vice president, received 
up to $600 from the Jarka enterprise around Christmas time 1949-50 (New York State Crime 
Commission, Public Hearings, vol. 3, pp. 85-89,1650-1,1603-7,1929-32; vol. 4, pp. 2414-5, 
vol. 5, p. 3275; U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
Waterfront Investigation: New YorkNewJersey: Interim Report, pp. 43-4) 
188 U. S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee No. 3, New York-New 
Jersey Waterfront Commission Compact, pp. 125-6. 
189 Court of General Sessions County of New York. Part 5- indictment no. 2894-52. People 
of the State of New York - against - James F. O'Connor 
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The key themes of public sessions were encapsulated in the testimony of Frank Nolan, 
head of the massive Jarka stevedoring enterprise. Payments the firm made to the 
ILA's president, Joseph P. Ryan, were explained by the fact that the Ryan and Nolan 
families were close, that the giving of money was a long-time, benign custom, and 
that they were never hidden from view. The sums were very small in relation to 
business turnover. But Nolan admitted, when pressed, that company profitability was 
another reason for such disbursements. 190 
Short handed working malpractices 
Writers also noted abuses surrounding New York gangs working on ships with 
depleted numbers. Larrowe, for example, claimed that the wages of the `missing' men 
in the short gang scheme were divided among the foreman, timekeeper and a union 
official. Johnson stated that ordinary longshoremen `get none of the graft' from this 
abuse. 191 The notion, however, that rank and file gang members could be excluded 
from the spoils seems far-fetched. 
Although short numbered gang malpractices were not a focus of Crime Commission 
interest, it did expose one such case. Witness Tony DeVincenzo testified that the 
Jarka offshoot in Hoboken, New Jersey, condoned this malpractice, in which the 
wages of absent men were split between the timekeeper, the paymaster and an ILA 
organiser. But the employer flatly denied this and even offered to open his books to 
the Crime Commission. 192 A U. S. Congressional Committee report also delved into a 
few like cases but did not consider how typical they were. 193 
In distinction with London, if interviewees are to be believed, New York work gangs 
refused to start work until their numbers were made up and according to the 
agreement. Alternatively, they started work (but without recompense) until 
190 New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 5, pp. 3794-3866 
191 Johnson, M., Crime on the Labor Front (McGraw Hill 1950) p. 110; Larrowe, Shape Up 
and Hiring Hall, pp. 57-8 
19 New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 2, pp. 774-5 
193 U. S. Congress Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Waterfront 
Investigation: New YorkNewJersey: Interim Report, p. 42 
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Waterfront Commission hiring halls or other employers could send men of the right 
skills mix to make up their numbers. 194 
New York's time determined wage system did not give the same financial incentives 
to indulge in this malpractice as that in London, since New York labourers received 
the same whether they worked under strength or not. In London, as described in 
chapter six, pieceworking gang members could legitimately argue that a short-handed 
gang translated into lower earnings, forming a basis for consequent demands, 
sometimes moving across to the improper. 
Local union malpractices 
The State Crime Commission made much of `undemocratic' practices across the 
unionised sector. Closer examination revealed that most undemocratic practices 
within union units dated from the era before the ILA installed tighter controls, this 
occurring several months before the Crime Commission began to investigate the port. 
Previously, the union was guilty of negligence in its dealings with constituent 
elements but this was not corruptly motivated. A special report on corrupt ILA Locals 
in south Brooklyn, for example, was based in part on `the conditions existing ... 
during the period 1930 to 1940. '195 Nevertheless, there was little doubt that 
corruption in the administration of some ILA Locals existed. 
The secretary-treasurer of Local 338 in Brooklyn for instance was given a suspended 
sentence in April 1954 for the theft of $800 in union funds 196 At the time the Crime 
Commission reported, some Local elections had not been held for up to fifteen years, 
it was claimed, in others the same people were `elected' each year without opposition, 
records for Locals were absent, union dues not chased up when members were in 
194 Telephonic interviews with NYC, 2.5.01, NYD, 18.1.02, NYI, 2.1.01, NYY, 8.4.00 See 
also NYT, 12.4.55 
195 New York State Crime Commission, Interim Report of Evidence Adduced by .. Relating to Six Brooklyn Locals of the International Longshoremen's Association (New York, September 
1952) p. 6 
196 NYT, 8.4.54 
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arrears, funds not properly accounted for or missing and no financial reports made to 
memberships. 197 
Six union Locals in South Brooklyn were defined as unusually corrupt, leading the 
Commission to issue a separate report on their activities. A gamut of malpractices 
was revealed, including the non-disclosure of Local finances to Commission auditors, 
undemocratic and infrequent Local meetings, and the `re-election' of the same officers 
connected to large criminal syndicates running the Local. Financial reports to Local 
members were virtually non-existent, and expenditure made without the explicit 
approval of members. Local officers were alleged to have received moneys from 
steamship interests in the form of Christmas gifts, though the sums mentioned were 
again small. 198 
In the early 1940s, ILA President Ryan revoked the charters of these Locals and new 
elections for union positions were held, this time under supervision. In the event, the 
`old guard' was, with minor exceptions, returned to office. Thereafter, Ryan felt 
constrained in taking further action, he argued, by fears over his personal safety and 
because of the `democratic' results of the election. Contrary to the suggestion made 
by later critics of the ILA such as academic Alan Block, police on the spot reported no 
intimidation during the electoral process. 199 
Anecdotal evidence had noted similar problems in ILA Locals before, but there had 
been no comprehensive review of the situation by union headquarters, since public 
and political pressure to take action was lacking. Swanstrom told in 1938 how ILA 
Local meetings were of a `stereotyped' kind, of the rank and file being excluded from 
deliberations and of poorly maintained Local accounts. Congressional hearings in 
1949 heard references to undemocratic electoral norms in Locals. 00 
197 New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 5, pp. 3710-1 198 New York State Crime Commission, Interim Report of Evidence Adduced by... Relating to 
Six Brooklyn Locals of the International Longshoremen's Association, pp. 1-78 
199 New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 3, pp. 1552-8, vol. 5, 
pp. 3656-60. The Block presentation is explained in his East Side West Side (University 
College Cardiff Press, 1980) p. 190 
200 Swanstrom, The Waterfront Labor Problem, pp. 95-6; Shape Up, 5.2.39; U. S. Congress, 
Committee on Commerce and Committee on Education and Labor, Amending the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1936, hearings 75th Congress 3rd Session, 1938, pp. 1202-3; U. S. Congress, 
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The Crime Commission reckoned that over half of the forty-five Locals investigated 
failed to live up to accepted benchmarks regarding record keeping. Only fifteen fully 
met these standards. Critically though, cases where outright corruption could be 
demonstrated were in the minority, directly reflected in the handful of successful post- 
Commission prosecutions. 0' 
What the Commission, along with other critics of the ILA, did not adequately consider 
were `naive' explanations for irregular behaviour by financial secretaries in Locals. 
Reid thus argued that many smaller Locals simply could not afford a full-time officer 
and thus the men might turn a blind eye if an unpaid official pocketed part of Local 
proceeds. 02 
The Corsi survey of 1951-2 that preceded the Crime Commission probe found that 
problems of balloting malpractices it uncovered were largely the result of slipshod and 
untutored methods of working rather than motivated by criminality; furthermore, that 
the level of ballot abuse was `insufficient to change the final result of the vote on 
ratification. ' 203 Apathy and incompetence, rather than conspiracy, were the major 
problems in most New York Locals. 
More saliently still, criticisms made by the Kefauver Committee in the spring of 1951 
moved the ILA in New York to begin an internal `housecleaning' process under 
general counsel Ernest Waldman. He found, for example, that media reports of 
several Brooklyn Locals, which had `not had elections in ten years', were 
exaggerated. But all had in fact held elections between 1949-51, even if these were 
flawed in practice and procedure. Much of the blame was assigned to similar ones to 
those operating in Liverpool and London, such as membership disinterest, so much so 
House. Committee on Education and Labor, Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938, pp. 610-2; U. S. Congress, Senate, Waterfront Investigation: New York New Jersey: 
Interim Report, pp. 30-1 
201 (New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 3, pp. 1612,1624-5, 
1672-81,1914-7,1965-73) ILA Local meetings under the presidency of Joe Ryan were 
described of `as rare as a snowflake in July' (Kisseloff, You Must Remember ? iris, p. 484). 
Reid, E., The Shame of New York (Victor Gollancz, 1954) p. 153. 
203 'Report of Board of Inquiry on Longshore Industry Work Stoppage, October-November 
1951 Port of New York', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 5 pt. 3 (April 1952) pp. 
426-38 
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that some Brooklyn Locals had difficulties in obtaining a quorum. 204 Even when 
Local officials made a determined effort to increase turnouts at meetings, the push was 
generally a flop. 05 
As Taft noted, `apparent embezzlement of funds is often merely `poor or inexpert 
keeping of accounts. '206 The ILA was long aware of the problem of membership 
apathy, but felt powerless to do anything under its constitution without evidence. It 
recognised, in 1935, the difficulties in getting Brooklyn Locals to meet, and of getting 
Local 791 men to attend their own Manhattan gatherings. In 1949, ILA chiefs 
complained of both falling attendances at Local meetings and of lax Local affairs 207 
Problems continued to exist in a minority of union Locals even after all the 
recommendation made by various committees were enacted. During 1960, Waterfront 
Commission hearings revealed fresh links between union officials and criminals 
attached to the union but that were active outside of the Waterfront Commission's 
jurisdiction. In other cases, organized criminals who were earlier disallowed from 
returning to the New York waterfront as union `officers' came back under different 
job titles such as `clerks, ' but with the same power as before. 208 
What tended to be forgotten were improvements in the way that Local unions in 
general were organized and run from 1952. They made the situation, on balance, 
more transparent and `democratic' than that achieved in Liverpool and London, where 
no such `purge' had been even attempted of errant TGWU docks branches. What was 
also true was that in a few New York Locals, in contrast to British examples, career 
criminals were able to direct and manipulate union affairs whatever the political and 
industrial climate in force. 
204 ILA Longshore News, June 1952 
New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 3, pp. 1527-8. 
206 The so-called `Waldman' report was not located while I was doing field research in New 
York, and the son of Ernest Waldman (himself a lawyer) could not enlighten me as to its 
whereabouts (NYT, 5.5.52,20.8.52; Jensen, Strife on the Waterfront, p. 93; New York State 
Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 3, pp. 1861-8,2220-30, vol. 5, pp. 3706-10) 
207 U. S. Congress Senate. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, To Clarify the Overtime 
Compensation Provision, pp. 635-6; New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings 
(No. 5), vol. 3, p. 1627; ILA 1921 Proceedings, p. 86; ILA 1935 Proceedings, pp. 56,211 
m See New York Harbor, Waterfront Commission, Special Report of the Waterfront 
Commission to the Governors of the States of New York and New Jersey (New York, 
December 1960). 
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BROADER CRITICISMS 
There were deeper problems with the Crime Commission's approach and evidentiary 
base. Despite the evidence adduced for New York, there was `no hint or suggestion of 
extortion' in other ports where the ILA had contracts 209 Even within New York, the 
evidence presented at hearings of payoffs by shipowners to unionists was equivocal. 
In a typical case, occurring in 1946, two vessels carrying perishable flower bulbs were 
stranded in Hoboken until $45,000 was allegedly given to shady characters. But 
rather than being just a small part of a far larger shakedown racket, this incident was 
never repeated, as the witness made clear. 210 The Crime Commission highlighted a 
few other cases like this of `opportunistic' shakedowns, which illustrated the 
unstructured basis to this malpractice. 
When two Local officials demanded that employer Phineas Blanchard put them on his 
payroll, in about 1951, it was the first time he was asked `to do a thing like that. ' In 
1949, Fruit Export Corp. perishable lemons cargo was held up in Jersey City by a 
stoppage, which was called off after a settlement of seventy-five cents a box was 
agreed with an individual connected to the Local. In another instance, Gregory 
Butman of the British-American Fur Corporation explained how in 1950 his company 
was compelled to shell out $25,000 to two men associated with Local 1235 in Port 
Elizabeth, in order to discharge its Russian furs without further delays. A second 
shipment required another disbursement to the same men. Butman added however 
that these `payoffs' were unique in his experience 211 
Episodes like these paled into insignificance when set against the systematic hold-ups 
to vessels manufactured in Liverpool or London. Moreover, set within the larger 
economic backdrop, the amounts involved were of extremely limited economic 
20 NYT, 22.12.52 
zoo New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 2, pp. 786-825. 
211 New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 1, pp. 284-6,658-9, vol. 
3, pp. 505-14 
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impact. The Crime Commission tended to lump together minor sums into impressive 
looking totals? " 
Although a few payments to ILA officials in New York were substantial, the majority 
were of a minor value and hardly enough to reverse union policy (although its local 
level interpretation was another matter). 213 U. S. Senate accountants estimated that 
$182,000 was given to ILA officials between 1947 and 1951 by steamship and 
stevedoring enterprises, 214 but this compared to the gross income of just one of the 
larger companies of nearly $29 million between 1947 and 1951215 
The ILA suspected that many of the charges made by the Crime Commission 
originated in long running employer grouses over the costs of cargo handling. A 
particular target for employer opprobrium was the `public loader' system in the port, 
which was accused of making the port uncompetitive through over-charging. The 
Crime Commission also heard that several loaders were racketeer controlled and 
responsible for waterfront violence. This, together, explained their prohibition after 
1953216 
212 New York Herald Tribune, 9.1.53 
213 Examples can be found in New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), 
vol. 1, p. 293, vol. 3, p. 343, vol. 5, p. 3208. 
214 U. S. Congress, Waterfront Investigation, p. 581. 
215 New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings, vol. 1, p. 743. A list of known 
payments made by shipowners to New York maritime and port unions between 1947 and 1951 
is given in U. S. Congress, House. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Port of New 
York, Subsidized Lines, Subsidy Contracts, and Port Security, hearings 83rd Congress Ist 
Session, 1953, pp. 140-1 
216 NYT, 27.7.33; U. S. Congress, Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in 
Interstate Commerce, Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, pp. 1130-3. The saga of 
Varick Enterprises, a collection agency on the North River piers, exemplified criminal control 
of the loading service. The supposition was that Varick, representing the underworld through 
its investors, used strong-arm methods to enforce collections. A number of 1920s gangland 
murders were also reported as associated with the `loading racket. ' (Raymond, Waterfront 
Priest, p. 117; Pasley, F. D., Muscling In (Faber and Faber, 1932) pp. 188-92. ) The practices 
of the loaders were originally highlighted in the 1920s and 1930s (New York State Crime 
Commission, Fourth Report, pp. 46-51; New York Herald, 16.3.22,20.3.22; FBI File No. 63- 
914; NYT, 15.1.27,25.5.28,13.11.30,22.11.30,10.12.30,17.3.31,2.1033; U. S. Congress, 
House. Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee No. 3, New York-New Jersey Waterfront 
Commission Compact, pp. 230-3). Since public loaders employed casual workers who were 
only paid when working, this turned out to be much cheaper than alternatives for shipowners. 
The loaders also argued that they would be left to load the most undesirable freight if 
employers' agents were permitted to load the rest. Since the loaders were paid by the piece, 
this would result in a steep drop of income. The central charges against the public loaders in 
New York are contained in: Johnson, Crime on the Labor Front, pp. 117-29. They emerged 
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In order to gain convictions `weakening' criminal control over the New York docks, 
as uncovered by the Crime Commission, `rarely invoked' sections of the penal code 
related to `gifts and gratuities' were deployed in the aftermath of the Commission 
hearings. The subsequent conviction of Joseph Ryan for accepting illegal payments 
from employers was thus only the second case of its type made under the 1947 Taft- 
Hartley legislation. 
However, as Russell argued, there was no hard evidence that employers who gave 
Ryan money received favourable treatment, while the sums handed out `were hardly 
tempting. ' FBI agents who examined his finances at the time concluded that they 
showed no great personal income. Ryan admitted taking $1,500 yearly from the 
stevedore Daniels and Kennedy, depositing this and similar moneys in his personal 
bank accounts and that of the `ILA Journal, ' to be used for supposed `anti- 
Communism' work on the docks. 217 
Headline allegations of misbehaviour often came to nothing when placed in a legal 
framework for testing. 218 It was also the case that `malpractices' such as gift 
from the practice in the immediate years after 1918 of truckers using men hired off the street 
to help their drivers to load consignments 
217 Ryan was subsequently convicted of grand larceny, since a part of the money was used to 
benefit him personally. He was jailed in 1953 for six months and fined for accepting $2,500 
from two waterfront employers. (NYT, 10.252,9.12.52; 9.153,14.4.53; 28.2.56; Russell, 
Men Along the Shore, p. 162; FBI file on Ryan, file no. 92-915) 
218 A later review by the Waterfront Commission dismissed at least one `clear-cut' case of 
abuse taken from Crime Commission testimony, pertaining to the McGrath stevedoring 
enterprise and Jersey City politicians. During 1949, McGrath was introduced to a relative of 
Jersey City mayor John Kenny, when McGrath was attempting to secure business via the 
municipality. McGrath was told that a pier would become available and that the relative 
would share in any profits derived from pier operations secured. In the interim, $1,000 was 
given him as an advance against expected earnings. The Waterfront Commission reported 
that this type of business arrangement was widespread and not illegal (Waterfront 
Commission of New York Harbor, In the Matter of the Application of John W. McGrath 
Corporation for License as a Stevedore: Report of Hearing Officer, New York, 7 September 
1956). Waterfront felony cases dragged on in federal and state courts for the remainder of the 
decade involving payments from stevedores to shipowners, or from employers to ILA 
officials. In 1954, the Jarka stevedoring firm pleaded guilty to commercial bribery, fined and 
its president given a suspended sentence. After this, Jarka withdrew from the port. In 1956, 
the McGrath Corp. admitted paying $16,000 in 1950 to avoid labour trouble. In 1953, a 
unionised defendant was convicted of taking $6,920 from a stevedore firm after threatening to 
picket it. A business agent that year was also convicted of extorting $75 to $100 for each 
shipload of newsprint unloaded on the East River by a stevedoring firm. Another case 
involved Local 856 with Mike Clemente, jailed for perjury. In 1956, an officer in Local 824 
and the head of a stevedoring contractor were jailed. The business agent of Local 338-1 was 
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accepting were hardly unique to the waterfront sector, as Ryan himself argued in 
1951.219 Christmas gifts and the like were as common in the construction trade as 
within the shipping industryu0 Furthermore, the ILA in New York was far from 
alone in influencing the choice of hiring boss, u' a focal point of Crime Commission 
criticism on the hiring structure; `in most instances the employer has little to say in the 
selection of hiring foreman, ' a group of which had police records n2 
A danger exists of applying modem standards on bribery and corruption to those of 
the 1940s and before. On the heels of the Crime Commission hearings, the ILA 
issued a statement repudiating any future taking, by union officials, of gifts or 
gratuities from employers of ILA labour, but with the provision that this did not apply 
to gifts `comparable with those received that year by other employees of the same 
employer. '223 This stipulation reflected the widespread view that waterfront payments 
outside of joint agreements were to a degree `acceptable. ' 224 
The ILA repeated many of these arguments, but by then it had become discredited. 
Underlying many of these contentious payments was the obvious failure of the official 
grievance machinery to work effectively, particularly after 1945, when such payments 
may have increased in value. Within this context, employers considered relatively 
insignificant payments, even when illegal, a small price to pay for smoother labour 
relations and for dispute-free operations. 
incarcerated in 1957 for perjury in connection to the alleged shakedown of a shipping firm 
The Tally, 13.4.54, NYT, 18.2.53,13.8.53,14.10.53,27.4.54,3.4.56,16.5.56,8.157). 
"NYT, 25.7.51 
220 Interviews with NYI, 22.3.00, NYW, 15.4.00 
221 Cook, A. H. and Gray, L S., 'Labor Relations in New York City', Industrial Relations, vol. 
5 no. 3,1966, pp. 92-3; Goulden, J. C., Meany: The Unchallenged Strong Man of American 
Labor (Atheneum 1972) p. 19 
New York State Crime Commission, Fourth Report, p. 39 
2,23NYT, 9.1.53 
New York Herald Tribune, 9.1.53 
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OTHER MALPRACTICES 
This section covers malpractices not covered to the same depth by the Crime 
Commission but which were of significance and parallel those found in Liverpool and 
London. Differences and similarities emerge from comparisons. 
Slow working 
Like Liverpool's payments system, that in New York encouraged the systematic 
slowing down of work in order to supplement the basic wage, which could be 
irregular. Documentary evidence of New York malpractices related to this is uneven. 
More reliance is therefore given to the statements of interviewees, especially those 
who had left the docks industry after many years of working inside it. = 
Because of the high cost of night work, it was rarely resorted to226 (though loading and 
discharging of passenger vessels on the Hudson went on throughout the night, as did 
some North River work). 7 When necessary, the regular day gang was asked to stay 
on or, less frequently, a new gang was brought in for nighttime dockwork. 228 
New York longshore work was generally paid for by the hour, with agreed 
supplements for handling `dirty' or `dangerous' cargoes. So long as the clock was 
running, the men were paid. ILA leaders were adamantly opposed to their longshore 
members receiving piece- payments. (During the 1940s, a Weehawken, New Jersey, 
docked steamer made a deal with the local ILA to unload sugar. To encourage the 
men to discharge it faster, they were given the privilege of going home after unloading 
forty tons an hour per gang. Competitors complained to Ryan, who warned the parties 
against this practice in future. )229 Some specialised classes of labour such as the 
225 Interviews with NYH, 2.4.00, NYN, 11.4.00 
' NYT, 24.4.47 
22' South Street Seaport Museum, Veterans Day Storytelling, 11.11.93, transcript of tape, 
James Capastle; U. S. Congress, House. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 
Maritime Labor Legislation, p. 918 
228 U. S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, To Clarify' the Overtime 
Compensation Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as Amended, hearings 81st 
Congress Ist Session (1949) p. 730 
229 New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 3, pp. 346-9 
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public loaders and coffee weighers were paid by results however, but this was only 
because of the nature of their work. 230 
Cases of the deliberate manufacture of overtime earnings by a slow down of the pace 
of work were probably more common than the union liked to admit ?1 One 
interviewee recalled, on the west side terminals, `The QE2 had problems (when) the 
longshoremen were just dancing because they kept holding the ship over and over, so 
they went into double time and god only knows triple time and everything else. 232 
Similar accounts of `go-slows' exist, and many employers saw them simply as 
`shakedowns. ' As late as 1963, employers were complaining that maritime and 
longshore unions `time after time' stopped work on board vessels to make the owner 
`give way ... or else. ' 
233 
Statistics indicated the importance of overtime earnings in the total wage packet for 
the average New York longshore worker, varying from 21.8 per cent in 1952-3 to 26.7 
per cent in 1962-3.4 The hatch boss might give his gang more time than strictly 
necessary to clear the hold; in the process, his own earnings were conveniently topped 
up 235 Another incentive given could be an early departure from the docks, on full 
wages and including an overtime element in the pay packet, as in Britain. Referring to 
the 1970s, one interviewee recalled how `there used to be local deals ... do you give 
me twenty containers an hour and you can go home early or finish up the ship and you 
can pay me to 9. '236 
Pilferage and gambling 
Akin to London in the mid-nineteenth century, river thieves were rampant on the New 
York piers in the 1870s, but were `virtually cleared' over the course of the next 
230 Telephonic interview with NYD, 6.9.00; Hutchinson, The Imperfect Union, p. 351 
231 Interviews with NYA, 31.3.00, NYN, 11.4.00 
232 Interview with NYG, 12.4.00 
233 U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries Maritime Labor 
Legislation, p. 93 
XIIR Box 25 folder 12 `Overtime hours as a percentage of total hours worked by 
occupation contract years 1951-2 through 1962-3. ' 
235 Interview with NYT, 4.4.00 
236 Interview with NYL, 7.4.00 
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twenty-five years. 37 The full extent of pilferage in the port of New York was never 
ascertained, but accounts suggest it was considerable, as in Liverpool and London. `I 
'23wouldn't say pilferage was widespread, ' stated an interviewee, `it was universal. 8 
Just outside the docks, stolen goods were sold, depending on the section, quite 
openly 239 Contrary to a perception, however, 240 crimes such as pilferage were not 
`controlled' by organized criminals, as the Davis study equally showed. 4' 
In common with Liverpool and London, many employers tolerated smaller thievery 
`as part of the cost of doing business, as they liked to refer. 242 A powerful factor 
shared with Liverpool or London was a fear that if pilferers were reported, `they'd tie 
up the ships. '243 Port watchmen could be bribed (or intimidated) to let thieves operate 
unmolested, a facet of the problem investigated by the Crime Commission? 44 To 
make theft easier to perpetuate, docks pillagers might have two union cards, one for 
work as a checker and one as a longshoreman. 45 
Illegal gambling was mostly confined to perhaps a game of cards or dice at lunch 
hours or when waiting for work, or perhaps putting on a bet, according to 
interviewees. Since average engagements were of greater duration than those in 
Liverpool for instance, there was that much less idle time left over for gambling and 
other forms of entertainment, though the taking of bets could take place at any time 246 
23' 'A Day in the Docks, Scribner's Magazine, vol. 18,1879, pp. 32-47; McCabe, J. D., Lights 
and Shadows of New York Life (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1970) p. 534; Asbury, If., The 
Gangs of New York (Old Town Books, 1989) p. 85. 
238 Interview with NYE, 12.4.00 
239 Interview with NYA, 31.3.00. 
° Cooke Johnson, L, `Criminality on the Docks' in Davies, S. et al (eds. ), Dock Workers: 
International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970 (Ashgate Publishing 
2000) pp. 721-745 
241 Davis, C. J., `Working with the Hook: A Comparative Study of London and New York 
Dockworkers, 1945-1955', The London Journal, vol. 25 pt. 2,2000, p. 89 
242 Interview with NYI, 22.3.00 
243 Interview with NYE, 12.4.00 
2" New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 2, p. 1060, vol. 3, pp. 
395-6, interview with NYJ, 20.3.00 (New York) 
2'5 Interview with NYJ, 20.3.00 
246 Interview with NYH, 2.4.00; U. S. Congress, Senate. Special Committee to Investigate 
Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, p. 1461; 
U. S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Waterfront 
Investigation, p. 111. 
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NEW YORK DOCKS UNIONISMAND THE LOCAL STATE 
The ILA benefited from improvements in citywide employment conditions after 
1945 247 Still, longshore work could be scarce in the late 1940s, depending on 
borough and pier. And in the absence of registration schemes to limit the numbers 
seeking dockwork and to cement state-union relations, as in Britain, ILA activity 
became concentrated on the cultivation of local political levers to buttress its efforts. 
Pre-1953 history 
The ILA's primary political strength was at municipal level, where the details of 
policy were decided, though federal legislation facilitated its growth from 1933 until 
reversals in the late 1940s. Federal level lobbying was also instrumental in the 
248 passage of compensation legislation in 1927 
By 1870, the connection between local politics and the New York waterfront was 
evident, as revealed by Knights of Labor manoeuvrings during the 1887 strike, 
longshore union endorsement of the failed Henry George campaign in 1886 for the 
mayoralty and inside the history of the Walsh enterprises in the port. 249 Nonetheless, 
it was left to the ILA to more fully develop the potential offered by political 
involvement. Daniel Keefe, the first ILA President, was especially known for his 
enthusiasm for mixing union and political business. 
247 Recorded unemployment statistics for New York City, as annual averages, were: 
1950: 235608 
1951: 176700 
1952: 146343 
1953: 141225 
1954: 179781 
(Source: New York State Department of Labor, Division of Employment, Annual Report 
1954) 
Locke, J. G., 'Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation for the Port of New 
York', US Bureau of Labor Statistics, no. 485,1929, pp. 26-52 
249 The rise of Walsh stevedoring firms in lower Manhattan involved a judicious mixture of 
party political contacts and personal relationships with the LUPA union. During a wage 
dispute in 1879, local aldermen were approached to arbitrate while near the end of the 1887 
`Big Strike, ' the Knights of Labor became a convert to the cause of arbitration, made 
compulsory if necessary (Montgomery, D., The Fall of the House of Labor (Cambridge 
University Press, 1987) pp. 102-3; NYT, 29.4.1879) 
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Keefe was a member of the National Civic Federation, established in 1900 as a class 
mediation agency and numbering in its membership the great and good of U. S. urban 
society and industry. The NCF, according to Einhorn, `championed conservative 
organized labour as a permanent institution in American life. 'u° 
Keefe's successor, T. J. O'Connor, continued this position, ending up as Chairman of 
the U. S. Shipping Board and serving under Republican administrations until 1933 ul 
Joseph Ryan, when in command of the ILA from 1927, forged links with local 
political powers through the Central Trades and Labor Council. The Council, as `the 
largest membership association among the nongovernmental groups in the city, ' had 
an important role in endorsing Mayors and other candidates for public office in New 
York . 
252 Reinforcing this was the oft-misconstrued Joseph P. Ryan Association, 
where Ryan and other ILA luminaries sat with shipowners, politicians and others 
interested in the port 253 
As also president of the New York Central Trades Council of over 600 local affiliates 
with a combined membership of 700,000, Ryan in the 1930s represented most AFL 
unions in the city. 254 One result was a mutually buttressing relationship between the 
union and members of the social and political elite. In attendance at the 1951 ILA 
Convention for example was the (Republican) State Industrial Commissioner Edward 
Corsi (who praised the ILA for fighting Communism). 
Others such as the Mayor, the Police Commissioner, President of the AFL and state 
politicians spoke of their high regard for the union at ILA Conventions. Another 
250 MRC: MSS. 159/3/B/49: letter from Daniel Keefe to ILA officers and members of 7.12.08. 
The fact that Daniel Keefe backed the Republican Party was a cause of difficulty with other 
AFL unions (Einhorn, R. L, Industrial Relations in the Progressive Era: The United States 
and Great Britain', Social Service Review, vol. 58 no. 1, March 1984, pp. 98-116; Karson, M., 
American Labor Unions and Politics, 1900-1918 (Beacon Press 1958) pp. 63,126; Pelling, 
H., American Labor (University of Chicago Press 1960) pp. 101-6; MRC: MSS. 159/5/3/1184: 
ILA Annual Convention 14-19 July 1902, p. 10). 
251 NIT, 18.10.35 
252 Sayre, W. and Kaufman, H., Governing New York City: Politics in the Metropolis (W. W. 
Norton 1965), pp. 508-9 
253 XIIR: Box 2 Folder 54: 'Twenty-Eighth Anniversary Dinner The West Side Association of 
Commerce in the City of New York' (1952), Box 26 Folder 14: `Annual Dinner Dance of the 
Joseph P. Ryan Association, Inc ... Seating List' (1936) ua Goulden, J. C., Meany: The Unchallenged Strong Man of American Labor (Atheneum 
1972) p. 65; WA: ILA 1927 Proceedings, p. 127, WA: ILA 1931 Proceedings, p. 40 
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product of this engagement with politics was Daniel P. Moynihan, U. S. Senator from 
New York, who had himself worked on the west side piers during the war and whose 
aunt owned a bar where dockworkers used to congregate 255 
The 1946 U. S. Congressional elections were a chance for the fledgling post-war rank 
and file reform committee, centred on Brooklyn, to advance its objective of a hiring 
hall and rotational employment. But the timing proved unfortunate, as candidates 
sponsored by the dockworkers became caught up in `anti-union' sentiment and Cold 
War hysteria (a huge wave of strikes hit the economy in 1946 as wages failed to keep 
up with prices). Congressional elections in 1948 failed to recover the initiative for the 
dockworkers, for the same reasons. 
Vincent J. Longhi, a New York labour lawyer, was nominated by the Brooklyn 
committee to represent the dockworkers in their struggle as the Republican-ALP 
candidate, covering the Red Hook and South Brooklyn docks. His opponents 
dismissed Longhi as a `Red' and he was defeated in the 1946 elections by almost 
6,000 votes. When Longhi again ran for Congress, as part of the `Progressive Party' in 
1948, the outcome was similar and he severed his ties to the waterfront in the early 
1950S. 256 Other attempts, at State level, to decasualise New York waterfront labour 
ran into the ground. 
The argument advanced by ILA critics misunderstood these links. Raymond thus 
referred to Ryan Association dinner-dances as serving `to dramatize, once a year, the 
great power and influence which Ryan and his closest associates wielded in New York 
City's government. 257 Rather than showing the power of waterfront racketeering, 
however, attempts by the ILA to associate itself with politicians was much less sinister 
255 Interview with NYO, 29.3.00; NYT, 25.7.51; WA: ILA 1951 Proceedings, p. 89; Hodson, 
G., The Gentleman from New York (Houghton Mifflin 2000) pp. 34-5 
M Paul O'Dwyer, a brother of the Mayor, was also defeated in November 1948. O'Dwyer, a 
lawyer for the ILA checkers' union, became President of the City Council (interview with 
NYM, 4.4.00, telephonic interview with NYM, 5.1.01; Brooklyn Public Library, Brooklyn 
Collection, series of clippings on Vincent J. Longhi; Ginger, A. F. and Christiano, D. (eds. ), 
The Cold War Against Labor, Volume One (Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute 1987) pp. 
268-77; NYT, 24.7.48) 
257 Raymond, Waterfront Priest, pp. 42-5 
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in motive, in a shared concern with Liverpool and London port unionism to secure its 
organisational base. 
New York Harbor Waterfront Commission 
Following Crime Commission hearings, the Waterfront Commission was established, 
to confront the connection between the hiring system and racketeering. At the end of 
the process, according to one supporter, the Waterfront Commission made `the 
industry from the most corrupt trade in New York City to a straightforward trade. '258 
Waterfront Commission actions, especially registration of all portworkers, did not 
completely eradicate kickbacks for work, since a) shakedowns and under-the-counter 
payoffs still occurred to access better paid work, b) employment in Commission hiring 
halls was subject to an `indoors shape up. ' New union men had to wait before getting 
their first wage, and it was also rumoured that temporary longshore workers might 
have `to pay up' to be detailed to a permanent job u9 In most waterfront sections, the 
minimum engagement period remained four hours, although the numbers utilising the 
hiring centres declined over the years. 260 The infiltration of racketeers into ILA 
Locals and waterfront related businesses was a special worry and never fully 
resolved. 261 
Commission codes were often implemented in a more rigid and legalistic fashion than 
the equivalent ones administered by the Dock Labour Scheme in Britain, as befitting 
258 Commission agents in the mid 1950s destroyed a racket in the Leonardo Navel Base in 
New Jersey in which payoffs were made to the union delegate for higher paying work. Those 
who refused to play along were refused work. The Waterfront Commission also found cases 
where payoffs were arranged for more regularly waged checker work (interview with NYF, 
26.3.00; Waterfront Commission `1955-1956 Annual Report' p. 19) 
259 NYT, 27.5.79 
260 In March, 2002, for example, it was reported that a `system of cash payoffs' was 
discovered in two Jersey City-Bayonne ILA Locals, in which back door deals were negotiated 
by longshore workers for better paying assignments as crane driver and stackers. Involved in 
the racket were a hiring agent, two shop stewards, two `union field bosses' and a hiring agent. 
A couple of interviewees seen in 2000 had alluded in general terms to this type of malpractice 
For more details, read: New York Harbor, Waterfront Commission of, Special Report of the 
Waterfront Commission to the Governors of the States of New York and New Jersey 
(December 1960); NYT, 29.12.60, U. S. President's Commission on Organized Crime, The 
Edge (March, 1986) pp. 52-61 
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its anti-crime mandate 262 For example, under Commission rules, any unauthorised 
absence from the site of work could be construed and treated as `ghosting, ' a serious 
offence. In this, it contrasted most starkly with Liverpool, where the equivalent 
malpractice, `welting' continued virtually unchecked? 63 The Commission, like Dock 
Labour Boards in Britain, could also take into account the behaviour of registered 
dockworkers outside the dock gates if it involved (in the British case) violence or (in 
New York) `organized' criminality or contact with syndicated crime families. M 
Concrete differences between the Waterfront Commission and the NDLB were also 
seen in respective policies towards the importation of strikebreakers, which the British 
system refused to get engaged in, but which the Waterfront Commission countenanced 
under controlled conditions and under its `emergency' provisions. This indicated 
the supplementary but at times explicit role of the Waterfront Commission in 
facilitating the movement of cargoes in the port. While not often deployed, the 
Commission had the authority to lift a man's pass if he belonged, or had once 
belonged, to a proscribed political group. A new Commission unit was established 
in 1956 `for the full time duty of uncovering subversive elements and taking proper 
action against them. ' 
262 A conviction for illegal gambling on or near a pier or terminal in New York was a ground 
for suspension or revocation of a registration from the mid-1950s. (telephonic interview with 
D. Greenfield, New York, 13.2.01; New York Waterfront Commission `1990-1991 Annual 
Report' p. 12) 
263 In one case, a man was caught working in a factory when he was on the payroll of a 
stevedoring firm for `nearly three years. ' He involved two timekeepers and his father-in-law 
in the scam. Cases of ghosting and other unauthorised absences continued into the 1990s. 
Perpetrators' registration would usually be suspended and the `victimised' employer 
compensated monetarily by the offender for the `lost' time (Axelrod, Government Covers the 
Waterfront, p. 348; New York Waterfront Commission 'Annual Report 1956-1957' p. 24, 
`1989-90 Annual Report' p. 12, `1991-1992 Annual Report' pp. 8-9, `1996-1997 Annual 
Report' p. 9; Annual Report 1997-1998' p. 12; New York Waterfront Commission `Statement 
of Policy by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor Concerning Payroll Cheating' 
. 3.75)) Telephonic interview with D. Greenfield, 13.2.01 
263 Nossiter, B. D., 'Waterfront War: Round Two in New York', The Nation, 8 October, 1955, 
pp. 298-302; NYT, 1.4.54 Axelrod, D., Government Covers the Waterfront: An Administrative 
Study of the Background Origin, Development, and Effectiveness of the Bistate Waterfront 
Commission of New York Harbor, 1953-1966 (Syracuse University, D. P. A 1967) p. 444. Also 
consult Johnson, T., The Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor: A Case Study of a Bi- 
State Regulatory Agency (Columbia University, Ph. D 1963); Hutchinson, J., The Imperfect 
Union: A History of Corruption in American Trade Unions (E. P. Dutton 1972) p. 350 
26 Waterfront Commission `1956-1957 Annual Report', pp. 29-30. 
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But it was suggested that any rank and file activist who threatened the status quo 
could find himself entangled with the statutory body 267 These features had no parallel 
on British docks, where members of Communist or Trotskyite associations achieved 
considerable authority in the Liverpool and London docks. 
DIFFERENCES 
Philosophical individualism 
This is not to say that there were `no' differences in practices and malpractices across 
these ports. When trying to fully understand the behaviour of union executives, for 
example, wider values that they shared with mainstream opinion were clearly in force, 
which conferred or denied legitimacy to characteristics of dockwork. As values 
differed according to nation- state, so did the meaning of these characteristics. 
By this means, the ILA refused to countenance registration of their members on the 
grounds that if this involved the state, it was an unacceptable exercise of state power, 
with no parallel in other industries, even though it would limit dockworker-hiring 
malpractices. ILA corporate philosophy shared the world-view of the AFL, focused 
on freedom from state interjections in its affairs. The AFL hierarchy opposed 
government mandated unemployment insurance until the last, for the reason that free 
men should not be coerced into measures against their own informed judgement 269 
The Dockers Union, in London, meanwhile displayed a deep attachment to 
267 The Waterfront Commissions' 1955-6 Annual Report noted that it was `very much aware 
of the importance of this phase of its work' (p. 27). A case was that of Brooklyn Local 1814 
member Peter Bel who, in the early 1960s, stood as a reform candidate for the post of union 
delegate. This and some old left-wing associations of his aroused the Commission's interest, 
which removed Bel's pass in 1964. It was eventually returned, but only after years of court 
action (interview with NYB, 29.3.00; Axelrod, Government Covers the Waterfront, p. 232-4; 
DiFazio, W. Longshoremen, Community and Resistance on the Brooklyn Waterfront (Bergin 
and Garvey, 1985) p. 49) 
2" For a good account of these groups, see Dash, J., Good Morning Brothers (London 
Borough of Tower Hamlets 1987). TUC hostility towards Communism is articulated in 
MRC: MSS 292/770/6 T 1688 
269 Pelling, H., American Labor (University of Chicago Press 1960) p. 123 
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governmental guarantees and obligations over a far wider range of social and 
economic activities. 270 
Another differential over Britain was a predilection more stressed in the American 
setting for viewing behaviour as self-determined, accounting for a viewpoint of crime 
as divorced from `ordinary' social relations. Moore observed that this led to the 
highly influential Kefauver interstate crime investigation for instance adopting `a 
conspiratorial, law enforcement perspective rather than a sociological regulatory 
one. 271 Waterfront Commission practices underscored this position, in a distinction it 
made between the `good guys' (Commission staff and other police units) and the `bad 
guys' (waterfront perpetrators) 272 
The British predilection, meantime, remained one of under-stating corruption as a 
broad phenomenon. As Jenkins and Potter stated, the idea of a British `organized' 
crime problem was assumed to be `almost a contradiction in terms. '273 These 
contrasting views powerfully distorted the reporting of `industrial' crime and cast into 
doubt statistical evidence. 
Accountability 
Another strand of American thought focused upon `democratic' accountability, 
usually denoting (in the waterfront sector) the popular election of dock administrators. 
New York pier management was an arm of local political processes, though over time 
the function was bureaucratised and taken over by skilled administrators. 
Unlike dock authorities in Liverpool or London, after 1870, the municipality in New 
York was heavily involved in pier management. 74 This characteristic stemmed from 
270 As previously stated, the Dockers' Union espoused a much more direct state role in issues 
such as unemployment, conciliation and industrial policy (Western Mail, 6.7.1891; The Echo, 
4.7.1891; Coates, K. and Topham, T., Making of the Labour Movement: The Formation of the 
Transport and General Workers' Union, 1870-1922 (Spokesman Books 1994) pp. 106-8) 
271 Moore, W. H., The Kefauver Committee and the Politics of Crime 1950-1952 (University 
of Missouri Press 1974) p. 237. 
272 WA: Box 11: Daniel Bell 'Comments on the Waterfront Problem' (1955). 
273 Jenkins, P. and Potter, G. W., 'Before the Krays: Organized Crime in London, 1920-1960', 
Criminal Justice History, 1988, p. 211 
274 For more, see: NYT, 26.9.1867,11.2.1868,14.2.1868,16.2.1868 
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a greater governmental role in all forms of transportation in the United States. Canal 
financing and building, for example, was from the start reliant on state and federal 
resources. 75 Private capital in most cases financed canals and railways in Britain, 
meanwhile, and entrepreneurs funded dock investments in Liverpool and London 
before the early twentieth century. 276 
In New York, a dedicated Docks Board was created in 1870, `containing magnificent 
and comprehensive schemes for the improvement of the waterfront of New-York (sic) 
City. ' The Docks Board was authorised to regulate wharfage charges, lease wharves 
and piers and to draw up grand plans for the modemisation of the 277 
The New York Times presciently warned of the `room for unchecked extravagance' 
and grafting contained in the `political' composition of the Board 278 A succession of 
`scandals' hit the Board, and centred on insider deals, political patronage over 
appointments, corruption in the leasing of piers and of pier rentals. 279 
Many of the problems of corruption inside the New York docks administration were 
overblown, as suggested in low conviction rates, but not without a basis in reality, in 
this case feeding off underlying conflicts of interest and confusion over the 
275 Goodrich, C., Government Promotion of American Canals and Railroads 1800-1890 
(Columbia University Press 1960) pp. 20-22; Davis, L E. et al, American Economic Growth 
(Harper and Row 1972) p. 648. Corrupt dealings in the maintenance of the Eric Canal system 
in New York State emerged in 1876. Ten men were indicted and the Canal Auditor with other 
public officials was dismissed from his job. 
76 Bagwell, P. S., The Transport Revolution from 1770 (Batsford 1974) p. 18; Parliament, 
Royal Commission on the Port of London, Minutes of Evidence, cmd. 1152 (1902), p. 287 
27 NYT 22.1.1870. The Docks Board underwent a number of changes in title. 
278 NYr, 12.4.1870 
279 In 1889, evidence was taken that dredging contracts for the Docks Board were awarded 
without competition, that Board accounts were open to manipulation, that the Engineer-in- 
Chief exercised undue influence in the department, and that 'dummies' were utilised to 
purchase pier leases that were sold on for high prices. The Collector of Wharfage gave out, in 
was claimed in 1895, privileged information on the bids received for work and it was 
demonstrated that contracts were not always awarded on the basis of value for money. Most 
of those in the employment of the Board were 'political appointees'. The Mazet Committee, in 
1899, told how dredging work for the Board was given to a Tammany Hall connection and 
how the Board bought all its cement from a Tammany-connected firm (New York llerald, 
12.11.89,14.11.89,15.11.89,20.11.89,23.11.89; NYT, 2.10.1895,3.8.1899,22.12.31, 
23.12.31,25.1.32) 
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appropriate role of docks officials. 80 Probably the most substantial case involved 
negotiations over pier leases approved in 1926 leading in 1930 to the tax evading 
conviction of Judge Bernard Vause, for receiving $250,000 from the United American 
Lines. In 1947, the Deputy Head of the Marine and Aviation Department (a new 
name for the old Docks Board) together with a contractor using the port were 
convicted of conspiracy and of taking unlawful fees. 281 
Across the Hudson River, in New Jersey, local governments in Hoboken and Jersey 
City were more obviously implicated in patronage activities on the docks, as 
recounted. Underworld figures from New York were among a cast of questionable 
characters in the episode that also included ILA Locals in the region and the Mayors 
of Hoboken and Jersey City. 2 
no George Plunkitt, head of Tammany Hall in the 1890s, freely admitted before another 
official inquiry that his political position helped him make money from Board contracts, and 
that Commissioner Cram, sitting on the Board, showed him favours. Charles Murphy, a Docks 
Commissioner and Tammany `boss' after Plunkitt, related how most of the men sent to him 
for work with the Board were hired as a reward for political work. Alderman Gaffney was 
acquitted of securing a lease on a pier from the city for his New York Contracting and 
Trucking Company in 1901. In 1900, evidence was presented of favoured `insiders' with ties 
to the docks administration and to Tammany being granted privileges on the use of city docks 
to unload ice. The improper use of `treasurer's orders' was the centrepiece of a 1902 scandal. 
It was discovered the following year that pier rental prices were fixed in private, and that 
middlemen sold pier lease contracts on for vast sums. The 1931 Seabury Inquiry looking into 
the city's political machine devoted attention to the leasing of New York piers. Seabury 
revealed how Tammany leaders received legal fees from Jarka stevedoring company profits. 
The President of the National Democratic Club took $50,000 from the North German Lloyd 
Line to secure a lease on a Manhattan pier; the Club was close to the Democratic political 
machine and the money paid out, it was alleged, as an insurance that the lease would be 
obtained (Werner, M. R., Tammany Hall (Greenwood Press 1968) pp. 424-5; Allen, 0. E. The 
Tiger: The Rise and Fall of Tammany Hall (Addison-Wesley 1993) pp. 209-11; NYT, 
31.10.1895,3.8.1899,13.6.02,3.7.03,10.7.03,17.9.21,11.5.30,19.5.30,24.10.30; New York 
Herald, 13.6.02; New York Tribune 17.6.03) 
28' NYT, 30.5.47,17.7.47,25.7.47,6.8.47 
282 A couple of witnesses before the New York State Crime Commission detailed how the 
Hoboken authorities interfered in hiring and firing of longshore workers in that part of the 
waterside. Mayor Kenny in Jersey City shared, it was claimed, in kickbacks for each job 
`sold' on the piers and helped remove from the docks those who were politically hostile The 
U. S. Congress, in 1953, took evidence that in Jersey City, Claremont Terminal attracted `the 
most venal elements' After the Terminal opened, Kenny gave Tony Marchitto, his 
representative in ILA Local 1247, a list of names of men recommended by ward leaders and 
others as being deserving of work. When Kenny was pushed out of the situation, this caused 
chaos, leading to the closing of the Claremont installation in September 1952 (New York 
State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 2, pp. 751-765,853-7,933-44,965- 
74; 1030-1046,1142-7,1287,1361; U. S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, Waterfront Investigation: New York New Jersey: Interim Report, Report 
No. 653.83rd Congress Ist Session, 1953, pp. 17-31) 
290 
Acceptance of violence 
Violence was a more `legitimate' part of labour relations disputes in the American 
situation from the late nineteenth century, when unions began first to flex their 
muscles. Reflected in the high murder rate per capita in the United States, 283 it helped 
explain older generation ILA leadership tolerance towards violence in the furtherance 
of union objectives; ILA President Thomas Gleason was noted in his FBI report for 
instance as being a "tough guy' and quick with his fists. ' Industrial disputes all too 
commonly degenerated into armed contests in which the use of firearms was virtually 
285 
Many examples of waterfront violence exist for New York, dating from the 1920s. 
During the 1919 ILA Proceedings, it was charged that Dick Butler, a union organiser, 
owned a detective agency established to prevent longshore strikers from being 
assaulted by private detectives hired by employers. Members of the detective agency 
were also used to drive out radical elements out of the union. In 1920, a Brooklyn 
`gang leader' was slain in what police claimed was a bloody waterfront dispute. 286 
The ILA in the 1930s openly admitted employing `sluggers' to battle it out with 
`communists', while Joseph Ryan claimed that employers used `goons' with criminal 
records to protect scabs. It was further reported that Tony Anastasio, a leading 
Brooklyn based union officer, led a contingent armed with baseball bats during a 1946 
87 strike in Elizabeth, New Jersey in which shots were fired? 
Reports of waterfront mayhem from 1945, at a time when national economic 
management placed a premium on the rapid movement of ships in and out of ports, 
had lasting effects. Marshall Aid supplies to Europe were routed through New York, 
283 Archer, D. and Gartner, R., Violence and Crime in Cross-National Perspectives (Yale 
University Press 1984) 
2" FBI file 62-72482 
285 Kelly, R. J., The Upperworld and the Underworld: Case Studies of Racketeering and 
Business Infiltrations in the United States (IGuwer Academic/Plenum Publishers 1999) pp. 
48-52 
286 WA: ILA 1919 Proceedings, pp. 30-34; NYT, 1.4.20; NYT, 25.4.32 
287 U. S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate 
Commerce, Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, hearings part 7: New York-New 
Jersey. 81st Congress Ist Session and 82nd Congress 2nd Session. 1951, pp. 1467-71 
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as were some military supplies used to fight communism in Korea later. Previously 
ignored docks malpractices became, in line with new imperatives, a matter of national 
concern. Although the chief underlying concern of British and American 
governments became centred on unofficial stoppages by dockworkers, the fact of 
waterfront killings and gangsterism did help to shape the specific form of state 
interventions in New York, although with similar outcomes to Liverpool and London 
in terms of reasserting `order' to the industry. 
Syndicated criminality on the docks 
At the heart, therefore, of state relations with the ILA were allegations of malpractice 
and of racketeering in the union. Although misconduct on the New York docks was 
overstated as a `problem' to be confronted, there was undoubtedly a presence of 
syndicated or `organized' criminals who were active in some ILA Locals. 
Criminal control or authority over parts of the New York docks was its most 
distinctive historical feature from either Liverpool or London. Similarly, construction 
industry practices in Britain, although described as `open to fraud and corruption'288 
never attracted organised criminals in the same way as those in New York did. 
In this fashion, racketeering acted `independently' from malpractices as an industrial 
problem across countries, in the New York situation interacting with immigrant 
labour, ethnicity, the problems associated with localism, an ideology discounting 
formal means to control hiring discrimination and an industrial inheritance that 
favoured `might' over `right. ' 
A weakness of the sources given in chapter two was their lack of discussion of those 
instances in which the power of New York waterfront racketeers was shown to be 
partial. They were not always as successful in placing their associates into lucrative 
docks jobs as was assumed, for example? Moreover, shipowners could effectively 
288 Times, 5.8.00 
289 State Crime Commission testimony told how, for example, prison connections could prove 
valuable if a convict required a pier job after release. But the `corner' this gave apparently 
only extended to a `no-show' work assignment at best, and often the individual had to labour 
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oppose racketeers' demands if their bluff was called. M The suggestion that port 
racketeers `ran' ILA leaderships, using the union as a weapon to cow dockworkers, 
was also refuted by the union's obvious failure to avert post-1945 work stoppages. 
Dynamics propelling racketeers to invade some sections of New York unionism but 
not others seem to have been linked to ethnic and often family backgrounds. 91 Also 
of note was their behaviour once `installed' in a union Local. Several of the most 
cited union racketeers were well received by their fellow union members. Much of 
this was related to their support of measures also espoused by rank and file unionists, 
though this sat uneasily with the lower profits they would rake in from payoffs that 
were a feature of the old system 292 
Regardless of other evidence, examples of admitted underworld penetration of the 
waterfront were presented as the norm. American texts, by and large, suggested that 
syndicated criminals in New York port were at once the instigators and receivers of 
proceeds from the major improper dock practices, an assertion that was unproven but 
achieved `acceptability' in mainstream literature through its repeated and uncritical 
usage. The extent of New York's malpractices problem was comparable with those in 
alongside the rank and file for a while once taken on. Dominick Genova, released from jail in 
the 1930s, got a job via his prison mates on the upper west side, being hired as a baggage 
handler without paying for a union book as required. Through the Bowers family, who were 
a power on the pier, he was given steady work, then secured a 'no-show' job on the payroll of 
a steamship firm (New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5) vol. 3, pp. 
548-53; 2146-81) 
290 See the interview with NYA, 31.3.00 in which his company rebuffed the wife of racketeer 
Tony Scotto without suffering any repercussions. 
291 'Operation Underworld', the collaboration from 1942-5 between U. S. intelligence and the 
waterfront underworld in New York to safeguard military supplies from sabotage, had strong 
ethnic overtones. One upshot was that 'no active sabotage, no labour disturbances, no 
disruptions, nor delays of shipping' stopped military personnel and supplies from leaving on 
time. More pertinent than conspiracies were 'no strike' agreements. The central character in 
the episode, Salvatore 'Lucky' Luciano, had his greatest following among Italian longshore 
workers. The saga is told well in Campbell, R, The Luciano Project (McGraw-Hill 1977); 
U. S. Federal Bureau of Investigation File No. 39-2141 'Charles 'Lucky' Luciano; U. S. 
Congress, U. S. Senate, Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate 
Commerce, Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, hearings part 7: New York-New 
Jersey. 81st Congress Ist Session and 82nd Congress 2nd Session, 1951, pp. 606-8,1187-91; 
Columbia University, Butler Library, Frank Hogan Papers, Box 20) 
292 Such as reputed Mafia members and ILA powers Mike Clemente, Tony Anastasio and 
Tony Scotto, already mentioned Clemente helped to operate a work-sharing scheme on the 
pier he worked on 
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Liverpool and London, in addition, while in respect to shipboard malpractices, the 
New York situation was on a lesser scale. 
Criminal intrusions in Britain, by their very absence, supplied far less ammunition for 
critics of the consensual machinery established after 1945 to seize upon on in the 
name of crime fighting. Intrusions of gangland elements into Britain's ports were 
peripheral, if interviewees and an exhaustive examination of published works are to be 
believed. As one interviewee said, speaking of London, `We had hard men but we had 
no-one that tried that game. '293 
Where allegations are made of more substantial gangland infiltration of the docks in 
London, they are at the level of unconfirmed rumour. 294 The only case of London 
dock related violence I could find came from 1961, when eight dockworkers were 
jailed for participating in a gang fight in Canning Town. Two factions were involved 
in a feud unconnected to dock practices, but the London Docks Board nonetheless 
dismissed them all from the industry295 
A fundamental difference over New York may have been the fragmented state of 
organized criminality in the British capital and in Liverpool. Italian immigration into 
England was relatively small; most of it from the north of Italy (where no `mafia' 
tradition existed), and offences commonly associated with first generation New York 
Sicilians were unknown in London, according to the police 
Given the lack of systematic work on Liverpool's underworld, what exists suggests 
even less of a gang problem on that waterfront. Scattered accounts exist for London 
of the late nineteenth century `Deptford Eye-Ball Buster' group, hired by the Shipping 
Federation to maintain order on the docks in London. Ben Tillett recalled how the 
contract system used on London's enclosed docks encouraged the use of `bullies, ' 
before the 1889 stoppage. London Dock Labour Board registration books were 
293 Interview with LONG, 26.5.99 
294Author James Morton made the most detailed claims of gangland penetration into London 
docks in his East End Gangland. Through private communications, Morton failed to 
substantiate them to this writer and a hoped-for interview with his principal informant never 
materialised 
295 East London Advertiser, 29.9.61 
296NYT, 16.3.09 
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allegedly sold on the black market in the latter 1950s. Both the Kray gang and the 
Butler crime family south of the Thames (Wapping and Bermondsey docks) were 
believed to be involved in this, facilitating for those entitled to a registration book a 
shorter wait before they could start work. The `Watney Street' gang in Stepney, cast 
London, was reported to be composed of Irish dockers - the gang's long history 
included waterfront gambling, pilferage and loansharking dated from before 1914.97 
CONCLUSION 
The experience of the Liverpool-London axis shows that even where systematic 
failures within an industrial structure were conducive to malpractices, such problems 
did not necessarily create a problem of racketeering. The orthodoxy among American 
sources obscured the empirical reality of most New York dock work and differences 
in the legitimacy or acceptability of malpractices and interventions, akin to 
distinctions made in Liverpool and London. 
What was remarkable was how little was actually known about malpractices in the 
port in spite of the large number of sources devoted to this field. One obstacle was the 
subjective and political basis of many charges made of a more `serious' problem 
needing new state powers. `Show trial' aspects of State Crime Commission hearings 
were highlighted by its few critics, as `not designed either to ascertain facts or to 
present facts in a balanced, impartial manner. '298 `The reader is constantly and 
297 A case of violence made the headlines in Hull during the early 1930s, in which the local 
TGWU branch was implicated. `Hard men' were utilised, operating with a local TGWU 
official to ensure that competition for waterfront business was dampened by the simple 
expedient of destroying rivals' equipment. A complaint was made, leading to the destruction 
of the ring, which it was argued in court had only been set up to ease depressed trade 
conditions in the port. Sources used for Hull: Hull Daily Mail, 2-3.9.31,3.8.96, transcript of a 
tape of Viv Hill, kindly supplied by Keith Sinclair, Sinclair, K., How the Blue Union Came to 
Hull Docks (privately printed 1995), p. 5. London: Briggs, A. and Saville, J. (eds), Essays in 
Labour History (Macmillan 1967) p. 335-6; Tillett, B., Memories and Reflections (John Long 
1931) p. 173; Sponza, L, Italian Immigrants in Nineteenth-Century Britain: Realities and 
Images (Leicester University Press 1988); Kray, R., Born Fighter (Arrow Books 1991) p. 47; 
Morton, J., Gangland Volume 2 (Little, Brown and Co. 1994) p. 24; Morton, J., East End 
Gangland (Little, Brown and Co. 2000) pp. 240-2. 
298 U. S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee No. 3, New York-New 
Jersey Waterfront Commission Compact, hearing 83rd Congress Ist Session, 1953, p. 207 
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cleverly led to infer, ' as Russell pointed out in 1966, `that what is revealed is but a 
glimpse of an even more shocking picture. '299 
Seen from the `structural' perspective, exemplified in most of the `decausalisation' 
texts and more obviously in the construction industries reports, there was much in the 
port of New York to validate the analysis. Of significance was a lack of income 
support measures in New York, which fostered patronage and a feeling, more that 
elsewhere, that a man should grab what he could when he could. Institutional and 
physical barriers to the productive use of the waterfront were obvious, furnishing 
standing incentives for employers and employees to find illegal means of 
circumventing them. Where racketeers existed, they had many levers through which 
to exact tribute. 
But standards of legitimate industrial conduct varied tremendously by time and by 
place, accounting for the uneven spread of malpractices given the same opportunity 
structures and of the differential way interests equally involved in malpractices were 
considered and treated. The Waterfront Commission showed flexibility in its 
interpretation of `criminal' behaviour on the docks. Commission rulings also 
mirrored, in some instances, the assumption it made that port employers were more 
sinned against than sinning, 300 weighed up `such considerations as the business 
climate in the industry when the payments were made, the circumstances under which 
they were made, the amounts involved, the number of years elapsed since the last of 
i301 such payments and the affirmative evidence of subsequent good conduct ... 
Within this, the most illuminating aspect in New York is the behaviour of unionists 
towards allegedly racketeering elements in their ranks. They illustrated the 
complexity of receptivity to malpractices, based on notions of legitimate forms of 
299 Russell, Men Along the Shore, p. 157. 
300 The McGrath Corp. for example, was treated leniently by the Waterfront Commission and 
given a license to operate in the port, on the basis that 'shakedowns and racketeering were the 
rule rather than the exception on the waterfront. ' (New York Harbor, Waterfront Commission 
of, In the Matter of the Application of John IV. McGrath Corporation for License as a 
Stevedore: Report of h earing Of cer, New York, 7 September, 1956) 
301 New York Waterfront Commission, Annual Report 1955-1956, p. 29. In India, according 
to one interviewee, many maintenance contracts were done through means of kickbacks. This 
was but a 'normal' part of doing business in the region. (interview with NYN, 11.4.00) 
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action that to a degree `corrupt' union officials shared with the men. `Pilfering' rank 
and file dockworkers, for example, were hardly in a moral position to complain about 
the activities of corrupt union officials. 
Publicly `responsible' and hard working New York docks union officials like Anthony 
Anastasio and Tony Scotto took part in serious criminal offences, as revealed by the 
FBI in the late 1970s 302 Their behaviour owed more to a multilevel analysis, but 
most important, their activities were perceived as at least not harming the interests of 
the rank and file. 
Mars explained how "normal' work roles' were `adapted to serve the needs' of 
pilferage 303 Viewed more broadly, this was the case with union racketeers. 
Reflecting the similar concept of `entitlement, ' a feeling, more common than was 
admitted, was that so long as racketeers were seen to be advancing the men's cause, 
some personal veniality `on the side' was permissible. Said a former union member in 
Anastasio's Local, for example, `he was no Boy Scout ... but gave you a fair 
shake. '304 On Freddie Field, convicted of port racketeering in the 1970s, an 
interviewee claimed that `His men would swear by him, because he made sure they 
got everything. '305 
Anastasio, labelled as an organised crime figure though never convicted, had been a 
foe of the shape-up method of hiring relatively early on, and was best recalled by the 
rank and file for his active sponsorship of the first free Medical Centre of its type in 
the port. In 1963, when he died, thousands of people lined up in the streets outside the 
church where Anastasio lay. Scotto took over as 1814 President in 1963, by general 
302 Cf. Salerno, T. J. and Salerno, T. N., United States v. Scotto: Progression of a Waterfront 
Corruption Prosecution from Investigation Through Appeal', The Notre Dame Lawyer, vol. 57 
no. 2,1981, pp. 364-88 
303 Mars, G., Dock Pilferage' in Rock, P. and McIntosh, M. (eds), Deviance and Social 
Control (Tavistock 1974) p. 209 
304 Interviews with NYJ, 20.3.00, NYN, 11.4.00; Journal of Commerce, 6.3.63; New York 
Herald Tribune, 12.5.53; NYT, 10.5.53,8.5.55; Nossiter, 'Waterfront War. Round Two in 
New York'; MacNair, Chaplain on the (Vaterfront, pp. 118-129; Schulberg. 'The Waterfront 
Revisited', pp. 32-3; Meyers, "Wrangdoodle' Time on the Docks', pp. 85-6+; Russell, Men 
Along the Shore, pp. 270-2) 
' Interview with NYN, 11.4.00 
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acclaim becoming an outstanding labour leader and an arch proponent of the seniority 
system, while pressing the NYSA to improve the GAI's provisions. 
Former Attorney General Robert Kennedy told how, in the same way, the corrupt 
activities of Teamsters boss Jimmy Hoffa were excused so long as he got `good 
contracts for his men. '306 Moreover, other factors other than simple `corruption' 
entered the equation when union members voted into power alleged `racketeers, ' such 
as their prior experience and competence and negotiating good contracts for the men. 
Considerations such as these `dictate that he is retained even if his methods of 
personal enrichment do not meet with the hearty approval of a majority of the 
membership. ' 307 
As demonstrated, the New York waterfront landscape was conditioned by perceptions 
of criminality and presentations with a debatable empirical basis. Chapter eight draws 
together the major themes of the thesis, emphasising those points where the evidence 
matches chapter two sources and perspectives while indicating shortcomings in 
established frameworks, both empirical and theoretical. 
306 Kennedy, R. F., The Enemy Within (DaCapo Press 1994) p. 143 
m Landesco, J., Organized Crime in Chicago (University of Chicago Press 1968) p. 135; 
Stier, Anderson and Malone, LLC, The Teamsters: Perception and Reality (Stier, Anderson 
and Malone, 2002) pp. 373-4 
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EIGHT 
PORT PRACTICES, STATE STRUCTURES AND POLICY DIRECTIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter eight returns to the theoretical interests that lie the heart of this thesis, in 
assessing how well the historical evidence matches the arguments advanced in the 
approaches encapsulated in the works by Shaw, Leggett, Devlin and other British 
authors. Also explored, for New York, are the works of Bell, Kimeldorf, Larrowe and 
the New York construction industry authors. 
The thesis shows the need, when comparing practices across national boundaries, to 
radically re-negotiate definitions and other constructions intended solely for singe 
county usage. What the authors identified in chapter two could not explain was why 
ports such as Liverpool or London did not share the same unsavoury status as that 
plaguing New York even though they shared such similar economic characteristics. 
The question became more urgent as evidence mounted of comparable malpractices in 
Liverpool and London, in some respects surpassing those reported in New York. 
Given the incomplete evidence to hand, a conclusion made was that a docks crime 
problem in New York port was undoubtedly inflated, making its situation much closer 
to that in the other ports. 
The real extent of abuses in these ports is impossible to ascertain, due to chronic 
under-reporting problems. But they were of sufficient magnitude to bring in state 
action and to preoccupy unions and employers, notably over unconstitutional 
stoppages but extending (in Britain) to malpractices like the welt. After 1945, a 
`lawless' industrial environment on both sides of the Atlantic, in which strike activity 
escalated, drew in government initiatives endeavouring to restore discipline where 
orthodox means had clearly failed. 
Malpractices have been of especial interest and formed the centrepiece around which 
the thesis is structured. The comparative project has deep ramifications, as discussed, 
extending to wider networks found away from waterfronts. As demonstrated, the 
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language and imagery applied to docks practices and malpractices in materials 
reflected divergences in official policies, but dealing in fact with similar underlying 
economic structures. While there were `real' differences between malpractices in 
Liverpool and London and those in New York, these have been overstated. 
Previous studies have neglected or understated `subjective' factors in making 
judgements about practices in New York. Although industrial practices could assume 
an unchanging form or economic function, the political and ideological environment 
in which they occurred could shift fundamentally, altering their meaning and 
connotations. More so with dock practices than most other sectors of an economy, 
`the role of the state in prompting dock employers to act was significant. This was 
especially so in the case of moves to decasualisation, and was most evident in times of 
crisis such as war. " 
Formerly `legal' operations might be criminalized, but the `seriousness' of the crime 
differed according to the country under examination. Consequently, malpractices that 
in Liverpool and London might attract a fine from a union branch might bring in 
Waterfront Commission investigators in New York. Even where the criminal law on 
industrial malpractices was comparable in the three ports, enforcement of it varied 
dramatically. In Britain, forms of organized industrial deviance were resolved 
through negotiation, unlike the New York situation. 
Methodology 
It was found that practices and malpractices in these ports could be validly compared 
utilising the triangulation methodology, as described in chapter one, but only after the 
introduction of new variables alongside those proposed in the other docks materials. 
Triangulation methodology was utilised since dock practices involved many interests 
and perspectives, none with `definitive' answers. 
The fact, for instance, that those wishing to changes made to hiring practices released 
the vast bulk of the materials onto the public arena meant that factors that disturbed 
1 Davies, S. `Employers and Dock Labour. Employment, Work and Industrial Relations in 
International Perspective' in Davies, S et al. Dock Workers (Ashgate 2000) p. 626 
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their world-view were given short shrift. In this environment, `deviations' suggesting 
that the men had managed to forge relatively comfortable niches in docks markets 
without the necessity to alter the existing status quo, were judged as irrelevant. As 
Phillips and Whiteside in Britain explained, majority opinion among portworkers was 
for the retention of the `casual' system of employment. Scattered evidence for New 
York indicates a similar sentiment. Conventional accounts, in a word, tended 
towards both elitism and ambiguity when dealing with the rank and file. 
The use of informants who were personally familiar with docks work became 
especially important given this, the sensitivity of the subject matter and a dearth of 
documents in key respects. Under-reporting of industrial malpractices was common, 
more so in Britain, making valid comparisons utilising statistics alone problematic. 
The fact that shipping was an international industry, that these three cities were 
founded on the maritime industry and that dockworkers tended to respond in similar 
ways to the same pressures, considerably eased many problems this project would 
have otherwise encountered, by limiting the number of relevant variables to be 
isolated, identified and considered. 
OTHER PERSPECTIVES 
Different emphases were evident in the published materials but often inside a set of 
core assumptions that became skewed towards two separate paradigms. British works 
operated within a model that although critical of many aspects of dock relations, did 
not want to see the solution in greater use of the criminal law. New York's literature 
also reflected the official version there, is the stress upon organised crime as the 
defining feature of the local waterfront. 
In the British context, the Shaw Report set the original paradigm, in underlining 
temporary dockwork as the primary (though not exclusive) cause of unrest. As with 
the Leggett study thirty years later, it realised a link between hiring programmes and 
ship-focused malpractices. Goldstein and the University of Liverpool, meantime, 
concentrated on problems within the TGWU that exacerbated the difficulties port 
2 See for instance XIIR Box 11: Minutes of the New York District Council Special Meeting, 
March 10,1953 
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managers had in maintaining order. Oram and Hovey related these, insofar as 
question marks over hiring, unionism and payments systems were connected to inter- 
port competitiveness. 
Turnbull and Sapsford's 1992 work was an advance. Malpractices in this view were 
influenced by economic and organisational variables, which ultimately prevailed but 
in the interim came up against a `culture' of absenteeism that had developed and was 
not easily removed. Phillips and Whiteside, meanwhile, had introduced in a deeper 
manner than hitherto political factors, placing British decasualisation efforts within 
oscillating central government policy directions. 
American `waterfront' authorities matched their British counterparts until 1945 in the 
key concerns identified, revolving about hiring dysfunctions and a commensurate 
need for the better distribution of earnings. Hiring corruption was hardly given a 
mention, even within such seminal works as those by Barnes and Swanstrom. 
A sharp conceptual disconnection from this framework was clearly evident when 
economic and political conditions changed in the mid 1940s New York. The first of a 
highly damaging series of wildcat strikes in 1945 combined with dramatic accusations 
of violence and laxity inside the criminal justice system dating from 1940 letting 
waterfront murders go free. The publicity accorded to these events admixed with old 
stereotypes of `anarchy' on the docks to manufacture a `new' framework, in which 
waterfront criminality was moved centre stage. 
Johnson's articles in 1948 for example only marginally connected to the earlier 
American works through its critique of the shape-up system, but this was now 
construed as encouraging a expanding racketeering issue rather than social problems. 
Crime Commission reports and the Waterfront Commission kept this construction 
alive through the 1950s and 1960s, and inspired theoretical modelling from Bell to 
Kimeldorf. 
The potentially positive role of New York's government was minimised, with the 
example of the ILWU on the Pacific waterfront furnishing little in the way of an 
exemplar of how the state could move debates forward, since its leadership shared the 
302 
ILA's distaste of state interference. With the exception of Phillips and Whiteside, 
political -stratagems were at 
best secondary to British analyses also. 
Human agency and local action 
The `model' usually presented in Britain and America also dealt with the broad-brush 
`economic' properties of dockwork, which quickly became identified with an 
institutional perspective. Although of value, it had the drawback of accepting that 
reforms were to be tied to outside constituents such as governments but rarely to rank 
and file actions. But as indicated in this thesis, there were extensive variations in dock 
practices and malpractices within and between ports, often unofficial in their origins 
but reinforced by and informed through port wide developments. An incredible 
number and range of practices operated by the rank and file away from formal 
controls and structures negated the hope that unionism would lead to the integration of 
labour, and thus to better discipline and higher output. 
Ports were characterised by both common and, as importantly, unique ingredients of 
union and employer organisation, infrastructure difficulties, payments methods, 
employment duration, disputes processes and political supports. `Each port is owned 
by a different type of authority, ' according to the Dock and Harbour Authority, 
`without any uniform set of conditions throughout the country. Accordingly each port 
presents its own peculiar problems. ' 
Localised understandings in defence of established `practice' or for new rights were a 
strong pressure through all post-1945 waterfront difficulties, stimulating debate and 
driving legislation but less studied and analysed than were port scale developments. 
Practices and malpractices were especially diverse in the largest two ports, the hubs of 
which are reproduced in diagrammatic form for the 1950s in Appendix G along with a 
depiction of the central waterfront area in Liverpool. 
3 Professor Alan Block, who in other respects has offered well-sourced and thought-provoking 
accounts of criminality as a historical phenomenon, fell into this trap in his'On the Waterfront 
Revisited, ' Contemporary Crises, vol. 6, pp. 373-96 
4 Dock and Harbour Authority, October 1955. 
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A creative interaction of human agency and the larger economic structure was 
occasionally evident in published materials, but the importance of the latter was 
generally over-estimated. Many descriptions therefore saw the dockworker as a 
passive `victim' of the hiring systems The result of this deficiency was a somewhat 
mechanistic outlook between authors, with port employers in the driving seat and the 
rank and file angry but powerless. The positive role of unofficial stoppages, for 
example, in illuminating faults in port systems that led to reforms was not addressed 
well. 
Chief among those who acknowledged local issues were Barnes and the Mayor's 
Committee (for New York) but without relating these to dockworker attitudes, making 
them appear perverse. British works did devote much more attention to unofficial 
action, in large part since it was so obvious from 1945. Nonetheless, this often 
became disconnected from local differences. 
Unionism and docks malpractices 
American materials also gave too much weight to waterfront unions' ability to 
centralise and then to eradicate malpractices, and too little to variations only 
nominally within their control. Given the unusually diverse nature of New York 
docks work, the ILA was more than aware of the acute organisational difficulties 
involved in even attempting to `control' decision-making there. Similarly, in 
Liverpool and London localism was a force to be reckoned with which the formality 
of unionism masked but did not eradicate. Hill argued that dockworkers were, after 
engagement, `often able to define industrial relationships on their own terms, '6 a point 
also made by Anna Green in her study of the New Zealand docks industry. 7 
Moreover, industrial pressure by the rank and file dockworker could be applied on 
employers even in the absence of unionisation, or where docks unionisation was 
s For example in: Cooke Johnson, `Criminality on the Docks' in Davies, S et al (eds. ), Dock 
Workers: International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970 (Ashgate 
Publishing 2000), pp. 721-745 
61ii11, The Dockers, p. 126. 
7 Green, A., 'Spelling, Go-Slows, Gilding Away and Theft: Informal Control Over Work on 
the New Zealand Waterfront 1915-1951, Journal of Industrial Relations, pt. 63,1992, pp. 
100-114 
304 
patchy in its coverage (as in Liverpool). In any case, non-union men were reputed to 
be the most prepared to deploy unofficial practices and malpractices! 
SPECTRUM FRAMEWORK 
When studying similar practices between countries with different cultural, political 
and legislative frameworks, as this work does, the spectrum approach supplies a more 
useable and realistic alternative. Variables included in the other frameworks never 
seemed likely to supply a solution to the questions posed therein of ideological 
interpretation of economic characteristics. The very few attempts made to relate 
docks abuses across national borders, so far as New York and Britain were concerned, 
ended up as stereotypical and derivative in form. 
Two levels of systemic bias were identified in understandings of docks activities. 
First by governments, that differed in how they viewed docks practices. Second, as a 
knock-on effect, published authors also adopted values and frameworks that in effect 
underscored the positions of governments, most importantly demonstrated in the self- 
imposed constraints found in their works. This made international comparisons of the 
`same' economic phenomena more difficult. 
`Material, ' `structural' or `organisational' constituents were of first-order significance 
in shaping malpractices, on a par with `subjective' constructs. As Turnbull, Morris 
and Sapsford note, `strike action on the waterfront was more frequent and often more 
intense than in other industries precisely because dockers were able to redefine 
`background conditions' to their own advantage and because of their ability to seize 
available opportunities, most notably the `variability' inherent in the job itself and the 
commercial pressures on stevedoring companies to turn vessels round. "o 
8 Parliament Ministry of Labour Committee on Inquiry Under the Rt. Zion. Lord Devlin into 
Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, Final Report, and. 2734 (1965). 
9 See the recent works by Colin Davis in the bibliography and the article by Cooke Johnson. 
lo Turnbull, P. Morris, J. and Sapsford, D., 1996, 'Persistent Militants and Quiescent 
Comrades: Intra-Industry Strike Activity on the Docks, 1947.89, The Sociological Review, 
vol. 44 no. 4,1996, p. 720 
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Port failures interacted with sluggishly moving grievance-handling procedures, for 
example, and eroded the legitimacy among dockworkers of constitutional means of 
resolving differences. Speaking of New York's problems, the Mayor's Joint 
Committee on Port Industry in 1952 asserted that, `There is more to operating this 
man-forsaken port, after all, than attacking evil-doers of whatever shape and variety. 
Enormous engineering problems are involved - problems which involve railroads, 
steamship lines, terminal operators and their complicated operational functions. 'll 
While not denying the economic underpinnings of docks malpractices, explanations of 
docks malpractices based solely on `material' criteria are not adequate, in two senses. 
First, they denied the politicisation of definitions of malpractices. Second, they gave 
insufficient attention to contextual factors in the area of sentiments and solidarities. 
Comprehensive explanations require that `objective' (economic) processes be viewed 
as mediated through `political' and `legitimising' (subjective) understandings. 
The spectrum framework is subdivided. First is the `national' dimension in which 
perceptions of docks processes become stigmatised by wider political structures 
external to docks relations, with serious effects on related legislation and in the 
enforcement of violations of dock rules. Locally, within the docks industry, came a 
lower level of subjectivity, in differential and sometimes colliding thresholds of 
legality and legitimacy accorded to docks practices by the main interested parties. 
Variants of this theme were identified and developed, varying by political organisation 
and dynamics (at a macro level) to earnings and by port developments on the micro 
scale. Issues of legitimate and illegitimate forms of cargo handling, shading across 
the two, intimately linked together `working' practices and `malpractices' 
conceptually and operationally. 
Politicised definitions 
The `fact' of state involvement in docks was long recognised. What remained 
unexplored in the texts is the manner in which this conditioned interpretations of 
11 Mayor's Joint Committee on Port Industry, The Decline of the Port of New York (W. J. 
McCormack, 1952) p. 3 
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docks practices. Government policies or official commissions could confer 
`invisibility' or `visibility' to industrial malpractices as a social, economic or law 
12 enforcement `problem' in a way unrecognised by most single-country sources. 
Where powerful political or ideological variables were influential in conditioning the 
popular and academic perception of waterfront structures and practices, analyses 
frequently became biased and incomplete, as illustrated in chapter two 
As a rule of thumb and under normal trading conditions, when organized labour was 
politically strong, docks `malpractices' were either overlooked or left for internal 
committees to resolve (as with the British case). But where labour was but one 
institution among others competing for dominance or power in the political 
establishment, (the case in New York) its voice was less audible, and governments 
could afford to take a less sympathetic view of malpractices that in some sense were 
associated with unionism. 
The political factor accounted for most of the perceived and reported `differences' in 
the `seriousness' and the extent of malpractices between these three ports. In New 
York, for example, by means of the organized crime issue, it was expected that more 
`order' could be imposed on the waterfront, at a time when unionism (the ILA) had 
signally failed in the job. Since `organised' crime was generally considered a greater 
public order menace than `occupational' crime, or even run-of-the-mill waterfront 
`corruption, ' the organised crime label could be powerfully utilised to justify all 
manner of interventions. Cooke Johnson, for instance, refers to organized crime as 
"big business' that comes in the wake of everyday `corruption. ' 13 
Through the use of the organised crime issue, the fact of state incursions into 
waterfront union practices was legitimised on anti-crime grounds and with broad 
support that extended to other AFL unions. For this to work, however, required 
evidence of a huge threat from racketeering that, in retrospect, the evidence failed to 
buttress, although labels from the period still resonate. 
12 Davies, P., Francis, P., Jupp, V., 1999, Invisible Crimes: Their Victims and their Regulation 
(Macmillan Press 1999); Croall, li., White Collar Crime: Criminal Justice and Criminology 
Open University Press 1992) 
3 Cooke Johnson, `Criminality on the Docks, ' p. 723 
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Docks level legitimacy and opportunity structures 
Common between and within these ports was legitimacy based on repeated usage, and 
in which material properties and shortcomings revolving around poor facilities and 
communication networks were of primary significance. Questions of the `legitimacy' 
of waterfront malpractices were more ones exercised and operated by the rank and 
file, although employers cooperated with those offering `stability' and ultimate 
profitability. 
Regardless of their legitimacy and the authority attached to them by workers, part of 
the dockwork abuse problem was clearly `material' in its origins, since the distribution 
of malpractices closely followed the structural openings for them to take place, 
whether based on payments systems or on time factors, for instance. Much British 
dock strike activity for example, as Turnbull explained, was `almost separate' from 
the daily struggles of `industrial life on the waterfront. '14 Class conflict as an 
explanation for the existence of malpractices such as systematic pilferage was true 
only up to a point. 
Malpractices like the Liverpool welt depended on the exercise of sheer industrial or 
economic power, made possible by the economic foundations of docks work and by 
bottlenecks to the efficient dispatch of commodities. Subjective ideas about the 
`entitlement' of dockworkers to perform malpractices, for example, were secondary in 
this context, though no doubt used by those involved to justify them if they were 
caught or challenged. Accounting for the persistence of malpractices after the hiring 
question had been resolved, the centrality of turnarounds for employers was such that 
all manner of deals and agreements continued to be struck, many crossing over into 
illegality. 
In a typical scenario, a Senate subcommittee eloquently told how in certain sectors of 
New York's port, `The free enterprise system has been thrown off balance. Contracts 
14 Turnbull, Morris and Sapsford, Persistent Militants and Quiescent Comrades, ' p. 701 
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were not awarded on the basis of merit ... Profitability was not based on efficiency 
and hard work rather than on bribery, extortion and questionable connections. ' 15 
CONCLUSION 
Malpractices could vary widely in the same port and certainly between ports; 
depending on the criteria utilised, the outlines of bottlenecks and by social and 
political notions of legitimacy. Given similar industrial and economic situations, 
subjective concepts and constructs determined the timing, scope and - most important 
- the nature of state intervention. 
Even where port malpractices existed, questions arose of how they should be defined, 
in what context, and for what reasons? The interplay of port capital, government 
dynamics and dock labour in Liverpool, London and New York produced variable 
outcomes in terms of the labels attached to their working practices. Confined to 
studies within one country or to within the same port, these dichotomies in how dock 
practices and malpractices were understood and signified have been obscured. 
15 U. S. Congress Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, Waterfront Corruption: Report, 98th Congress 2nd Session 1984, p. 2 
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APPENDIX A 
DEFINITIONS IN COMMON USAGE 
Break bulk cargoes - loose, non-containerised cargoes. Break bulk cargo is usually 
regarded as a subdivision of general cargo, not amenable to packaging or unitisation. 
Longshoreman - any person, other than a hiring agent, employed for work at a 
waterfront terminal to move commodities, to record-keep, or to supervise waterfront 
labour. By tradition, `longshoremen' worked the oceanic, or deep-sea, ship, as opposed 
to the smaller and more regular inter-coastal and coastal ships. There was no precise 
counterpart of `longshore' labour in Britain in the strict sense of the term. From about 
1900, in New York, it became the norm to refer to all shipboard dockworkers as 
longshoremen. 
Stevedore - Liverpool: `stevedores' were loading dockers; `stevedoring firms' were 
contractors, as in New York. London: `stevedoring firms' were as in New York and 
Liverpool, contracted to load or discharge a vessel while in port. `Stevedores' were also a 
specialised group of dockworkers, members of NASDU, employed to load vessels, which 
was considered a more skilled job than discharging and consequently attracting a higher 
status and pay. New York: usually describing an employing contractor who supplied 
labour for loading or unloading boats, working on contracts made with vessel owners or 
operators. 
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APPENDIX B 
DOCK WORKERS' REGISTER STATISTICS 
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Sources: National Dock Labour Board Annual Report and Accounts. 1953-1969. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor Annual Reports. 1954-M. 
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1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 - 1959 1960 1961 1952 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1959 
Years 
YEAR LIVERPOOL LONDON NEW YORK 
1953 16500 28713 N/A 
1954 16376 28900 38934 
1955 18173 31045 35657 
1956 16716 31109 31084 
1957 16532 30273 34961 
1958 15695 29544 35841 
1959 15066 28779 32441 
1960 15529 28722 31543 
1961 15098 28749 29865 
1962 13544 26836 29178 
1963 13113 25583 30026 
1964 13283 24992 27282 
1965 14033 25484 27114 
1966 13551 24697 26127 
1967 12845 23884 25312 
1968 12186 22174 23862 
1969 11885 19570 23554 
1970 10797 16573 24271 
1971 10738 15986 22683 
1972 8728 12656 22046 
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APPENDIX C 
QUESTIONS ASKED OF SUBJECTS 
INTRODUCTION - what were the major problems you faced at work? Please give 
examples of those circumstances where dockworkers or port employers cut corners 
and bypassed the official machinery. 
THE HIRING STRUCTURE - how did it differ by section, by type of engagement, 
was there a preference or seniority system in operation? How was the hiring foreman 
chosen? Explain any efforts to work-share. Were there any `decasualisation' efforts? 
How many of the work gangs were employed on a regular basis? How did the 
structure of shipowning affect patterns of employment? What were the barriers to 
decasualisation of dock labour? 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING - were port employers always on the defensive? 
Were they fragmented in dealings with the major unions? Were there unwritten 
understandings? Were there local and port-wide agreements? What were the 
contractual arrangements for short-handed work gangs, overtime working and for 
night work? The formal arbitration process - was it fast and fair? Did it vary by time 
and place? What were the work disciplinary problems? Was the union involved in 
them? Were employers fearful of reporting stoppages? 
VESSEL ORGANISATION - discussions on the structure of the vessel-level 
hierarchy, the hiring process, nepotism in the selection of gangs and individuals, 
relationships between the ship workers. Did this lead to favouritism? 
RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES - issues related to complaints by employers about 
labour inflexibility, over-manning, absenteeism, overtime guarantees, rules on 
workloads, poor timekeeping. 
CUSTOM AND PRACTICE - could these be sanctioned by the dockworkers, what 
were they, did they vary by time and place, what was their function? 
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MALPRACTICES - questions about the deliberate slowing down of work to gain 
concessions, the slowness of the arbitration system as a contributory cause, what's 
meant by a `malpractice', were smaller employers more likely to indulge in 
malpractices? Violence on the docks, payments systems, the casual system as 
encouraging abuses, management attitudes to malpractices, the New York State Crime 
Commission hearings in 1952-3, the role of `go-slow' tactics, gambling and 
loansharking on the docks, the question of whether or not congestion contributed to 
malpractices. 
UNION ORGANISATION - questions related to the decentralisation of decision 
taking, the `communism' issue, autocracy of the top union elites, ethnic or religious 
affiliation of union branches, the closed shop or union shop, the structure of branch 
life, abuses in the selection of branch officials, balloting abuses. Were some branches 
more important than others? How were dock union branch officials elected? 
POLITICAL ACTIVITY - how did political associations help the port union? 
Government involvement in New York docks and in Britain 
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APPENDIX D 
NATIONAL DOCK LABOUR SCHEME 
Hiring control 
points 
Dealt with 
"surplus" labour. 
Gangs and 
individuals were 
hired twice daily 
inside these 
`hiring halls. ' 
Those not 
selected were 
allocated to 
employers, if 
possible, by 
control officers. 
Otherwise, 
surplus labour 
received the 
"fall-back" 
income 
guarantee 
Port authority 
Usually given wide 
latitude to interpret 
nationally mandated 
standards 
Local Dock Labour 
Board 
(Registered Dock Workers 
only)* 
Joint Committees 
established to determine 
port-wide standards and 
work disciplinary codes 
from within Dock 
Labour board 
regulations 
Employers 
Government 
Passed 
legislation 
Trade 
unions 
* Permanent employees of firms were 
subject to that firm's practices and 
procedures. Not always registered 
portworkers. `Regular' gangs could 
also be hired on a daily or weekly 
basis directly by employers or from 
`the stones' (call-on stands). This 
class of dock labourers were registered 
and thus subject to local dock labour 
board rules. 
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APPENDIX E 
LIVERPOOL AND LONDON 
TYPICAL SHIPSIDE AND DOCKSIDE ORGANISATION 
PRIVATE SECTOR, 
BREAK BULK CARGO' 
Shipowner 
Shipowner's 
Agent 
Contractor 
Stevedore 
SHIPBOARD 
Ship's 
Foreman 
Ship SHORESIDE 
Superintendent 
Quay boss 
Hatch Hatch Quay Quay 
Foremen Foremen Workers Workers 
Hatch II Hatch 
Gangs Gangs 
1 There were variations in the Port of London Authority sector and with smaller operations. 
The former had its own historic arrangements, while the hierarchy characteristic of smaller 
employers was flatter, with fewer administrative layers. Smaller contractors might, for 
example, hire labour directly rather than though a hiring foreman. Large jobs could have over 
one superintendent, e. g. a separate one for quayside labour. One superintendent might look 
after a pier comprised of several vessels. 
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NEW YORK 
NEW YORK SHIPBOARD LABOUR ORGANISATION 
LOADING AND DISCHARGING 
Stevedore contractor - the central employer of dock labour. Gave instructions to the 
vessel superintendent. Could be, in the old days, an ILA member. Some could come 
up from the ranks. Took instructions from the ship-owner. 
Ship superintendent - non-union, in charge of the entire job. Would instruct the ship 
foremen on what to do and how many work gangs to engage. Some came originally 
f, 
from rank and file gangs. There could be separate pier and `upland area' 
superintendents. Attached to up to three berths. In charge of both loading and 
discharging. After the establishment of the Waterfront Commission, they could not be 
ILA members. 
Ship foreman/ship boss/general foreman - in charge of a single ship labour process. 
Generally a former rank and filer. Kept his ILA membership. Allocated the hatch 
gangs, could hire the gangs, and could, with the ship superintendent, hire the other 
supervisors. Could have assistants on the larger jobs and so-called `pushers' 
underneath them charged with keeping the work gangs from slackening off work. 
Reported to the stevedore contractor. A regular employee. 
Dock bosses/walking bosses/head checkers - organised the terminal or pier labour. 
Hired the checkers. Sometimes several dock bosses to a pier. ILA members. Regular 
workers. Were rarely former rank and file members. Could be separate dock bosses 
for longshore and checker labour. Told the hatch bosses what to do. 
Timekeepers and clerks - usually kept on. Reported to a head clerk. Did the union 
check-offs. Clerks reported to the timekeeper. 
Hiring foreman/head stevedore/hiring boss. /hiring agent - did the daily hiring. In 
theory could be laid off; but in practice usually kept on. Instructed by the stevedore 
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contractor. Separate hiring bosses for different types of labour. Performed the lower 
level work disciplinary functions. After 1953 could not be ILA members. 
Hatch foremen/hatch bosses/gang bosses - virtually all were former rank and file. 
ILA members. Had to shape daily and could be laid off if no work, but as experienced 
men they were rarely unemployed. Not always necessary on a smaller job. 
Responsible for assuring that the cargoes discharged or loaded correctly and quickly. 
Hatch gang members - in the 1950s, the standard complement was of about twenty 
men in a hatch working gang, later reduced to seventeen. 
Sources: interviews in New York City; Kelly, J. W., Labor Problems of Longshoremen in the 
United States (Boston University Ph. D. 1941), pp. 59-60; New York State Crime 
Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 1 pp. 126-8,290-1,304-5,576-7, vol. 2 p. 851, 
vol. 3 pp. 1813-4, vol. 5 pp. 3749-50. 
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APPENDIX F 
ILA ADMINISTRATIVE HIERARCHY 
The basic administrative structure of the ILA ran as follows: the ILA Convention, 
meeting every four years, was the `supreme council' of the organisation. When the 
Convention was not in session, the union executive council took major decisions, 
composed of twenty-three vice-presidents representing the four ILA Districts, 
including the Atlantic District. The ILA President was the functional head at all 
Conventions and at meetings of the Executive Council had the authority to hire and 
fire organisers. All union Locals - up to sixty-seven in New York in the early 1950s - 
were affiliated with port-wide District Councils. Four District Councils, composed of 
union Local representatives, adopted their own constitutions to deal with matters 
affecting their own union Locals and memberships. Through the New York District 
set up, each Local's negotiations in the port were coordinated with those Locals in the 
same waterfront section. Work gang sizes, pensions and allied questions were the 
business of the New York District Council, acting in this capacity like joint 
committees in Liverpool and London. 
Sources: 
Hoffman, M. E., A Contemporary Analysis of a Labor Union. International Longshoremen's 
Association AFL-CIO-Canadian Labor Congress, Development-Structure-Functions (Temple 
University, 1966); New York State Crime Commission, Public Hearings (No. 5), vol. 5, pp. 
3628-30; International Longshoremen's Association, Statement of the International 
Longshoremen's Association, AFL, on the Report, dated January 22,1952, of Industrial 
Commissioner Corsi's Board of Inquiry (New York, 1952), pp. 7-8. 
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APPENDIX G 
LIVERPOOL ANI) LONDON PORTS 
. _ý 
ýýý! 
. ýý r ý'ý 
º' V IC TCý! IA C- 
tlvnc IOHK 
320 
NEW YORK HARBOUR 
VOM LOIOIMIMG ARIA CI[ Ysp NO ) 1ALf 
ý, 
S 
321 
ývn niýýumýny wnlw i11 MAP Mil w IMMA Ir PIlq, 9 
APPENDIX H 
INTERVIEWEES - BIOGRAPHIES 
LIVERPOOL 
LIVA 
A South End docker from 1960 and after 1967, allocated to a permanent employer until 
1989, when he left the industry. 
L1VB 
He was formerly a Chief Officer in Liverpool, working for the Cunard Line. He was 
transferred to Southampton in the early 1950s and a few years later became head of the 
stevedoring section of Cunard in New York port. He left Cunard in the late 1950s to part 
own a container service in New York port and was later a manager for the Grace Line in 
New York. 
LIVC 
This interviewee was a registered docker employed as a holdsman or ship hatch labourer 
in Liverpool from 1965-95, when he was sacked after a lockout. 
LIVD 
Worked on the Liverpool docks from 1960 as a porter, crane driver, checker, freight clerk, 
deck worker and stowage worker. He still works on the docks. 
LIVE 
Worked as a holdsman in Liverpool between 1933 and 1973, with a break between 1940- 
45 to serve in the army. Retired due to ill health in the early 1970s. 
LIVF 
An author of the British labour movement, joining the Trotskyist movement in 1938 and 
in 1944 joined the Revolutionary Communist Party and was later an editor. Now retired, 
living in Liverpool. 
LIVG 
Began work in Liverpool docks in 1966, as a clerk for a stevedoring firm. In 1972, 
transferred to the port authority in Merseyside, working mainly in the general cargo area 
until 1987. In 1995, he sacked during a docks dispute. From 1991-2000, functioned as 
the Secretary of TGWU docks branch 6/605 in Liverpool. 
LIVH 
Worked in the Liverpool docks from 1964-95, at first part of the `unofficial movement' in 
the port. He was elected a shop steward in 1967 when the system was instituted. Now 
retired. 
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LIVI 
Worked in the Liverpool and Birkenhead docks from 1960 in various capacities, as a 
timekeeper, a foreman, a supervisor and a superintendent. Today he is a berth manager. 
LIVJ 
Started as a quay porter in 1965 in Liverpool. 
LIVK 
He worked as a holdsman and checker in the Port of Liverpool from 1939 on the North 
End docks, retiring from the docks in 1972. From 1955, he was a NASDU member in 
Liverpool. 
LIVL 
Began on the Liverpool docks in 1956. From 1972, the porterage superintendent on the 
north side docks in charge of eighty-four staff working for the Mersey Docks and Harbour 
Board. In 1983 he resigned over a dispute with shop stewards as to `who was in charge. ' 
LIVM 
From 1996-99, Deputy Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union Members. 
LONDON 
LONA 
Worked in London, during the 1970s, as a tally-clerk, shipworker, superintendent and 
berth superintendent, finishing in the late 1970s as a terminal manager until it closed in 
about 1987. Presently works at Tilbury container base. 
LONB 
Started with the PLA in the 1930s, following his father. After the war, he became a 
Traffic Officer and later a Dock and Traffic Manager, ending up as the Chief Docks 
Manager. He retired in 1975. 
LONC 
Worked in the docks in London in 1951 to 1993. 
LOND 
From 1976, he worked in the shipping industry in various capacities in smaller British 
ports, as a stevedore and for a substantial period was involved in industrial relations 
issues. Now a port consultant 
LONE 
He worked in the London docks from 1965 through 1989. From 1965 to the 
amalgamation with the TGWU, he was in NASDU. This interviewee was a union activist 
and was sacked in 1989 during a national dock strike. 
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LONF 
Worked as a `ganger' and docker in London from about 1953 in the Surrey docks in 
London, later in the Royal Docks. Also acted as a shipworker and ship superintendent. 
LONG 
Came from a long docking family in London, starting work in 1948 as a registered 
docker. He subsequently served as a TGWU Branch officer and on various TGWU 
committees including the National Committee, finally becoming chairman of the Docks 
Group in London. 
LONH 
He entered the docks at Tilbury in 1965 as a registered OST clerk, then acted until the 
1980s as a clerical superintendent, now working in the post of Clerical Manager in the 
Tilbury container depot. 
LONI 
He began work for the Port of London Authority in 1958, first as an office worker, then a 
traffic manager. Later worked in central policy development and served as a member of 
the London Dock Labour Board and on various joint industrial committees. He worked 
as a manager in the Tilbury container depot and the PLA consultancy company. Since 
1990, has worked as an independent port consultant. 
LONJ 
From 1965, he was a NASDU member on the Royal docks, London, later working for 
Scruttons on the quayside and as a delegate and shop steward. Became a union delegate 
in 1972 until being sacked in 1989. In the early 1980s, he became a TGWU delegate, 
when NASDU amalgamated with it. 
LONK 
From 1946 to about 1960, branch secretary for one of the tally clerks' branches of the 
TGWU in the India and Millwall Dock, London. Retired in the mid-1970s. 
LONL 
A member of NASDU from 1955, and from about 1960 served as a union delegate. He 
was a member of NASDU's executive and in 1968 was elected union secretary. Shortly 
afterwards he became Blue union general secretary. After the amalgamation of the 
NASDU and TGWU, he became a TGWU officer and retired in 1991. 
LONM 
He entered the docks industry in 1948 in London and did `all the jobs' including a stint as 
member of Islington Trades Council, treasurer of the London Labour Party, while serving 
on many port committees. He is now retired. 
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LONN 
Entered the East India Docks, London, in 1960 working for Scruttons-Maltbys. He 
worked as a casual to 1966, but with the Devlin reforms became a regular worker and in 
1969 was made permanent. He was sacked in 1989 during an industrial dispute. 
LONO 
Was an economist for the Docks Board in Britain during the late 1950s, then operated as a 
ports consultant and worked for the National Docks Labour Board Scheme ports in a 
marketing capacity. 
LONP 
After 1945, employed by the Shipping Federation, involved with working conditions in 
the London enclosed docks. He was a senior manager in Scruttons, the largest 
stevedoring company in the Port of London. Now retired. 
LONQ 
Was a rank and file London docker from 1960 until he was sacked in 1989 during the 
national docks strike. 
LONR 
Involved with the watermen's and lightermen's union until its amalgamation with the 
TGWU. Later he became a TGWU Regional Secretary for London and the south-east. of 
England 
LONS 
He joined the PLA in 1936, after 1945 becoming a PLA Traffic Officer, director of 
industrial relations and Chief Docks Manager. Retired from the PLA in 1970 and later 
worked in Felixstowe and Bristol in senior managerial posts. He left the industry in 1984. 
LONT 
Started in the docks in London in 1951 as a casual hatch man. From 1951, LOHT was a 
docker, TGWU delegate and shop steward. Was one of the London dockworkers jailed 
in 1972 for refusing to cooperate with a judgement of a Industrial Relations Act court. 
Finished dock work in 1980. 
LONU 
Worked in the docks in London from 1950 in the enclosed docks. About seven years 
later, he became a delegate for NASDU, and in the 1950s served on the union executive. 
Through to 1967, he served as union president `on and off' in the (dockers' section). In 
1982, when the union amalgamated with the TGWU, he was elected to various TGWU 
committees until taking severance in 1984. 
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NEW YORK CITY 
NYA 
Still works as a ship agent, broker, vessel manager, operating and chartering ships 
NYB 
He began on the Brooklyn waterfront in 1952, starting in the hold of a ship, then as a 
crane man. He left the Brooklyn docks, as a Local 1814 member, in 1967. 
NYC 
Began working on the Brooklyn Docks in 1952 as a ILA Local 1814 member and retired, 
with the GAI, in about 1990. During this time, he was a hold worker, a checker and a 
dockworker. 
NYD 
He started on the docks in 1954, in Local 1814, Brooklyn as a holdsman. Worked in 
Staten Island with ILA Local 920 from 1983-98, as its secretary-treasurer. 
NYE 
Worked in the merchant marine from 1963-4, running in and out of Bayonne, NJ, 
supplying military bases. He finished in 1969-70 working on cargo-carrying ships. Now 
in charge of the South Sea Seaport Museum library 
NYF 
Writer on American maritime union affairs and on the history of the National Maritime 
Union. Has also had two articles published related to Irish New York longshore workers. 
NYG 
He is a marine journalist who later worked for a tugboat company. The co-author of a 
book on New York port 
NYH 
Started in 1968 as a seaman and shipyard worker. From about 1970 to 1984, worked on 
the New York docks, mostly as a casual worker, in Brooklyn with ILA Boilermakers' 
Local 67. 
NYI 
Worked for Moore-McCormack from 1945 to 1983, ultimately making the rank of vice- 
president and working across the port. He is now retired, helping run the library of the 
Maritime College at Throggs Neck, New York 
NYJ 
About 1945 started on the docks, working on the South Brooklyn piers in the Bay area. 
From at least 1958, drove a hi-lo truck. Left the docks industry in 1972 on medical 
grounds. 
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NYK 
Began working in 1945-6 on the west side piers of Manhattan as a checker and then 
worked in Brooklyn in the Local 1814 section. Became a Chief Clerk, working with a 
night gang on the docks for almost ten years. His father was a President of the ILA. 
Today, he represents the ILA as General Counsel. 
NYL 
From 1974, worked for a stevedoring company on the Brooklyn waterfront and left the 
firm in 1993 to join the Port Authority. He is now head of labour relations in the 
organisation. 
NYM 
His father was a founder in Italy of the Italian Socialist Party and in New York was a 
longshoreman and a leader of the 1907 strike. The interviewee became a lawyer and was 
involved in the post-1945 rank and file strikes in Brooklyn. Severed his links with the 
docks in about 1952. 
NYN 
Began his docks career in 1943, working on ships. Worked for the Grace Lines, New 
York, in 1956-7, on loading and supervising ships, operating a terminal and negotiating 
with the union. Later worked for the New York Port Authority. 
NYO 
A former U. S. seaman, he has knowledge of some New York longshore work. 
NYP 
Worked in the treasurer's department of the NYSA-ILA funds for eleven years until fired. 
Was a shop steward in ILA Local 1809. 
NYQ 
Started on the New York docks in 1959 as a Local 920 (Staten Island) hold man, then as a 
crane driver. He is now a Local 920 shop steward. 
NYR 
Presently the New York City Central Labor Council AFL-CIO Director of Public Policy 
and Worker Education, a post has held since 1996. Has experience of the New York 
labour movement for over thirty years. 
NYS 
Began on the New York waterfront in 1941 in Brooklyn in a hatch gang, then as a checker 
and later a dock boss. Still works on the docks, on Staten Island 
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NYT 
Began about 1951 in the New York docks with Local 1814. Retired on medical grounds 
in about 1977. Began in a hatch as a casual worker, got into a hatch gang, then he became 
part of a regular gang. 
NYU 
A renowned writer famous for his screenplay of the motion picture film `On the 
Waterfront. ' Has a continued interest in the NY waterfront. 
NYV 
Began in 1946 with Local 306 in Hoboken, New Jersey. When it was abolished, he 
moved to Local 1198. Began in a hatch gang, then worked as a driver, hatch foreman, 
shop steward, etc. Retired in 1996 and died in the autumn of 2000. 
NYW 
His law firm was general council for the ILA until Tommy Gleason took it over. His 
father was General Counsel for the ILA in the 1950s. 
NYX 
Started work in 1949 in Brooklyn with Local 968, the `Negro' local, later moving to 
Local 1814. Now works on Staten Island with Local 920. 
NYY 
Worked in New York docks from 1954 in most sections of the port. Now works in New 
Jersey, living there during the week. Was, and is, a checker but if there was no checker's 
work going, he would shape up. 
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CIO - Congress of Industrial Organizations 
DWRGLU - Dock, Wharf, River and General Labourers' Union 
IBL - International Brotherhood of Longshoremen 
ILA - International Longshoremen's Association 
ILWU - International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union 
LEDEA - London Enclosed Docks Employers' Association 
LPEA - London Port Employers' Association 
LUPA - Longshoremen's Union Protective Association 
LWA - London Wharfingers Association 
MDHB - Mersey Docks and Harbour Board 
NAC - National Adjustment Commission 
NAPE - National Association of Port Employers 
NASD - National Amalgamated Stevedores' and Dockworkers' Union 
NDLB - National Dock Labour Board 
NJCDL - National Joint Council for Dock Labour 
NTWF - National Transport Workers' Federation 
NUDL - National Union of Dock Labourers 
NYSA - New York Shipping Association 
NYT - New York Times 
PEA - Port Employers' Association (London) 
PEA - Employers' Association of the Port of Liverpool 
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